370. c

THE HISTORY OF THE *PELOPONNESIAN* WAR,

Tranſlated from the *GREEK* of

THUCYDIDES.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOLUME THE FIRST.

By *WILLIAM SMITH*, A. M.
Rector of the Pariſh of the *Holy Trinity* in *Cheſter*, and Chaplain to the Right Honourable the Earl of *Derby*.

Κτῆμα ἐς ἀεὶ.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

THE HISTORY OF PERFORMANCE

TO

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE

PRINCE OF *WALES*.

SIR,

THE Hiſtory of Thucydides hath been ſtudiouſly read and admired by the greateſt Princes, and may therefore preſume to lay ſome claim to the Protection of Your ROYAL HIGHNESS. Great Britain, of

all the States now exiſting in the world, moſt nearly reſembleth what Athens was at the time when the War, which is the Subject of it, broke out in Greece. A love of Liberty, which hath erroneouſly been ſuppoſed to thrive and flouriſh beſt in a democratical Government, was then warm and active in every Athenian. Athens, it is true, had thus been raiſed to a great height of maritime power, and was become a very formidable State: But Faction diſjointed a noble Plan, and at length brought on the loſs of her Sovereignty at Sea. The Athenians ſoon ceaſed to be great, when they deviated from thoſe ſalutary maxims, which their worthieſt Patriots and moſt conſummate Stateſmen had recommended to their conſtant obſervance.

The

DEDICATION.

The Maritime power of Great-Britain is more ſubſtantially founded, and hath ever been more ſteddily ſupported than was that of Athens. The moſt complete and moſt laſting Form of Government, that man can invent, happily ſubſiſts in this Realm under Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER. The Britiſh Conſtitution hath long been, and may it long continue to be the envy of other Nations! For the future ſupport of it, the public hopes and expectations are fixed upon Your ROYAL HIGHNESS. Long may HIS MAJESTY Your ROYAL GRANDFATHER live to ſecure the freedom and happineſs of his People, that Your ROYAL HIGHNESS may become equal, in every reſpect, to the ſame great and glorious Charge!

DEDICATION.

I have a heart duly ſenſible of the great honour conferr'd upon me, by being thus permitted to profeſs myſelf,

Your ROYAL HIGHNES's

moſt devoted and

moſt humble Servant,

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PRE-

PREFACE.

IT was not from a private choice, but from deference to what was judged a public call, that the following tranſlation of Thucydides was firſt undertaken. To explain the motive more largely, might perhaps incur the imputation of impertinence or vanity. The performance, upon the whole, muſt juſtify the undertaking. In what manner it is done, and not why it was done, will be the point of public arbitration.

It will be alſo needleſs to tell the Engliſh Reader, how many verſions have been made of Thucydides into Latin. Their deſign was to bring the author more under the obſervation of what is generally ſtiled the *learned* world; as the tranſlations of Him into modern languages have aimed at introducing him into general acquaintance, as an hiſtorian capable of innocently amuſing moſt ranks of men, but of uſefully inſtructing the perſons, who from duty and from paſſion would guard the rights or ſecure the welfare of public communities. The grand buſineſs of Hiſtory is to make men wiſer in themſelves and better members of ſociety. For this purpoſe it recals paſt ages to their view; and thus opens a more extenſive ſcope to reflexion than any perſonal experience

can offer. To be well verſed in a ſimilarity of caſes prepares men better for counſel or action on preſent contingencies. The ſtateſman, the patriot, the friend to liberty and reaſon will be better enabled to plan and to regulate his *own* meaſures, when he can ſee the tendency and conſequence of ſuch as were followed on parallel occaſions, and adjuſt the degrees, in which they were either prejudicial or ſerviceable to public good.

All men have neither the turn of mind, nor the leiſure, to make themſelves proficients in the dead and learned languages. Such as have are certainly honeſtly, perhaps beneficently, employed, in holding out light to others. The Greek hiſtorians, as they take a precedency in time, lay further a ſtrong claim to precedency in merit. Thucydides is the moſt inſtructive of theſe; and, ſince the reſtoration of letters in the weſtern world, each nation, that hath piqued itſelf at all about humanity or politeneſs, as his manner was ſoon found to be excellent, have given thanks to thoſe who have endeavoured to inveſtigate his matter and lay it open to public view.

It is to the honour of the *French*, that they took the lead. The firſt tranſlation of Thucydides into *French*, publiſhed at *Paris* in 1527, was that of *Claude de Seyſſel* biſhop of *Marſeilles*. However performed, it went, within the ſpace of little more than thirty years, through four impreſſions. It is ſaid to have been done at the command of Francis I. king of France; and, to have been

been carried about with him in his wars, and diligently ſtudied by the Emperor Charles V. The *Germans* had alſo a tranſlation of him ſoon afterwards in the year 1533. In 1545 *Francis di Soldo Strozzi* publiſhed an *Italian* tranſlation dedicated to *Coſmo di Medicis*. The firſt *Engliſh* tranſlation made its appearance in *London* in 1550; but, in fact, was only the tranſlation of a tranſlation, ſince it was intitled a verſion from the French of *Claude de Seyſſel*. In 1564 he was publiſhed in *Spaniſh*. A ſecond *French* tranſlation by *Louis Jonſaud d'Uſez* was publiſhed at *Geneva* in 1600. The ſecond into *Engliſh*, by the famous Mr. *Hobbes* of *Malmsbury*, was firſt publiſhed in the year 1628, about which it will be neceſſary immediately to inlarge. A third *French* tranſlation, by the Sieur *d'Ablancourt*, was publiſhed at *Paris* in 1662, and hath ſince gone through four editions. There is alſo a *Daniſh* tranſlation, which cloſeth the liſt given of them in the *Bibliotheca Græca* of *Fabricius*.

Mr. *Hobbes* declares in his preface, that "the virtues "of this author ſo took his affection, that they begot "in him a deſire to communicate him further." He conſidered alſo, that "he was exceedingly eſteemed of "the Italians and French in their own tongues, notwith-"ſtanding that he be not very much beholding for it to "his interpreters." He ſays afterwards, that, by the firſt tranſlation of *Nicholls* from the French of *Seyſſel*, "he "became at length traduced rather than tranſlated into

" our language;" alluding perhaps to the Italian ſarcaſm on tranſlators, *Traduttore traditore.* He then reſolved himſelf " to take him immediately from the *Greek* ---- " knowing, that when with diligence and leiſure I ſhould " have done it, though ſome errors might remain, yet " they would be errors but of one deſcent; of which " nevertheleſs (ſays he) I can diſcover none, and hope " they be not many."

Mr. *Hobbes*, however ſorry and miſchievous a philoſopher, was undoubtedly a very learned man. He hath ſhewn it beyond diſpute in his tranſlation of Thucydides. He is an excellent help, for any one who conſults him, to find out the meaning and adjuſt the ſenſe. But, tho' his tranſlation hath now paſſed through three editions, and hath profitably been read by many, yet (I ſpeak not from my own private judgment) he cannot now be read with any competent degree of pleaſure. He is faithful, but moſt ſervilely ſo, to the letter of his author. Even in the *orations*, he merely acts the interpreter, and hath quite forgot the orator. He tranſlates literally throughout, and numbers rather than weighs the words of Thucydides. By this means the conſtruction is very often intricate and confuſed, the thoughts pregnant with ſenſe are not ſufficiently opened, nor the glowing ideas of the author or his orators transfuſed with proper degrees of warmth and light. Too ſcrupulous an attachment to the letter of the original hath made the copy quite flat and heavy, the ſpirit is evaporated, the lofty and majeſtic air

hath intirely diſappeared. Too many low and vulgar expreſſions are uſed, which Thucydides ever ſtudiouſly avoided. Such frequently occur in the midſt of ſome grand circumſtance, which they throw into a kind of burleſque, and may excite a reader's laughter. The Engliſh language hath gone through a great variation, hath been highly poliſhed, ſince Mr. *Hobbes* wrote. Hence, tho' his terms be in general very intelligible, yet they have not that neatneſs, preciſion, and dignity, to which the polite and refined writers within the laſt century have habituated our ears. And, after all, I am inclined to think, that Mr. *Hobbes* either executed in great haſte, or performed his reviſals in a very curſory and negligent manner. I am inclined to think ſo from the very many paſſages, neceſſary and emphatical periods, nay ſometimes in the very ſpeeches, which to my great ſurpriſe I have found omitted in his tranſlation. A particle, an epithet, or even a comma, may with the greateſt attention ſometimes be dropped in a long work. But the omiſſions in Mr. *Hobbes* are too numerous and important, to be excuſed in any tolerable conſiſtence with repeated care and circumſpection.

Monſieur *Bayle* hath aſcribed the tranſlation of Thucydides by Mr. *Hobbes* to a motive of which he hath not left the leaſt hint himſelf in his preface; — "in order to "ſhew the Engliſh, in the hiſtory of the Athenians, "the diſorders and confuſions of a democratical govern-"ment. Mr. *Hobbes* could not poſſibly, ſo long before

they

they happened, foreſee the ſtrange revolutions, that were ſoon to take place in the government of his country. The very actors in them could not poſſibly diſcern the conſequences of their own embroilments. Some violent incroachments had indeed been made on the liberty and property of Engliſhmen, and a ſpirit of diſcontent began to ſpread throughout the nation. But it cannot be ſuppoſed, that the plan of a commonwealth was formed at that time, or for ſeveral years after. The hiſtory of Thucydides abundantly ſhews, how dangerous and deſtructive is faction in a State; that ſevere or wanton power may make men deſperate; and that liberty abuſed may make them inſolent and mutinous. It detects and expoſeth venal orators and falſe patriots; but it exhibits men, who are ſtudious and eloquent in behalf of public welfare, and active in ſupport of liberty and honeſt power, in full beauty and proportion. And his leſſons lie not ſo oppoſite and ready for the application of any State now exiſting in the world, as for that of Great-Britain.

The Reader may by this time have caught a glimpſe of ſeveral reaſons, for which the preſent tranſlation of Thucydides was finiſhed and is now made public. No care hath been omitted to make it as correct as poſſible. It hath been attentively reviewed; the *narrative* part, more than once; the *oratorial* part, with repeated endeavors to reach the ſpirit and energy of the original. In the former, the Author hath been followed ſtep by

ſtep:

ſtep: Bold deviations here might imperceptibly have miſrepreſented or diſtorted the facts, and quite baniſhed the peculiar ſtile and manner of the author. In the latter, it hath been often judged neceſſary to dilate the expreſſion in order fully to include the primary idea; tho', where it ſeemed poſſible, the ſtudied conciſeneſs of the author hath been imitated, provided the thought could be clearly expreſſed, and the ſententious maxim adequately conveyed. The turns and figures of expreſſion have been every where diligently noted, and an endeavour conſtantly made at imitation. This was judged a point of duty; or a point at leaſt, where tho' ſomething may be permitted to a tranſlator's diſcretion or to the genius of a modern language, yet he muſt not indulge himſelf in too wide a ſcope, leſt, when what ought to be a copy is exhibited, the prime diſtinctions of the original be loſt, and little or no reſemblance be left behind.

It is very juſt and true what Mr. *Hobbes* hath obſerved, that "this author ſo carrieth with him his own light "throughout, that the Reader may continually ſee his "way before him, and by that which goeth before ex-"pect what is to follow." And he, who applies to any commentator but Thucydides himſelf for an explanation of his own meaning, muſt exceedingly often get quite wide of the ſenſe. The writers of *Scholia* and the *notes* of verbal critics put us frequently on a wrong ſcent, and more frequently leave us utterly in the dark. But, if we will

will be patient at a dead lift, ſomething will ſoon occur in the author himſelf to help us out, the obſcurity will vaniſh, and light beam in upon us. Tho' ſometimes we may be forced to divine his meaning, ſince in many caſes it is vain to apply to the aids of Grammar to develope the conſtruction, yet the context at length will ſhew whether we have ſucceeded, or help us to aſcertain the ſenſe. This however demands repeated and attentive reviſals. The preſent tranſlator hath not been frugal of his time or labour in theſe points. And whether he hath generally ſucceeded in aſcertaining the thought and properly expreſſing it in another language, muſt be left to the deciſion, not of men of no learning nor of mere learning, but to that claſs of judges, who are well acquainted with the ſtate of Athens at the time of the hiſtory, and are really *Attic* both in taſte and judgment. This claſs, it may be thought, will be but ſmall: It is larger however, and higher ſeated in this our community, than the generality have either opportunity enough to diſcover or good-nature enough to own.

The complaints ſo often made by the moſt able tranſlators are indeed alarming. Their performances (they ſay) may very much diſgrace, but can never commend them. The praiſe of all that is clear, and bright, and pleaſing, and inſtructive, is reflected back upon the original author; but every appearance of a different nature is laid with ſeverity of cenſure at the door of the tranſlator. If it be ſo, we know the terms beforehand on which,

either

either able or unable, we engage, and muſt patiently acquieſce in the iſſue. But candor is always expected, nay ever will be had from perſons of good ſenſe and ſound judgment. Few but ſuch may be pleaſed with Thucydides either in his old native Greek, or in a modern Engliſh garb; and, if ſuch confer the honour of their applauſe, the clamour of ſome will not terrify, nor the ſilence of others mortify at all. The bookſeller, it is true, forms his own judgment, and then dictates to the judgment of others from the ſale. And it muſt be owned, that every original writer as well as every copyiſt is heartily glad to receive that mark of public approbation.

The preſent tranſlation of Thucydides is accompanied with *maps* of ancient Greece and Sicily, with a few *notes*, and three preliminary *Diſcourſes*. Concerning each of theſe ſomething muſt be added.

The *maps* are borrowed from the laſt edition of the original in *Holland* in the year 1731. That of ancient *Greece* was drawn by Dr. *Hudſon*, partly from the hiſtory itſelf, and partly from a chart that was lent him by Dr. *Halley*: That of Sicily is taken from *Cluver*; but a multiplicity of names are omitted, which have no connexion with the ſubject. The geography of places is exactly fitted to ſuit the hiſtory. It will help to trace the motions of the fleets and armies, and will preſerve the view of all military occurrences very clear and diſtinct.

PREFACE.

The *notes* are only deſigned for the Engliſh Reader, to give him light into that *antiquity*, with which he may be little acquainted. And therefore the firſt time, that any thing relating to the conſtitution or forms of the Athenian republic, or peculiar to their fleets and land-armies occurs, I have endeavoured in a *note* to give him a competent perception of it. I have done the ſame, in regard to the characters of the chief perſonages in the hiſtory, which ſeemed to need a farther opening than what Thucydides hath given them. The perſons were well known when he wrote: But a modern reader may not be diſpleaſed to be regularly introduced, and early to be made acquainted with the characters of the principal agents in theſe buſy and important ſcenes. In *notes* of verbal criticiſm or mere learning I have been very ſparing, judging they would never be read with patience.

Of the preliminary *Diſcourſes*, the two *firſt* were due, by the rules of decorum obſerved by editors and tranſlators, to the author. In the *laſt*, I have thrown into one continued diſcourſe what might have been broke into pieces, and interſperſed occaſionally by way of *notes*. The method obſerved appeared moſt eligible, as it will give the Reader a clear proſpect of the whole hiſtory; preparing him for or inciting him to a cloſe and attentive peruſal of it; or, enabling him, after he hath peruſed it, to recollect the moſt inſtructive paſſages and moſt material occurrences. By this means alſo, a more lively and ſuccinct acount could be given of the ſpeakers and the ſpeeches, than

than could have been done by way of ſet and formal arguments.

I think the Engliſh Reader can want nothing more, to enable him to read Thucydides with pleaſure and profit; eſpecially, if he be at all acquainted with the Grecian hiſtory, of which few that ever read can now be ignorant, ſince Mr. *Stanyan*'s *Hiſtory* of Greece and the *Univerſal Hiſtory* are in ſo many hands. I diſmiſs the work with ſome hope, but more terror, about its ſucceſs. That hope is encouraged and ſupported by the liſt of my *Subſcribers*. There are NAMES that do me honour indeed; and which, whether the work may ſuit the generality or not, will preſerve me from ever repenting, that I have beſtowed ſo much time on tranſlating *THUCYDIDES*.

THREE

THREE PRELIMINARY

DISCOURSES.

I. On the LIFE of *THUCYDIDES.*

II. On his Qualifications as an HISTORIAN.

III. A Survey of his HISTORY.

DISCOURSES

DISCOURSE I.

On the LIFE of

THUCYDIDES.

IT is a natural piece of curioſity, either when we have read a book we like, or hear one commended, to enquire after the author. We acquieſce not in his bare name; we immediately ſeek farther informations. The ſtranger ſhews an inclination to form ſome acquaintance with him; the reader to improve what he already hath. We at length grow inquiſitive about all that concerns him, and are eager to be let into the particulars.

Some claim of this kind will no doubt be made in regard to Thucydides. He, who endeavours to introduce him to general notice, ought at leaſt to have ſomething to ſay about him, and ſomething rather tending perhaps to give favourable impreſſions. All his editors and tranſlators have reckoned this a point of duty incumbent upon them: But, it hath been generally performed in a very imperfect and ſlovenly manner. His *life* wrote by Marcellinus, a crude incoherent morſel, hath been prefixed to all the Greek editions. *That* by Suidas is an unſatisfactory mere dictionary-account. A *third* in Greek by an *anonymous* author is alſo but a very ſlight and ſhapeleſs ſketch, and ſeems the work of a grammarian, who hath read indeed but very ſuperficially read his hiſtory. Some incidental eſcapes

from

from his own pen are the marks, which ſhould be always kept in view by him, who would give any tolerable account of Thucydides. Writers of a better age and claſs will contribute now and then a little aſſiſtance. And the laborious care of a late * author, in adjuſting the chronology and clearing away rubbiſh, will enable one now to give at leaſt a coherent, tho' by no means an accurate, account of Him.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, by borough an Halymuſian, was born in the year before Chriſt, four hundred ſeventy one; twenty-five years after Hellanicus, thirteen after Herodotus, according to Aulus Gellius; and about three years before Socrates, as the birth of the latter is ſettled by Laërtius. He was deſcended of a very ſplendid and noble family, tho' perhaps not ſo honourable as many others, ſince it was not purely Attic. Its ſplendor can no longer be doubted, when it is known to be the family of Miltiades. Miltiades the *elder*, born a citizen of Athens, had reigned over the Dolonci, a people in Thrace; and left vaſt poſſeſſions in that country to his deſcendents: And Miltiades the *younger* had married Hegeſipyle the daughter of Olorus a Thracian king †. Yet foreign blood, tho' royal, was always thought to debaſe the Athenian. The firm republicans of Athens had an hereditary averſion to every circumſtance of royalty; and the polite inhabitants of it abhorred all connexion with *Barbarians*, the ſcornful *title* they gave to all the reſt of the world, except their countrymen of Greece. Iphicrates, a famous Athenian in later times, was the ſon of an Athenian ſhoemaker and a Thracian princeſs. Yet, being aſked to which of his parents he thought himſelf moſt obliged? he replied haughtily — "To my mother. She did "all ſhe could to make me an Athenian; my father would have "made me a Barbarian." The younger Miltiades, whom wars had

* Vitæ Thucydidis Synopſis chronologica, ab Henrico Dodwell.

† *Herodotus* in *Erato*.

obliged

obliged to quit his hold in Thrace, commanded the troops of Athens in the famous field of Marathon. He died afterwards in a jail, unable to pay a large fine ſet upon him by the *people* of Athens. His ſon Cimon contrived afterwards to pay it. The family for a time had been in poverty and diſtreſs, but emerged again in Cimon. Cimon the ſame day gained a victory both by land and ſea over the Perſians at Mycale. By his conduct he very much enlarged the power of Athens, and put it in a train of much greater advancements. In civil affairs he claſhed with Pericles, who was leader of the *popular* party: Cimon always ſided with the *noble* or the *few*; as were the party-diſtinctions in vogue at Athens.

The proofs that Thucydides was of this family are ſtrong and convincing. Plutarch directly aſſerts it in the *life* of *Cimon*. His father, in grateful at leaſt if not honourable remembrance of the Thracian king, whoſe daughter Miltiades had married, bore the name of Olorus. His mother alſo was another Hegeſipyle. He inherited rich poſſeſſions in Thrace; particularly, ſome mines of gold. A monument of him was to be ſeen for many ages after, in the Cœle at Athens, amongſt the Cimonian, or thoſe belonging to the family of Cimon; and ſtood next, according to Plutarch, to that of Elpinice, Cimon's own ſiſter. His father's name in the inſcription on this monument, at leaſt ſome latter grammarians have averred it, was *Orolus*. Thucydides himſelf, in the fourth book of his hiſtory, calls it *Olorus*. Can we want ſtronger authority? Whether any ſtreſs ought to be laid on the variation, or whence the miſtake, tho' a very minute one, might proceed, are points too obſcure and trifling to take up any attention.

Such was the family of which Thucydides was deſcended. His pedigree might be fetched from the Gods; ſince that of Miltiades is traced down from Æacus. But, like my author, I ſhould chooſe to keep as clear of the *fabulous* as poſſible. Cicero ſays of him, "Tho' "he had never written an hiſtory, his name would ſtill have been

" extant, he was ſo honourable and noble *." I quote this, merely as a teſtimony to the ſplendor of his birth, ſince it may be queſtioned whether the *hiſtorian*, in the preſent inſtance, hath not intirely preſerved his memory, and been ſolely inſtrumental in enobling and perpetuating the *man*.

His education no doubt was ſuch, as might be expected from the ſplendor of his birth, the opulence of his family, and the good taſte then prevailing in Athens, the politeſt city that then exiſted, or ever yet exiſted in the world. It is impoſſible however to give any detail of it. The very little to be found about it in writers of any claſs whatever, ſeems merely of a preſumptive tho' probable kind. It is ſaid Anaxagoras was his preceptor in philoſophy, becauſe the name of Anaxagoras was great at this period of time. Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides, of Pericles, and of Socrates, is named alſo by Marcellinus for the preceptor of Thucydides. And he adds, quoting Antyllus for an evidence, that " it was whiſpered about that Thu-" cydides was atheiſtical, becauſe he was ſo fond of the theory of " Anaxagoras, who was generally reputed and ſtiled an atheiſt." The ſolution of an eclipſe from natural cauſes, accounting for appearances from the laws of motion, and inveſtigating the courſe of nature, were ſufficient proofs of atheiſm amongſt a people ſo ſuperſtitious as the Athenians. Thucydides, poſſibly, might be well acquainted with the philoſophy of Anaxagoras, without having perſonally attended his lectures. However that be, his own hiſtory abundantly ſhews that he was no *atheiſt*; it may be added, and no *polytheiſt*. By his manner of ſpeaking of the oracles and predictions toſſed about in his own time, it is plain he looked upon them as equivocal, or rather inſinuates them to be mere forgeries. " And yet, ſays Mr. *Hobbes* †, " he confirms an aſſertion of his own, touching the time this war " laſted, by the oracle's prediction." The paſſage occurs in the fifth

* *In the* Orator. † Of the Life and Hiſtory of *Thucydides*.

book of this hiſtory. But whoever conſiders it, will find it only an *argumentum ad hominem*, to ſtop the mouths of ſuch as believed in oracles, from conteſting his own computation of the whole time the Peloponneſian war laſted. I can only ſay, that he was undoubtedly a ſerious man, and of a large fund of ſolid ſenſe, which deriving originally from the bounty of nature, he had moſt certainly improved by a regular and ſound education.

For a reaſon of much leſs weight, Antipho is aſſigned for his maſter in rhetoric — becauſe he ſpeaks handſomly of him in the eighth book. He there indeed pays due acknowledgment to the merit of Antipho as a ſpeaker; but it cannot be inferred from hence, that he had ever any connexion with him. Others have made Antipho a ſcholar of Thucydides, * with full as little reaſon. Thucydides certainly was never a teacher by profeſſion. It is pity to waſte ſo much time on uncertainties. It is certain Thucydides had a liberal education, tho' the particular progreſs of it cannot now be traced.

But, to ſhew the peculiar bent of his genius, and a remarkable prognoſtic what ſort of perſon he would prove, the following ſtory is recorded by ſeveral authors, and dated by Mr. Dodwell in the fifteenth year of his age. — His father carried him to the Olympic games. He there heard Herodotus read his hiſtory to the great croud of Grecians aſſembled at that ſolemnity. He heard him with fixed attention; and, at length, burſt out into tears. "Tears childiſh indeed!" it hath been remarked: But however ſuch as few children would have ſhed, and highly expreſſive of his inward ſpirit. The active aſpiring mind of Themiſtocles was not ſtronger ſhewn, when the trophy of Miltiades would not let him be at reſt; nor the genius of the lad at Weſtminſter-ſchool, when he could not ſleep for the colours in Weſtminſter-hall. Herodotus is ſaid to have obſerved it, and to have

* Plutarch's *Lives* of the ten *Orators*.

complimented Olorus on his having a ſon, that had ſo violent a bent to letters. A ſimilar paſſage in any perſon's life would always be called to mind, when he was the ſubject of converſation.

In about two years more, Thucydides was obliged by the laws to take his exerciſe in the ſtudy of arms, and to begin to ſhare in the defence of his country. Every citizen of Athens was alſo a ſoldier. They ſerved at firſt within the walls, or on great emergencies marched, tho' to no great diſtance from home. As years and ſkill advanced, they were called upon to join in more diſtant and foreign expeditions. We are quite in the dark about the particular ſervices, in which he might thus be employed. We are ſure at leaſt he much improved in the theory of arms. He qualified himſelf for the great truſt of heading the forces of the *State*; and, in the ſequel, we ſhall ſee him inveſted with a command.

The *anonymous* author of his *life* relates, that Thucydides was one of the number, whom the Athenians ſent to found a colony at Thuria in Italy. Lampo and Xenocritus were the leaders of this colony, and Herodotus is ſaid to have been aſſociated in it. If Thucydides went the voyage; (and the ſtrange inconſiſtencies of him who relates it render his whole account ſuſpicious,) he muſt have been about twenty-ſeven years of age. One thing is pretty certain; his ſtay at Thuria could have been of no very long continuance. This is not to be inferred from the *oſtraciſm*, which the ſame writer ſays he ſoon after ſuffered; a miſtake incurred, it is highly probable, by confounding him with Thucydides the ſon of Mileſias, who was of the ſame family, and being a leader in the oligarchical-party at Athens, had the *oſtraciſm* thrown upon him by the intereſt and popularity of Pericles. But, the quarrel between the Corcyræans and Corinthians about Epidamnus broke out ſoon after this. The enemies of Athens were now ſcheming the demolition of its growing power. Thucydides writes all the preparatory tranſactions, marks all the defenſive meaſures of the Athenians, as a perſon who was privy to every one

of

of them. And there ſhould be very ſtrong and very poſitive proofs of the contrary, before any reader of his hiſtory doubts of his having been all the time at Athens.

His own *introduction*, of itſelf, in a great meaſure eſtabliſheth the fact. He perceived the ſtorm was gathering; he knew the jealouſies of the *States* which compoſed the Lacedæmonian league; he alſo knew the real ſtrength of Athens, and heard all the preventive meaſures recommended by Pericles to put his countrymen in a proper poſture of defence. He himſelf ſeems to have been alert for the contention, and ready both with lance and pen, not only to bear his ſhare in the events, but alſo to perpetuate the memory of them. His own words (ἔλπισας and τεκμαιρομένος) ſeem to denote the great earneſtneſs and attention of his mind to the wide field of matter, which was now going to be opened. He longed to become an hiſtorian; he ſaw a fine ſubject for hiſtory faſt approaching; he immediately ſet about noting all occurrences, began at once to collect materials; and was reſolved to write the Hiſtory of *The Peloponneſian War* before it was actually on foot.

Can we doubt then of his reſidence during this portion of time at Athens? He was arrived, at the breaking out of this war, to the full vigor and ripeneſs of his years and underſtanding, according to his chronologiſt (Mr. Dodwell) was juſt forty years old. We learn from himſelf *, that he knew perſonally the whole ſeries of things; he was ever preſent at the tranſactions of one or other of the contending parties; more, after his exile at thoſe of the Peloponneſians; and conſequently, before his exile, at thoſe of the Athenians. He ſpeaks of Pericles, as one who was an eye-witneſs of his conduct; as one who heard him harangue in the aſſembly of the people, convincing that a war there would neceſſarily be, and for that reaſon they ought not to weaken themſelves by ill-judged conceſſions, but gal-

* Book the fifth.

lantly

lantly to exert that naval power, which had made Athens envied and dreaded, and which alone, as it had made, could keep her great. He muſt regularly have taken his poſt upon the walls, and ſeen the Peloponneſians, in the firſt year of the war, lay all the adjacent country waſte. He muſt have marched under Pericles to retaliate on the territories of Megara, ſince the whole force of the *State* was obliged to take the field on this occaſion. He muſt have aſſiſted at the public funeral ſolemnized in the winter for the firſt victims of this war, and heard Pericles ſpeak in honour of the dead and the living, and make his countrymen enamoured of their own laws and conſtitution. The *plague* broke out immediately after this; we are abſolutely certain he was then in Athens. He himſelf aſſures us of it. He was an eye-witneſs to all that horrid ſcene. He had the plague himſelf; and hath given a circumſtantial detail of it.

The war proceeds with vigor, and through a great variety of events. Thucydides muſt have born his ſhare in the ſervice; the particulars he hath not recorded. No man was ever leſs guilty of *egotiſm*; he never mentions himſelf but when it is abſolutely neceſſary. His next ſix years were certainly employed in fighting and in writing; the latter was his paſſion, and the former his duty. In the forty-ſeventh year of his age, he was joined in the command of an Athenian ſquadron and land-force on the coaſts of Thrace. He might be aſſigned to this particular ſtation, on account of his poſſeſſions and intereſt in this part of the world. It was judged at Athens, that he was beſt qualified to ſerve his country in this department. The Lacedæmonian commander in Thrace dreaded his oppoſition. Let us wait a little for the event: It is the moſt important paſſage in the *Life* of THUCYDIDES.

It was intirely on the authority of Plutarch, that Thucydides was aſſerted above to be a deſcendent from Miltiades, and in the *mode* of conſanguinity to have inherited his fine eſtate in this part of the world. Marcellinus, who is for ever jumbling and confounding

facts,

facts, hath alſo made him marry a Thracian lady, who brought him his gold-mines for her fortune. Mr. Hobbes is willing to reconcile the facts, and ſolves all the difficulty in a very plauſible manner. "In Thrace, ſays he, lay alſo the poſſeſſions of Thucydides and "his wealthy mines of gold, as he himſelf profeſſeth in his fourth "book. And although thoſe riches might come to him by a "wife (as is alſo by ſome affirmed) which he married in Scapte-"Hyle a city of Thrace; yet even by that marriage it appeareth, "that his affairs had a relation to that country, and that his nobility "was not there unknown." I cannot believe, that Thucydides ever married a lady that was not purely Attic. He ſeems to have been high-ſpirited in this reſpect, and proud of his country. Miltiades indeed had married a Thracian princeſs; and nothing, but the vaſt eſtate brought into the family by this match, could have made his deſcendents eaſy with ſuch a blemiſh in their pedigree: For, a blemiſh undoubtedly it muſt have been thought at Athens. Let us ſee, how Thucydides himſelf drops his ſentiment of ſuch another match. The paſſage I have in view occurs in the ſixth book. He is ſpeaking of Hippias the ſon of Piſiſtratus, tyrant of Athens. "To "Æantidas the ſon of Hippoclus tyrant of Lampſacus——to a "Lampſacene tho' he himſelf was an Athenian—he married his "daughter Archedice." I cannot think, that he, who let ſuch a ſarcaſm fall from his own ſerious pen, could ever condeſcend to marry a Barbarian, let her fortune be never ſo great. The reader, if it be worth his while to think at all about it, may determine for himſelf.—This digreſſion was cauſed by the expreſs mention Thucydides hath made of his mines, the very moment he is going to enter the liſts againſt the moſt gallant and active commander at this time in the armies of the Lacedæmonian league.

It was Braſidas the Spartan, who was now at the head of the Peloponneſian troops in Thrace. He had made a forced march thither through Theſſaly and Macedonia. By his fine deportment and his perſuaſive

perſuaſive addreſs joined to uncommon vigilance and activity, he had hitherto carried all before him. He at length endeavoured to get poſſeſſion by ſurpriſe of the important city of Amphipolis: He had very nearly ſucceeded. Eucles commanded there for the Athenians. Thucydides was at this time in the iſle of Thaſus, about half a day's ſail from Amphipolis. A meſſenger was diſpatched to him, to haſten him up for the defence of that city. He put to ſea immediately with a ſmall ſquadron of ſeven ſhips. Braſidas, knowing he was coming, opened a negotiation with the Amphipolitans, and gained admiſſion for his troops. Thucydides ſtood up the Strymon in the evening, but too late, ſince Braſidas had got faſt poſſeſſion of Amphipolis. The city of Eïon is ſituated alſo upon the river Strymon lower down, and about two miles and a half from Amphipolis. Thucydides put in here, and ſecured the place. "Braſidas, (in his "own words) * had deſigned that very night to ſeize Eïon alſo. "And, unleſs this ſquadron had come in thus critically to its defence, "at break of day it had been loſt." Thucydides, without loſing a moment, provided for its defence. Braſidas, with armed boats, fell down the river from Amphipolis, and made two attempts upon it, but was repulſed in both: Upon which, he gave up the ſcheme, and returned back.

One would imagine that Thucydides had done all that could be done on this occaſion, and deſerved to be thanked inſtead of puniſhed. The people of Athens made a different determination. Cleon was now the demagogue of greateſt influence there, and is generally ſuppoſed to have exaſperated them againſt the man, who had not wrought impoſſibilities in ſaving their valuable town of Amphipolis. It is certain their fury roſe ſo high againſt him, that they ſtripped Thucydides of his command, and paſſed the ſentence of baniſhment upon him. It is himſelf who tells us †, "It was his lot to

* Book the fourth. † Book the fifth.

"ſuffer

ſuffer a twenty years exile from his country after the affair of Amphipolis.

We have thus loſt Thucydides the *commander* to ſecure more faſt Thucydides the *hiſtorian*. Tho' ſadly treated, he ſcorned to be angry with his country. His complexion was not at all choleric or reſentful; there appears not the leaſt ſign of any gall in his conſtitution. Diſcharged of all duties, and free from all public avocations, he was left without any attachments but to ſimple truth, and proceeded to qualify himſelf for commemorating exploits, in which he could have no ſhare. He was now eight and forty years old, and intirely at leiſure to attend to the grand point of his ambition, that of writing the hiſtory of the preſent war; a calm ſpectator of facts, and diſpaſſionate obſerver of the events he was determined to record.

To judge of him from his hiſtory, (and we have no other help to form our opinion about him,) he was ſo nobly complexioned as to be all judgment and no paſſion. No murmur or complaint hath eſcaped him upon account of his ſevere undeſerved treatment from his country. Great ſouls are congenial; their thoughts are always of a ſimilar caſt.

Sweet are the uſes of adverſity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.

Shakeſpear hath thus expreſſed what Thucydides, as it is highly probable, muſt have thought. "Exile, according to Plutarch *, "was a bleſſing which the Muſes beſtowed upon their favourites. "By this means they enabled them to compleat their moſt beautiful "and noble compoſitions." He then quotes our author for the firſt proof of his obſervation — "Thucydides the Athenian compiled his

* Of Baniſhment.

" History of the *Peloponneſian War* at Scapteſyle in Thrace." At that place he fixed his reſidence. It lay convenient for taking care of his private affairs, and overlooking his mines: They lay not within the dominions of Athens; for then they would have been forfeited to the *State*. Hence he made excurſions at proper ſeaſons to obſerve tranſactions, and pick up intelligence. He was now more converſant in perſon on the Peloponneſian ſide. Some private correſpondences he might ſtill carry on with Athenians. And he had money to purchaſe all proper materials, was ready, and knew how to lay it out. This was his employment 'till the very end of the war; and it is certain he had collected materials for carrying down his hiſtory to that period of time " when (in his own words *) the Lacedæmo-" nians and their allies put an end to the empire of Athens, and be-" came maſters of the Long-walls and the Piræus." But whoever reads it, will be inclined to think, that he drew it not up in that accurate and elaborate manner in which it now appears, 'till the war was finiſhed. He might keep every thing by him in the form of annals; he might go on altering or correcting, as he ſaw better reaſon or gained more light. His compleat well-connected hiſtory, tho' the firſt thing in his intention, was the laſt in execution.

His exile laſted twenty years. It commenced in the eighth year of the war, in the year before Chriſt four hundred twenty-three. Conſequently, he was reſtored the year before Chriſt four hundred and three, being at that time ſixty-eight years old. In that very year an *amneſty* was publiſhed at Athens, in the archonſhip of Euclides, after the demolition of the thirty tyrants by Thraſybulus.

Thucydides was now at liberty, if he pleaſed, to return and paſs the remainder of his days at Athens. Whether he did ſo or not, is left quite in the dark. He lived twelve years after, and died in the year before Chriſt three hundred ninety-one, being then about

* Book the fifth.

fourſcore

fourſcore years old. He was conſtantly employed in giving coherence and dignity to this *Hiſtory*; — with what accuracy, what ſeverity, what toil, the reader may judge, ſince he will find that after all he left it imperfect. The firſt ſeven books are indeed fully and exactly finiſhed. The eighth, tho' moulded into due form, hath plainly not had a final reviſal, and breaks off abruptly. The whole work is ſaid to have fallen into Xenophon's poſſeſſion, who, at the time of the death of Thucydides, was exiled from Athens: And Xenophon is alſo ſaid to have made it public. This carries a great air of probability with it, ſince Xenophon became the continuator of Thucydides, not in ſo lofty and majeſtic, but in a ſweeter and more popular ſtile. There is a chaſm indeed between the time the *Hiſtory* of Thucydides breaks off, and the *Grecian Hiſtory* of Xenophon begins. There is no accounting for this but by conjecture. May I venture to offer one, I believe intirely new, but which, for that reaſon, I ſhall readily give up to the firſt perſon of judgment, who thinks it hath no foundation? It is this — that Thucydides left ſomewhat more behind him than now appears. How it came to be ſuppreſſed or loſt, I will not pretend to gueſs. It is natural to imagine, that his acknowledged continuator reſumed the ſubject at the very ſpot where his predeceſſor had left off. Nearly two years are however wanting, in which ſeveral important incidents took place. It is pity, but we have no redreſs. General hiſtorians are by other means enabled to ſupply the deficiency; but the loſs of any thing from ſo maſterly a hand is ſtill to be regretted.

The place of the death and interment of Thucydides was moſt probably Scapteſyle in Thrace. Long habitude might have made him fond of a ſpot, where he had paſſed ſo many years in ſtudious and calm retirement. The hurry and buſtle and engagements of Athens could not have been much to the reliſh of ſo grave, and now ſo old a man. His monument there among the Cimonian confirms this opinion, ſince moſt writers agree, it had the mark upon it

which ſhewed it to be a cenotaph, and the words, *Here lieth*, were not in the inſcription *. I have nothing to add about his family. It is ſaid he left a ſon; but the very name of that ſon is merely conjectural. I have collected every thing that carries any conſiſtency with it about the *Man*; I ſhall proceed with more pleaſure to view him in a clearer and more ſteddy light, and mark the character, in which it was his ambition to be diſtinguiſhed, that of an *Hiſtorian*.

* *Marcellinus.*

DISCOURSE

DISCOURSE II.

On his QUALIFICATIONS as an HISTORIAN.

IT is now to be conſidered, how well qualified Thucydides was, to undertake that nice and arduous taſk of writing Hiſtory. — No one certainly was ever better fitted for it by outward circumſtances; and very few, ſo enabled to perform it well by the inward abilities of genius and underſtanding.

Lucian, in his celebrated treatiſe "How a Hiſtory ought to be "written," is generally ſuppoſed to have had his eye fixed on Thucydides. And every perſon of judgment, who loves a ſincere relation of things, would be glad, if it were poſſible, to have the writer of them abſtracted from all kind of *connexion* with perſons or things that are the ſubject-matter; to be of no *country*, no *party*; clear of all *paſſions*; *independent* in every light; intirely *unconcerned* who is pleaſed or diſpleaſed with what he writes; the ſervant only of *reaſon* and *truth*.

Sift Thucydides carefully, and we ſhall find his qualifications in all theſe reſpects very nearly, if not quite, compleat.

No *connexion* with, no favouring or malevolent bias towards any one *perſon* in the world can be fixed upon him. Never man ſo intirely detached, or proceeded ſo far (if I may uſe the expreſſion) in annihilating

lating himſelf. He had a father indeed, whoſe name was Olorus; he was an Athenian born; — But, who are his relations? who were his aſſociates? what rival or competitor doth he ſneer? what friend doth he commend? or, what enemy doth he reproach? — Braſidas was the immediate occaſion of his diſgrace and exile. Yet, how doth he deſcribe him? He makes the moſt candid acknowledgments of his perſonal merit, and doth juſtice to all his ſhining and ſuperior abilities. Cleon is generally ſuppoſed to have irritated the people againſt him, and to have got him moſt ſeverely puniſhed, when he merited much better returns from his country. Doth he ſhew the leaſt grudge or reſentment againſt this Cleon? He repreſents him indeed in his real character of a factious demagogue, an incendiary, a bully, and of courſe an arrant coward. And how do all other writers? how doth Ariſtophanes paint this worthleſs man, this falſe bellowing patriot? I would never call Ariſtophanes for an evidence to character, but in caſes where every other writer accorded fully with him, on the ſame foundation of truth, tho' not with the ſame ſuperſtructure of bitterneſs and abuſe. He ſhould not be a voucher in regard to Socrates, or Pericles; but certainly may be heard about an Hyperbolus or a Cleon. Thucydides never mentions himſelf as oppoſed to any man but Braſidas; and never ſo much as drops an inſinuation that he was hurt by Cleon. And thus, by general conſent, he hath gained immortal honour by giving fair and true repreſentations of men, whom he never *felt* to be ſuch, but whom ſucceeding writers have aſſured us to have actually been his *enemies*. — As to *things*; tho' in the firſt ſeven years of the war he muſt in ſome meaſure have had employment, yet he was ſoon diſentangled from all buſineſs whatever, in a manner which bore hard upon his reputation. He hath ſtated the fact; and then, with the greateſt calmneſs and unconcern, he hath left the deciſion to poſterity.

He was henceforth of no *country* at all. Cut off from the republic of Athens, he never ſought after or deſired a naturalization in any other

other *State* of Greece. He was now only to chuſe out and fix a proper ſpot of obſervation, from whence, like a perſon ſecurely poſted on a promontory, he could look calmly on the ſtorm that was raging, or the battle that was fighting below, could note every incident, diſtinguiſh every turn, and with a philoſophical tranquillity enjoy it all. In ſhort, he now was, and continued all the reſt of the *Peloponneſian War*, a citizen of the world at large, as much as any man ever actually was.

But, before this ſeparation from the community, whilſt yet he continued at Athens, where liberty opened the field to all paſſionate chaces after power, where conſequently competitions were ever fermenting, and *party* was always alive and active, — can we find him aſſociated with any particular ſet of men? can we find him dabling in political intrigue? a leader of, or led by any party? or, can we aſſuredly find out his principles? or even gueſs at his real thoughts about the form of government, under which he had lived? His *biographers* indeed, tho' ever parading his candor and impartiality, are often tracing out ſigns and marks of party-zeal and perſonal prejudices from the very characters in his hiſtory. Marcellinus ſays, "he deſcribed Cleon as a madman becauſe he hated him;" forgetful, what Cleon really was, and of the concurrent teſtimonies to the truth of the character. The *anonymous* writer ſays, "he oppoſed "Pericles at Athens, got the better of him, and became the firſt "man in the republic." A ridiculous ſtory! void of all manner of ſupport. According to this writer's way of arguing in other places, who ſays, "he cajoled the Lacedæmonians, and inveighed againſt "the tyrannic all-graſping temper of the Athenians, in his hiſtory, "becauſe he had no opportunity to rail at them in any other "ſhape," — he ſhould have left a far different character of Pericles behind him, than he hath actually left. But theſe are ſtrange compilers of patch-work, and deſerve no regard. From what the former hath ſaid about him, a reader might be tempted to judge him

of

of the *oligarchical*; from what the latter hath ſaid of him, of the *democratical* principle. Mr. Hobbes imagines he hath dived to the bottom of his real principles, and avers him a tight and ſound *royaliſt*. He is ſure, that he leaſt of all liked the *democracy*; as ſure, he was not at all fond of an *oligarchy*. He founds this aſſurance on a paſſage in the eighth book — "They decreed the ſupreme power to be "veſted in the *five thouſand*, which number to conſiſt of all ſuch "citizens as were enrolled for the heavy armour, and that no one "ſhould receive a ſalary." — Thucydides juſt after pronounceth this, in his own opinion, "a good modelling of their government, a fine "temper between the *few* and the *many*, and which enabled Athens "from the low eſtate into which her affairs were plunged to re-erect "her head." If this paſſage proves any thing of the author's principles, it certainly proves them in a pretty ſtrong degree *republican*. Mr. Hobbes however ſets out from hence to prove him a *royaliſt*. "For (ſays he) he commendeth the government of Athens more, "both when Piſiſtratus reigned (ſaving that it was an uſurped "power,) and when in the beginning of this war it was democrati-"cal in name, but in effect monarchical under Pericles." He praiſeth, it is true, the adminiſtration at both theſe periods; and he alſo praiſeth the good effects reſulting from an adminiſtration lodged in the hands of five thouſand men. Under Pericles it was lodged in more, but the extraordinary abilities and influence of the man had taught all their voices to follow the dictates of his heart. Yet, Pericles was all the time a ſtrong republican, and owned his maſters. Plutarch ſays, he never harangued them without praying beforehand, that "not a word might ſlip out of his mouth, that was "not pertinent to the buſineſs in hand;" and that he never put on his armour to lead them out into the field without ſaying to himſelf -- "Remember, Pericles, you are going to command free men and "Grecians." I leave it to the reader, whether the principles of Thucydides can thus be diſcovered. It appears only, that he was

always

always candid to a good adminiſtration, and might poſſibly think of government, as Mr. Pope hath wrote:

> For modes of government let fools conteſt,
> That which is beſt adminiſtred is beſt.

That ſtudied obſcurity, in which he hath veiled himſelf, will not let us diſcover, whether on inſtant and critical occaſions he ever ſuffered himſelf to be actuated by any of the darker paſſions, or too fondly indulged thoſe of a brighter caſt. But it cannot be found from what he writes, that he hath praiſed any man from fondneſs, or even from gratitude, degraded any one through envy, or reproached any one with malice and ill-nature. The ſame will hold in regard to *States* or whole communities. Doth he ever cenſure the Athenians in the wrong place? or commend the Lacedæmonians but in the right? Were his name expunged from the beginning of the whole work and the concluſions of the years, could any one gueſs to what *State* he had ever belonged, whether he was a Lacedæmonian, a Corinthian, an Athenian, or a Sicilian, except from the purity of the Attic dialect in which he writes? In that dialect he was cradled; he could not poſſibly ſwerve from it; without it he could neither write nor ſpeak. Could he have thought, that this might yield ſuſpicion of an impaſſioned or prejudiced ſpirit, he might perhaps have endeavoured to write in the Doric or Ionic idiom.

Independent, further, he certainly muſt have been, ſince he had no great man to cajole, and no prince to dread or flatter. The powers of Greece or the monarch of Perſia could affect him no more, than the Germanic body or the grand monarch of France the quiet and contented refugee, who lives on the ſunny ſide of a hill in Switzerland. The circumjacent powers had no more, perhaps not ſo much, influence at Scapteſyle, than the neighbouring kingdoms can have at Lauſanne. The *States* of Greece had garriſons on the coaſts, but

were not maſters of Thrace. Thrace was full of little communities and petty principalities. Thucydides had credit enough amongſt them to inſure his perſonal ſafety and guard his retirement. He could diſoblige thoſe about whom he wrote, without fear of their reſentment, and could praiſe without being in the reach of a requital. Human nature will not admit of a ſtricter *independence*.

His *unconcern* about the opinions of a preſent generation is ſtrong and clear. It looks as if he thought they would ſcarce give him a reading, ſo little care had he taken to ſooth or to amuſe them. He had a greater aim than to be the author in vogue for a year. He hated contention, and ſcorned ſhort-lived temporary applauſe. He threw himſelf on poſterity. He appealed to the future world for the value of the preſent he had made them. The judgment of ſucceeding ages hath approved the compliment he thus made to their underſtandings. So long as there are truly great princes, able ſtateſmen, ſound politicians, politicians that do not rend aſunder politics from good order and the general happineſs, he will meet with candid and grateful acknowledgments of his merit.

Other hiſtorians have ſooner pleaſed, have more diffuſively entertained. They have aimed more directly at the paſſions, have more artificially and ſucceſsfully ſtruck at the imagination. *Truth* in its ſeverity, and *Reaſon* in its robuſt and manly ſtate, are all the Muſes and Graces to which Thucydides hath done obeiſance. Can we wonder, that he hath not been more generally read and admired? or, could we wonder, if he had not been ſo much? A great work planed under ſuch circumſtances and with ſuch qualifications as I have been deſcribing, cool ſerious judgment will always commend as a noble *deſign*, even tho' *executed* it may prove too chearleſs to the more lively paſſions, its reliſh not ſufficiently quick for the popular taſte, or piquant enough to keep the appetite ſharp and eager.

But to proceed. Thucydides hath been cenſured in regard to the *choice* of his ſubject. It hath occaſioned the ſolidity of his judgment

and

and excellence of his taſte to be called in queſtion. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus hath exerted himſelf much on this account; hath tried him by laws, which have *poetry* rather than *hiſtory* for their object; and cenſures him for not *delighting*, when his profeſſion was only to *inſtruct*. Mr. Hobbes hath gallantly defended his author, and ſhewn all the arguments of Dionyſius to be impertinent, and to proceed from partiality and envy. I ſhall not repeat, it will ſuffice to refer the curious reader to what Mr. Hobbes hath written upon this topic. Homer hath celebrated the Trojan war, and intermingled in his poems all the hiſtoric ſtrokes of that and of preceding ages, enlivening and exalting every thing he touched. That ſplendid part of the Grecian hiſtory, in which his countrymen reſiſted and triumphed over the very formidable arms of the Perſian monarch, had already been recorded by Herodotus. Should Thucydides plunge back into dark and fabulous ages, and turn a mere legendary and romantic writer? He had, he could have no ſubject equal to his ambition and his abilities, but the war, which broke out in his own days, which he foreſaw would prove extenſive and important, when the efforts of her enemies would be vigorouſly exerted to pull down the power of Athens, to demoliſh that naval ſtrength which gave her the ſovereignty of the ſea, and made her the dread and envy of her neighbours. Coolly therefore with my reaſon as an examiner of things, and warmly with my paſſion as an Engliſhman, I cannot but applaud his choice, who hath projected the ſoundeſt and beſt ſyſtem of Engliſh politics, ſo long before the conſtitution had exiſtence; and hath left us fine leſſons, ſuch as his factious countrymen would not obſerve, how to ſupport that dominion of the ſea, on which our glory is built, and on which our welfare intirely depends. In this light it is a moſt inſtructive and intereſting hiſtory, and we may felicitate ourſelves on the choice of Thucydides. I muſt not anticipate: Thucydides would have his readers pick out their own inſtructions. I can only add, that Thucydides is a favourite hiſtorian with the ſtateſmen

and patriots of Great-Britain: This fits him alſo to be an Hiſtorian for the people. Other nations have admired him, and I hope will continue to admire him *gratis:* We are bound to thank him, and never to loſe ſight of that grand political ſcheme, formed by a Themiſtocles, and warmly and ſucceſsfully purſued by an Ariſtides, a Cimon, and a Pericles; the ſwerving from which at Athens drew after it the loſs of the ſovereignty at ſea, then ſunk her into a petty *State*, and made her end at laſt in a mere academy, tho' moſt excellent in its kind.

From ſuch conſiderations it will alſo follow, that the hiſtory of Thucydides is more uſeful than that of Livy; at leaſt, that *we* have more reaſon to applaud the choice of the former. I deſign no compariſon between theſe two hiſtorians. The performance of the Jeſuit *Rapin* on that point is in general reading. Livy's hiſtory is certainly more auguſt, more ſplendid, more amazing; I only inſiſt that it is not more uſeful. And, tho' Livy be happier in his ſubject, this ought not to degrade Thucydides, who ſeized the only fine ſubject that could offer itſelf to him: In regard to *him*, it was either this or none at all. The parallel ſhould be only drawn in regard to *execution*, where much hath been ſaid on both ſides, and the ſuperiority ſtill remains undecided.

This brings me to the inward abilities of genius and underſtanding, which capacitated my author to execute his work. His *genius* was certainly of the higheſt order: It was truly ſublime. Here the critics unanimouſly applaud. In the arrangement of his matter he emulated Homer. In the grandeur of his thoughts and loftineſs of his ſenſe he copied Pindar. He is ever ſtately and majeſtic; his ſtatelineſs perhaps too formal, his majeſty too ſevere. He wrote, as he thought, far beyond an ordinary perſon. He thinks faſter than he can utter: His ſentences are full-ſtored with meaning: And his very words are ſentences. Hence comes his obſcurity. Where pure thought is the object, he connects too faſt, nor is enough dilated for

common

common apprehenſion. But this is not the caſe with the *narrative* part of his hiſtory, which is pithy, nervous and ſuccinct, yet plain, ſtriking, and manly. He never flouriſheth, never plays upon words, never ſinks into puerilities, never ſwells into bombaſt. It is a relation from the mouth of a very great man, whoſe chief characteriſtic is gravity. Others talk more ingeniouſly; others utter themſelves with a more chearful air; yet, every one muſt attend to Thucydides, muſt hearken with ſerious and fixed attention, leſt they loſe a word, a weighty and important word, by which the whole ſtory would be ſpoiled. It is in his *Orations*, that he is moſt remarkably obſcure. He might not be ſo in ſo high a degree to the apprehenſions of mankind, when his hiſtory was firſt made public. The world was then uſed to hear continual harangues: No buſineſs of a public nature could be carried on without them. In his time, the ſpeakers aimed intirely at ſtrength and brevity. If they were not exceeding quick, the apprehenſions of the Athenians would outſtrip, or at leaſt affect to outſtrip, their utterance. They muſt think much, and yet leave much of what they had thought to the ready conception of the audience. An orator in the following hiſtory * calls them "Spectators "of ſpeeches." They affected to diſcern at the firſt glance, and without waiting for formal deduction and ſolemn inference, to be maſters of the point as it were by intuition. The more copious and diffuſive eloquence was the improvement of the next generation. But the moſt forcible orator, that even Athens ever boaſted, improved, if he did not quite learn, his peculiar manner from Thucydides. It was Demoſthenes, who copied him in the cloſe energy of his ſentences, and the abrupt rapidity of his thoughts. Demoſthenes is ſaid to have tranſcribed him eight times over with his own hand: ſo diligently did he perſevere to form an intimate acquaintance with him, and habituate himſelf to his quick manner of conception, and to his cloſe and rapid delivery. Cicero ſays however †, that "no rheto-

* Cleon's ſpeech in book the third. † In the *Orator*,

"rician

" rician of Greece ever drew any thing from Thucydides. He " hath indeed been praiſed by all; I own it; But, as a man, who " was an explainer of facts with prudence, ſeverity, and gravity: " Not as a ſpeaker at the bar, but an hiſtorical relator of wars. And " therefore he was never numbered amongſt the orators." Cicero learned nothing from him: He could not, neither in his own words " would he if he could." His talents were different; he was quite in all reſpects accompliſhed; he was eloquence itſelf. But Demoſthenes--and can there be higher praiſe? — Demoſthenes certainly loved, and ſtudied Thucydides; for whoſe perfection I am not arguing; I would only eſtabliſh his character of loftineſs and ſublimity. Longinus * propoſeth him, as the model of true grandeur and exaltation in writing hiſtory.

And now I have mentioned this princely and moſt judicious critic, let us call Thucydides to take a trial at his bar, and ſee whether he hath all the genuine conſtituents of the true ſublime. — For *elevation* of thought, for his power in alarming and intereſting the *paſſions*, for his bold and frequent uſe of *figures*, his character will ſoon be eſtabliſhed. Even Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus bears teſtimony here, who loved him not, and would have been glad to degrade him. Plutarch calls him the moſt pathetic, and a writer of the greateſt energy and variety that ever was. The ſcenes in his hiſtory are ſtrong moſt expreſſive paintings. He makes the paſt to be preſent; he makes hearing ſight. In the very words of Plutarch † — " His readers are " thrown into the ſame aſtoniſhment and hurry of paſſion, as the " eye-witneſſes to every ſcene muſt have felt. Demoſthenes drawing " up his men on the craggy ſhore of Pylus — Braſidas calling out " on his pilot to run the veſſel aſhore, getting himſelf on the ſtairs, " then wounded, fainting, falling down on the gunnel; here, the " Spartans fighting a land-battle from the water, the Athenians a " naval-battle from the ſhore; — and again, in the Sicilian war, the

* On the ſublime. Section 14. † De gloria Athenienſium.

" land-

" land-armies of both parties on the beach, whilſt a naval engage-
" ment is yet under deciſion on the water, ſympathiſing in all the
" conteſt, adjuſting themſelves to all the various turns of battle, by
" new attitudes, quick contorſions of the body ;— All theſe things
" are ſet before the readers in actual repreſentation, in all the diſpoſi-
" tion, all the expreſſion, and perſpicuity of picture." Through the whole courſe of the hiſtory, a battle either at land or ſea is an object clear and diſtinct. The writer is never confounded himſelf, nor throws confuſion on his reader. That reader ſees the whole, from the pæan of attack to the erecting of the trophy; he diſcerns the whole train of fight, and beholds exactly the loſs or gain of the victory. He further aſſiſts at the aſſemblies of the people and all important conſultations. He learns the ſtate of affairs from the managers themſelves; he hears the debates, is let into the tempers of the aſſembly, pries into all the politics, and preconceives the reſolution. Where the politics are bad, he will own no other could be expected from thoſe who recommend them. Where they are ſound and good, nor wilfully ſevered from duty to their country, and in moral conſiſtence with the welfare of their fellow-creatures, the reader will applaud, and think he hath been himſelf diſcovering the fine maxims which the author hath been teaching, who never appears in perſon, never puffs his own integrity and diſcernment, and without digreſſing into comments or ſetting up for a *politician*, is found upon reflexion the beſt of the kind that ever wrote.

To quote paſſages for the proof of his *ſublime* thought or his *pathetic* addreſs, would be to tranſcribe the greater part of the following hiſtory. They will be obſerved in the *orations* of theſe two different caſts, and the incidents of the work. His *figures* are thick ſet; the figures, that regard both the ſentiment and the diction. His *metaphors* are ſtrong and uncommon; his *hyperboles* far but not overſtretched, the tone is ſtill preſerved, they flow out from a warm pathetic in the midſt of ſome grand circumſtance. The figures, in

which

which he moſt delights, are the *Interrogation*; the *Change* of number and time; the *Hyperbaton*, or tranſpoſing and inverting the order of things which ſeem naturally united and inſeparable; and above all, the *Antitheſis*. This laſt he hath fondly uſed, almoſt to ſatiety. *Term* is not only oppoſed to *term*, but thought to thought, ſentence to ſentence, and ſometimes whole *orations* to one another, even where the latter ſpeaker cannot poſſibly be ſuppoſed to have heard the former. A conſtant adherence to this method carries with it the danger of glutting the reader. I am ſenſible there ſhould have been more variety to make the whole quite beautiful and graceful.

As to the fourth conſtituent of ſublimity, which according to Longinus is noble and graceful *expreſſion*, our author's claim cannot be ſo well eſtabliſhed. *Noble* undoubtedly he is, but as for the *graceful* — the reader may wiſh he had been more careful in this particular, and I am ſure his *tranſlator* wiſhes it from his heart. For fear of being vulgar he is too ſet and ſolemn; and from the paſſion to be always great, he hath loſt the air of eaſe and genteelneſs. Dionyſius of Halicarnaſſus ſays he ſtudiouſly affected hard and obſolete words. But yet the ſame writer ſets him up as the ſtandard of Attic purity; nay, hath frequently ſtrengthned his own ſtile by uſing the hard and obſolete words of Thucydides. However this be, it is certain Thucydides hath in this reſpect fallen half-way ſhort: And more ſo, in the fifth conſtituent of ſublimity, the *compoſition* or *ſtructure* of his periods. He hath no harmony, hath given little or no proof of having a *good ear*. He is rough, auſtere; his periods are ſometimes a mile long, in which he labours himſelf both out of tune and time. I acknowledge his *imperfections*, and beg the reader would weigh them and ſet them in the balance with his *excellencies*: He may then judge if the latter do not greatly preponderate. He thinks nobly; affects ſurpriſingly; his expreſſion is noble, but not graceful; his final colouring is neither bright nor chearful. But, tho' his pieces are not ſo compleatly finiſhed as to ſtand every teſt, yet they

are

are certainly high-wrought in his own peculiar *ſtile*, and for greatneſs of deſign and ſtrength of expreſſion are beyond every other *hand*.

I think no fair compariſon can be made of him, except with the Hiſtorians who are his countrymen, who like himſelf are original in their own way, and the firſt in their *manner*. Theſe are only two, Herodotus and Xenophon. In point of life, Thucydides was junior a little to the former, and ſenior to the latter. In ſtatelineſs, grandeur, and majeſty, he far ſurpaſſeth them both. The manner of Herodotus is graceful and manly; his addreſs is engaging; he loves to tell a ſtory; and, however fabulous or trifling that ſtory, he will be heard with pleaſure. The courſe of his Hiſtory is clear and ſmooth, and yields a moſt chearful proſpect: That of Thucydides is deep, rapid, impetuous, and therefore very apt to be rough and muddy. You may clearly perceive the bottom of the one: But it is very hard to dive to the bottom of the other. Herodotus, like a maſter on the horn, can wind a lofty air, and without any harſhneſs ſink down into the loweſt and melloweſt notes. Thucydides ſounds the trumpet; his blaſts are ſonorous and piercing, and they are all of the martial ſtrain *. Xenophon never pretends to grandeur; his character is a beautiful ſimplicity; he is ſweeter than honey; he charms every ear; the Muſes themſelves could not ſing ſweeter than he hath wrote. Each beats and is beaten by the others in ſome particular points. Each hath his particular excellence: That of Herodotus is gracefulneſs; that of Thucydides, grandeur; that of Xenophon, ſweetneſs itſelf. If generals and admirals and ſtateſmen were to award the firſt rank, it would undoubtedly be given for Thucydides; if the calmer and more polite gentry, it would go for Herodotus; if all in general who can read or hear, Xenophon hath it all to nothing.

As to the Roman Hiſtorians, who ſaw what theſe mighty *originals* had done before them, I cannot judge it fair to form deciſive parallels. Time had enabled them to judge maturely about the defects and

* *Canit quodammodo bellicum.* Cicero *in the* Orator.

excellencies of their Greek predeceſſors. Yet every Roman Hiſtorian ſhews plainly he is a *Roman* himſelf; he ſtood not ſo aloof from his ſubject as Thucydides. The loſs of a Peloponneſian writer is never regretted in regard to the latter; the loſs of Carthaginian and hiſtorians of other nations is highly regretted in regard to the former. National *impartiality* will admit no compariſon here; tho' excellence of *compoſition* may admit a great deal. Saluſt is the only one, who ſeems to have had our author ever in his eye, and to have been his profeſſed imitator. Saluſt frequently tranſlates his political maxims, copies him exactly in the conciſeneſs and laboured energy of his phraſe; and Saluſt, for that reaſon, is like him very often obſcure. It is entirely in *his* manner, that he draws up his orations, contraſts his ſpeakers, and fights his battles. Saluſt hath many, hath deſervedly many admirers: And I hope, if I am ſo fortunate as to bring Thucydides into more general acquaintance, that the admirers of the one will beſtow regard upon the other, and pay due honour to his hiſtoric progenitor.

I ſhall wind up this eſſay on Thucydides as an *Hiſtorian* with a paſſage from the Critic on the Sublime *, only deſiring the reader to keep Thucydides in remembrance, as Longinus extended his view to writers both in poetry and proſe ——

" I readily allow, that writers of a lofty and towering genius are " by no means pure and correct, ſince whatever is neat and accurate " throughout, muſt be exceedingly liable to flatneſs. In the Sublime, " as in great affluence of fortune, ſome minuter articles will una- " voidably eſcape obſervation. But it is almoſt impoſſible for a low " and groveling genius to be guilty of error, ſince he never endangers " himſelf by ſoaring on high, or aiming at eminence, but ſtill goes " on in the ſame uniform ſecure track, whilſt its very height and " grandeur expoſes the Sublime to ſudden falls. Nor am I ignorant " indeed of another thing, which will no doubt be urged, that in

* Longinus, Section 33.

" paſſing

" paſſing our judgment upon the works of an author, we always
" muſter his imperfections, ſo that the remembrance of his faults
" ſticks indelibly faſt in the mind, whereas that of his excellencies is
" quickly worn out. For my part, I have taken notice of no incon-
" ſiderable number of faults in Homer, and ſome other of the greateſt
" authors, and cannot by any means be blind or partial to them;
" however, I judge them not to be voluntary faults, ſo much as ac-
" cidental ſlips incurred through inadvertence; ſuch as, when the
" mind is intent upon things of a higher nature, will creep inſenſibly
" into compoſitions. And for this reaſon I give it as my real opinion,
" that the great and noble flights, tho' they cannot every where boaſt
" an equality of perfection, yet ought to carry off the prize by the
" ſole merit of their own intrinſic grandeur."

DISCOURSE III.

A SURVEY of the

HISTORY.

IN the preceding diſcourſe we have examined into the capacity and qualifications of our author for writing hiſtory, and ſettled his character. Let us now take a view of the *work* itſelf; firſt caſting our eyes upon and noting the general diſpoſition of the *whole*; and then ſurveying it more diſtinctly in its *parts*.

Diſpoſition of the whole.

The *diſpoſition* of the whole is moſt elaborately exact. Order is ſcrupulouſly obſerved; and every incident ſo faithfully arranged in its proper time, that ſome have doubted whether *annals* were not a more proper title for it than *hiſtory*. If we ſhould call it *annals*, it muſt be owned at the ſame time that annals were never compoſed with ſo much majeſty and ſpirit; and never was *hiſtory* more accurately diſtinguiſhed by the punctuality of dates ſo nicely interwove. Thucydides ſtates every occurrence in juſt place and time. But he is forced for this purpoſe to make frequent tranſitions, and to drop a particular narration, perhaps the very moment a reader's attention may be moſt fixed upon and moſt eager for the event. If they cannot bear a diſappointment here, the remedy is ready at hand. By turning over a few leaves, they will find it regularly reſumed in due

due place and time; and they at once may ſatisfy their own curioſity, without diſarranging the author's ſcheme, or perplexing that work which he was determined to keep quite clear and unembarraſſed. They will afterwards forgive, perhaps applaud him, for his great care to prevent confuſion, and to give a neat and preciſe conception of all that paſſeth. He conſtantly gives notice, when he is neceſſitated, by the method he laid down for himſelf, to make ſuch tranſitions: And, when we have been amuſed with what looks like a ramble from an engaging part of hiſtory, but is really a coincidence of events not to paſs unheeded; when we have been ſo long at it, that we are convinced it lies in the road, and is no excurſion at all; yet we are glad to ſee him re-connect, and land us on a ſpot, where we are already well acquainted. He ſhews a ſteddy and inviolable attachment to *chronology*, a neceſſary attendant upon hiſtory. But the chronolgy of Thucydides is like a herald, that exactly marſhals a long ſtately proceſſion, adjuſts the rank, clears the way, and preſerves every ſtep diſtinct and unincumbered.

No writer had done this before him. No ſettled *Æra* was yet in uſe, not even the famous one of the *Olympiad*. The ſeveral States of Greece computed time by a method of their own. It was not eaſy to make thoſe methods coincide with one another. The Athenians reckon'd by their annual *archons*; the Lacedæmonians by their *ephori*; the Argives by the years of the *prieſteſs* of Juno. The ſeaſons of the year, when the two former entered on their offices, were fixed, but did not ſuit together in point of time; the beginning of the years of the latter was variable, ſince it depended on the death or removal of a predeceſſor. Thucydides, to avoid confuſion, left all theſe artificial jarring rules, and adhered to the courſe of nature. He divided the natural year into two halves, into a ſummer and a winter. His *ſummer* includes the ſpring, and reacheth from the vernal to the autumnal equinox; the other half-year is comprehended in his *winter*. He always records *eclipſes*, as ſtrange events,

and

and proper concomitants for the horrors of this war. I muſt not be ſo ſanguine as to imagine, that he ſuppoſed ſuch appearances might ſome time or other be reduced to exact calculation, and *aſtronomy* be made the faithful guide of *chronology*.

Book I. The Firſt Book of Thucydides is introductory to the reſt. It is a comprehenſive elaborate work of itſelf. It clears away rubbiſh, opens a view from the earlieſt ages, ſtrikes out light from obſcurity, and truth from fable, that the reader may enter upon the *Peloponneſian war* with a perfect inſight into the ſtate of Greece, and the ſchemes, intereſt and ſtrength of the contending parties. The author unfolds his deſign in writing, magnifies his ſubject, complains of the ignorance and credulity of mankind, rectifies their miſtakes, removes all prejudice, and furniſhes us with the knowledge of every thing proper to be known, to enable us to look at the contention with judgment and diſcernment, when the point contended for is no leſs than the ſovereignty of the ſea, which that of the land muſt neceſſarily follow.

He begins at the ſource, and traces the original of the Greek communities from certain and indiſputable facts; and the growth of Attica in particular, from the natural barrenneſs of the ſoil, which tempted no invaſions; and from the ſhelter its inhabitants gave to all, who would ſettle amongſt them, and ſhare their polity. — He ſhews the invention of *ſhipping* to have been exceedingly miſchievous at firſt. It filled the ſea with pirates, to whom it gave a ready conveyance from coaſt to coaſt, enabling them ſuddenly to ſeize, and at leiſure to carry off and ſecure their booty. No conſiderable commerce, or rather none at all, could be carried on, till the ſhore was cleared of ſuch annoyance. And when few durſt venture to ſettle on the coaſts, no marts could be opened for traffic, and no ports were yet ſecure. A ſhip was merely the inſtrument of ready conveyance from place to place: It was not yet become an engine of attack and defence on the water. Minos king of Crete made the firſt attempt with ſucceſs to

obtain

obtain a naval ſtrength *, by which he cleared the iſles of the pirates, who had ſettled upon them to ſet out readier from thence on their plundering excurſions. — The grand fleet, that carried ſuch a numerous army to Troy, was a mere collection of tranſports. Thucydides gives us a juſt and clear idea of that famous expedition. After this celebrated æra †, the Corinthians were the firſt people of Greece, who became in reality a maritime power. Their peculiar ſituation gave them an inclination and opportunity for commerce; and commerce muſt have ſtrength to guard and ſupport it. They firſt improved a veſſel of burden into a ſhip of war ‡, and ſet power afloat as well as wealth.

Their neighbors in the iſle of Corcyra ſoon followed their example, and, tho' originally a colony of their own, became a rival power at ſea. They fought on their own darling element for ſuperiority ‖. This was the moſt ancient ſea-fight, but it was not deciſive. They continued for two centuries more to be rival and jarring powers; till a third, that of Athens, grew up, which politically joined with one to gain the aſcendant over them both, and to aſſert the empire of the ſea for itſelf.

The claim both of Corcyra and Corinth to the town of Epidamnus had occaſioned their moſt recent embroilment §, and a hot war, in which the Corcyréans applied for the alliance and aid of Athens. On this was afterwards grounded the *firſt* pretext for the Peloponneſian war, and therefore our Author opens the affair at large. Athens held the balance of power in her hands: *How* ſhe came to be poſſeſſed of it, will ſoon give room for as pertinent a digreſſion as Thucydides could have wiſhed. Embaſſadors from both parties are ſoon at Athens; one, to negotiate alliance and aid; the other, to traverſe their negotiation. The *people* of Athens, in whom the ſupreme power was veſted, admit them both to audience, and *orations* of

* Years before Chriſt 1006. † Before Chriſt 904. ‡ Before Chriſt 697.
‖ Before Chriſt 657. § Before Chriſt 438.

courſe

courſe muſt follow. Our grave Hiſtorian is now retired, to make way for ſtateſmen and orators to mount the ſtage, who are very well worth hearing.

Speech of the Corcyréans.

The Corcyréans, who take the lead, recognize "the neceſſity of "*alliances*, which, tho' ſometimes intanglements, are generally ſecu- "rity and defence. Wronged as they now are, they ſue for alliance "as the means of redreſs. In granting it to them, the Athenians "would ſhew honour and virtue, and at the ſame time promote "their own private intereſt. The acceſſion of the naval ſtrength "of Corcyra to their own was very well worth the gaining; in the "end, it might preſerve their State. —— They open the nature of "*colonies*, ſhew the original contract between them and the mother- "country; obedience and protection are reciprocal and imply one "another. — They prove that Athens may grant them alliance, in "conſiſtence with all other engagements; by doing it, may ſecure "herſelf in time againſt the envy and attack of the Peloponneſians; "ſince the naval ſtrength of Corinth, joined to all the efforts of the "latter in a future war, will be weak and ineffectual againſt the com- "bined fleets of Corcyra and Athens.

Speech of the Corinthians.

The Corinthians, in their anſwer, inveigh highly againſt the Cor- cyréans. "They deſcribe them as a very deſigning iniquitous ſet of "men, and a colony in the higheſt degree undutiful to its mother- "ſtate. They endeavor to prove it unjuſt, and ungrateful too, in "the Athenians, to take them into alliance, and abet their criminal "behavior. They maintain, that true honour points out another "conduct; and ſchemes of intereſt ſhould never ſuperſede the laws "of equity and good-faith. What *may* happen ſhould be leſs re- "garded, than what on preſent occaſions *is* ſtrictly right. They in- "treat at laſt, tho' with a menacing air; and cloſe, with warmly "adjuring the Athenians, to ſtand *neutral* in the quarrel."

The Athenians however reſolve to enter into a defenſive alliance with Corcyra. The war is renewed; and the Athenians ſend the

Corcyréans

Corcyréans a petty aid, which they afterwards reinforce. Corcyra is ſecured, and all the projects of the Corinthians are baffled, who are highly exaſperated againſt the Athenians, and never will forgive them.

Another affair ſoon happens, to embroil them more, and to make the *ſecond* pretext for a general war. Potidæa, a town in the Iſthmus of the Pallene, was a Corinthian colony, but at this time tributary to the Athenians. Its ſituation between two bays, and amongſt the Athenian colonies on the coaſt of Thrace and Macedonia, would enable it to gall the Athenians ſorely in caſe of a rupture. They order it therefore to be diſmantled. The Potidæans refuſe obedience, and revolt. A war enſues. The Athenians attempt to reduce Potidæa; and the Corinthians to ſupport the revolt. It is at length beſieged by the former. The ſiege runs out into a great length of time, and at laſt becomes one of the conſiderable events of the Peloponneſian war.

The Corinthians, after this repeated provocation, are full of reſentments, and leave no ſtone unturned to ſtir up a general war in Greece. They were parties themſelves in the Peloponneſian league, of which the Lacedæmonians were the head. The Corinthians never ſet up for a leading *State*. They were ever content with the ſecondary rank, tho' the *firſt* in that rank. Their turn was always more to commerce than war. Commerce had long ſince made them rich; riches had made them luxurious; and, tho' they often produced great and excellent ſoldiers, yet they never piqued themſelves on being a martial or formidable people. Athens indeed they hated: Athens had rivalled them in trade, and very much abridged the extent of their commerce. One of the gulfs on which Corinth is ſeated, that of Sarone, was now intirely in the juriſdiction of the Athenians, who had alſo begun to curb and ſtraiten them much in the gulf of Criſſa. They were conſequently bent on the demolition of this all-graſping rival, but were unable to effect it by their own

ſtrength. They ſolicit all the confederates to repair to Lacedæmon, all full of complaint and remonſtrance againſt the Athenians. The Corinthians reſerve themſelves for the finiſhing charge; and our author repeats (or makes for them) their moſt inveigling and alarming ſpeech on this occaſion.

Speech of the Corinthians.

" They addreſs the Lacedæmonians with an artful mixture of " commendation and reproach; of commendation, for their ſtrict " adherence to good-faith; of reproach, for their indolence and " ſloth. *They* had ſuffered the *State* of Athens to grow too mighty " for her neighbours. Tho' the acknowledged deliverers of Greece, " *they* had now for a length of time taken no notice of the incroach- " ments of the Athenians; but, through wilful ignorance and habi- " tual ſupineneſs, had let them grow too big, and able now to in- " ſlave them all. — They do all they can to irritate and provoke " them. They draw an admirable parallel between *them* and the " Athenians; invidious and reproachful, but directly tending to ex- " aſperate thoſe whom they want to exaſperate. — Then, they " warmly renew their applications to the pride of the Lacedæmoni- " ans; they alarm their fears; they flatter and reproach their foi- " bles. They even threaten to abandon *their* league, unleſs they " exert themſelves in defence of their friends; they endeavour to " prove the neceſſity of active and vigorous meaſures; and end " with a very artful ſtroke of inſinuating and perſuaſive addreſs."

An Athenian embaſſy, now reſiding at Lacedæmon, being informed of theſe loud and bitter outcries againſt their maſters, beg an immediate audience. Accordingly, they are admitted; not indeed to plead before Lacedæmonians, as their judges or ſuperiors — Athenians ſcorn ſuch ſelf-debaſement; but, to vindicate their *State* from miſ-repreſentations, to clear her reputation, and juſtify her power.

Speech of the Athenian *embaſſy.*

" With this view, they run over the great ſervices they had done " to Greece, in the time of the Perſian invaſions: They had ever

" been

" been the moſt ſtrenuous, moſt diſintereſted, and moſt gallant " champions for liberty. They pompouſly detail their battles of " Marathon and Salamis; their evacuating Athens on the laſt occa- " ſion; and, when they had no polity of their own ſubſiſting, fight- " ing ardently and ſucceſsfully for the other communities of Greece. " Their power had been nobly earned; and, muſt they forego it, " becauſe it was envied? They had honourably gained, and juſtly " uſed it; much more juſtly, than the Lacedæmonians had it either " in will or ability to have done. They are calumniated merely " from that ſpite and diſcontent ſo common to mankind, who ever " hate and abuſe their ſuperiors, and ever repine at ſubjection tho' to " the moſt gentle maſters. — Lacedæmonians have neither ſkill nor " judgment for large command, and tho' moſt eagerly graſping at " it, are unable to manage it with any meaſure of dexterity and ad- " dreſs. *They* ſhould reflect again and again, before they ventured " upon war: It might laſt longer, and involve them in more cala- " mities, than they ſeemed willing to apprehend. *They* had better " ſubmit their complaints to fair arbitration: If not, the Athenians " invoke the Gods to witneſs their readineſs to defend themſelves, " whenever and however their enemies ſhall attack them."

All parties now withdraw; and the Lacedæmonians go to council amongſt themſelves. Exaſperated by the Corinthians, and mortified by the ſpeech of the Athenians, the majority are for an immediate declaration of war. Archidamus, one of their kings, roſe up to temper their fury. And the ſpeech of his Spartan majeſty on this occaſion, carries all the marks of a good king, an able ſtateſman, and a thorough patriot: It does honour both to his heart and head. A Spartan king never made a royal figure but at the head of an army: *Then* he reigned indeed. And yet, Archidamus retains no ſelfiſh conſiderations; they are loſt in his regard for the public welfare.

He tells them, " he is not fond of war himſelf; raw unexperienced " youth alone is liable to ſuch weakneſs. The war *now* under conſide- " ration is a moſt important point. It may run out into a great length " of time. It is againſt Athenians, — a remote people, — a naval " power, — abounding in wealth, — excellently provided in all reſpects. " He demands, in every ſingle article, whether they can preſume to " become a match for ſuch antagoniſts? They ſhould remember the " high ſpirit, the habits of activity and perſeverance ſo natural to theſe " Athenians, who are not to be dejected at the firſt loſs, nor frightned " at big words or haughty threats. *Inſults* indeed muſt not be brook- " ed; but, adequate preparations ſhould be made to avenge them, and " time be gained to make ſuch preparations. It would be moſt pru- " dent to begin a negotiation, to ſpin it out into length. If affairs " can be amicably adjuſted, it would deſerve their choice; — If " not, when they are competently enabled, it will be ſoon enough " to act offenſively. He dreads not war himſelf, yet, war cannot " be carried on without money. Ample funds muſt be provided, a " work of time and deliberation. Circumſpection is no real re- " proach; precipitation draws poſitive miſchiefs after it. Lacedæ- " monians are uſed to be calm and conſiderate; they ſhould not now " be cajoled or exaſperated out of their judgment. The Athenians " are a wiſe and dextrous people. The Lacedæmonians ſhould keep " *that* in remembrance, and ſupport their own characters of calm- " neſs of ſpirit and true manly reſolution: They ſhould begin with " caution, proceed with temper, end all things amicably if they " can; if not, when duly prepared and adequately provided, they " might truſt the deciſion to arms."

The *Kings* of Sparta were ever juſtled on their thrones by the haughty overbearing *Ephori*. Sthenelaïdas, one of that college, anſwers Archidamus in a ſhort, blunt, properly Laconic ſpeech. " He " is ſevere upon the Athenians, ſneers Archidamus, and avers that " Lacedæmonians ſhould not deliberate upon, but inſtantly take the

field

"field and avenge their wrongs." He then put the queſtion — Whether the peace was broke? — divided the council; told the votes; and declared, in the Engliſh ſtile, that the *Ays* had it.

The confederates were now called in, and acquainted with the reſolution. Yet, it ſeems the advice of Archidamus had carried ſome weight, and actual war was to be defer'd, 'till all the parties in the Lacedæmonian league had ripened their meaſures, and were ready to act with unanimity and vigor.

Here the author again makes his appearance, and aſſures us the true motive of the determination for war at Sparta, was a JEALOUSY of the Athenian power now very great, and a dread of its more extenſive growth; the latter of which they were determined to prevent, and to reduce the former within leſs diſtaſteful and terrific bounds.

Then follows a moſt pertinent *digreſſion*, in which Thucydides points out the ſteps, by which the Athenians had ſo highly exalted their *State*. In a cloſe and ſuccinct manner he runs over the hiſtory of Athens for fifty years, from the invaſion of Xerxes to the breaking out of the Peloponneſian war. He arranges all the incidents in due place and time. Herodotus hath related the ſplendid paſſages of the Grecian hiſtory during that invaſion; hath exhibited Themiſtocles in all the luſtre of his command at the battle of Salamis, where the Athenians, who had abandoned their all, fought, and through the addreſs of Themiſtocles obliged all parties to fight, for liberty againſt Xerxes. On this day they earned a greater title than that of *citizens* of Athens; they were afterwards acknowledged the *ſovereigns* of the ſea. The Lacedæmonians became mortified at it; but the Athenians had glorioufly deſerved it. Themiſtocles was the very life and ſoul of Greece on this occaſion. In the midſt of difficulties he formed a moſt extenſive plan for his beloved Athens, which he began to execute at once. Thucydides deſcribes his addreſs and foreſight. He ſoon ſets the city beyond the reach of envy and jealouſy. And tho'

ſoon

ſoon after he loſt his country, through the malice of his perſonal enemies and the enemies of his country in conjunction with them, yet the ſtateſmen and patriots left behind purſued his plan of naval power: And the ſteps of its progreſs and advancement are minutely traced out by our Hiſtorian.

Themiſtocles had made all ſafe and ſecure at home. The *Long-walls* were built; the *Piræus*, a ſpacious harbour, opened and fortified, a magazine for traffic, and an arſenal for war. Ariſtides, as true a patriot as ever lived, made all ſecure abroad. Through his honeſt management, all Greece ſubmitted to an annual tax, for the guard of their common liberty againſt future invaſions; and the *leaders* at ſea were made *collectors* and *treaſurers* of this naval fund. The iſle of Delos was the place, at firſt, of lodging this fund; but, it was ſoon after removed to Athens; — a ſhrewd political ſtep, yet capable however of an ample if not full juſtification. The war is briſkly carried on againſt the Perſian monarch; the iſles and ſeas are cleared of the common enemy; the cities on the coaſt are regained or conquered. Cimon alſo performs his part nobly; he earns two victories the ſame day, by ſea and land, on the coaſt of Ionia from the Perſians. He compleated a negotiation with the petty maritime *States*, confederate with Athens, who were tired of inceſſant warfare, for accepting ſums of money inſtead of ſhips and perſonal attendance. By this means the ſhipping of thoſe *States* ſoon mouldered away, and their money was by their own agreement ſent thither, to increaſe and ſtrengthen the maritime power of Athens. In ſpite of all the oppoſition, which the Corinthians and Bœotians gave them at home, whoſe rancor to them was never to be appeaſed, in the courſe of no large number of years, they had eſtabliſhed a very extenſive and formidable empire indeed. The iſles and coaſts of the Ægéan ſea were moſtly their own. The bay of Sarone was intirely in their own juriſdiction: And, by being maſters of Naupactus, they conſiderably awed the bay of Criſſa. Their ſquadrons cruized round

and

and quite awed the coasts of Peloponnesus. Their interest at Cephallene, and the new alliance which gained them the accession of the naval strength of Corcyra, rendered them masters of the Ionian, and they had colonies to extend their traffic and influence both in Italy and Sicily.

These points are opened step by step in this *digression* by Thucydides, 'till jealousy in the Lacedæmonians and malice in the Corinthians irritated all the Peloponnesian *States* and their allies against them, and ended in the *determination* for war. The Corinthians had now carried their point, and soon hoped to gratify all their resentments. Accordingly, at the second grand congress at Sparta, when all the rest of the *States* had declared their minds, they warmly encourage them to enter at once upon an offensive war, in a very studied and elaborate speech.

Speech of the Corinthians.

"They set out with handsome compliments to the Lacedæmoni-
"ans. They animate the landed *States* of Peloponnesus to join ef-
"fectually with those on the coasts. A firm and lasting peace can
"only be obtained by a vigorous war; and the power of Athens
"must needs be reduced. — They open a plan — for establishing
"funds — for weakening the marine of Athens, and consequently
"for improving and strengthening the marine of her enemies — for
"effectuating the revolts of her dependents — and raising fortifica-
"ons in Attica itself. Independence can never be earned at too
"great a price; it costs as much to be voluntary and obedient slaves.
"A single *State* should never be suffered to play the tyrant in Greece.
"Their own reputation, their dignity, their liberty, their welfare, a
"most righteous cause, nay the very Gods themselves summon them
"to action. They close with a very warm and pathetic recapitula-
"tion, sounding as it were the alarm for the destruction of Athens."

Now war is a second time resolved upon by ballot. All are ordered to get ready, with the utmost dispatch, to begin its operations. In the mean time, the Athenians are to be amused with embassies

and

and negotiations, merely to gain time and ſave appearances. Frivolous they really are, but our author minutely details them, as they give him an opportunity of introducing ſome notable paſſages relating to Cylon, Pauſanias, and Themiſtocles. He then ſhifts the ſcene to Athens; and introduces Pericles, the moſt commanding orator, the greateſt general, the moſt conſummate ſtateſman, and at this time prime miniſter of the republic — introduces Pericles, I ſay, in the aſſembly of the people, to give them an inſight into the ſchemes of their enemies, and a plan for their own conduct; to encourage them to a brave and ſteddy reſiſtance, in ſtrict adherence to ſuch methods, as in the end will infallibly not barely ſecure but aggrandize their *State*.

Speech of Pericles.

The thoughts in this ſpeech of Pericles are ſo grand, ſo nervous, ſo emphatically and conciſely juſt, that if the reader be not immediately ſtruck into an adequate conception of them, I know no method of opening his eyes or enlarging his underſtanding. He ſays but little, but ſays every thing in that little. He demoliſheth all the aſſertions of the Corinthians in their laſt ſpeech at Sparta, as if he had heard them ſpeak. Perhaps Thucydides *here* hath not ſufficiently concealed his art in writing. But the ſpeech is intirely in character, compleatly ſuited to the heart and head and mouth of Pericles. Pericles, I obſerve it with pleaſure, is an Engliſhman both in heart and judgment. England hath adhered and will adhere to the leſſons which Athens neglected and forgot. — "Of vaſt conſequence indeed," (ſays this enlightned ſtateſman) "is the dominion of the ſea. But, "conſider it with attention. For, were we ſeated on an iſland," (as the force of his argument evidently implies) "we could never be "ſubdued. And now you ought to think, that our preſent ſituation is "nearly as poſſible the ſame, and ſo to evacuate your houſes and lands "in Attica, and to confine your defence to the ſea." If this can need a comment, Xenophon will give it in his *Polity of the* Athenians. — "In one point (ſays he) the Athenians are deficient. For if,

beſide

" beſide their being ſovereigns of the ſea, they were ſeated on an " iſland, it would be ever in their power to ravage others at pleaſure, " and yet they could not be ravaged themſelves ſo long as they held " the maſtery at ſea; their lands could never be laid waſte, no ene- " my could poſt themſelves upon them. But now, the occupiers of " lands and the wealthy Athenians fly before invaders; whilſt the " people in general, conſcious they have nothing to be burnt and " nothing to be plundered, live exempt from fear nor fly before an " invader. The expedient uſed on ſuch occaſions is, that the former " depoſit their moſt valuable effects in the iſles, and truſting to their " ſuperiority at ſea, ſlight all the devaſtations an enemy can make " in Attica." England is compleat where Athens was deficient. And how fond muſt both Pericles and Xenophon have been of the iſland and maritime power of Great-Britain? I will not pretend to anticipate the reader's pleaſure by deſcending into more particularities. It may ſuffice to add, that the final anſwer of the Athenians is drawn up by the advice of Pericles, that " they will do nothing by " command; they had already offered to refer all diſputes to a fair " judicial deciſion; ſo far only, but no farther, compliance muſt be " expected from Athens." —— Here all negotiation comes to an end; and the war will very ſoon commence.

Thus I have endeavoured to give ſome idea of the firſt book of Thucydides. It is a grand piece of work beyond all denial. But Rapin thinks our author hath overdone it " out of a deſire of pre- " fixing a too ſtately portal to his hiſtory." Could the portal have been thought too ſtately, if the whole fabric had been compleatly finiſhed? To form a right judgment here, we ſhould examine the *deſign* and not the *execution*: The latter is imperfect, is broke off. So, look at it from the park, the Banqueting-houſe at Whitehall is too big and towering for what ſtands near it. But hath it that appearance in the original plan of Inigo Jones for the magnificent palace once deſigned to be erected? Something of this nature may juſtly

be pleaded in favour of Thucydides, and teach us not to judge too haſtily of a *whole*, when we cannot ſurvey all the *parts*, becauſe they never were finiſhed. Moved by decorum, I would gladly juſtify my author, but I by no means pretend to decide the point.

Book II. The Second Book opens with the firſt act of hoſtility. The Thebans march by night, and enter by ſurpriſe the city of Platæa. This city and petty *State*, tho' juſt within Bœotia, was not comprized in the *union*, of which all the other cities of Bœotia were conſtituents with Thebes at their head, but had ever been firmly attached, even in the worſt of times, to the common liberty of Greece, and was under the protection of and in faſt alliance with Athens. This ſurpriſe of Platæa our author deſcribes in all its turns, 'till its enemies are driven out or ſlaughtered, and the place is ſecured for the Athenians.

A rupture hath now been made, and the war is going to be general. Thucydides founds the charge in all the diſpoſition and ſpirit of Homer. He catalogues the allies on both ſides. He awakens our expectation; and faſt engages our attention. All mankind are concerned in the important point now going to be decided. Endeavors are made to diſcloſe futurity. Heaven itſelf is intereſted in the diſpute. The earth totters, and nature ſeems to labour with the great event. This is *his* ſolemn and ſublime manner of ſetting out. Thus he *magnifies* a war between two, as Rapin ſtiles them, *petty* States; *and thus artfully he ſupports a little ſubject by treating it in a great and noble method.*

Writers, who have been long contemplating the vaſt gigantic ſize of the Roman Empire, if they caſt their eyes on the State of Athens even at the preſent juncture, are apt to form a low idea of it. Athens, it is true, was at this time in the higheſt meridian of her power. Yet, why ever to be pitching upon the moſt diſadvantageous and incongruous parallels? His ſubject was certainly the greateſt that to this day had occurred in the world: And, ought Thucydides to be degraded,

degraded, or even leſſened at all, becauſe he was not born in the ſame age with Livy? As much amuſement at leaſt accompanies, and as much inſtruction flows from reading carefully the hiſtory of Athens, as from that of Rome. Wonder may be more raiſed by the latter, and the wonder may end in deteſtation of a people, who became enormouſly great by the miſeries and deſtruction of their fellow-creatures. The Romans were but brute-like men: They were not tolerably humaniſed 'till they had conquered Greece. Greece re-conquered them, and eſtabliſhed a better more laſting triumph over mind, than the others over body.

Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit —— *Hor.*

Who then beſt deſerve the applauſe of the heart, the citizens of Athens, or the the citizens of Rome? I am not at all in doubt, how men of a calm and conſiderate ſpirit will decide the queſtion. Or, let ſuch as judge only by numbers, conſider a little more ſedately, whether Athens at this time was that diminutive and petty *State*, which could be magnified and enobled only by artifice. The firſt army, that invaded her territories in this war, conſiſted (according to Plutarch) of ſixty thouſand men. This is an object big enough to fill the eye. The ſtate of her revenue, when the value of money is adjuſted, will turn out by no means trifling. They were poſſeſſed, at the breaking out of the war, of three hundred triremes fit for ſea. Two hundred and fifty of them were at one time in commiſſion, in the fourth year of the war: Conſequently at two hundred men a ſhip, the number of ſeamen employed muſt have been fifty thouſand. If the reader be not yet convinced, that Athens was not a *petty* State, nothing can get the better of his prejudice. It would be pity, any one ſhould ſit down to Thucydides with ſuch low prepoſſeſſions againſt his ſubject.

Speech of Archidamus.

The confederate army of Peloponneſians is now aſſembled, and ready to march into Attica, under the command of Archidamus. Like an able and cautious general he harangues his troops, "encou-"rages them with a ſight of their own numbers, but guards them "from catching at that ſight a contempt of their foes. The ſtrict "obſervation of diſcipline is always neceſſary to armies, be they "never ſo large. No enemy ought ever to be deſpiſed, much leſs "Athenians. Tho' an enemy, he ſpeaks in high commendation of "the latter, and eſtabliſhes the dignity of their characters. He ends "with an exhortation to his troops, to obſerve rules, conform to "diſcipline, and bravely to execute orders; and Spartan-like, "concludes with an encomium on the beauty and ſtrength of ſtrict "military obedience."

He then ſends a meſſenger to Athens, to try if a war were yet to be avoided. The Athenians are as determined as ever to make no ſubmiſſions. The meſſenger is conducted out of their territories, and parts from his eſcort with a pathetic prediction of the miſeries in which all Greece is going to be involved. Attica ſoon after is invaded. The miſchief done by the invaders is deſcribed; and the ſenſe at Athens of their ſufferings and diſtreſſes repreſented at large. The reader, on this occaſion, will be let into the form and conſtitution of the Athenian polity. He will ſee, how they began to be moulded into one community by the prudence of Theſeus one of their earlieſt kings. Other hiſtorians expatiate on the method, by which from being under a *regal* they had varied gradually into a purely *republican* form. I ſhall only mention an obſervation *, that, contrary to moſt other nations, they had aboliſhed the regal government, not from diſtaſte but reverence to kings. Codrus, the laſt of their kings, had devoted himſelf for his country, and was ſo worthy a man, that they reſolved no mortal ſhould afterwards wear that title amongſt them. They declared *Jupiter* king of Athens, about the

* Tourreil's Preface Hiſtorique.

ſame

ſame time that the Jews rebelled againſt *theocracy*, and would have a man to reign over them. *Archons* for life ſucceeded; whoſe term was afterwards abridged to ten years; then, to a ſingle year. All general hiſtories point out the variations, 'till they came to the *popular* form which now prevailed.

The enemy, after heavy depredations, at length evacuated Attica; and the Athenians take the field to retaliate upon them. Their ſquadron had been all the time at ſea, cruizing upon and infeſting the coaſts of Peloponneſus. But, in the winter, we are called to Athens to ſee the public funeral of thoſe, who were killed in the firſt campaign. Here, the firſt time it occurs, our author deſcribes this ſolemnity, and Pericles makes the Funeral-oration.

The Funeral-oration.

I ſhall make no reflexions on *this* celebrated performance. Should the reader not think it deſerving of its high reputation, I fear the *tranſlator* will be ſadly to blame. It is hard to give ſuch noble ideas their proper energy, and ſuch refined ones their due exactneſs. The great orators of Athens were always glad to diſplay their abilities on the ſame occaſion. Plato hath entered the liſts with a high ſpirit of emulation, and with a high degree of ſucceſs: And a great maſter * this way hath lately made him *Engliſh*. If Thucydides ſuffers by a compariſon, which now the unlearned but judicious reader is impowered to make, the latter muſt be intreated to obſerve, that the eloquence of Plato was beyond diſpute more ſmooth and fluent, more accompliſhed in all that is beautiful and ſweet than the eloquence of Thucydides, but an adjudged inferiority in any other reſpect muſt be laid at the door of his *tranſlator*.

The plague.

After ſuch an exhilarating and enlivening piece, for ſuch it muſt have been to all who heard it, and muſt have determined every Athenian to ſuffer any thing with intrepidity and patience in the cauſe of his country, a very mournful ſcene immediately ſucceeds, which lays them under ſuch a load of affliction and diſtreſs, as no arguments,

* Mr. Weſt.

no philoſophy can alleviate. The plague breaks out at Athens; and the reader muſt be ready to feel very ſharp emotions in behalf of his fellow-creatures, and in behalf of morality and virtue too. Amidſt their accumulated diſtreſſes, Pericles is the only ſupport of the community; and, like the greateſt benefactors to ungrateful men, is curſed for being their ſupport, and reproached for being fleddily wiſe and in the right. At laſt he convenes them, and addreſſes them with ſuch an air of ingenuity, ſuch ſpirit, and conſcious dignity, and firm reliance on a good cauſe, as only two orators that I know of have ever equalled on parallel occaſions. Thoſe I mean are Demoſthenes and St. Paul. All the world of letters and good taſte are well acquainted with the *oration* of the former againſt Æſchines about the *crown*; and every claſs of readers is ſurely well verſed in the *Second Epiſtle of* Paul *to the* Corinthians. I can but hint theſe reſemblances, ſince now I muſt attend on Pericles, who ſooths or thunders his countrymen out of all their diſcontent and malice, and ſends them home convinced and aſhamed. But domeſtic diſtreſs ſoon effaceth any other impreſſions; their paſſions are again inflamed by inwardly corroding anguiſh, and Pericles after all muſt be fined, and turned out of his employments. Yet people are not always mad; good-ſenſe and conviction return upon them; and he is begged, becauſe moſt worthy, again to accept the ſole adminiſtration. He enjoys it but a little time, before he is carried off by the plague. Athens then loſt her ableſt, honeſteſt ſtateſman. He was able to have ſat at the helm of government, to have ſteered the *republic* ſafe through every ſtorm, and to have inſured her not bare ſecurity but open triumph. His ſucceſſors were very alert at catching hold of that helm; but, none of them could hold it long; and the veſſel, through their mutual quarrels, muſt needs run aground or founder at laſt.

The Speech of Pericles.

But the next remarkable paſſage in the hiſtory, is the march of the Peloponneſians to inveſt Platæa, and the ſolemn parley held at their

their approach. Archidamus is at the head of this ungenerous enterprise. The malice of the Thebans muſt be gratified, ſince the alliance of Bœotia in this war is of mighty conſequence, and to be purchaſed at any rate. Archidamus indeed ſtruggles hard for the Platæans; he would fain ſpare them, could he perſuade them to a neutrality. But the Platæans have too much honour and gratitude to be neutral, when Athens, their faithful guardian and ally, is principally ſtruck at. They remonſtrate in vain from the topics of honour, juſtice, gratitude, the glory and ſanction of the great progenitors on either ſide. The ſiege is formed, and ſtrenuouſly plied, tho' without ſucceſs. Our author always ſhines in exact deſcription: No method of annoyance or defence is omitted. It is at length turned into a blockade; and a ſufficient body of troops left behind to carry it on, when the main army marcheth off.

The war grows warm in more remote quarters; in Thrace; and in Acarnania. An Athenian ſquadron, ſtationed at Naupactus in the bay of Criſſa, awed all the motions of the Corinthians and allies on their own coaſts; and it was determined, to clear away this annoyance. Accordingly, they lanch out againſt it with more than double the number of veſſels. The Athenians, at one exertion of ſkill, drive them all on a heap, defeat them, and make prizes of twelve. The Lacedæmonians, excellent land-men, but very aukward ſeamen, think this an unaccountable event. They ſend down their moſt active commanders to refit and reinforce the fleet, and to try their fortune again at ſea. Much artifice is employed on both ſides. The ſhort harangues of the admirals let us into all the views and deſigns of either party. Phormio at length is ſnared; the enemy blunders; then Phormio extricates himſelf, and gives them a ſecond defeat. The reader ſees every tack, and the motion of every veſſel.

Diſconcerted here, they form a bold project indeed to ſurpriſe the Piræus by night, and to finiſh the war in a moment. The project is deſcribed, and the probability of ſucceſs eſtabliſhed. But the very

grandeur

grandeur of the attempt deters the undertakers. Athens indeed is alarmed, and thrown into a great conſternation; but, the project totally miſcarries, and the Piræus is better ſecured for the future.

All Thrace is now arming under Sitalces againſt Perdiccas king of Macedonia. A vaſt army of Barbarians is aſſembled, marches over a great length of country, ſtrikes a general panic, effectuates no real ſervice, and ſoon diſperſes or moulders away. Such bulky unwieldy armies make an aukward figure, compared with the regularity, exact diſcipline, and perſonal bravery of the diminutive armies of Greece.

Thucydides gives us once more a ſight of Phormio and his gallant ſquadron; and then cloſeth the *book*, and the hiſtory of the third year of the war. "Never hiſtory (ſays Rapin) comprized ſo much "matter in ſo little room, nor ſo much action in ſo few words. If "any thing can be found fault with, it is that the exploits are too "cloſely crowded with one another, ſo that the coherence ſeems "ſomewhat intricate and confuſed, and the multiplying of objects "tends only to diſſipate the attention of the reader." An *hiſtorian* however is to take his incidents in their natural order, as they ſubſiſt in fact. He is not ſo much to diſpoſe, as to deſcribe them. If he does the latter pertinently, accurately, and with a due attention to their importance, he hath acquitted himſelf of his duty. The *poet* or writer of *fiction* muſt pick out and heighten his incidents, with a view to fill up properly, and give to every diſtinct object its needful ſplendor: He is to exert his choice, and by exerting it judiciouſly to gain applauſe. The *hiſtorian* is not to pick but to make the beſt uſe of his materials. He may give them indeed all poſſible luſtre; but, if they crowd too thick upon one another, the reader may be embarraſſed with the number, yet no body can be juſtly blamed.

Book III. The Third Book is no leſs full of matter than the preceding. The incidents crowd faſt upon one another, and politics and oratory are in full employ. The revolt of Leſbos is the firſt occurrence of importance.

importance. The people of that iſle had been long in the Athenian league: But the members of this league were *dependents* rather than *confederates*. Thucydides always employs the ſame Greek word (συμμάχοι) for the members of either league: The idea it gives is that of *companions* in war. But there is great difference between ſuch as accompany, becauſe they chuſe it; and ſuch as accompany, becauſe they are ſummoned and cannot help it. The former was in general the caſe of thoſe who ſided with Sparta; the latter, of thoſe who ſided with Athens. The leaſt thought of compulſion is grating to any *State*, which thinks it ought, and is able, to be quite independent. This was the caſe with the Leſbians, a people conſiderable in many reſpects, but eſpecially for their naval ſtrength. It was well worth the while of the Lacedæmonians to gain ſuch *confederates*; it muſt be a ſad blow to the Athenians to loſe ſuch *dependents*. The fact was; all the cities of Leſbos, except Methymne, declare a revolt. The Athenians loſe no time, but are at once with a powerful ſquadron before Mitylene, and block it up. The Mitylenéans had ſent embaſſadors to beg immediate aid from the Lacedæmonians. They had an audience from them and the reſt of their league at Olympia, ſo ſoon as the games were ended. The *ſpeech* they make on this occaſion is very artful, very inſinuating, and nicely adapted to carry their point.

Speech of the Mitylenéans.

" They open the nature of a *revolt*, and the caſes in which it me-
" rits protection and ſuccour from others. They have been ill
" uſed by the Athenians; have been made their tools in inſlaving
" their compatriots of Greece; have been long careſſed indeed, but
" are well aſſured what their own fate would ſoon have been.
" Every *State* hath a natural right to take preventive meaſures againſt
" the loſs of their liberty and to ſtand on their defence. They had
" revolted ſooner, would the Lacedæmonians have countenanced the
" meaſure: They had declared it on the firſt invitation of the Bœo-
" tians. It was a noble revolt; it had diſengaged them from a

" combination to inſlave the reſt of Greece; it had aſſociated them in " the cauſe of honour and liberty. It had been made indeed with " too much precipitation; but this ſhould make others more zealous " and active in their protection, who would reap a great acceſſion of " ſtrength by it; an acceſſion of maritime ſtrength; whilſt the " Athenians would be weakened in point of ſhipping, and in point " of revenue. It would be a ſignal of revolt to others, and aſſur- " ance to them that they might do it ſafely. It would reflect " abundant honour on the Lacedæmonians to ſuccour the diſtreſſed, " to ſave men whoſe preſervation would give them glory and " ſtrength, and prove them thoſe hearty friends to liberty, which " all Greece with united praiſes acknowledged them to be."

Intereſt without rhetoric was ſtrong enough to inſure their ſucceſs. But the latter helped to gain them a prompt reception from the Lacedæmonians, who reſolve on ſending them a ſuccour, and making diverſions on the Athenians, in order to oblige them to raiſe the ſiege of Mitylene.

The blockade of Platæa by the Peloponneſians ſtill continuing, our author relates the bold project, and bold execution of the project, of a party of Platæans, in making their eſcape over all the works of the beſiegers. It is a moſt circumſtantial, and a moſt clear and intelligible relation.

Mitylene is now forced to ſurrender at diſcretion. The principal agents in the late revolt are ſent priſoners to Athens, where the *people* vote that " not they only but all the Mitylenéans in general be put " to death;" and an order is immediately diſpatched to their commander at Mitylene to execute his part of the ſentence. This bloody decree was carried by Cleon, a furious demagogue. It was he, who worked up the people of Athens to ſuch a pitch of inhumanity; which, however, inſtantly ſubſided. They are ſtruck with horror at their own *reſolution*, and will have it again debated. We ſhall hear the two ſpeakers on each ſide of the queſtion, Cleon and Diodotus.

" Cleon

"Cleon ſets out with all the fury and fire of a man, who hath a "bad heart. He hath abjured humanity to ſhew himſelf a moſt "zealous patriot. Eloquent he is acknowledged to have been, and "ſo appears in his invectives againſt his own maſters and his own "tools, the *people*, for their fooliſh commiſeration, for their being "the eternal dupes of orators, of ſubtle and venal ſpeakers. For "his own part, he loves his country, and hates her enemies. Guilt "ſhall never find an advocate in him; he calls out for vengeance on "the Mitylenéans; none but their penſioners, none but men who "are bribed and corrupted can offer a plea in their behalf. He bids "his audience throw away all fooliſh pity, all womaniſh forbearance; "to fix their attention on the crimes of the guilty, and not on the "horrors of their puniſhment; and give this proof to their depen- "dents, that death ſhall inevitably be the portion of all revolters, "that their arms may be henceforth employed in oppoſing their pub- "lic enemies, and not in chaſtiſing their own ſubjects." Cleon's *ſpeech.*

Diodotus replies in a *ſpeech* that ſhews him a real patriot, and a man who thought good-manners, a calm conſiderate temper, and a regard to humanity to be very conſiſtent with the true patriot-ſpirit. "He therefore defends the *re-committing* of their former *reſo-* "*lution*, ſince repeated conſultations cannot be prejudicial to the "public welfare. It is a baſe and odious method to laviſh the "charge of ignorance and venality on men who differ in ſenti- "ment; it robs the public of its ableſt counſellors and ſincereſt "friends. Strict juſtice, in the preſent inſtance, may be with "Cleon; but the future and laſting welfare of their country is the "object now to be kept in view. The puniſhment of death hath "never effectually awed the tempers of mankind. To make men "deſperate is very impolitic; to extirpate their dependents is lopping "off their own limbs, and ruining their own revenue. Men ſhould "be retained in their duty by mild diſcretionary precautions; ſevere "and ſanguinary proceedings never anſwer the purpoſe. And, *Speech of* Diodotus.

" what cruelty to doom a whole people to deſtruction! to involve the
" innocent with the guilty! to murder even ſuch as had been their
" friends and benefactors! He adviſes them not to give too large a
" ſcope to mercy, but to puniſh the guilty, and the guilty alone.
" This will ſufficiently intimidate others; will ſecure their intereſt in
" Leſbos better for the future; and convince the world how ſoundly
" Athenians can deliberate upon all their concerns."

Diodotus carries his point. The Athenians, cruel only in the fit of choler but habitually humane, repeal the bloody ſentence; and diſpatch a veſſel with all haſte to ſtop execution, which arrives at Mitylene but juſt time enough to prevent the maſſacre.

The next event of importance contraſts the Lacedæmonian character with that of the Athenians. The author takes no pains to point it out; but it lies too ready and obvious to paſs unobſerved. — Platæa, after a tedious blockade, is obliged by famine to ſurrender. They ſurrender however to the Lacedæmonians, on condition of being brought to a judicial trial, and only, if found guilty of unjuſt behaviour, to be put to death. Some delegates arrive from Sparta to preſide in this court of mere inquiſition, ſince the whole proceſs is confined to a ſingle queſtion — " Whether they had done any poſitive " ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and allies" — that is, to their declared and determined enemies — " in the preſent war?" The queſtion plainly manifeſted a deliberate reſolution to put them all to death. And all the favour they obtain is, to be ſuffered to make a kind of dying ſpeech before men, who were ſtiled indeed judges but in fact were butchers. It was a caſe of great commiſeration, and the ſpeaker lays it open with all that natural eloquence which flows from an inward and keen ſenſibility. If men were not deaf to perſuaſion, it muſt have perſuaded. The cauſe was moſt alarming, and a more pathetic *plea* hath never been exhibited.

Speech of the Platæans.

" They inſiſt that on a fair and explicit condition they had ſurren-
" dered to the Lacedæmonians, whereas now they were prejudged

" and

" and precondemned to gratify their unrelenting foes the Thebans.
" The infidious *queſtion* left them no plea at all. They could not an-
" ſwer it, and muſt not be ſilent. Since life is at ſtake, ſomething
" muſt be ſaid even by men who deſpair of perſuading. Their
" quarrel with the Thebans had been juſt and honourable; quarrel
" with the Lacedæmonians they never had any. Nay merely at the
" deſire of the latter, had they cultivated Athenian friendſhip, that
" unpardonable crime, for which they were now doomed to deſtruc-
" tion. They expatiate with truth and energy on the great ſervices
" they had done to the liberty of Greece. All Greece was bound in
" honour, in gratitude, in deference to poſitive and ſolemn oaths, to
" preſerve the Platæans. Ought every tie to be rent aſunder, gene-
" roſity to be quite expunged, and all benevolence thrown aſide, to
" ſerve a private turn? Ought Platæans to be thus baſely reduced,
" as they really had been, either to be ſtarved or to be butchered?
" The Lacedæmonians ſhould intreat the Thebans for them, ſhould
" beg them to ſave the lives of friends and benefactors; at leaſt,
" ſhould replace them within their walls, and leave them to the fate
" of war. They apply to their generoſity, to their humanity;
" they ſtrive to give them ſome emotions of pity; they re-
" preſent the liableneſs of mankind to calamity; how brutal
" it is to be deliberately hard-hearted; how ſinful it is to be reſo-
" lutely ungrateful! They call upon heaven and earth to interpoſe
" in their behalf; they run over every pathetic and perſuaſive
" topic; 'till they can add no more, and yet dare not end; and,
" again intreat the Lacedæmonians to ſave thoſe worthy patriots, to
" whom all Greece is indebted for her liberty and independence."

The Thebans, who were afraid the Lacedæmonians had a higher ſenſe of honour and gratitude than they really had, demand alſo to be heard.

In the *ſpeech* they make on this occaſion, " they firſt accuſe the *Speech of the Thebans.*
" Platæans of ſlander and invective. They endeavour to palliate the
" reproach on themſelves, for deſerting the cauſe of liberty and

" joining

" joining the arms of Perſia. The Platæans had been active ever
" ſince to betray it to the Athenians; that wicked ſcheme, which
" with all their power the Thebans had ever oppoſed. By ſuch ini-
" quitous conduct the Platæans had extinguiſhed their former glory,
" had effaced all their former merits. No body was bound to redreſs
" or pity them, but their friends the Athenians. Their temper had
" been always bad; always bent on violence and miſchief; always
" addicted to ſet up tyranny in Greece, provided Athenians were the
" tyrants. They then endeavour to throw an *anti-pathetic* into
" their own repreſentations. They paint the death of their coun-
" trymen ſlain at the ſurpriſe of Platæa in a mournful light, as put
" to death contrary to every law, and murdered in the very act of
" ſtretching out their hands and pleading a promiſe of life. The
" lives therefore of ſuch butchers are forfeited to juſtice; and they
" inſiſt the forfeit ſhall be taken: The Lacedæmonians are bound in
" honour to take it. They beg them therefore to be deaf to vain
" complaints and intreaties, to revenge the injured, and to puniſh
" the guilty; to regard what bad men have done, and not what
" they have ſaid; to defy eloquence, and heed only ſimple unſo-
" phiſticated truth; by which alone men, who preſide in judgment,
" can ſatisfy their conſcience and their duty."

An alliance with Thebes is neceſſary in this war to the Lacedæmonians, and they purchaſe it at a mighty price indeed. The wretched Platæans, *by all mankind abandoned*, are butchered one after another, to the number of two hundred; their wives are ſold for ſlaves; their city is rooted up from its foundations.

Thucydides ſoon after deſcribes the ſedition of Corcyra, the horrors of which are ſcarcely to be paralleled in ſtory. He paints all the dreadful conſequences of faction in a community. And what pity it is, that a warm, generous, and innate love of liberty, when carried to exceſs, ſhould be the ſource of ſo much miſery to reaſonable creatures! Our author, contrary to his cuſtom, runs out here

here into many grave and judicious reflexions, in the intereſt of no party, a champion for no particular form, but as a friend to man, and a friend to virtue. It is the luſt of power, that throws embroilments and confuſions into all communities. In governments ſtrictly *republican*, the ambitious are eager to obtain more than an equal ſhare. In an *oligarchical* form, the few in power want ever to retain and often to enlarge their ſhare; and the cry of liberty is ſhouted loudeſt by thoſe who want moſt to overthrow it. But yet, was the matter ever mended, or the miſeries of mankind prevented by ſetting up a ſingle tyrant? Communities have ſuffered more, for the caprice, for the ſupport of the nominal glory of ſuch a *head*, than they have done by a number of popular ſeditions. The reader will certainly all along reflect on the fine model of government eſtabliſhed in his own country; and own, that a community may be governed and yet be happy, that the power of the *one* and of the *few* and of the *many* may be tempered into an apt and laſting conſiſtence; and, as it hath been for ages in a train of improvement, keep it but unhurt by inteſtine faction, may laſt to the diſſolution of this great globe itſelf.

After this tragical buſineſs of Corcyra, Thucydides enters upon the affairs of Sicily. The ſeeds of war are ſowing in that iſland, which will afterwards grow into a mighty harveſt. — He relates other incidents, 'till he comes to a remarkable ſcene of war in Ætolia, where Demoſthenes the Athenian commander is totally defeated. — He deſcribes the purification of the iſle of Delos by the Athenians; and hath found the art to make it a chearful and entertaining piece, for the relief of the reader, after he hath been engaged in ſo many ſcenes of horror and deſtruction, and is ſoon going to be engaged in more. — The battles of Olpe and Idomene are ſufficiently ſtored with ſlaughter, to glut any reader who delights in blood. The armies in this hiſtory have been often thought not to be ſufficiently numerous. They make no havoc; they do not knock one another

another on the head faſt enough to preſerve attention. But theſe old Greeks were men and not brutes. And it is pity, that the hiſtory of men ſhould be ſo much a hiſtory of the deſtruction of the human ſpecies.

Book IV. In the Fourth Book, the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, principals in the war, are matched directly againſt one another. Demoſthenes, a wiſe and brave commander, had ſeized and fortified Pylus in the territories of the latter, had placed ſuch a garriſon in it as annoyed the whole country, and in the end might wound the very vitals of that *State*. The Lacedæmonians ſlight it at firſt, as if their bare appearance would remedy all. But upon trial, their land-armies and their ſquadrons are unable to diſlodge the enemy. It is with the true martial ſpirit of an experienced and gallant commander, that Demoſthenes harangues his ſmall body of Athenians, when he draws them up on the beach of the ſea, to beat off the ſhips of the enemy. Thucydides ſhines on theſe occaſions; in him the addreſſes are always made, and pertinently made, to the ſoldiers who are preſent; they intereſt and animate but never run out into declamation and common-place. — The turns of war at Pylus are ſudden, and engage attention. They fight by land, and fight by ſea; nay, what is more, land-battles are fought from the water, and naval battles fought from off the ſhore. The eye will diſtinctly view theſe ſtrange occurrences; they are painted ſtrong; the groupes are not mere heaps of confuſion, and the principal figures are eminently diſtinguiſhed. The body of *Spartans* intercepted in the iſle of Sphacteria, who muſt either ſtarve, or what to Lacedæmonians is full as bad, muſt ſurrender their perſons and their arms, is a point that exceedingly alarms that martial community. Things had long ſince gone againſt them; but now, their hereditary honour and military glory, on which and which alone they piqued themſelves, are in danger of being miſerably tarniſhed. Their proud ſpirits condeſcend to beg a *truce*, that they may ſend an embaſſy to Athens to ſolicit an *accommodation*.

It

Speech of the Lacedæmonian *embaſſy.*

It muſt have afforded a high degree of ſpiteful joy at Athens, to find the Lacedæmonians lengthening their monoſyllables and petitioning for peace. It is curious to hear in what manner they ſolicit, when admitted to audience. They declare themſelves ſent, "in "behalf of their countrymen, to propoſe an *expedient* very much for "the honour of Athens, and which would extricate themſelves from "the difficulties that now bore hard upon them. Athens never had "ſo fine an opportunity of raiſing her credit, ſecuring her acquiſitions, and carrying her glory to the higheſt pitch. They ſhould not "be puffed up, but reflect on the ſtrange viciſſitude of human affairs. Who could expect, the Lacedæmonians ſhould ever be ſunk "ſo low, as to ſue for peace? Yet what was the lot of Sparta "might poſſibly become, ſome time or other, the lot of Athens. "The latter ſhould be moderate now, ſhould accept of offered "friendſhip, ſhould chearfully receive a ſubmiſſion, made only to "prevent deſperation in great and gallant ſouls, and open a field for "mutual benevolence. The rival-States may now be reconciled; and "only now, before things are brought to extremities, and diſgrace "hath rendered one party deſperate. At this criſis, the Athenians "may confer on Greece the bleſſing of a firm and laſting peace, "and reap all the honour and advantage of it, ſince all the credit of "it will be their own. Lacedæmonians may be *obliged*, but will "not be *compelled*. At length, they propoſe their *expedient*, not ex"plicitly but with a ſhrewd inſinuation, that would the Athenians "ſtrike up a bargain with them, they might jointly lord it over "Greece for the future, beyond control."

Had Pericles been now alive, we may eaſily gueſs, how readily he would have laid hold on this opportunity to end a burdenſome and diſtreſsful war, which on the ſide of Athens had at firſt been neceſſitated and merely defenſive. But ſucceſs had elevated Athens quite too high; and no real friend to the *State* had at preſent ſo much influence as Cleon, that loud and boiſterous demagogue. Hence it comes,

comes, that ſuch terms are inſiſted upon as the Lacedæmonians cannot in honour accept. The truce expires; and all the attention of Greece is fixed on the important ſcene of contention at Pylus.

The author here interpoſeth an account of what was now doing in Sicily, and then returns to Pylus. The *Spartans* in the iſle ſeem as far off a ſurrender as ever. The people of Athens murmur at the ſlowneſs of their troops, and begin to think that after all they ſhall not carry the point. Cleon amuſes them with lies, and exaſperates them by ſlanders. In ſhort, tho' quite undeſigning it, he bullies himſelf into the command; and, at the head of a reinforcement, joins Demoſthenes at Pylus. The author deſcribes the event with ſo much ſtate and dignity, that he raiſes it into another Thermopylæ. *There* three hundred Spartans ſtopped for a long time the whole numerous army of Xerxes, and periſhed in the ſervice. About the ſame number of them ſtruggle *here* as long as they can againſt the troops of Athens; but, to the diſappointment of all Greece, they at laſt ſurrender priſoners of war, and are carried, nay are carried by Cleon, in triumph to Athens.

The territories of Corinth are invaded ſoon after by the Athenians under Nicias, the conſequence of which is the battle of Solygia. We are then recalled to view the laſt acts of the tragical ſedition at Corcyra, quite of a piece with, or rather in cruelty and horror tranſcending the preceding.

In the eighth year of the war, the Athenians proceed with ſucceſs. The conqueſt of the iſle of Cythera by Nicias is another ſad blow to the Lacedæmonians. They are quite diſpirited; and dare no longer face in the field theſe active and lively, and now more ſo becauſe ſucceſsful, enemies.

Our author repaſſeth to Sicily. The Athenians had been hovering with a ſquadron on that coaſt, on pretence of aiding the Egeſtæans, but in fact to excite a war and embroil the *States* of that iſland. Syracuſe, the leading *State*, perceived all their ſchemes, and endeavoured

to prevent them. They firſt obtain a ſuſpenſion of arms amongſt all the parties at war; and prevail on the Sicilians to hold a general congreſs at Gela, for the amicable adjuſtment of all their quarrels and a perfect re-union againſt foreign enemies. Hermocrates, the plenipotentiary from Syracuſe, opens the true intereſt of Sicily on this occaſion. The warriors muſt now give place to the politician, who ſhews himſelf a maſter in the buſineſs.

Speech of Hermocrates.

" He is here (he tells them) as repreſentative of the greateſt of " the Sicilian *States*. As ſuch, he cannot ſpeak from puſillanimity " or a ſenſe of fear, tho' he declares himſelf averſe to war. It is " difficult to enlighten ignorance, and difficult to check ambition. " But there is a prudence, which all ought to learn; a prudence, " which points out the proper ſeaſon for every purſuit. It was ſe- " parate intereſt, that firſt kindled the flames of war in Sicily; but " ſeparate intereſts ſhould always be huſhed, when the general wel- " fare is at ſtake. The Athenians have been buſy amongſt them, to " inflame their mutual reſentments, to note their indiſcretions, and " turn them to their own advantage; that, when the Sicilians have " warred one another down, they may ſeize the whole iſland for " themſelves. The great paſſion of theſe Athenians is conqueſt; they " regard no ties of conſanguinity; they aim at acquiring vaſſals, no " matter who. He blames them not; he can never blame men, " who are deſirous of command; but he muſt blame ſuch as " are ready and willing to put on their chains. The Athenians have " no ſtrength in Sicily, but in the diviſion of its *States*. Let thoſe " *States* but once re-unite, and the Athenians muſt get them gone; " and may depart with a face of ſucceſs, as if they had united whom " they really wanted to diſunite, and had effectually re-ſettled peace, " when their latent deſign was war." — He toucheth every topic in a ſuccinct but maſterly manner. He hath recourſe often to *figures*; renders his addreſſes emphatical, by making his own community ſpeak from his mouth. He applies the *firſt perſon* and the *ſingular*

number with great energy and weight. He uſeth thoſe *figures* in the the ſame manner as ſaint Paul does in the *Epiſtle* to the *Romans*. He preſſeth harmony and cordial re-union amongſt them in a manner beſt fitted to perſuade. The whole ſpeech, in a word, is a very intereſting and perſuaſive piece of oratory.

The conſequence is, a peace is ſettled in Sicily to general ſatisfaction; and the Athenian commanders are obliged to return to Athens with their ſquadron, to be puniſhed there for what they could not poſſibly prevent.

The war continues hot through the remainder of this book. The Athenians take their turn in being checked and vanquiſhed. Their attempt on Megara is related at large; and this piece of narration, is by far the moſt intricate of the kind to be met with in Thucydides. The matter is quite too much crowded, when he endeavours to comprehend in a few terms the various incidents of this ſtruggle for Megara, the fluctuation of events, the views and motives of the parties engaged. Braſidas at laſt ſecures the city, and quite diſconcerts the main project of the Athenians. — The latter alſo had another great ſcheme in agitation for a total revolution in Bœotia. Arms and intrigues were at once to act, both without and within. The whole force of Athens takes the field on this occaſion, under the command of Hippocrates. The famous battle of Delium enſues, before which the generals harangue their troops. Pagondas the Theban is an excellent ſpeaker on this occaſion. The Bœotians are not repreſented in this hiſtory, as that groſs and ſtupid people, which was their character from the ſucceeding wits of Athens. The Athenian general begins alſo to harangue his troops, but is cut ſhort by the attack of the enemy. The battle is finely deſcribed, and the diſpute afterwards about the dead. The Athenians have received a dreadful blow, which will ſoon make them begin to accuſe their own judgments, in refuſing the accommodation lately offered from Sparta.

In other quarters alſo, the balance of war begins to incline in favour of the enemy. Braſidas, that active and accompliſhed Spartan, had now compleated a march, at the head of a ſmall army, through Theſſaly and Macedonia into Chalcidic Thrace. His bravery prevails much, but his conduct more. He disjoins Perdiccas king of Macedonia from the Athenian league. Whenever he fights, he conquers; and whenever he harangues, he effectually perſuades. His ſpeech to the Acanthians, is ſtrong, pertinent, Laconic. He ſays all that can be ſaid in favour of his countrymen, in recommendation of the cauſe of liberty. There is that air of ſincerity and good-faith in it, which were conſtantly approved and verified by his perſonal deportment. The towns revolt to him as faſt as he hath opportunities to addreſs them. The reader will follow him with pleaſure through his many and great exploits, and acknowledge he wears his laurels deſervedly, and with peculiar grace.

In Book the Fifth, Cleon appears again upon the ſtage to ſtop the rapid conqueſts of Braſidas. The former had been laughed into a general, and is now grown ſo conceited that he wants to enter the liſts againſt that truly heroic Spartan. He accordingly arrives in Thrace, at the head of a ſquadron and a fine body of land-forces. He retakes a town or two; is confident, he ſhall ſoon recover the important city of Amphipolis; and, tho' contemned by his own ſoldiers, he endeavours to brave the enemy. Braſidas, having harangued his men with his uſual ſpirit, throws open the gates, ſallies out of Amphipolis, and routs him in an inſtant. Cleon falls a victim to his own cowardice, and Braſidas alſo drops a victim to his own valour. The latter lives long enough to know his own ſide had conquered, and then expires, admired by all that knew him, and moſt highly regretted by the allies of his country. *Book* V.

Their riddance from Cleon diminiſhed the loſs of Athens in this defeat, and the Lacedæmonians had dearly purchaſed their victory with the loſs of their hero. As the principal *States* were now pretty nearly balanced,

balanced, and ſadly tired of the war, a truce is concluded for a year, and a peace ſoon after ſettled by the management chiefly of Nicias. Thucydides hath given us the forms of negotiating and drawing up *treaties.* They are curious morſels of antiquity, and the reader will ſee with admiration, how ſolemn, how conciſe, and yet how guarded they are. The peace turns out to be merely nominal. The Corinthians, who cannot reliſh it at all, ſet their invention to work in order to embroil Greece afreſh, and to re-kindle a general war. Several wars break out, in which the Athenians and Lacedæmonians are concerned as auxiliaries. And another *State* in Greece, which hitherto had been neutral and ſaving its ſtrength entire, endeavours now to ſeize the primacy of Greece for itſelf. We ſhall be made privy to all her negotiations for carrying on the plan, and ſee it all blaſted by one battle at Mantinéa. This *State* was the republic of Argos in Peloponneſus, which had been in long alliance with but in no dependence at all upon Athens, and had been a long time alſo at peace with Sparta, by means of truces for thirty years. Young Alcibiades doth all he can to promote the quarrel, till at length the troops of Sparta and Argos come to an engagement near the city of Mantinéa. Thucydides introduceth the battle with all the ſpirit and preciſion of Homer. The auxiliaries are marſhalled, and animated by ſuch exhortations, as are beſt ſuited to the peculiar circumſtances of each. The Spartans are exhibited at laſt in all their glory. Trained up for a camp and the day of battle, we ſhall view them in their diſcipline and actual exertion of their perſonal bravery. They were excellent combatants indeed; and the reader will judge, whether Thucydides did not love good ſoldiers, and take a pleaſure in doing them juſtice. It was the greateſt battle, which for many years had been fought in Greece. The Spartans, on this occaſion, wiped off all the imputations that had lately been thrown on their bravery, becauſe they had not been always ſucceſsful; And the aſpiring *State* of Argos is compelled to acquieſce in her uſual rank, and ſtill leave the

contention

contention for ſupremacy to the leading *States* of Athens and Sparta.

This Book affords but one incident more, of conſequence enough to be particularly diſtinguiſhed; and that is the conqueſt of the iſle of Melos by the Athenians, which fell out in the ſixteenth year of the war. When the Athenians were landed and incamped on that iſland, they ſummon the Melians to a *conference*, of which Thucydides hath drawn out the particulars. It is really an uncommon one, and hath ſadly puzzled the critics, whether they ſhould praiſe or condemn it. But, is there any thing more unnatural in reciting what was ſaid at it, than in holding a *conference?* It is my buſineſs only to look at the management of it, and not draw a veil over the Athenian politics, as they are avowed on this occaſion, ſince my author was too impartial to do it. Nothing could tempt him to make palliating repreſentations, or to ſuppreſs the truth.

Conference at Melos.

" The Athenians, on this occaſion, avow without a bluſh *that* prin-
" ciple on which conquerors and tyrants have always acted, and yet
" have been aſhamed to own: They are ever hunting for colourings
" and pretexts, and would fain give to greedy power a little of the air
" of equity: But here, without the leaſt ſhame or remorſe, the Athe-
" nians aſſert *their* right to inſlave another community, becauſe it ſuits
" their own intereſt, and becauſe they have power to do it. This is
" the principle from which they argue; and, how ſcandalous ſoever
" it be, they argue ſtrongly from it. They repreſent the politics of
" their own *State*, of the Lacedæmonian *State*, nay of all mankind,
" as incroaching, oppreſſive, rapacious, and totally eſtranged from
" humanity, good-faith, and the leaſt tincture of morality. The
" whole conference yields perhaps a juſt repreſentation of human
" nature in the groſs; but then, the repreſentation is diſtaſteful
" to a mind, that is cool and diſengaged. Such a mind muſt intereſt
" itſelf on the ſide of the Melians; and be ſorry, that the Athenians
" have not more equity and honour to qualify their power; or, that
the

" the Melians, with the regard they ſhew to honour and juſtice,
" ſhould not have had more power, or been able to intereſt at leaſt
" one ally in defence of their liberties and rights. In ſhort, through
" the whole courſe of this Hiſtory, the Athenians never make ſo
" ſcandalous a figure as on this occaſion."

Book VI. In the Sixth Book, a ſpacious theatre is opened for a renewal of the war. The ſcene is going to ſhift from Greece to Sicily. The Athenians, who have ſo bravely reſiſted all their enemies in Greece, are now going to do for thoſe enemies what they could not do themſelves. No patriot, no ſtateſman, no orator is able to diſſuade them from laviſhing their ſtrength on the projects of ſanguine ambition and foreign conqueſts. Their enemies, in the mean time, are at leiſure, to note their indiſcretions, and improve them all to their own advantage, 'till the great name of Athens is quite eclipſed, and an end is put to that empire of the ſea, which ſhe had maintained for ſeventy years with great luſtre and reputation.

The Sicilian war, which ſome critics * are inclined to think hath no connexion with the ſubject of Thucydides and to be mere digreſſion, whatever it may appear at firſt, the reader will at length be ſatisfied was an eſſential part of the Peloponneſian war, and haſtened its deciſion. But, ſuppoſing it remote from the principal ſubject, it muſt however be acknowledged, that it is the hiſtory of a war nobly related, well connected, very cloſely followed, and full of incidents to engage attention, to alarm and intereſt the paſſions. Thucydides in the courſe of it, which takes up the two following books, will diſplay the excellencies of the *poet* and the *painter* as well as of the *hiſtorian*. Let his merit be regulated from this portion of his work, it is preſumed that, without a negative, he will be allowed the *maſter* of Hiſtory.

He begins with deſcribing the theatre, on which two mighty *States* are going to enter the liſts. — The *geography* and *antiquities* of

* See Rapin's *Compariſon of* Thucydides *and* Livy.

Sicily

Sicily could not in their nature be very entertaining, and therefore they are drawn up in the conciſeſt manner. — The ſoaring enterpriſing genius of Alcibiades hath formed a ſuperb plan for the aggrandizement of himſelf and his country. Alcibiades could plan with all the magnificence and wild ambition of an Alexander; but a citizen of Athens could not have the means of executing in ſo imperial a manner as the Monarch of Macedonia and Captain-General of Greece. He was able ſoon to convince the younger and more numerous part of the Athenian community, that the enterpriſe was moſt inviting, and carried with it ſuch a probability of ſucceſs as over-balanced all expence and hazard. It was long the ſubject of general converſation; it gradually inflamed the public ardor; and at length ingroſſed all their hopes and wiſhes. In a word, the expedition to Sicily is formally propoſed and decreed in the aſſembly of the people. A ſecond aſſembly is convened on *ways* and *means*. On this occaſion a grand debate enſued, the managers of which are Nicias and Alcibiades.

Speech of Nicias.

Nicias declares himſelf "totally averſe to the expedition; but doth "it with that diffidence, which was a principal foible in his charac-"ter. The honour conferred upon himſelf, in his nomination to "the command, ſhall not ſuppreſs his real ſentiments. He is neither "fond, nor prodigal of his life: But he loves his country, and "would adviſe them to give up the expedition. —— He next runs "over the political *topics*, and ſhews it to be in every light an unde-"ſirable and ill-judged project. And then, without naming him, "ſtrikes at Alcibiades; proves him not qualified in any reſpect for "ſo important a command; he reflects with ſome ſeverity on his "life and behaviour; and, tho' owning himſelf afraid he ſhall be "out-voted, yet would fain have the queſtion put again, whether "the expedition ſhall proceed?".

Beſide all the natural vivacity and fire of his temper, Alcibiades was now provoked by the perſonalities that Nicias had thrown out againſt him. He had been a conſtant oppoſer of the latter, who was beloved

at Athens for his amiable qualities. For, tho' Nicias had not ſpirit enough to lead the people, yet he had influence enough oftentimes to check and reſtrain the aſpiring buſy Alcibiades. The reply he makes on this occaſion ſtrongly marks the character and complexion of Alcibiades; and delivered with that life and grace, and pretty liſp for which he was remarkable, muſt have engaged all the attention of his hearers, and drawn their approbation perhaps in ſpite of their judgment.

Speech of Alcibiades.

" Cenſured and provoked by Nicias, he begins with a vindication " of himſelf. He maintains his right to the command. He hints " at the ſplendor of his birth, his public ſpirit, the generoſity of " his heart. He recites, with an haughty and exulting air, his vic- " tories at the Olympic games, his magnificence at home, and his " capacity for political intrigue already and ſucceſsfully exerted. He " then juſtifies the wiſdom of the decree for the Sicilian expedition. " He ſhews all the political *topics* in a different light from Nicias. " He inſinuates the advice of the latter to proceed from indolence " and a deſire to ſow diſſenſions amongſt them. He exhorts to union, " and to the obſervation of *order*. So Athens roſe; ſo Athens may " yet be much higher exalted. The fire of youth, the temper of " the middle-aged, and the experience of the old ſhould ever duly " accord and act together. Sloth ruins a community; practice " enables it to go through every conflict, and to triumph over all " oppoſition."

Such an addreſs could not but affect, ſuch arguments could not but be perſuaſive with the people of Athens: The expedition muſt go forwards. But Nicias makes a ſecond effort, if poſſible, to divert them from it.

Second ſpeech of Nicias.

He begins with " a prayer for its ſucceſs; and a deſire, that the " preparations may be adequate to the ends propoſed. He ſtates the " nature, the power, and ſtrength of the people they are going to " invade. He then, in general terms, gives in a bulky roll of ne-

" ceſſary

"ceſſary articles for thoſe who invade them. He hopes to frighten
"and deter his audience by the vaſt expence, which he ſhews muſt
"neceſſarily be incurred on this occaſion. The Athenians muſt
"provide every thing themſelves, and truſt for nothing to the care
"and fidelity of Sicilian allies. The public welfare, and the ſafety
"of all, who are to be employed in this expedition, demand all
"manner of previous foreſight and care."

This ſpeech had a different effect to what Nicias deſigned. Inſtead of diſcouraging, it animated his countrymen more than ever for execution. Accordingly, a decree was ſoon paſſed, inveſting himſelf and his collegues, who were Alcibiades and Lamachus, with full power to provide every thing needful for the ſervice.

All hands now were ſoon at work. The quotas from the dependents were demanded; the fleet was equipped and manned; the levies went on briſkly, ſince all men came into the ſervice with alacrity; and every thing was ſoon ready for the expedition.

At this juncture, ſome drunken frolics, in which Alcibiades was engaged, threw Athens into conſternation. They were ſoon conſtrued by his enemies into a plot to bring about a revolution in the government. Informers came in, and he was directly accuſed of being a party. He avowed his innocence, inſiſted on an immediate trial, which he was ſure would end in his juſtification. The plot, which in fact was a plot againſt Alcibiades, was not yet ripe enough to ruin him; and therefore, by a ſtrange prepoſterous ſtroke of cunning, he is ordered to proceed in the expedition, and take his trial at his return.

Our author next deſcribes the departure of the grand armament in all its ſolemnity, and with all the medley of hopes and fears ſhewn by the whole people of Athens on this occaſion. He lays open to our view the very hearts of the ſpectators. The prime flower of their ſtrength, nay Athens itſelf is now ſailing out of the Piræus, never again to return. They make the beſt of their way to Corcyra, where

they are left for a time, that we may be made privy to the conſultations and defenſive meaſures of Sicily. The ſcene is now removed to Syracuſe, the moſt powerful State in that iſland, inhabited by Grecians, and if indeed inferior yet ſecond at this time to no other State in Greece but Athens alone. It had frequently been haraſſed by ſeditions, had often been plagued with tyrants, but was at preſent under a *democratic* conſtitution.

Advice had been received there of the intended invaſion. The *people* are convened about it. Harangues are made; and the temper of mankind, when party is fermenting, juſtly exemplified. Some are incredulous; others magiſterially pronounce it all a falſhood. At length Hermocrates riſeth up, and gives them his own ſenſe of the affair.

Speech of Hermocrates.

He aſſures them, "his country is eminently indangered, and neither incredulity nor ridicule ſhall awe him into ſilence. To his certain knowledge, the Athenians are already at ſea, fully bent on the conqueſt of Sicily. The Syracuſans ought to believe it, and to prepare for their defence. Fear will unite all Sicily againſt the invaders. Athens will only reap diſgrace, but Syracuſe abundant glory on this occaſion. Large armaments are ſeldom ſucceſsful; they moulder away for want of ſupplies, or are ruined for want of conduct. They ſhould therefore prepare for gallant reſiſtance, by getting every thing in readineſs at home, and ſtrengthening themſelves by foreign alliances. They ſhould do more; they ſhould at once put out to ſea, and diſpute their very paſſage with the enemy. A defeat, or even delay thus given them, might oblige them to give up the project. He ſupports his advice by many ſtrong and judicious arguments; and ends with warm exhortations to his countrymen to be lively and active, by no means to deſpiſe the enemy except in action, but vigorouſly and with all their foreſight to prepare for reſiſtance, ſince their enemies are undoubtedly at ſea, and only not arrived on their coaſts."

Such

Such advice was now given to the people of Syracuſe by Hermocrates. That community, it is evident, was full of cabal and faction, ſince this worthy patriot was regarded as a party-tool and a public incendiary. Athenagoras, the bluſtering demagogue who replies, treats him in this light. His virulence ſhews, that he regarded Hermocrates, as one who wanted by any means whatever to force himſelf into employment. He ſeems more alarmed for the lucrative poſts of the State than for the welfare of his country. He throws out a deal of good-ſenſe, but in a very impertinent and ſcurrilous manner. Such are the perſons, who ſtudy popularity more than duty, and ſacrifice all their talents to ambition or private lucre.

Speech of Athenagoras.

He affirms, that "none but cowards and traitors wiſh the Athe- "nians might not invade them, and ſo infallibly meet their deſtruc- "tion: But the whole account is a glaring falſhood, the forgery of "a factious cabal. He appeals to his audience, whether it carries the "leaſt probability with it. Athenians invade them! The Athenians "eſteem themſelves happy they are not invaded by the Syracuſans. "Yet, ſuppoſing them ſo mad, nothing but their own diſgrace and "ruin can be the conſequence. But it is all a fiction; a ſcheme to "diſhearten the friends of the *people*, and ſeize the government of "the State. Some men have ever been, and ever will be dabling in "ſuch vile machinations. But, let them not hope to eſcape de- "tection. The intention is plain already, and ought to be puniſhed "like open treaſon. He then exhorts the *people* or the *many* to "ſupport their friends, and intirely to diſarm the malice of their "domeſtic foes; and inveighs ſeverely againſt the *few*, or the party "whom he ſuppoſeth to be bent on the overthrow of the *democracy* "at Syracuſe."

This ſpeech of Athenagoras was ſo full of ill-timed choler and party-animoſity, that had the debate proceeded, diſſenſions might have run very high at a ſeaſon when unanimity was ſo needful in all the members of that community. A General of great eminence and

weight

weight thinks it high time to interpoſe; who, in a ſhort ſpeech, reprimands Athenagoras, recals the general attention to their own preſervation from the imminent danger, and adjourns the aſſembly.

The grand fleet of Athens is now putting to ſea from Corcyra. The Hiſtorian takes a review of the whole, and gives a ſhort account of its numbers and ſtrength. They arrive on the coaſt of Italy, where they are refuſed a reception. Every thing yields them a diſcouraging and gloomy aſpect. They ſoon find, they had been groſly deluded by their Sicilian friends, who inſtigated them chiefly to the expedition. The trick, which the Egeſtéans had put on their embaſſadors, is particularly recited. The commanders, at a council of war, differ highly in opinion, and at laſt come to no ſound reſolution. They hover about the coaſt of Sicily, and parade in ſight of Syracuſe. Alcibiades endeavours to perſuade the Catanéans to join with and receive them, but a mere accident accompliſhes what his eloquence could not. The command of Alcibiades came here to an end. One of the State-veſſels arrives, and ſummons him to Athens, to take his trial for the late frolics and irregularities committed there. That city, ever ſince the departure of the fleet, had been filled with confuſion and horror. A plot there was, or rather a plot it was determined there muſt be, to ſet up a *tyrant*, that moſt odious ſound to Attic ears. Recollection of the diſmal things they had heard about the tyranny of the Piſiſtratidæ increaſed their fears, and drove them into furious and deſperate proceedings. Thucydides here digreſſeth to ſettle ſome facts relating to that ſet of tyrants, and their demolition; particularly, the affair of Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, one of the moſt famous incidents in the annals of Athens. He differs indeed from moſt other writers, and the moderns have not thought proper to reſt the point upon his authority, great as it is; or, tho' no man ever traced out facts, or made his enquiries with more ſedateneſs and impartiality.

But

But to return to Alcibiades. He was obliged to quit the command, and he ſeemed quietly to ſubmit to the orders of the State. But, determined not to face his countrymen in their preſent mood nor to hazard a trial, he gave them who were ſent for him the ſlip, and ſheltered himſelf in Peloponneſus. He became inſtantly a moſt violent and dangerous enemy to his country. He is gone to pave the way for the ruin of Athens; of Athens, which he loved better than any thing, except the parade of his own perſonal importance, and the gratification of his private caprice.

Nicias and Lamachus, who now remained in the command of the fleet, by help of a ſtratagem, land at Syracuſe without oppoſition, and ſeize a ſtrong poſt for their incampment. The Syracuſans determine on a battle to diſlodge them. Both ſides form in order. Nicias encourages his men by a ſhort, but ſpirited and forcible, harangue. Thucydides paints the battle with the exactneſs, perſpicuity, and ardor of Homer. The Athenians had the better; yet not ſo deciſively, as to think proper to continue in their poſt, ſince they re-embark, and ſail back to Catana.

The winter, it is true, was approaching, which both ſides ſpend in negotiations for the acquiſition of allies. That at Camarina, where embaſſadors from both the warring parties are at the ſame time admitted to an audience, is particularly recited. —— Hermocrates, in behalf of Syracuſe, makes the firſt addreſs. *Speech of Hermocrates.*

" It is maſterly, like
" all that Hermocrates performs. It is deſigned to convince the Ca-
" marinæans, how inſidious and how vile the ſchemes of the Athe-
" nians had ever been, and ſtill continue to be. He arraigns all their
" politics and all their conduct ſince the Perſian invaſion; and gives
" that artful turn to his remarks, which might well deter others
" from entering into any connexion or alliance with them. His
" ſtrokes are ſevere and cutting. He makes uſe of the *figures*, which
" give force and energy to diſcourſe. No perſon better underſtood
" the common welfare of Sicily; and no perſon could better explain

" it.

" it. He unfolds the political ſcheme at preſent in agitation; de-
" clares the conſequence in caſe the Athenians prevail, to alarm the
" concern of the Camarinéans for their country, and further to alarm
" their fears for themſelves. He even threatens them with a ſevere
" revenge, in caſe the Syracuſans, without their aid, get the better
" of the invaders." In ſhort, if the Camarinéans had been good Sicilians, his arguments muſt have prevailed.

Speech of Euphemus.

Euphemus, who is the mouth of the Athenian embaſſy on this occaſion, makes a bold and ſpirited defence for his country. " He at
" once briſkly attacks Hermocrates for the bitter imputations he had
" caſt upon Athens. He aſſerts her fair reputation, and juſtifies her
" ſeries of politics ever ſince the invaſion of Xerxes. Liberty had
" been the object of all her care and all her conduct. The Athe-
" nians had guarded, had eſtabliſhed it in Greece; and were come
" to ſupport and ſecure it in Sicily. He throws back the charge of
" inſlaving projects on the Syracuſans, who now are eager to deprive
" the reſt of Sicily of their beſt defence, by raiſing diſtaſte towards
" the Athenians. He ſpares no artifice, omits no topic that is likely
" to affect. He proves a notable advocate for his Athens, pom-
" pouſly celebrates her paſſion and her care for liberty, and moſt in-
" geniouſly ſtrives to conceal her preſent ambition under a veil of
" moſt generous and diſintereſted principles."

The iſſue is, that the orators have juſt counterpoiſed one another's arguments, and the Camarinéans declare a neutrality.

The embaſſies from Syracuſe ſucceed much better in Peloponneſus. The Corinthians are zealous and active in their behalf; and they have now got an advocate to rouſe up and inflame the phlegmatic Spartans, who was born to be of every party, and to be the beſt ſupport of whatever party he by times eſpouſed. It is the exiled Alcibiades, who pleads moſt effectually in their behalf at a grand conſultation at Sparta. His ſpeech on this occaſion is a maſterpiece. " He inſi-
" nuates himſelf into the favour and confidence of men who had

Speech of Alcibiades.

" feared

" feared and hated him. Whilſt he is making his own perſonal " juſtification, he praiſeth and magnifieth himſelf. He betrays all " the ſchemes of Athens, diſcloſeth all her plan, points out her weak " and unguarded parts, directs towards them the attack of her foes; " and, full as he is of reſentment againſt and ſkilful to annoy her, " ſhe totters whilſt he ſpeaks." Syracuſe and Sparta are now to grow famous by the debaſement of this mighty and imperial Republic. Her glory hath reached its ſummit: It immediately will begin to ſink, and her laurels will fade away apace.

In the ſummer of the eighteenth year of this war, the Athenians ſtand away from Catana, and land by night at Syracuſe. They inſtantly march, and ſeize Epipolæ, a ſtrong poſt that commanded the city. The Syracuſans fight, but without ſucceſs, to beat them from it. The ſiege now commenceth in form. It is clearly repreſented in the whole of its progreſs, in all its forms. Every ſkirmiſh is a diſtinct and lively picture. In one of them old Lamachus is killed, and Nicias of courſe left ſingly in the whole command. He carries on the ſiege with vigor and ſucceſs for a ſhort ſpace of time; but Gylippus from Sparta, and the Peloponneſian aids are now only not arrived.

" If you would read truly great things," ſaid a Spartan to *Book* VII. Auguſtus Cæſar, " read the Seventh Book of Thucydides." Thither we have now brought this curſory ſurvey. The reader of it will undoubtedly own, that no Hiſtorian ever executed ſo cloſely, ſo ſtrongly, ſo clearly and ſo pathetically, as Thucydides. " No fleet " but that of the Athenians," it is the obſervation of Cicero *, " was ever able to enter the harbour of Syracuſe. That fleet was " only able to atchieve it by the mighty force and number of three " hundred ſhips. But here firſt was the power of Athens defeated, " leſſened, depreſſed. In this harbour the fame, the empire, the " glory of Athens are judged to have ſuffered a total wreck."

* Orat. quinta in Verrem.

Schemes projected and actions conducted by Hermocrates and Gylippus the Spartan prove too hard for Nicias, whoſe phlegm and natural diffidence are no match againſt ſuch vigilance and activity. The beſieging party ſoon becomes as it were the beſieged. The *Letter* of Nicias to the people of Athens repreſents all the difficulties, to which he finds himſelf reduced. No man ever wrote ſo preciſely and perſpicuouſly about military affairs. The reader of it wants no light, no dictionary of art, or an adept in war to explain the terms; and can judge, as could the meaneſt citizen of Athens to whom it was read, what was proper to be done. Secure in the conſciouſneſs of his own integrity, he neatly reprimands his countrymen for the great foible in their behaviour, juſtifies his own conduct, and begs to be recalled. In ſhort, Nicias is finely characterized by his own pen in this epiſtle.

Letter of Nicias.

The Athenians are too high-ſpirited to recal their troops, and have too good an opinon of Nicias to diſmiſs him from the command. Tho' Attica was now invaded by the Peloponneſians and a fortreſs raiſed by them within ſight of Athens itſelf for their laſting annoyance, they ſend a powerful reinforcement to Nicias under the command of Demoſthenes. They empty Athens of the reſidue of her ſtrength, ſo highly wanted for domeſtic ſupport. The Syracuſans, when adviſed of this reinforcement, redouble their alacrity, and hope to finiſh the war before it could arrive. They had had a career of ſucceſs againſt Nicias, had juſt beat him both by land and ſea, when Demoſthenes ſteered into the harbour of Syracuſe. The ſight cauſed a ſtrange alternative of elevating hope and dreadful apprehenſions in the contending parties. The Syracuſans again become the beſieged; and Demoſthenes is intent to put an end to the ſiege, if poſſible, by vigorous and daring meaſures.

His attempt to re-take Epipolæ is, in our author's deſcription of it, as fine a night-piece as can poſſibly be drawn, and no pencil could expreſs it ſtronger. The moon ſhines juſt bright enough, to

ſhew

ſhew us the Athenians gaining the aſcent, and to give a glimpſe of the approaches of the armies and their firſt ſtruggles with one another. The whole ſoon becomes gloomy confuſion and horrid tumult. What a medley of ſinging their pæans, of conflict, of flight, of purſuit! friends and countrymen routing one another, 'till numbers come tumbling down the precipices, and periſh in the fall! The hope of the Athenians is blaſted: Syracuſe erects her trophies faſt.

Demoſthenes is now convinced, the moſt prudent ſtep they could take is to raiſe the ſiege, and Nicias at laſt complies. The very moment they are going to embark their troops, the moon is eclipſed. Who but muſt pity the weakneſs of Nicias at ſo dangerous a criſis? who but be ſorry indeed, that ſo good and amiable a man ſhould ſtop an army from a principle of ſuperſtition, and detain them for ſo long a time on a ſpot of ground, where nothing but ruin and deſtruction could befal them? Men ſo diſpirited can make but faint oppoſition againſt an always high-ſpirited and now ſucceſsful enemy. They ſoon loſe another battle, and the deciſive engagement is faſt approaching.

But before it is fought, Thucydides, animated with more than hiſtoric ſpirit, emulates his admired Homer, reviews the parties concerned, and catalogues the troops now warring againſt and in defence of Syracuſe. This catalogue is far from being a mere muſter-roll of names. It is full of ſuch ſtrokes as muſt imprint many uſeful and moral reflexions in the mind. His little incidental ſketches repreſent mankind in a true light, as Homer's do the world of nature. Homer paints the ſoil, and Thucydides the people.

The mouth of the harbour is now barred up by the enemy. The Athenians muſt fight their way out; or, burn all their ſhips and march off by land. It is determined to attempt the former; and the conſequence is the battle within the harbour of Syracuſe. A more ſtriking, more aſtoniſhing battle-piece was never exhibited; and a maſterly pencil, tho' none but a maſterly one, might exactly

delineate it from this deſcription. The preſent temper of the combatants on both ſides is ſtrongly marked in the *harangues* before the engagement. Nicias then ſaid *all*, and the Athenians in action did their *beſt*; but all was unavailing. I ſhall ſay no more about it, ſince the reader hath nothing to do but turn his eye towards it, and diſtinctly view it through the whole of its proceſs, 'till the Syracuſans ſail in triumph to their city, and raiſe the moſt glorious of all their trophies.

The wretched perplexities of the Athenians, the raiſing of the ſiege, the mournful decampment, the good heart of Nicias ſympathiſing in all their diſtreſs, and endeavouring to chear a little their deſponding minds, their laborious marches whilſt the enemy is haraſſing them both in front and in rear and on all ſides, the ſurrender of the column under Demoſthenes, the carnage in the river Aſinarus of the troops under Nicias, his ſurrender too, the butchery of the generals, and the miſeries of the captivated reſidue of once ſo flouriſhing and gallant an army, —— Theſe are the ſeveral incidents of this book, for which an attentive reader will give the higheſt commendation to the Hiſtorian, when he hath read them through: He will have no leiſure 'till then to think of Thucydides.

Book VIII. The *cataſtrophe* hath now taken place in this hiſtory, and the reader is aſſured how all will end. The wings of this ſoaring republic of Athens are clipped, never to reach their full growth again: Yet, like an eagle in the ſame ſituation, ſhe will ſtruggle hard a long time (as it were) with beak and talons, and would yet repulſe her aſſailants, did ſhe not grow ſick at heart. Inteſtine faction will aſſiſt her enemies to finiſh her ruin, as a State *imperial* and *commercial*. A regular deduction of ſuch incidents as theſe is the ſubject of the Eighth and laſt Book of Thucydides. As a writer, he now performs in a more faint and leſs engaging manner, compared with what hath gone before. He hath but drawn his lines, but juſt ſketched his pieces: But the drawings and ſketches will ſtill manifeſt the

maſter's

maſter's hand. We will give them a curſory view: The reader will give them a more exact and deliberate peruſal.

He ſets out in his uſual grave and ſolemn manner, to deſcribe the people of Athens, diſpirited and diſtreſſed as they are by the overthrow in Sicily. All the paſſions and emotions of the human nature take their train. They are incredulous; they are angry; they are convinced; and then, they deſpond; they pluck up their ſpirits again, and are reſolved to ſtand it out, nor abandon their own preſervation. They now caſt their thoughts towards every reſource, and prepare again for war with ſpirit and reſolution. All the reſt of Greece is ready to concur with the victorious party; all are eagerly running in to ſhare the glory and the ſpoil. Their own dependents are meditating revolts, and ſome make them at once without pre-meditation. The Lacedæmonians, amidſt the many applications made to them, are puzzled which of the revolting States they ſhall firſt countenance and aſſiſt. Alcibiades is buſy at Sparta, adviſing proper meaſures, and guiding their counſels. Even the Perſian monarch, by his lieutenants, enters into league againſt them; and ſome of their fineſt iſlands are immediately rent aſunder from ſubjection to the Athenians.

The various turns of the war at Chios, and on the coaſt of Ionia, are diſtinctly but conciſely related, 'till Alcibiades appears in action, and exerts his buſy intriguing genius. Suſpected at length and hated by the Lacedæmonians, he became again their enemy, and turned all his projects on accompliſhing his return to Athens, and ſaving his country from impending ruin. His partizans, in the fleet and troops of Athens now lying at Samos, cabal in his favour. A change of government is judged a neceſſary meaſure to bring about his recalment. It is the ſcheme of Alcibiades himſelf; but it is oppoſed, and diſconcerted by Phrynichus; by Phrynichus, who ſoon after turns out a violent enemy to the *democracy*, whilſt Alcibiades is active and zealous in its ſupport.

None

None but our author's pen could have ſo clearly unfolded that ſeries of caballings, that fluctuation both in principle and conduct, and that horrid embroilment of the leading members of the Athenian State amongſt themſelves, which brought on ſeditions amongſt the troops abroad, and a revolution of government in the city of Athens. The *democracy* is at length overturned; and an *oligarchy*, conſiſting of four hundred perſons, erected in its ſtead. The Athenians at Samos, where the project was firſt laid, declare againſt the Athenians at Athens. Alcibiades is grown again a hearty republican; and Thraſybulus alone manifeſts throughout a ſincere love and regard for his country. Parties newly formed are broke again into diviſions; and Athens was indebted to nothing but the indolence of the Lacedæmonians, that ſhe did not fall immediately into their hands, through the violence of her own inteſtine ſeditions. But the new adminiſtration proved of ſhort continuance; the *democracy*, tho' on a model ſomewhat varied, is again eſtabliſhed; and Athens thus obtains a reſpite.

Full of matter as this part of the hiſtory is, Thucydides hath kept his narration clear and unembarraſſed. But then, it is a ſimple unadorned narration, and never received the finiſhing hand. There are ſcattered occaſionally throughout it ſome ſhort accounts, in what manner the principal agents delivered their ſentiments at important junctures. They ſeem to have been memorials, laid down as the ground-work, for regular and full orations. The reader will be ſorry the author was hindered, by what accidents can only be gueſſed, from drawing out ſome of them at leaſt into full proportion; particularly *that* of the *deputation* from the army at Samos to Athens, in which "the people are perſuaded to part with their darling *democracy*;" of Thraſybulus to the troops at Samos, when they mutiny in favour of the *democracy*, in which "he muſt pathetically have expatiated on "the revolt of Athens from liberty and her choiceſt patriots, who "might now form another Athens at Samos, and preſerve her em"pire, tho' they had loſt the city;" *that* of Alcibiades further, when

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on his recalment he harangues the army at Samos which recalled him, where " he deplores the malignity of his fate, magnifies his ability " yet to ſerve his country, and again ſhines in the character of an " able ſtateſman, a ſubtle politician, and a zealous patriot."

Upon the whole. One point more muſt be particularly diſtinguiſhed in honour of the Athenians. The characters of them and of the Lacedæmonians are ſtrongly contraſted through the whole courſe of this Hiſtory, and highly to the credit of the former. Their ſpirits riſe with difficulties, and patriotiſm ſtarts out of mutiny and faction. The Lacedæmonians are indolent in ſucceſs, and ſhew neither alacrity nor addreſs in promoting that cauſe of liberty, which was the grand pretext of engaging in this deſtructive war. They ſeem at laſt more intent on pocketing the *royal* ſubſidies, than doing their duty as leaders and champions of Greece. They have not yet learned to make a figure at ſea. The laſt view we have of them is at the battle of Cynos-ſema, where they receive a ſignal defeat from thoſe very men, whoſe ruin they judged was well nigh compleated. When Athens is totally to be vanquiſhed, as her doom is faſt approaching, ſhe muſt aid her own conquerors and tyrants, in demoliſhing her own trophies, and trampling under foot her liberties and rights. Her own factions will help to accompliſh, what without them no foreign enemy could have done. Whatever is human muſt decay. The beſt-conſtituted State in the world may be undermined by its own members, when they could not be conquered, and at length be rendered an eaſy prey to foreign powers. May GREAT-BRITAIN prove an exception to this affecting but juſt obſervation!

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THE IONIAN SEA
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ANTITANIANS
CHAONIANS
THESPROTIANS
CESTRINE
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AGRÆI ANS
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DOLOPIANS
ATHAMANIANS
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LYNCESTIANS
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EORDIANS
ALMORIA
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GYRTONIANS
MACEDONIA
THESSALY
PIERIA
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OPHIONEIANS
APODOTIANS
ACHAIA
ELIS
MESSENIA
LACONIA
ARCADIA
ARGOS
ARGOS AMPHILOCHICUM
GULF OF AMBRACIA
GULF OF MESSENIA
GULF OF LACONIA
GULF OF ARGOS
GULF OF THERMÆ
GULF OF TORONE
GULF OF SARONE
AGRIANIANS
DROANS
PÆONIANS
SINTIANS
LEÆANS
DERSÆANS
ODOMANTIANS
BISALTIANS
EDONIANS
MYGDONIA
CHALCIDICA
PALLENE
GRESTONIA
MÆDIANS
BŒOTIA
ATTICA
Haemus
Scomius
Pangæus M.
Orbelus M.
Dysorum M.
Physca
Axius R.
Europus
Arnissa
Epidamnus or Dyrrachium
Apollonia
Pindus M.
Aous R.
Aracthus R.
Acheron R.
Acherusia Lake
Ambracia
Ister
Corcyra
Leucimne pr.
Sybota pr.
Chimerium pr.
Actium
Anactorium
Stratus
Metropolis
Thermopylæ
Callidromus M.
Œta M.
Parnassus M.
Delphi
Crissa
Daulia
Thespiæ
Haliartus
Coronea
Thebes
Tanagra
Delium
Eretria
Chalcis
Aulis
Euripus
Lelantius Plains
Orobiæ
Ægæ
Cenæum pro.
Ædepsa
Oreus
Hestiæa
Artemisium
Preparethus I.
Melitia
Pagasæ
Pherræ
Magnesia
Pineus R.
Peneus R.
Phæstus
Apidanus
Enipeus R.
Asopus R.
Ismenus R.
Cithæron M.
Helicon M.
Parnes M.
Pentelicus M.
Hymettus M.
Athens
Eleusis
Megara
Salamis I.
Ægina I.
Cia I.
Seriphus I.
Philocandros I.
Dia I.
Sicinus I.
Melos I.
Thera I.
Cythera Isle
Malea pro
Taenarus pr.
Cape Matapan
Aphrodisia
Helos
Gythium
Leuctrum
Amyclæ
Ithome
Messene
Pylus
Corone
Colonides
Asine
Taenarus
Sphacteria I.
Coryphasium pr.
Prote I.
Pylus
Lepreum
Cyllene
Elis
Olympia
Pisa
Phia
Ichthys pro
Buprasium
Hermione
Halicæ
Epidaurus
Troezene
Sunium pro.
Cape Colonna
Isle of Cephalene
Ithaca
Zacynthus Isle
Echinades
Leucas
Leucas
Ellomenus
Pronnæ
Pallenians
Crania
Patræ
Rhypes
Dyme
Iritæa
Phlius
Pellene
Sicyon
Corinth
Cenchreæ
Orneæ
Caryæ
Nemea
Mantinea
Orchomenus
Pheneus
Stymphalus
Argos
Mycenæ
Lerna
Nauplia
Tegea
Anthena
Cynuria
Scirus
Scirites
Gypsela
Parrhasia
Thuria
Æthaia
Lacedæmon or Sparta
Scotussa
Cynoscephalæ
Pharsalus
Phera
Larissa
Melitia
Phthiotis
Thermopylæ
Heraclea
Trachinians
Lamia
Thronium
Callieæ
Bœne
Cytinium
Lemnæa
Idomenæ
Modeon
Argos
Phytia
Erinæus
Œpæ
Bœum
Tolophon
Metropolis
Chæronea
Orchomenus
Lebadia
Haliartus
Coronea
Thespiæ
Daulia
Panopeus
Phocis
Parnassus
Delphi
Crissa
Œnoe
Panactum
Eleusis
Megara
Eleusis
Plains of Thria
Athens
Phalerus
Munichia
Piræus
Halimus
Laurium
Sunium
Polyægus I.
Hermione
Halicæ
Epidaurus
Troezene
Methone
Pylus
Corone
Colonides
Asine
Taenarus
Leuctrum
Helos
Aphrodisia
Gythium
Cape Matapan
Malea pro
Cythera Isle
Cape Cerigo
Isle of Cerigo
Sphacteria I.
Coryphasium pr.
Prote I.

SCYTHIANS
Ister R.
GETES
PART OF THE
EUXINE SEA
Haemus Mounts
TRIBALLIANS
TILATAEANS
TRE RIANS
Hebrus R.
Rhodope Mounts
Machæriophori
KINGDOM of the ODRYSIANS
Nestus R.
Strymon R.
Scomius Mt.
Panganus Mt.
Abdera
Perinthus
Byzantium
Chalcedon
PART OF
PONTUS
PROPONTIS
PIERIAN GULF
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Ænus
Samothrace I.
Arrhiana
Idacus
Sestus
Parium
Lampsacus
Priapus
Cyzicus
Abydus
Dardanum
Rhœteum
Granicus R.
Aesepus R.
Simois R.
Ascanius R.
PROVINCE of DASCYLIS
BITHYNIA
Rhyndacus R.
Imbrus I.
Lemnus Isle
Tenedus I.
Sigeum
Larissa
TROAS
Colonæ
Hamaxitus
Harmatus
Antandrus
Adramittium
ÆOLIA
Lectus pr.
Lesbus Isle
Antissa
Eresus
Ægina
Mitylene
Pyrrha
Cycus R.
Thyatyra
Hermus R.
Sardes
Cyme
Phocæa
Polichna
Philadelphia
IONIA
Smyrna
Chios Isle
Delphinium
Chius
Pele
Clazomena
Coaster R.
Mæander R.
Laodicæa
Lebedus
Claros
Notium
Colophon
Ephesus
Sandius Hills
Andrus Isl.
Phanæ
Scyros I.
Tenos I.
Samos I.
Anæa
Trogilium
Priene
Mycale M.
Magnesia
Myus
Latmos M.
Miletus
CARIA
Iasus
Tychiussa
Halicarnassus
Calydna
Patara
Cnidus
Loryma
Crumnus
Syme Isle
Ielysus
Rhodes
Camirus
Rhodes Isle
Phaselis
Aspendus
Teuglussa
Carpathus Isle
Cythnus I.
Delos I.
Myconus I.
Icarus I.
Rhenia I.
Siphnus I.
Parus I.
Lerus I.
Claros I.
Dia I.
Naxus Isl.
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Amorgus I.
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CYCLADES
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THE
HISTORY
OF
The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE FIRST.

CONTENTS.

Introduction, containing the Author's reaſons for writing this Hiſtory, upon a review of the affairs of Greece from the earlieſt times.— The true reaſon of the Peloponneſian War was a jealouſy of the Athenian power. Thoſe pretended were, I. *The affair of Epidamnus, which is opened at large;* II. *The revolt of Potidæa, the circumſtances of which are exactly related. Conſultations held at Sparta by the members of the Lacedæmonian League, where at length War is decreed, but the rupture protracted for a year. The Lacedæmonians act from a dread of the growing power of Athens. A Digreſſion ſhewing how that power aroſe, which gives the Author an opportunity to relate the hiſtory of fifty years between the retreat of Xerxes, and the breaking out of this War. Embaſſies accuſing and recriminating are ſent to and fro, in the account of which are interwove the ſtories of Cylon, Pauſanias, and Themiſtocles. The Lacedæmonians ſend a final demand to Athens; and the Athenians, at the perſuaſion of Pericles, return a reſolute anſwer, upon which all negotiations are ended, and an open rupture enſueth.*

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK I.

THUCYDIDES an Athenian hath compiled the hiſtory of the war between the Peloponneſians and the Athenians, as managed by each of the contending Parties. He began to write upon its firſt breaking out, from an expectation that it would prove important and the moſt deſerving regard of any that had ever happened. He grounded his conjecture on the earneſtneſs of both the flouriſhing parties to make all neceſſary preparations for it: and he ſaw, that all the reſt of Greece was engaged on one ſide or the other; ſome joining immediately, and others intending ſoon to do it. For this was the greateſt commotion that ever happened amongſt the Grecians; ſince in it ſome Barbarians and, it may be ſaid, the greateſt part of mankind were concerned. The actions of an earlier date, *Introduction.*

and thoſe ſtill more ancient, cannot poſſibly through length of time be adequately known; yet, from all the lights which a ſearch into the remoteſt times hath afforded me, I cannot think they were of any great importance, either in regard to the wars themſelves, or any other conſiderations.

State of old Greece.

It is certain, that the region now known by the name of Greece was not formerly poſſeſſed by any fixed inhabitants, but was ſubject to frequent tranſmigrations, as conſtantly every diſtinct people eaſily yielded up their ſeats to the violence of a larger ſupervening number. For, as commerce there was none, and mutual fear prevented intercourſe both by ſea and land, as then the only view of culture was to earn a penurious ſubſiſtence, and ſuperfluous wealth was a thing unknown, as planting was not their employment it being uncertain how ſoon an invader might come and diſlodge them from their unfortified habitations, and as they thought they might every where find their daily neceſſary ſupport, they heſitated but little about ſhifting their ſeats: And for this reaſon they never flouriſhed in the greatneſs of their cities or any other circumſtance of power. But the richeſt tracts of country ever were more particularly liable to this frequent change of inhabitants, ſuch as that which is now called Theſſaly, and Bœotia, and Peloponneſus moſtly except Arcadia, and in general every the moſt fertile part of Greece. For, the natural wealth of their ſoil increaſing the power of ſome amongſt them, that power raiſed civil diſſenſions which ended in their ruin, and at the ſame time expoſed them more to foreign attacks. It was only the barrenneſs of the ſoil, that preſerved Attica through the longeſt ſpace of time, quiet and undiſturbed, in one uninterrupted ſeries of poſſeſſors. One, and not the leaſt convincing, proof of this is, that other parts of Greece, becauſe of the fluctuating condition of the inhabitants, could by no means in their growth keep pace with Attica. The moſt powerful of thoſe, who were driven from the other parts of Greece by war or ſedition, betook themſelves to the Athenians for ſecure refuge, and

as they obtained the privileges of citizens [1], have conſtantly from remoteſt time continued to enlarge that city with freſh acceſſions of inhabitants, inſomuch that at laſt, Attica being inſufficient to ſupport the numbers, they ſent over colonies into Ionia.

Low before the war of Troy.

There is another, and to me a moſt convincing, proof of the weakneſs of the Ancients. —— Before the affairs of Troy, it doth not appear that Greece (or Hellas) was ever united in one common undertaking; nor had the whole country that *one* general appellation; nor indeed did the ſame ſubſiſt at all before the time of Hellen the ſon of Deucalion; the ſeveral nations taking their diſtinguiſhing names from their own ſelves, and Pelaſgicum being *that* of the greateſt tract. But when Hellen and his ſons had acquired power in * Pthiotis, and led out their dependants by way of aid to other cities, converſation made the uſe of *this* name become much more frequent among the ſeveral people, tho it was long before it ſo prevailed as to become the general appellation of them all. For this Homer is my principal authority, who, tho born a long time after the Trojan war, hath no where mentioned them all in *this* general ſtile, but hath appropriated it to thoſe who came with Achilles from Pthiotis and were the firſt that bore *this* name of Grecians (or Hellenes). In his poems Danäans and Argives and Achæans are their diſtinguiſhing titles. Nor hath he farther once mentioned the *Barbarians*, for this plain reaſon in my opinion, becauſe *Grecians* were not yet diſtinguiſhed by *this* one comprehenſive name in contra-diſtinction to *that* other. Theſe Grecians therefore whatever, whether ſo apart in

* *Southern part of* Theſſaly.

[1] They were admitted to the ſame privileges with free-born native *Athenians*. But this was practiſed only in the infancy and early growth of that ſtate. It was, afterwards, an honour very ſeldom and with difficulty granted. Thoſe who came from other places to ſettle at *Athens* are diſtinguiſhed from πολῖται citizens, by the name of μετοῖκοι ſojourners, who had taken up their reſidence and co-habited with them. They performed ſeveral duties as ſubjects to the ſtate which gave them protection, but never became *Athenians*, or citizens of *Athens* in the emphatical ſenſe of thoſe terms.--The *Engliſh* reader will pleaſe to remember this, as the diſtinction often occurs in the ſequel of the hiſtory.

their

their different cities, or united by mutual converſe, or at length comprehended in *one* general name, for want of ſtrength and correſpondence, never acted together in joint-confederacy before the war of Troy: Nor was it, till the uſe of the ſea had opened free communication amongſt them, that they engaged together in that expedition.

Minos. For Minos is the earlieſt perſon, whom we know from tradition to have been maſter of a navy, and to have been chiefly lord of the ſea which is called the Grecian. To him were the iſles of the Cyclades ſubject; nay, moſt of them he planted himſelf with colonies, having expelled the Carians and ſubſtituted his own ſons in the different commands. And then of courſe he exerted his utmoſt power to clear that ſea of pirates, for the more ſecure conveyance of his own tributes.

Piracy. The Grecians formerly, as well as thoſe Barbarians who tho ſeated on the continent lived upon the coaſt, and all the iſlanders, when once they had learned the method of paſſing to and fro in their veſſels, ſoon took up the buſineſs of piracy under the command of perſons of the greateſt ability amongſt them, for the ſake of enriching ſuch adventurers and ſubſiſting their poor. They landed and plundered by ſurprize unfortified places and ſcattered villages, and from hence they principally gained a ſubſiſtence. This was by no means at that time an employment of reproach, but was rather an inſtrument of glory. Some people of the continent are even to this day a proof of *this*, who ſtill attribute honour to ſuch exploits if [2] genteelly performed: So alſo are the ancient poets, in whom thoſe that ſail along the coaſts are every where equally accoſted with this queſtion *Whether they are pirates?* as if, neither they to whom the queſtion is put would diſown their employment, nor they who are deſirous to be

2 "With due reſpect, with humanity", as the Scholiaſt explains it. For then they never made booty of or carried away by ſtealth the labouring cattle: They never made their attacks by night, nor committed any murder.

informed

informed would reproach them with it. The people of the continent alſo exerciſed robberies upon one another. And to this very day many people of Greece are ſupported by the ſame practices; for inſtance, the Ozolian Locrians, and Ætolians, and Acarnanians, and their neighbours on the continent: And the cuſtom of wearing their weapons, introduced by this old life of rapine, is ſtill retained amongſt them.

The cuſtom of wearing weapons once prevailed all over Greece, as their houſes had no manner of defence, as travelling was full of hazard, and their whole lives were paſſed in armour, like Barbarians. A proof of *this* is the continuance ſtill in ſome parts of Greece of thoſe manners, which were once with uniformity general to all. The Athenians were the firſt, who diſcontinued the cuſtom of wearing their ſwords, and who paſſed from the diſſolute life into more polite and elegant manners. And it is not a long time, ſince thoſe amongſt the rich, who were advanced in years and ſtudied their eaſe, left off wearing their linen garments and faſtening the hair of their head in a knot behind with [3] graſhoppers of gold; tho the aged amongſt the Ionians have conſtantly perſevered in the uſe of theſe ornaments as marks of their affinity. That modeſt uniformity of dreſs, which is ſtill in vogue, was firſt introduced by the Lacedæmonians; amongſt whom in other points alſo there was the greateſt equality of dreſs and diet obſerved, both in the higheſt and the meaneſt ranks. They alſo were the firſt who performed their exerciſes naked, ſtripping themſelves in public and anointing with oil before they entered the liſts; tho, before, the cuſtom had prevailed at the Olympic games for the champions to wear ſcarfs about their loins; and it is only a few years ſince theſe were quite [4] diſuſed. But even yet, amongſt ſome Barbarians, more eſpecially thoſe of Aſia, where the matches

3 To intimate their being the original poſſeſſors and pure natives of the ſoil, as much as the very graſhoppers, which they ſuppoſed to be a natural and ſpontaneous production of the earth. They regarded themſelves as cotemporary with the inſects.

4 See Mr. *Weſt*'s Diſſertation on the Olympic Games, *p.* 50.

of

of boxing and wreſtling are in repute, the combatants engage with ſcarfs round their loins. Many other arguments might with eaſe be alledged, to prove that ancient Greece had forms and modes of living quite ſimilar to thoſe of the preſent Barbarian world.

As for cities, ſo many as are of a later foundation and better placed for the increaſe of wealth ſince the improvement of naval skill; all theſe have been built on the ſea-ſhore and walled about, and are ſituated upon necks of land jutting out into the ſea, for the ſake of traffic and greater ſecurity from the inſults of neighbouring people. But thoſe of an earlier date, having been more ſubject to piratical depredations, are ſituated at a great diſtance from the ſea, not only on iſlands but alſo upon the main. For even thoſe who lived upon the coaſt, tho' inexpert at ſea, were uſed to make excurſions up into the country, for the ſake of plunder: And ſuch inland ſettlements are diſcernible to this very day.

But the people of the iſlands, that is the Carians and the Phœnicians, were by much the moſt expert at theſe piratical adventures: For by them the greateſt part of the iſles was inhabited. *This* is proved from the expiation ſolemnized at Delos in the courſe of this war; on which occaſion, all the ſepulchres of the dead in that iſland being broke open, more than half of the number appeared to be Carians, known to be *ſuch* from the weapons found in their graves and a particularity of interment [5] ſtill uſed amongſt them. It was not till after the equipment of fleets by Minos, that a communication was opened at ſea. For by him the miſchievous Banditti were ejected from the iſlands, and many colonies of his own planted there in their ſted. And from this period it was, that the maritime people, grown more intent on the acquiſition of wealth, became alſo more

5 The Carians firſt invented the boſs of ſhields and the creſt of helmets. In remembrance of this, a ſmall ſhield and a creſt were always buried with them: By this means were the Carians known. The Phœnicians were diſtinguiſhed by the manner of their interment: For, whereas other Nations laid the faces of their dead towards the eaſt, the Phœnicians reverſed the poſture and laid them to the weſt. *Scholiaſt.*

fond

ſond of ſettled habitations: and ſuch of them, as then ſurpaſſed in wealth, ſtrengthened their ſettlements by walling them about. And this their paſſion for gain continuing to increaſe, the poorer hired out their ſervices to thoſe who had affluence; and the great, who had all needful ſupplies at hand, reduced leſs powerful cities into their own ſubjection. And their power by theſe methods gradually advancing, they were enabled in proceſs of time to undertake the Trojan expedition.

Review of the expedition againſt Troy.

It is farther my opinion, that the aſſemblage of that armament by Agamemnon was not owing ſo much to the attendance of the ſuitors of Helen in purſuance of the oaths they had ſworn to Tyndarus, as to his own ſuperior power. It is related by thoſe, who received from their anceſtors the moſt certain memorials of the Peloponneſian affairs, that Pelops, arriving there from Aſia with abundance of wealth, ſoon gained ſo great an influence over thoſe needy people that, tho' a foreigner, he had the honour to have the country called after his own name; and, that the power thus gained by him was ſucceſſively enlarged by his poſterity. Euryſtheus indeed, whoſe mother was the ſiſter of Atreus, periſhed in Attica by means of the Heraclidæ; and Euryſtheus, when he departed on that expedition, left the government of Mycenæ and his kingdom, becauſe of his affinity, in the care of Atreus who then reſided with him, having fled from his father upon the murder of Chryſippus. When therefore the return of Euryſtheus was prevented by death, and the Myceneans from a dread of the Heraclidæ were well inclined to Atreus, as a perſon of great abilities and deep in the affections of the people, he eaſily obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ and all the territories which had belonged to Euryſtheus; and from hence the family of Pelops quite overpowered the family of Perſeus. To theſe enlargements of power Agamemnon ſucceeding, and being alſo ſuperior to the reſt of his countrymen in naval ſtrength, he was enabled in my opinion to form that expedition more from awe than favour. It is plain, that he

equipped out the largeſt number of ſhips himſelf, beſides thoſe he lent to the Arcadians. Homer is my witneſs here, if his teſtimony have any force; who hath farther at the delivery of the ſceptre ſtiled him,

"Of many iſles and of all Argos king."

And a king who lived upon the continent could not poſſibly be lord of iſlands, except ſuch as were adjacent, the number of which muſt needs be ſmall, unleſs he had a competent ſtrength at ſea: But, from this armament we have good light afforded to gueſs at the preceding.

What though Mycenæ was a ſmall city, or though any place at that time remarkable appear at preſent inconſiderable to us; yet, no one ought on theſe motives prematurely to imagine that armament to have been leſs conſiderable than it is deſcribed by the poets and reported by tradition. Suppoſing the city of Lacedæmon to be now in a ruinated condition, nothing left but the temples and the pavements of the maſs, I fancy, in proceſs of time, poſterity could not eaſily be induced to believe that their power had ever been proportioned to their glory. Of the [6] five diviſions of Peloponneſus they are actually poſſeſſed of two, have the command of the whole, and of many confederate ſtates *without*; yet, as the city is neither cloſely built, as the temples and public edifices are by no means ſumptuous, and the houſes detached from one another after the old mode of Greece, it would ſuffer diſparagement from ſuch a view. If we farther ſuppoſe the Athenians in the ſame reverſe of fortune, from the view the city then would afford, it might be gueſſed that once it had double the ſtrength which it really hath. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, nor ſo much to regard the appearances of cities as their power; and of courſe to conclude, the armament

6 Theſe were Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Meſſenia and Elis. The Lacedemonians were poſſeſſed of Laconia and Meſſenia. *Scholiaſt.*

againſt

againſt Troy to have been greater than ever was known before, but inferior to thoſe of our age. And whatever credit be given to the poetry of Homer in this reſpect, who no doubt as a poet hath ſet it off with all poſſible enlargement, yet even according to his account, it appeareth inferior. For he hath made it to conſiſt of twelve hundred ſhips; thoſe of the Bœotians carrying each one hundred and twenty Men, thoſe of Philoctetes fifty; pointing out, as I imagine, the largeſt and the ſmalleſt rates; for of the rate of other ſhips he hath not made the leaſt mention in his *catalogue*, tho' he hath expreſly informed us that every perſon of the crews belonging to the ſhips of Philoctetes were both mariners and ſoldiers, ſince he hath made all who plyed at the oar to be expert at the bow. It is not probable that any ſhips carried ſupernumeraries, excepting kings or perſons in command, eſpecially as their point was a mere tranſportation with all the neceſſary habiliments of war, and as their ſhips were not decked, but built entirely in the faſhion of the old piratical cruizers. If therefore a *mean* be taken between the largeſt and ſmalleſt rates, the number of the whole will turn out [7] of ſmall account for quotas ſent in general from the whole of Greece. The reaſon of this was not ſo much a ſcarcity of men as want of money. They adjuſted the number of men to the ſlender ſtore of proviſions they already had, and the probability of procuring a competent ſubſiſtence in the courſe of the war. On their firſt landing they got the better in fight; the proof is, that they could not otherwiſe have fortified their camp with a wall. Neither doth it appear that they exerted all their ſtrength at once, numbers being detached for ſupplies of proviſions, to till the Cherſoneſus, and to forage at large. Thus divided as they were, the Trojans were better able to make a ten years reſiſtance, being equal in force to thoſe who were at any time left to carry on the ſiege.

7 Thucydides makes it of ſmall account, in regard to the war which is his ſubject. But the number of men employed in the expedition againſt Troy was 102000. For the mean between 120 and 50 is 85, and 85× by 1200=102000.

For had the ſtores of proviſion at the firſt landing been ample enough for the whole number of men they brought, and had they been able to proſecute the war free from the avocations of foraging and tillage, their ſuperiority in the field muſt have given them an eaſy and expeditious conqueſt. But in fact they did not ply the work with all their number, but only with a part conſtantly reſerved for the purpoſe: Had they formed the ſiege with their whole force, in leſs time and with leſs difficulty they muſt have taken Troy. Through want of Money it was, that expeditions *prior* to this, and even *this* the moſt celebrated of all that ever happened, are plainly found to have been leſs in reality than they are in fame or current eſtimation at preſent through poetical aſſiſtance.

State of Greece *conſequent to it.*

Nor did the proſperous event of the Trojan expedition put an end to the unſettled and fluctuating ſtate of Greece, or ſecure that tranquillity ſo neceſſary to advancement. The return of the Grecians from Ilium after ſo long an abſence, gave riſe to many innovations. Seditions were excited in almoſt every city; and thoſe, who were forced to withdraw, built cities for themſelves in other places. The preſent Bœotians, for inſtance, being driven out of Arne by the Theſſalians, ſixty years after the taking of Troy, planted themſelves in the country *now* called Bœotia, tho' *before* that time Cadmëis: But a body of them had already ſeated themſelves there, of whom were thoſe who went in the expedition againſt Troy: And eighty years after it, the Dorians with the Heraclidæ took poſſeſſion of Peloponneſus. It was not without much ado and length of time, that Greece quiet and ſettled at home had opportunity to ſend colonies abroad. Then the Athenians planted Ionia and moſt of the iſlands; the Peloponneſians the greateſt part of Italy and Sicily, and even ſome colonies in the different tracts of Greece. But all theſe tranſactions are of a later date than the Trojan war.

When it begun to thrive.

But when once the ſtate of Greece was grown more robuſt, and increaſe of wealth became their ſtudy more than ever before, as the public

public revenues grew apace, in many places *tyrannies* ſtarted up: For before this kingdoms were hereditary and with limited authority. Now Greece throughout was employed in building navies, and became addicted to naval affairs with unuſual application. The Corinthians are ſaid to have been the firſt, who by varying the make of their ſhips, brought them to that model which is now in uſe, and Corinth to be the firſt place of Greece where [8] *triremes* were built. It is a known fact, that Aminocles a ſhip-carpenter from Corinth built four ſhips for the Samians: Now, from the arrival of Aminocles at Samos to the concluſion of the *war* which is now my ſubject, there paſſed at moſt but three hundred years. The oldeſt ſea-fight we know any thing of, was that of the Corinthians againſt the Corcyreans: But the diſtance between *that* and the ſame period is not more than two hundred and ſixty. For the city of the Corinthians, being ſeated on the iſthmus, hath ever been a place of trade, as formerly the Grecians both within and without Peloponneſus, more accuſtomed to land than ſea, could have no traffic with one another without paſſing through *their* territory. *They* were alſo remarkable for wealth, as clearly appeareth from the ancient poets, who have given that city the epithet of *rich*. And, when once navigation was practiſed in Greece, they loſt no time in their own equipments; they cleared the ſea of pirates; and, opening their town as a public mart both by land and ſea, made Corinth powerful by the increaſe of its revenue. The Ionians had no naval force till a long time after this, in the reign of Cyrus firſt king of the Perſians and his ſon Cambyſes: And, waging war with Cyrus, they were for a time maſters of the ſea which lieth upon their own coaſts. Polycrates alſo, who was

Aminocles.

The oldeſt ſea-fight.

Corinth.

8 The triremes were the ſhips of war, of the galley kind, and take their name from the three banks of oars with which they were furniſhed. They were alſo maſted and carried ſails; but they generally lowered the ſails when they came to action, and relied chiefly on their oars, that they might be more able to tack about, or to run down upon the enemy with more force and ſteddineſs. See Potter's Archæologia, vol. ii. c. 14.

tyrant

tyrant of Samos in the reign of Cambyſes, having a powerful navy ſubdued many of the iſlands, and among the reſt Rhenea, which as ſoon as conquered he conſecrated to Delian Apollo. The Phocéans alſo, when planting their colony at Marſeilles, had a ſucceſsful engagement at ſea againſt the Carthaginians.

Naval affairs. Theſe were the moſt remarkable equipments of a naval force; and theſe, tho' beyond conteſt many generations later than the war of Troy, had a very ſmall number of triremes, but conſiſted chiefly of veſſels of fifty oars and barges of the more ancient model. And it was but a little while before the Median war and the death of Darius who ſucceeded Cambyſes in the kingdom of Perſia, that the tyrants of Sicily and the Corcyréans became maſters of any conſiderable number of triremes. For theſe laſt were the only inſtances of a naval ſtrength in Greece, before the invaſion of it by Xerxes, that deſerve particular mention. The veſſels of the Æginetæ, of the Athenians, and ſome [redacted] were few in number and moſt of them but of fifty oars. It w[redacted] till later times, when the Athenians had war with the Æginetæ and alſo expected the approach of Xerxes, that at the perſuaſion of Themiſtocles they built thoſe *ſhips* with which they fought ſucceſsfully againſt the *Barbarian*; and even *theſe* were not yet compleatly decked over.

Such therefore were the navies of Greece, both of an earlier and later date. And the *ſtates* to which they belonged gained by them conſiderable ſtrength, through an increaſe of their revenue and the enlargement of their dominions. Embarkations grown more frequent, eſpecially to thoſe who were pent up in a narrow ſoil, occaſioned the reduction of the iſles: But for a *land war*, and in conſequence of *that*, an acceſſion of power, *none* ſuch was at that time known. All conflicts of that ſort, which ever happened, were diſputes of boundary between contiguous ſtates. The Grecians had not yet lanched forth into diſtant expéditions, nor aimed ambitiouſly at foreign conqueſts. There were no dependent cities, which furniſhed

furniſhed quotas at the will of others who gave them law; nor did thoſe who were upon equality concur in any joint undertaking; each petty *ſtate* took up arms occaſionally in its own defence againſt the incroachments of its neighbours. At moſt, the greateſt diviſion of Greece that ever happened was in the old rupture between the Chalcideans and Eretrians, when leagues were formed in favour of both.

By theſe means was the growth of many ſtates prevented, and that of the Ionians by a different cauſe —— the great and ſurprizing growth of the Perſian power. For Cyrus, after he had compleated the conqueſt of Crœſus and all the country which lieth between the river Halys and the ſea, invaded them and inſlaved their towns upon the continent: And Darius afterwards, victorious by the ſtrength of a Phœnician fleet, did the ſame by the iſlands. Ionians.

As for thoſe tyrants, who had any where uſurped the government of Grecian cities, — their whole application being confined to their own private concerns, to the guard of thei[illegible]s or aggrandizement of their families — they reſided in their own cities ſo far as was conſiſtent with their own ſecurity. Nothing worthy of remembrance was atchieved by them, unleſs we take into account the frequent broils between them and their neighbours: Not but that the tyrants in Sicily had advanced their power to a great height. But Greece in general was *thus* withheld for a long courſe of time from performing any remarkable exploit, by the ſtrength of her united or the adventurous efforts of her ſeparate *ſtates*. *Tyrants.*

But, after that the tyrants of Athens, and all the tyrants of other parts of Greece, generally and of old ſubject to theſe violent incroachments, notwithſtanding their number and the freſh vigour of * the laſt, were all (except thoſe of Sicily) demoliſhed by the Lacedæmonians: —— For Lacedæmon, ever ſince it came into the hands of the Dorians, in whoſe poſſeſſion it ſtill continueth, tho' haraſſed with ſeditions the longeſt of any place we know, yet hath ever Athenians.

* *The* Piſiſtratidæ.

ever been happy in a well-regulated government, and hath always been exempt from tyrants: For, reckoning to the concluſion of this preſent war, it is ſomewhat more than four hundred years that the Lacedæmonians have enjoyed the ſame polity: On this baſis was their power at home founded, and this enabled them to exert it in regulating other *ſtates*. —— But, after that the tyrants were by them extirpated from Greece, not many years intervened, before the battle of Marathon was fought by the Medes againſt the Athenians: And in the tenth year after that, the *Barbarian* (Xerxes) again with a vaſt armament invaded Greece in order to inſlave it. Hanging then on the very brink of ruin, the Lacedæmonians, on account of their preeminent power, took the command of all the Greeks combined together in their own defence; whilſt the Athenians, on the approach of the Medes, having already determined to abandon their city and laid in their neceſſary ſtores, went on board their ſhips, and made head againſt *him* by ſea. Having thus by their common efforts repulſed the *Barbarian*, the Grecians, not only thoſe who revolted from *the king* but thoſe alſo who had combined together againſt him, were ſoon after divided among themſelves, ſiding either in the Athenian, or in the Lacedæmonian league: For the maſtery appeared plainly to be in their hands, ſince *theſe* were the moſt powerful by land and *thoſe* by ſea. The agreement between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians was but of ſhort continuance; variance enſued; and they entered the liſts of war one againſt another, each with the additional ſtrength of their own reſpective allies: And hence, if any other Grecians quarrelled, they went over in parties to theſe as their *principals*. Inſomuch that from the invaſion of the Medes quite down to the breaking out of this war, one while ſtriking up truces, another while at open war either with one another or the confederates revolting from either league, they had provided themſelves with all military ſtores, and much improved their skill by conſtant practice exerciſed in dangers.

As

As for the Lacedæmonians, they gave law to their confederates without the heavy impoſition of tributes. Their ſtudy was only to keep them well-affected to themſelves, by introducing the *oligarchy* among them. But the Athenians lorded it over theirs, having got in courſe of time the ſhips of all thoſe who might oppoſe them into their own hands excepting the Chians and the Leſbians, and impoſed on them a certain payment of tribute. And their own particular preparations for the preſent war were more ample than former times had known, even during the greateſt vigour of their *ſtate* and the moſt perfect harmony between them and their allies. Lacedæmonians.

Such are the diſcoveries I have made concerning the ancient ſtate of Greece; which, tho' drawn from a regular ſeries of proofs, will not eaſily be credited: For it is the cuſtom of mankind, nay even where their own country is concerned, to acquieſce with ready credulity in the traditions of former ages, without ſubjecting them to the teſt of ſedate examination. Thus, for inſtance, it is yet a received opinion amongſt the bulk of the Athenian People, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and therefore ſlain by Harmodius and Ariſtogiton; and they have not yet diſcovered, that Hippias then governed by virtue of his being the eldeſt of the ſons of Piſiſtratus, and that Hipparchus and Theſſalus were his brothers. Harmodius and Ariſtogiton, on the very day appointed and juſt at the criſis, ſuſpecting that information had been given to Hippias by ſome who were privy to the deſign, made no attempt upon *him* as put already on his guard. Yet willing, before they were apprehended, to ſhew their reſolution and contempt of danger, they accidentally found Hipparchus at the Leocorium ſuperintending the [9] Panathenaical proceſſion, and immediately *Ignorance and credulity of men.*

9 This proceſſion was made at the great Panathenæa, which feſtival was celebrated once in five years in commemoration of the union of all the people of Attica by Theſeus. The leſſer Panathenæa was celebrated every third year, ſome ſay every year, and was lengthned out by public games. Theſe were alſo uſed at the great Panathenæa, in which the greateſt ſplendor and magnificence were employed, and the proceſſion added

diately ſlew him. There are many other things of a more recent date and of memory not yet invalidated by time, about which the other Grecians are very wrong in their notions; ſuch as, that the Lacedæmonian kings had each of them a double and not a ſingle vote in public queſtions; and, that amongſt them the Pittanate was a military band, which *never yet exiſted*. So eaſy a taſk to numbers is the ſearch of truth; ſo eager are they to catch at whatever lieth next at hand!

The true account.

But, from the teſtimonies alledged in ſupport of what I have hitherto advanced, any one may depend on my account of things, without danger of falſe opinions. Let him withhold his credit from the ſongs of poets, whoſe profeſſion it is to give all poſſible enlargements to their ſubjects: Let him do ſo farther, by [1] the writers of proſe, who ſtudy more that artful compoſition which captivateth the ear than the plain and ſimple recital of truth, where proper atteſtations are never to be found, and many things through length of time have incredibly fallied out into mere fable; and then he will be convinced upon the plaineſt proofs, that the ſtate of ancient Greece was very nearly the ſame as I have deſcribed it. And this preſent war, when conſidered in all its operations, notwithſtanding the propenſity of mankind to imagine that war in which they are perſonally engaged, to be the greateſt that ever happened, and ſo ſoon as it is over to replace their admiration upon others more ancient, will eaſily be owned to have been the moſt important of all.

Speeches.

As to the *ſpeeches* of particular perſons either at the commencement or in the proſecution of the war, whether ſuch as I heard myſelf or ſuch as were repeated to me by others, I will not pretend to

added, here mentioned by Thucydides, and of which the curious reader may ſee a particular account in Potter's Archæologia, vol. i. p. 421.

1 Thucydides is here ſuppoſed to glance at Herodotus; and again a little after he juſtly thinks, that *fiction* and *fable* ought to have no place in hiſtory.

recite

recite them in all their exactneſs. It hath been my method to conſider principally what might be pertinently ſaid upon every occaſion to the points in debate, and to keep as near as poſſible to what would paſs for genuine by univerſal conſent. And as for the *actions* performed in the courſe of this war, I have not preſumed to deſcribe them from caſual narratives or my own conjectures, but either from certainty, where I myſelf was a ſpectator, or from the moſt exact informations I have been able to collect from others. This indeed was a work of no little difficulty, becauſe even ſuch as were preſent at thoſe actions diſagreed in their accounts about them, according as affection to either ſide or memory prevailed. *Facts.*

My relation, becauſe quite clear of *fable*, may prove leſs delightful to the ears. But it will afford ſufficient ſcope to thoſe who love a ſincere account of paſt tranſactions, of ſuch as in the ordinary viciſſitude of human affairs may fully occur, at leaſt be reſembled again. I give it to the public as an EVERLASTING POSSESSION, and not as a contentious inſtrument of temporary applauſe. *The work itſelf.*

Of former tranſactions, the greateſt was that againſt the Medes, which however by two engagements at ſea and as many at land, was brought to a ſpeedy concluſion. But the continuance of this war ran out into a much greater length; and Greece in the courſe of it was plunged into ſuch calamities, as were never known before in an equal ſpace. Never had ſo many cities been made deſolate by victories, ſome by *Barbarians* and ſome by the violence of inteſtine feuds; to ſay nothing of thoſe where captivity made room for new poſſeſſors: Never ſo many inſtances of baniſhment; never ſo many ſcenes of ſlaughter either in battles or ſeditions. Such calamities farther, as were known only by report but had rarely been felt in fact, now gained credit from experience: Earthquakes, for inſtance, which affected the largeſt part of the habitable globe and ſhook it with the utmoſt violence: Eclipſes of the ſun, which happened more frequently than former times had remembred: Great droughts in ſome *Importance of the war.*

places, the conſequence of which was famine: And, what made not the leaſt ravage but did its ſhare of deſtruction, the noiſome peſtilence. For all theſe things enſued in the ſequel of this war, which was carried on between the Athenians and Peloponneſians, after breaking the thirty years truce concluded between them upon the reduction of Eubœa.

Reaſons of it. The reaſons for which this truce was broke, and their *courſe* of variance, I have in the *firſt* place thought proper to write, that none may be at a loſs about the origin of ſo momentous a war among the Grecians. *The real one.* The growth of the Athenian power I conceive to have been the trueſt occaſion of it, tho' never openly avowed: The jealouſy ſtruck by it into the Lacedæmonians made the conteſt neceſſary. *The pretended.* But the pretences, publicly alledged on either ſide for breaking the truce and declaring open war, ſhall now be related.

I. *The affair of* Epidamnus. EPIDAMNUS is a city on the right hand as you ſail into the Ionian gulph: Adjoining to it live the Barbarian Taulantii, a people of Illyria. The Corcyréans ſettled a colony *here*, the leader of which was Phalius the ſon of Heratoclides, a Corinthian by birth, of the lineage of Hercules, invited to the office out of the mother-city according to the cuſtom of ancient times: and beſide this, ſome Corinthians and others of Doric deſcent joined themſelves to this colony. In proceſs of time, the city of the Epidamnians became great and populous. Yet, having been afterwards harraſſed with ſeditions of many years continuance, they were brought very low (according to report) by a war waged againſt them by the neighbouring Barbarians, and were deprived of the greateſt ſhare of their power. But the moſt recent event at Epidamnus before the preſent war was, that the *people* there had driven the *noble* out of the city. Theſe ſheltering themſelves amongſt the Barbarians began depredations on thoſe who remained behind, both by land and ſea. The

Epidamnians

Epidamnians of the place, ſuffering vaſtly from theſe depredations, diſpatched ambaſſadors to Corcyra as their mother-city, beſeeching them, "Not to behold their deſtruction with eyes unconcerned, but to reconcile their exiles to them, and to deliver them from this Barbarian war." The ambaſſadors, ſitting down ſubmiſſively in the temple of Juno, offered theſe ſupplications. But the Corcyréans, refuſing to receive them, ſent them home again without effect. The Epidamnians, thus convinced that no redreſs could be had from Corcyra and ignorant how to proceed in their preſent perplexities, ſent to Delphos to enquire of the God, "Whether they ſhould ſurrender their city to the Corinthians as their founders, and ſhould ſeek ſecurity from their protection?" He anſwered, that "they ſhould ſurrender, and take *them* for their leaders." The Epidamnians, in purſuance of this oracle, arriving at Corinth, make there a tender of the colony; repreſenting that "the leader of it had been of Corinth," and communicating the oracle; and farther intreated them "not to look on with eyes of unconcern till their deſtruction was compleated, but to undertake their redreſs." The Corinthians granted them their protection from a regard to juſtice, imagining themſelves to be no leſs intereſted in this colony than the Corcyréans. But they were alſo actuated by an hatred of the Corcyréans, from whom, tho' a colony of their own, they had received ſome contemptuous treatment: For they neither payed them the uſual honour on their public ſolemnities, nor began with a Corinthian in the diſtribution of the ſacrifices, which is always done by other colonies. This their contempt was founded as well on the ſufficiency of their own wealth, in which at that time they equalled the richeſt of the Greeks, as on the ſuperiority of their military force. Their inſolence became greater in time with the enlargement of their navy, and they aſſumed glory to themſelves in a naval character as ſucceeding the Phæacians in the poſſeſſion of Corcyra. This was their chief incentive to furniſh themſelves with a naval ſtrength, and in it they were by no means incon-

inconſiderable: For they were maſters of an hundred and twenty triremes, when they began this war. Upon all theſe reaſons the reſentments of the Corinthians riſing high againſt them, they undertook with pleaſure the relief of Epidamnus; encouraging all who were ſo diſpoſed, to go and ſettle *there*, and ſending thither a garriſon of Ambraciots and Leucadians and their own people. Theſe marched by land to Apollonia, which is a colony of the Corinthians, from a dread of the Corcyréans, leſt they ſhould have hindered their paſſage had they attempted it by ſea.

As ſoon as the Corcyréans heard, that the new inhabitants and garriſon were got to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered into the hands of the Corinthians, they grew hot with indignation: And putting out immediately with twenty-five ſhips which were ſoon followed by another equipment, they command them "at their peril to receive their exiles;"—For thoſe who had been driven out of Epidamnus had already been at Corcyra, where pointing to the ſepulchres and claiming the rights of conſanguinity they had intreated them to undertake their reſtoration:—"and to ſend away the garriſon and new inhabitants which they had received from Corinth." The Epidamnians were quite deaf to theſe haughty commands. And upon this, the Corcyréans with a ſquadron of forty ſhips, accompanied by the exiles whom they pretended to reſtore and an aid of Illyrians, began hoſtilities. Having blocked up the city, they made proclamation, "That all Epidamnians who were willing and the ſtrangers might depart without moleſtation, or otherwiſe they ſhould be treated as enemies." But this having no effect, the Corcyréans beſet the place, which is ſituated upon an iſthmus, on all ſides, in regular ſiege.

Epidamnus *beſieged by the* Corcyréans.

The Corinthians, upon the arrival of meſſengers from Epidamnus with an account of the ſiege, draw their forces together. They alſo gave public notice, "That a new colony was going to Epidamnus, into which all that would enter ſhould have equal and like privileges with

with their predeceſſors; that, if any one was unwilling to ſet out immediately, and yet chuſe to have the benefit of the colony, he might depoſit fifty Corinthian Drachmas, and be excuſed his perſonal attendance." The number of thoſe who entered for immediate tranſportation, and of thoſe who depoſited their money, was large. They ſent farther to the Megaréans, requeſting a number of ſhips to enlarge their convoy, that their paſſage might not be obſtructed by the Corcyréans, from whom they received a ſupply of eight, and four more from Pale of the Cephallenians. The ſame requeſt was made to the Epidaurians, who ſent five. A ſingle ſhip joined them from Hermione; two from Trœzene; ten from the Leucadians; and eight from the Ambraciots. Of the Thebans and Phliaſians they requeſted money; of the Eléans, empty ſhips and money. And the number of ſhips fitted out by themſelves amounted to thirty, and three thouſand *heavy-armed*.

When the Corcyréans were informed of theſe preparations, they went to Corinth, purpoſely accompanied by ambaſſadors from Lacedæmon and Sicyon. There they charged the Corinthians "to fetch away their garriſon and new ſettlement from Epidamnus, as having no manner of pretenſions *there*: That, if they had any thing to alledge to the contrary, they were willing to ſubmit to a fair trial in Peloponneſus before ſuch *ſtates* as both ſides ſhould approve; and to which-ever party the colony ſhould be adjudged, by them it ſhould be held." They alſo intimated "their readineſs to refer the point in diſpute to the oracle at Delphos;—— war, in their own inclinations, they were quite againſt: But if it muſt be ſo, on their ſides (they ſaid) mere neceſſity would preſcribe the meaſure; and if thus compelled to do it, they ſhould for aſſiſtance have recourſe to friends not eligible indeed, but better able to ſerve them than ſuch as they already had." The Corinthians anſwered, That "if they would withdraw their fleet and their Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then treat of an accommodation: But, till this was done, their honour would

would not ſuffer them to ſubmit to a reference, whilſt their friends were undergoing the miſeries of a ſiege." The Corcyréans replied, that "if *they* would recal their people from Epidamnus, themſelves alſo would do the like; but were ready further to agree, that both parties ſhould remain in their preſent ſituation, under a ſuſpenſion of arms, till the affair could be judicially determined."

The Corinthians were not only deaf to every propoſal, but ſo ſoon as ever they had manned their ſhips and their allies were come up, diſpatching a herald beforehand to declare war againſt the Corcyréans, and then weighing anchor with a force of ſeventy-five ſhips and two thouſand *heavy-armed*, they ſtretched away for Epidamnus to make head againſt the Corcyréans. The commanders of this fleet were Ariſteus the ſon of Pellicas, Callicrates the ſon of Callias, and Timanor the ſon of Timanthes: Thoſe of the land-forces were Archetimus the ſon of Eurytimus, and Iſarchidas the ſon of Iſarchus.

Fight at ſea between Corcyréans *and* Corinthians.

When they were come up as far as Actium in the diſtrict of Anactorium, where ſtandeth the temple of Apollo, in the mouth of the gulph of Ambracia, they were met by a herald diſpatched expreſly in a row-boat by the Corcyréans, forbidding them "at their peril to proceed." But at the ſame time the Corcyréans were buſied at home in manning their own ſhips, repairing ſuch as were old to make them fit for ſervice, and equipping the reſt with the utmoſt expedition. When the herald brought back nothing pacific from the Corinthians, and their ſquadron was now compleated to eighty ſhips (for they had forty employed in the ſiege of Epidamnus) they ſailed in queſt of the enemy, and drawing up againſt them came to an engagement. The victory fell beyond diſpute to the ſide of the Corcyréans, and fifteen ſhips of the Corinthians were utterly deſtroyed.

Surrender of Epidamnus.

Their good fortune was ſuch, that on the very ſame day Epidamnus was ſurrendered to the beſiegers upon a capitulation, by which "all

" all the ſtrangers in the place were to be ſold for ſlaves, but the " Corinthians to be detained priſoners at diſcretion."

After the engagement at ſea, the Corcyréans having erected a trophy [2] upon Leucimna a promontory of Corcyra, put to death all the priſoners they had taken, except the Corinthian, whom they kept in chains. And after this, as the Corinthians and allies having been vanquiſhed in fight were forced to retire within their own harbours, they were quite maſters of all the adjacent ſea; and, ſailing firſt to Leucas a colony of the Corinthians, they laid its territory waſte; and then burnt Cyllene a dock of the Eléans, becauſe they had ſupplied the Corinthians with ſhips and money. In this manner they continued maſters of the ſea a long time after their naval victory, and in their cruiſes very much annoyed the allies of the Corinthians. It was not 'till the beginning of the ſummer, that a check was given them by a fleet and land-army, who were commiſſioned, in order to relieve their harraſſed allies, to ſtation themſelves at Actium and round the Chimerium of Theſprotis. There they lay, to cover Leucas and other places which were in friendſhip with them from the ravage of the enemy. The Corcyréans, upon this, with a naval and land-force ſtationed themſelves over-againſt them at Leucimna. But, neither party venturing out to attack the other, they lay quiet in

2 This was conſtantly done by the Grecians upon a victory. Nay, when the victory was claimed on both ſides, both ſides erected trophies, of which ſeveral inſtances occur in Thucydides. The trophies for a victory at land were decked out with the arms they had taken: Thoſe for a victory at ſea, with arms alſo and the ſhatters of the enemy's ſhips. " To demoliſh a " trophy was looked on as unlawful, and a " kind of ſacrilege, becauſe they were all " conſecrated to ſome deity: Nor was it leſs " a crime to pay divine adoration before " them, or to repair them when decayed, " as may be likewiſe obſerved of the Ro- " man triumphal arches: This being the " means to revive the memory of forgot- " ten quarrels, and engage poſterity to re- " venge the diſgrace of their anceſtors: " For the ſame reaſon, thoſe Grecians, " who firſt introduced the cuſtom of erect- " ing pillars for trophies, incurred a ſevere " cenſure from the ages they lived in." *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 12.

their oppoſite ſtations the whole ſummer; and, on the approach of winter, both ſides withdrew to their reſpective homes.

Embaſſies to Athens.

During the remainder of the year after the engagement at ſea and all the following, the Corinthians, whoſe indignation was raiſed in this their war againſt the Corcyréans, were building new ſhips, and ſparing neither labour nor coſt to get a ſtrong armament ready for ſea, and ſent throughout Peloponneſus and the other parts of Greece to hire mariners into their ſervice. The Corcyréans, hearing of theſe great preparations, were terribly alarmed, and with reaſon: For at that time they were in no alliance with any of the Grecians, nor comprehended either in the Athenian or Lacedæmonian league. And hence, they thought it quite expedient to go and ſue for the alliance of the Athenians, and endeavour to obtain ſome ſuccour from them. The Corinthians, gaining intelligence of their deſign, diſpatched an embaſſy at the ſame time alſo to Athens *inſtructed* by any means to prevent the junction of the Athenian to the naval ſtrength of the Corcyréans, which might hinder them from bringing this war to a ſucceſsful iſſue. The Athenians being met in [3] general aſſembly, both

3 The ἐκκλησία or aſſembly of the people. In this the ſovereignty was veſted: and it is proper the *Engliſh* reader ſhould grow acquainted with this particular form in the Athenian democracy.

The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which preſided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courſes, and each tribe preſided about five weeks. The tribe in courſe elected fifty perſons to manage by their authority and in their name: Theſe were called *Prytanes*. This being too large a number for buſineſs, they were ſub-divided into tens, each of theſe diviſions preſiding for a week: and theſe were called *Proëdri*. One of the *Proëdri* preſided or was in the chair for a day, and was ſtiled *Epiſtates*. For that day, and he never enjoyed this preeminence a ſecond time in his life, he was inveſted with the higheſt truſt in the government. He kept the public ſeal and the keys of the citadel and treaſury. In the aſſembly of the people he ordered all the proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the queſtion, and declared the majority.

The aſſemblies of the people were of two kinds, *ordinary* and *extraordinary*. Of the firſt kind, four were regularly held during each preſidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambaſſadors from foreign ſtates had public audience. The latter were occaſionally convened by the *preſidents* in courſe or by the *generals* of the ſtate.

Some

both embaſſies roſe up to plead their own cauſe; and the Corcyréan ſpoke as followeth.

Speech of the Corcyrean embaſſy.

" IT is quite proper, Athenians, that thoſe who addreſs themſelves to a neighbouring power imploring their ſuccour, which is now our caſe, without being able to plead the merit of prior good-ſervices or an old alliance in their own behalf, ſhould previouſly convince them, *chiefly*, that a compliance with ſuch requeſts muſt turn to their advantage; at *leaſt*, that it will cauſe no manner of inconvenience; and *then*, that the favour will be returned with effectual gratitude. If they are unable to give ſatisfactory conviction in any of theſe particulars, they can have no reaſon to be angry if their ſuit be rejected. The Corcyréans, confident that they can clear up theſe points beyond the reach of ſcruple, have ſent us hither to requeſt your alliance.

" The method, indeed, which hitherto we have fondly obſerved, hath proved in fact abſurd towards you in this our exigency, and prejudicial to our own affairs in our preſent ſituation. In preceding times, we never choſe to grant our alliance to any, yet now are we come to ſue for alliance from others, being through our own maxims quite deſtitute of friends in this our war againſt the

Some days before-hand, notice was publicly given by the ſenate or council of five hundred upon what ſubjects they were to deliberate; but this could not be obſerved upon ſudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning, generally in the Pnyx, at the ſummons of the public *crier*. At the ſecond ſummons they were obliged to attend at their peril. For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a rope ſtretched acroſs and rubbed over with vermilion, and all upon whom a mark was found were fined; but thoſe who attended early and regularly, received half a drachma each for attendance. The number which attended generally amounted to five or ſix thouſand.

The aſſembly opened with the ſacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, and the blood was ſprinkled round by way of purification. Then a prayer was pronounced aloud by the *crier* for the proſperity of the commonwealth of Athens; which ended, a curſe was next pronounced on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of his country. Then, the preſidents of the week opened the points upon which they were convened, and the aſſembly proceeded to buſineſs.

" Corinthians: and *that* which before appeared the conduct of re-
" fined prudence, to keep clear of danger by ſhunning the intangle-
" ments of a foreign alliance, we now find by the event to have been
" both impolitic and weak.

" Once already we have engaged the Corinthians at ſea, and re-
" pulſed them merely by our own ſtrength. But, ſince with a
" greater force collected from Peloponneſus and the reſt of Greece
" they are again preparing to attack us; ſince we perceive ourſelves
" unable to reſiſt them merely with our own domeſtic ſtrength;
" ſince further with our ſubjection the danger will ſpread abroad;
" we are neceſſitated to apply to you and every where elſe for ſuc-
" cour; and, tho' now emboldened to act in oppoſition to our for-
" mer inactive maxims, yet we deſerve your pardon, as they were
" not the reſult of bad deſigns, but of miſtaken judgments: and,
" could we but obtain redreſs from you, this incidental neceſſity
" of ours, will turn out highly to your honour, upon ſeveral
" accounts.

" In the firſt place, you will favour thoſe with your aſſiſtance,
" who have felt but never committed injuſtice. In the next place,
" by protecting thoſe whoſe lives and liberties are at ſtake, you will
" confer ſo vaſt an obligation that the memory of it can never be
" aboliſhed. We are now maſters of the greateſt naval force except
" your own. Conſider therefore how fair an occaſion very ſeldom
" to be met with, of the greateſt advantage to yourſelves, of the
" greateſt vexation to your enemies, now lieth before you; when
" that very power, the acceſſion of which you would readily have
" purchaſed with ample ſums of money and a weight of obligation,
" cometh here to invite your acceptance and make a tender of itſelf
" without any danger or expence to you; nay, what is more, ena-
" bling you to gain the praiſe of the world, the grateful acknow-
" ledgments of thoſe you defend, and an increaſe of power to your-
" ſelves. Few people, in preceding ages, have ever had at any one

" time

" time ſo many fine opportunities within their reach. And few
" there are, who, ſuing for alliance, do it not rather from a view
" of receiving than conferring ſecurity and reputation by their
" ſuit.

" If there be any one amongſt you, who imagineth *that* war will
" never happen in which we may do you ſervice, in ſuch imagina-
" tion he is quite miſtaken. He doth not penetrate the deſigns of
" the Lacedæmonians, who alarmed at your power are intent on
" war; nor thoſe of the Corinthians, who, powerful of themſelves
" and your enemies, have begun with us to open the way for attack-
" ing you; that, united by common reſentments, we might not
" ſtand up in our mutual defence againſt their violence: nor they
" be diſappointed at leaſt in one of their views, either effectually to
" humble us, or ſecurely to eſtabliſh their own power. It is your
" intereſt to prevent them by accepting that alliance which we offer,
" and rather to anticipate their deſigns than counterplot them when
" ripening into act.

" If farther, they tax with a breach of juſtice your preſuming to in-
" terfere with their colonies; let them learn, that every colony, whilſt
" uſed in the proper manner, payeth honour and regard to its mo-
" ther-ſtate, but, when treated with injury and violence, is become
" an alien. They are not ſent out to be the ſlaves, but to be the
" equals of thoſe who remain behind. *Their* violence and injuſtice
" require no proofs. For, invited by us to ſubmit the buſineſs of
" Epidamnus to a judicial trial, they choſe rather to proſecute their
" claims at war than at equity. And let ſuch behaviour towards *us*
" their relations put *you* timely on your guard, that you may not be
" over-reached by their colluſions, nor heſitate one moment to
" grant our petitions. For he, who findeth the leaſt room to repent
" of having gratified his enemies, is moſt likely to perſevere in un-
" interrupted ſecurity.

" You

" You will not break your treaty with the Lacedæmonians by our " admiſſion, who are allied to *neither* of you. By that treaty it is " expreſly ſtipulated, that --- " If any of the *ſtates* of Greece be not " at preſent in alliance with either of the contracting parties, per- " miſſion is given them to go into either league, at their own diſ- " cretion." ---- And terrible indeed it is, if they muſt be at liberty " to man their fleets out of places in their alliance, nay more than " that out of Greece at large, and to no ſmall amount, even out of " your dependents: and we muſt be debarred not only your moſt " inviting alliance, but every poſſible expedient of ſuccour: Then " after all, they muſt raiſe a cry of injuſtice, if we offer our re- " queſts to you and have them granted. But much greater reaſons " of complaint will lie with us, if we cannot prevail upon you. " For then, you will throw at a diſtance thoſe who are beſet with " dangers and never were your enemies; you will not only not re- " ſtrain the incroachments of enemies and invaders, but will be- " hold them through your negligence aſſuming ſtrength out of your " dominions, which you ought never to endure. You ought either " to hinder them from ſeducing your ſubjects into their pay, or " ſend an immediate ſuccour to us, in what manner you may be " perſuaded is the moſt expedient: But the courſe you ought prin- " cipally to take is, to form with us a defenſive alliance, and to act " immediately.

" The advantage of ſuch a meaſure, as we premiſed at firſt, we " are clearly proving. But that which carrieth the greateſt weight is " this, that our enemies are enemies alſo to you (a point too clear to " require proof), and enemies by no means deſpicable, but able to " make revolters feel their vengeance. The bad conſequences of re- " jecting a *land* cannot be equal to thoſe of rejecting a *naval* alliance, " eſpecially to you, who ſhould exert your utmoſt efforts to let none " be maſters of a fleet beſide yourſelves; or, if that be not feaſible, " to make the moſt powerful in that reſpect your faſt allies. And

" who-

" whoſoever, allowing the plain advantage of theſe our arguments,
" may yet dread a rupture if their influence prevail, —— let ſuch an
" one know, that the event he feareth accompanied by ſtrength will
" ſtrike greater dread into all your enemies, but that the zeal of
" him who would have us now rejected, ſince it is founded on a
" weak preſumption of their ſtrength, muſt the ſooner encourage
" thoſe enemies to attack you. The preſent conſultation is not con-
" fined to Corcyra, but very nearly concerneth Athens alſo: —— Let
" him therefore be aſſured, that he doth not provide the beſt for the
" welfare of Athens, when, directly foreſeeing a war faſt approach-
" ing and only not on foot, he heſitateth the leaſt about gaining a
" people provided with all the neceſſary means of being a moſt ſer-
" viceable friend or a moſt prejudicial foe; —— a people opportunely
" ſituated in the courſe to Italy and Sicily, ſo capable to hinder the
" acceſſion of any naval force from thence to the Peloponneſians,
" and to ſecure a paſſage from hence to any of thoſe coaſts, not to
" mention the commodiouſneſs of it in many other reſpects.

" To reduce the whole to one ſhort point, wherein all and every
" individual of you is concerned, learn from *hence* that we are not
" to be abandoned: There are but three naval powers amongſt the
" Grecians of any conſideration, your own, our own, and that of
" the Corinthians. If you indolently ſuffer two of theſe to be in-
" corporated, by leaving us a prey to the Corinthians, you muſt for
" the future make head againſt the Corcyréans and Peloponneſians
" both: But, if you grant your alliance to us, the conteſt will lie
" againſt them alone, and your own naval ſtrength be conſiderably
" augmented."

In this manner the Corcyréans ſpoke: and, when they had con-cluded, the Corinthians took their turn, as followeth ——

Speech of the Corinthian embaſſy.

" SINCE theſe Corcyréans have not confined their diſcourſe
" merely to ſollicit the favour of your alliance, but have enlarged it
" with

" with invectives againſt our injuſtice in making war upon them, we " alſo lie under a neceſſity to make ſome previous obſervations on " both of thoſe points, before we proceed to other matters. By this " means, you will perceive your own great ſecurity in complying " with our demands, and what weighty reaſons you have to reject " their importunate ſollicitations.

" They alledge it as a maxim of prudence that they have been " hitherto averſe to any foreign alliance: But their motives in this " were founded upon malice, and not upon virtue. They would " have no ally to be a witneſs of the wrongs they do; they declined " the ſociety of ſuch as might put them to the bluſh. Their very " iſland farther, which is finely ſituated for ſuch arbitrary tempers, " ſuffereth them alone to judge thoſe outrages they themſelves com- " mit: exempting them from fair and equitable trials, becauſe they " ſeldom go abroad to viſit their neighbours, as their harbours are " the conſtant and neceſſary reſort of others. Here then lieth the " modeſty of their unaſſociating maxim: It was deſigned to prevent " their having any partners in violence, that they might have it all " to themſelves; that, when they were ſuperior, they might oppreſs " without controul, when there were none to watch them they " might ingroſs the ſpoil, and might enjoy their rapine without " danger of a bluſh. Had they been thoſe virtuous ſouls they pro- " claim themſelves, then, clear of every bad imputation from their " neighbours, they had a fine opportunity to manifeſt their integrity " to the world, by doing and by ſubmitting to juſtice.

" But *ſuch* neither we nor any other people have in fact expe- " rienced them. For, tho' planted by us, they have ever diſowned " their allegiance to us, and now wage open war againſt us, plead- " ing that they were not ſent abroad to be maltreated and oppreſſed. " We alſo aver in our own behalf, that neither did we ſend them " to receive their injurious requitals, but to retain them in lawful " dependence, and to be honoured and reverenced by them. Such

" dutiful

" dutiful returns the reſt of our colonies punctually make us, and
" by ſuch no other people are ſo well reſpected as ourſelves. From
" the great ſatisfaction therefore we give to all the reſt it plainly ap-
" peareth, that we afford no reaſonable diſguſt to theſe alone, and
" that without ſome glaring injury, we ſhould have had no inclina-
" tion to declare war againſt them. But, tho we had actually tranſ-
" greſſed, it would have been quite decent on their part to have
" ſhewn condeſcenſion when we are angry; and then, it would
" have been baſe in us, to have preſſed too far on ſuch moderation.
" To their pride and the inſolence of wealth their many tranſgreſ-
" ſions againſt us are juſtly to be aſcribed. Hence it was, that they
" laid no claim to Epidamnus, which belongeth to us, whilſt har-
" raſſed with inteſtine feuds; but, when we came to its redreſs, then
" by force they ſeize and detain it. And now, they pretend that
" previous to that they were willing to have ſubmitted to a fair ar-
" bitration. — Such pleas are not to be regarded, when offered by
" men who are already maſters in poſſeſſion, and on that ſecurity
" make appeal to juſtice: They are only of weight, when facts and
" words are equitably to be judged, before the point hath been de-
" cided by arms. And it was not before they had beſieged that
" city, but when they thought that we were intent on ſaving it, that
" they had recourſe to the ſpecious pretence of a fair arbitration.
" And *here* they are at preſent, by no means content with the
" wrongs they have *there* committed, preſuming to ask conjunction
" from you, not in league but in violence, and on the merit of being
" rebels againſt us to beg your protection. Then was the proper
" time for ſuch an addreſs to you, when their affairs ſecurely flou-
" riſhed; not now, when we have been outraged by them and they
" are beſet with dangers; not, when you, who have ſhared no be-
" nefit from their former power, are to relieve their diſtreſs, and by
" no means their accomplices in crimes are to come in for an equa-
" lity of cenſure from us. A prior conjunction of force juſtly in-

" titleth to a ſhare of what may be the event: But thoſe, who had " no participation in the guilt, ought to be exempted from the " conſequences of it. —— And thus we have clearly ſhewn, that " we have addreſſed ourſelves before you with all the requiſites " of a rightful cauſe, and that their proceedings are violent and ra- " pacious.

" It is now incumbent upon us to convince you, that you cannot " with juſtice receive them into alliance. For, granting it to be ex- " preſly ſtipulated in the treaty that *any of the ſtates not particularly* " *mentioned may go into either league at their own diſcretion*, yet the " intent of the ſtipulation reacheth not to thoſe who join one party " to the prejudice of another, but to ſuch as having withdrawn " from neither ſide are in need of protection --- to ſuch, as bring " not war inſtead of peace to *thoſe* who receive them, ---- if *they* " know their intereſt. And yet, the latter muſt be your portion, if " our arguments loſe their influence: For you will not only become " auxiliaries to *them*, but enemies alſo to *us* who are your allies by " treaty. Of neceſſity, if you join with them, our vengeance muſt " be levelled at them without ſeparating you. Right above all things " it would be for you, to keep yourſelves at a diſtance from us both; " ---- if that will not pleaſe, to reverſe your proceedings, and join " with us in oppoſition to them ---- For, to the Corinthians you are " bound by firm and laſting treaties, with the Corcyréans you have " never yet tranſacted even for a truce ----, and by no means to " eſtabliſh a new law for receiving revolters from the other league. " We ourſelves did not, upon the Samian revolt, give our ſuf- " frage againſt you, when the reſt of the Peloponneſians were " divided upon the queſtion ---- whether they ought to be ſup- " ported: But we openly maintained, that every *ſtate* had a right " to proceed againſt its own dependents. For if you receive and " undertake the defence of thoſe who have behaved amiſs, the " event will ſhew that the greater number will come over to our

" ſide,

" ſide, and that you eſtabliſh a law prejudicial to yourſelves much
" more than to us.

" The points of juſtice we have thus ſufficiently cleared up to you,
" according to the general laws of Greece. We have only to add a
" word of advice and the claim of a favour, ſuch an one as we now
" affirm upon a principle of gratitude ought not to be denied us,
" who are neither your enemies ſo far as to hurt you, nor ever were
" your friends ſo far as to burden you. When formerly, before the
" invaſion of the Medes, you were in want of long ſhips in your
" war againſt the Æginetæ, you were ſupplied by the Corinthians
" with twenty. The ſervice which we then did you, and that other
" more recent about the Samians, when we prevented their receiving
" any ſupport from the Peloponneſians, enabled you in their turns to
" vanquiſh the Æginetæ and to chaſtiſe the Samians. And theſe ſer-
" vices were done you at a ſeaſon, when the human attention, fixed
" intirely on war, regardeth nothing but what tendeth to victory.
" Whoever forwardeth this men eſteem their friend, tho' he
" was before their foe; and him who checketh it their foe, tho'
" perhaps he may be their real friend. For even domeſtic affairs
" are ſorrily conducted at a time when the mind is inflamed by
" contention.

" Recollect theſe things. Let the young-man learn the truth of
" them from his elders, and acknowledge that we ought to be pro-
" perly requited. Let him not entertain the thought, that what we
" ſay is agreeable to equity, but that in caſe of a war intereſt in-
" clineth another way: For intereſt is moſt ſurely to be found
" there where the leaſt injuſtice is committed. The contingency of
" that war, from a dread of which the Corcyréans encourage you to
" act unjuſtly, lieth yet in obſcurity, and ought not to inflame you
" into open and immediate hoſtilities againſt the Corinthians. It
" would be prudent, farther, to leſſen that jealouſy we have already
" conceived from the proceedings at Megara. For a latter obliga-

" tion, by the favour of time, tho' of leſs weight in itſelf, is able " to cancel a charge of greater moment. Neither ſuffer yourſelves " to be allured with the promiſe of a powerful conjunction of naval " force: For never to act unjuſtly againſt equals is a firmer ſecu- " rity of power, than to be elevated upon preſent plauſibilities and " enlarge it through a ſeries of dangers. Our preſent circumſtances " reſemble thoſe, concerning which we explicitly declared at Lace- " dæmon, that every *ſtate* had a right to proceed againſt its own de- " pendents: And now we beg that liberty from you; and that you, " who have reaped the benefit of ſuch a ſuffrage from us, would " not prejudice us by yours. Render us for it the juſt requital; " remembering, that this is the critical ſeaſon, in which he who " aideth is the beſt of friends, and he that oppoſeth the greateſt foe. " And, as for theſe Corcyréans, take them not into your alliance in " deſpite of us, nor abet them in the injuries they have done us. " By acting in this manner, you will diſcharge the obligations in- " cumbent upon you, and will take thoſe meaſures which are moſt " for your own advantage."

This is the ſubſtance of what was ſaid by the Corinthians.

Reſolution taken at Athens.

The Athenians having heard both parties, [4] met twice in full *aſſembly* on this occaſion. At the firſt meeting, they thought there was validity in the arguments of the Corinthians; but, at the ſecond,

4 Here the *Engliſh* reader ſhould be informed, in what manner buſineſs went on, when difficulties, diverſities of opinion, and conſequently debates enſued.

When it appeared that the point propoſed would not paſs unanimouſly, the crier at the command of the preſident in the chair proclaimed aloud, " What citizen above " fifty years of age hath a mind to ſpeak?" When ſuch had been heard, the crier made a ſecond proclamation, that " any Athe- " nian whatever had liberty to ſpeak." The debate being ended, the preſident in the chair bade the crier put the queſtion. It was decided by holding up of hands. The chairman diſtinguiſhed the numbers in the affirmative and negative, and declared the majority. Then the reſolution or decree was drawn up in form: and the Archon's name who gave title to the year, the day of the month, and the name of the preſiding tribe were prefix'd.

The

ſecond, they came to a different reſolution —— not indeed to form ſuch an alliance with the Corcyréans as to have the ſame enemies and the ſame friends (for then, if the Corcyréans ſhould ſummon them to join in an expedition againſt Corinth, their treaty with the Peloponneſians would be broke;) but an alliance merely defenſive, for the reciprocal ſuccour of one another, if either Corcyra or Athens or any of their reſpective allies ſhould be aſſaulted. A war with the Peloponneſians ſeemed to them unavoidable; and they had no mind to leave Corcyra, which had ſo great a naval force, for a prey to the Corinthians; but, to break them to the utmoſt of their power againſt one another, that upon occaſion they might be the better able to war with the Corinthians thus weakened to their hands, though joined by other *ſtates* of Greece which had power at ſea. At the ſame time that iſland appeared to them moſt conveniently ſituated in the paſſage to Italy and Sicily. Upon theſe motives the Athenians received the Corcyréans into their alliance: And, not long after the departure of the Corinthians, ſent ten ſhips to their aid under the command of Lacedæmonius the ſon of Cimon, Diotimus the ſon of Strombichus, and Proteas the ſon of Epicles. Their orders were "by no means to engage the Corinthians, unleſs they ſtood againſt and endeavoured to make a deſcent at Corcyra, or any of its dependent places; if they did ſo, to reſiſt them with all their efforts." Theſe orders were given with a view of not infringing the treaty: And this their aid of ſhipping arriveth at Corcyra.

The public decorum of the Athenians is worthy obſervation. The ſentiments of age and experience were firſt to be heard, and then the ſpirit and reſolution of the younger were called in to aſſiſt at the public conſultation. Nay they carried it farther; no perſon convicted of prophaneneſs, debauchery, cowardice, or public miſdemeanor was ſuffered to ſpeak in this aſſembly. From them they expected no ſound inſtruction, no diſintereſted advice. If any ſuch offered to ſpeak, the *preſidents* of the aſſembly immediately injoined them ſilence; or, if they were refractory, ordered their officers to pull them down and turn them out of the aſſembly.

The

Corinthians *again at ſea.*

The Corinthians, when they had compleated their preparations, ſet ſail for Corcyra with a fleet of one hundred and fifty ſhips. Of theſe, ten belonged to the Eléans, twelve to the Megaréans, ten to the Leucadians, twenty-ſeven to the Ambraciots, one to the Anactorians, and the other ninety were their own. The quotas from the allied cities had each of them their reſpective commanders; but the Corinthian ſquadron was commanded by Xenoclides the ſon of Euthycles with four collegues. So ſoon as they were all aſſembled at that part of the continent which looks towards Corcyra, they ſet ſail from Leucas, and arrive at the Chimerium in Theſprotis. A harbour openeth itſelf here, and above it is the city of Ephyre at a diſtance from the ſea in Eleatis a diſtrict of Theſprotis: Near it is the outlet into the ſea of the lake of Acheruſia, into which the river Acheron, having run through Theſprotis, is at laſt received; from which alſo it deriveth its name. The river Thyamis alſo runneth here, dividing Theſprotis from Ceſtrine, and between theſe two rivers ariſeth the cape of Chimerium. The Corinthians therefore arrive at this part of the continent, and fix their ſtation there. But the Corcyréans, ſo ſoon as ever adviſed of their ſailing, having manned a hundred and ten ſhips under the command of Miciades, Æſimides, and Eurybatus, took their ſtation at one of thoſe iſles which are called *the Sybota*, accompanied by the ten Athenian ſhips. Their land-force was left at the promontory of Leucimna, with an aid of a thouſand heavy-armed Zacynthians. The Corinthians had alſo ready upon the continent a numerous aid of Barbarians: For the people on that coaſt have ever continued their friends. When every thing was in order among the Corinthians, taking in proviſions for three days they weigh by night from Chimerium with a deſign to fight; and having ſailed along 'till break of day, they diſcover the ſhips of the Corcyréans already out at ſea, and advancing againſt them. When thus they had got a view of each other, both ſides form into the order of battle. In the right wing of the Corcyréans were

were the Athenian ſhips; the reſt of the fleet was all their own, ranged into three ſquadrons, each of which was reſpectively under the orders of the three commanders: In this manner was the order of the Corcyréans formed. In the right of the Corinthians were the ſhips of the Megaréans and Ambraciots; in the centre the other allies in their ſeveral arrangements: The Corinthians formed the left wing themſelves, as their ſhips were the beſt ſailors, to oppoſe the Athenians and the right of the Corcyréans. When [5] the ſignal-flags were hoiſted on both ſides, they ran together and began the engagement; both ſides having ſtowed their decks with bodies of heavy-armed, with many further that drew the bow or toſſed the javelin. Their preparations ſtill retained ſomething of the aukward manner of antiquity. The engagement was ſharply carried on, yet without exertions of ſkill, and very much reſembling a battle upon land. When they had laid one another cloſe, they were not eaſily ſeparated again, becauſe of the number and hurry of the veſſels. The greateſt hope of victory was placed in the heavy-armed fighting on the decks, who fixed to their poſt engaged hand to hand, whilſt their ſhips continued without any motion. They had no opportunity to make their charges and tacks, but fought it out by dint of ſtrength

Battle of Sybota.

5 To give the *Engliſh* reader, once for all, a proper light into their method of beginning an engagement, I ſhall quote the following paragraph from archbiſhop *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 21.

"Before they joined battle, both parties invoked the Gods to their aſſiſtance by prayers and ſacrifices; and the admirals going from ſhip to ſhip in ſome of the lighter veſſels, exhorted their ſoldiers in a ſet oration to behave themſelves like men: Then all things being in readineſs, the ſignal was given by hanging out of the admiral's-galley a gilded ſhield, as we read in Plutarch, or a red garment or banner, which was termed ἀίρειν σημεῖα. During the elevation of this the fight continued, and by its depreſſion or inclination towards the right or left, the reſt of the ſhips were directed in what manner to attack their enemies, or retreat from them. To this was added the ſound of trumpets, which was begun in the admiral's-galley, and continued round the whole navy; it was likewiſe uſual for the ſoldiers before the fight to ſing a pæan or hymn to Mars, and after the fight another to Apollo."

and

and courage without any dexterity. The tumult was great on all ſides, and the whole action full of diſorder: In which, the Athenian ſhips relieved the Corcyréan wherever they were preſſed too hard, and did what they could to intimidate the enemy; but their commanders refrained from any direct attack, remembering with awe the orders of *the Athenians*. The right wing of the Corinthians ſuffered the moſt: For the Corcyréans with twenty ſhips, having put them to flight, chaced them when diſperſed to the continent; and, continuing the purſuit to their very camp, land immediately, where they ſet fire to their abandoned tents and carried off all the baggage: In this part therefore the Corinthians and their allies were vanquiſhed, and the Corcyréans were plainly ſuperior. But in the left, where the Corinthians perſonally engaged they eaſily prevailed, as twenty ſhips of the Corcyréans, and thoſe too from a number at firſt inferior, were gone off in the purſuit. But the Athenians, ſeeing the Corcyréans thus diſtreſſed, now came up to their ſupport more openly than before, having hitherto refrained from any direct attack. And when the chace was clearly begun and the Corinthians followed their ſucceſs, then every one amongſt them applied himſelf to action. There was no longer any time for diſcretion: Corinthians and Athenians were forced by abſolute neceſſity to engage one another.

The chace being thus begun, the Corinthians towed not after them the hulks of the veſſels they had ſunk, but turned all their attention to the men *who were floating about*, and cruized at large more to ſlaughter than take alive. And, having not yet diſcovered the defeat of their *right*, they ſlaughter'd through ignorance their own friends. For the number of ſhips being large on either ſide and covering a wide extent of ſea, after the firſt confuſion of the engagement they were not able eaſily to diſtinguiſh which were the victors or which the vanquiſhed: Since Grecians againſt Grecians had never at any time before engaged at ſea with ſo large a number of veſſels. But after the Corinthians

rinthians had purſued the Corcyréans to land, they returned to look after their ſhattered veſſels and their own dead. And moſt of theſe they took up and carried to Sybota, where alſo lay the land-force of their Barbarian auxiliaries: *This* Sybota is a deſart haven in Theſprotis. Having performed this duty, they gathered together again into a body and went in queſt of the Corcyréans, who with thoſe damaged veſſels that yet could ſwim and with all that had no damage, together with the Athenians, came out to meet them, fearing leſt they might attempt to land upon their ſhore. It was now late in the day, and they had ſung their *pæan* as going to attack, when on a ſudden the Corinthians [6] ſlackened their courſe, having deſcried a reinforcement of twenty ſail coming up from Athens. This ſecond ſquadron the Athenians had ſent away to ſupport the former ten, fearing (what really happened) leſt the Corcyréans might be vanquiſhed, and their own ten ſhips be too few for their ſupport. The Corinthians, therefore, having got a view of them, and ſuſpecting they came from Athens, and in a larger number than they yet diſcovered, began gradually to fall away. They were not yet deſcried by the Corcyréans (for the courſe kept them more out of their ken) who were ſurprized to ſee the Corinthians thus ſlacken their courſe, till ſome, who had gained a view, informed them that ſuch ſhips are coming up, and then they alſo fell back themſelves: For now it began to be dark, and the Corinthians being turned about had diſſolved their order. In this manner were they ſeparated from one another: And the naval engagement ended with the night.

The Corcyréans having recovered their ſtation at Leucymna, thoſe twenty ſhips from Athens under the command of Glauco the ſon of

6 The original is πρύμναν ἐκρόυσε, *they knocked the hind-deck*, a phraſe elegantly applied by Thucydides to thoſe that retreat fighting, and ſtill facing their enemies. It was done by running their ſhips backwards upon their hind decks in order to tack about. See *Potter's Archæologia*, vol. ii. c. 20.

Leager and Andocides the ſon of Leogoras, having paſſed through floating carcaſes and wrecks, came up to the ſtation, not long after they had been deſcried. Yet the Corcyréans (for now it was night) were in great conſternation leſt they ſhould be enemies: But they were ſoon known, and then came to anchor.

Next morning the thirty Athenian ſhips, accompanied by ſuch of the Corcyréans as were fit for ſea, weighed away and made over for the haven at Sybota where the Corinthians lay, deſigning to try whether or no they would engage again. The Corinthians, putting their ſhips from off the ſhore and drawing up into order in the deeper water, remained there without advancing. They had no deſign or inclination to begin another engagement, as they were ſenſible of the junction of the freſh Athenian ſhips, and of the numerous difficulties with which they were beſet, about the cuſtody of the priſoners whom they had on board, and the want of neceſſary materials to repair their ſhips upon this defart coaſt. Their thoughts were more employed upon their return home, and the method to accompliſh it, from the apprehenſion leſt the Athenians, judging the league to be broke as they had come to blows, might obſtruct their paſſage. For this reaſon they determined beforehand to diſpatch a boat with proper perſons, tho' without the ſolemn protection of a herald, and ſo to ſound their intentions. The meſſage to be delivered was this:

Meſſage of the Corinthians *to the* Athenian *auxiliaries.*

"YOU are guilty of injuſtice, ye men of Athens, in beginning war "and violating treaties: For you hinder us from taking due ven- "geance upon our enemies, by lifting up your arms againſt us. If "you are certainly determined to hinder our courſe, either againſt "Corcyra or any other place whither we are willing to go, and ſo "violate treaties, take us firſt who are here in your power, and treat "us as enemies."

The

The perſons ſent thus delivered their meſſage: And the whole company of the Corcyréans who heard it ſhouted out immediately to "apprehend and put them to death." But the Athenians returned this anſwer:

"WE neither begin war, ye men of Peloponneſus, nor violate *Their anſwer.*
"treaties. We are come hither auxiliaries to theſe Corcyréans our
"allies. If therefore you are deſirous to ſail to any other place,
"we hinder you not. But, if you go againſt Corcyra or any other
"place belonging to it, we ſhall endeavour to oppoſe you, to the
"utmoſt of our power."

UPON receiving this anſwer from the Athenians, the Corinthians prepared for their return home, and erected a trophy at Sybota on the continent. But the Corcyréans were employed in picking up the wrecks and bodies of the dead, driving towards them by favour of the tide and the wind, which blowing freſh the night before had ſcattered them all about; and, as if they too had the victory, erected an oppoſite trophy at Sybota in the iſland. The reaſons, upon which each ſide thus claimed the victory, were theſe—The Corinthians erected a trophy, becauſe they had the better of the engagement till night, and ſo were enabled to pick up moſt of the ſhatters and the dead; they had, further, taken a number of priſoners not leſs than a thouſand, and had diſabled about ſeventy ſhips of the enemy.—The Corcyréans did the ſame; becauſe they alſo had diſabled about thirty; and, upon the coming up of the Athenians, had recovered all the wreck and dead bodies driving towards them; and becauſe the Corinthians tacking about had retired from them the night before, ſo ſoon as they deſcried the Athenian ſhips; and when they came to offer them battle at Sybota, durſt not come out againſt them. In this manner did both ſides account themſelves victorious.

The Corinthians, in their paſſage homewards, by ſtratagem ſeized Anactorium, which lieth in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia. It belonged in common to the Corcyréans and themſelves. They put it entirely into the hands of the Corinthian inhabitants, and then retired to their own home. Eight hundred of their Corcyréan priſoners, who were ſlaves, they ſold at public ſale. Two hundred and fifty they reſerved in ſafe cuſtody, and treated them with extraordinary good uſage, that after their ranſom they might ſerve them in their deſign of gaining Corcyra: For the majority of them were perſons of the greateſt authority in that *ſtate*. Thus therefore is Corcyra preſerved in the war of the Corinthians; and the ſhips of the Athenians after ſuch ſervice left them. But *this* was the *firſt* ground of war to the Corinthians againſt the Athenians, becauſe they had aſſiſted the Corcyréans in a naval engagement againſt themſelves, who were in treaty with them.

II. *The affair of* Potidæa.

IMMEDIATELY after this tranſaction, other miſunderſtandings alſo happened between the Athenians and Peloponneſians, tending to a war. For, all the ſchemes of the Corinthians aiming at revenge, the Athenians jealous of their enmity ſent an order to the inhabitants of Potidæa ſituated upon the iſthmus of Pallene, (and tho' a Corinthian colony yet allied with and tributary to them) "to demoliſh that part of their wall which faceth the Pallene, to give "them hoſtages, to ſend away the *epidemiurgi*, and not to receive "*thoſe* magiſtrates for the future, who were annually ſent them from "Corinth." They were apprehenſive of a revolt at the inſtigation of Perdiccas and the Corinthians, and their ſeducing into the ſame defection the other dependents of Athens in Thrace. Theſe ſteps the Athenians thought proper to take with the people of Potidæa, immediately after the ſea-fight of Corcyra. For the Corinthians were manifeſtly at variance with them, and Perdiccas ſon of Alexander king of the Macedonians was now become their enemy, who before

before had been their ally and friend. His enmity was occaſioned by an alliance the Athenians had formed with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were jointly in oppoſition againſt him. Alarmed at this, he ſent proper perſons to Lacedæmon to ſtir up againſt them a Peloponneſian war, and to draw over the Corinthians into his intereſt, in order to bring about the revolt of Potidæa. He had alſo been tampering with the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans to perſuade them to revolt at the ſame time; concluding, that if he could bring about a junction of the adjacent people, he might venture a war againſt them with greater probability of ſucceſs. The Athenians perceived his ſcheme, and were deſirous to prevent the revolt of the cities. They had begun an expedition againſt his territories with a fleet of thirty ſhips and a thouſand heavy-armed, under the command of Archeſtratus the ſon of Lycomedes aſſociated with ten others in this ſervice. They gave particular orders to the commanders to take hoſtages from the Potidæans and to demoliſh their walls, and to keep a watchful eye over the neighbouring cities that they might not revolt. The Potidæans had already ſent embaſſadors to the Athenians, to diſſuade them if poſſible from the execution of any new deſigns againſt them: And had at the ſame time diſpatched an embaſſy to Lacedæmon along with the Corinthians, inſtructed to procure a promiſe of redreſs if there ſhould be occaſion. But, when their long negotiation at Athens proved quite ineffectual, and the fleet was gone out to ſea both againſt Macedonia and themſelves; when, farther, the regency at Lacedæmon had given a promiſe to make an irruption into Attica, if the Athenians ſhould attempt any thing againſt Potidæa; upon this encouragement, without loſs of time, they revolt in conjunction with the Chalcideans and Bottiæans, all combined by an oath of mutual defence and ſupport. Perdiccas, farther, prevaileth with the Chalcideans to abandon and demoliſh all their towns upon the ſea-coaſt, and then to remove to Olynthus and fortify that town by a junction of all their ſtrength. And, to theſe

Revolt of Potidæa.

theſe people thus abandoning their own homes he made a ceſſion of that part of Mygdonia which lieth round the lake of Bolbe, for their ſubſiſtence during the war with the Athenians. Having thus demoliſhed their own cities, they went to another place of reſidence, and were employed in preparations for the war.

The thirty ſhips of the Athenians, arriving on the coaſts of Thrace, find Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. The commanders, judging it impoſſible with their preſent ſtrength to act againſt Perdiccas and the revolted cities both, turn their courſe towards Macedonia, purſuing the firſt deſign of the expedition. Landing there, they joined in the war with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, who with an army had made an irruption from the inland country.

In the mean time, Potidæa being now in revolt and the Athenian fleet on the Macedonian coaſts, the Corinthians, anxious for the ſecurity of that place, and making the danger their own, diſpatched thither ſome volunteers of their own people and other Peloponneſians taken into their pay, in all ſixteen hundred [7] heavy-armed and four hundred light-armed. The command of this body of men was given to Ariſteus the ſon of Adimantus; ſince, out of their own private affection to him who had ever been a ſteddy friend to Potidæa, moſt of the volunteers from Corinth had undertaken the ſervice: and the time of their arrival in Thrace was the fortieth day after the revolt of Potidæa.

An expreſs ſoon arrived at Athens with the news of the revolt of the cities, and when afterwards they heard of the arrival of that body under Ariſteus, they ſend away two thouſand of their heavy-armed

7 The *heavy-armed* wore a complete ſuit of armour, and engaged with broad ſhields and long ſpears. They were the flower and ſtrength of the Grecian armies, and had the higheſt rank of military honour. The *light-armed* were deſigned for skirmiſhes and fighting at a diſtance: Their weapons were arrows, darts, or ſlings. The *targateers* mentioned often in this hiſtory, were a middle ſort of ſoldiery, armed with targets or narrow ſhields and ſpears, neither large nor heavy.

and

and forty ſhips, under the command of Callias the ſon of Calliades and four collegues, to reduce the revolted. Theſe, arriving firſt of all in Macedonia, find the former thouſand employed in beſieging Pydne, having a little before got poſſeſſion of Therme. They ſat down with them for a time to carry on the ſiege of Pydne; but afterwards, making with Perdiccas a compoſition and alliance the beſt they could in their preſent exigency, ſince Potidæa and the arrival of Ariſteus were very urgent points, they evacuate Macedonia. They marched next to Beræa; and turning from thence, after having firſt made an unſucceſsful attempt upon the place, they marched by land towards Potidæa. Their army conſiſted of three thouſand heavy-armed of their own, without including a large body of auxiliaries, and ſix hundred Macedonian horſe who had ſerved with Philip and Pauſanias: Seventy ſhips at the ſame time ſailed along the coaſt. And thus, by moderate marches, they came up in three days to Gigonus, and there encamped.

Battle in the iſthmus of the Ballene.

The Potidæans with the body of Peloponneſians commanded by Ariſteus, expecting the Athenians, had formed a camp near Olynthus *within* the iſthmus, and had a market kept for them without the city. The command of the infantry had been given to Ariſteus by the voice of the confederates, and that of the cavalry to Perdiccas: For now again he had abruptly broke with the Athenians and joined the Potidæans, deputing Iolaus to command in his abſence. It was the deſign of Ariſteus, by encamping the body under his own command *within* the iſthmus, to obſerve the motions of the Athenians if they advanced, whilſt *without* the iſthmus the Chalcideans and allies and two hundred horſe belonging to Perdiccas ſhould continue at Olynthus, who, when the Athenians came forwards againſt them, were to throw themſelves in their rear, and thus ſhut up the enemy between the two bodies. But Callias the general of the Athenians, in concert with his collegues, detaches the Macedonian horſe, and a few of their allies to Olynthus to prevent any ſally from thence;

thence; and then, breaking up their camp, they marched directly for Potidæa. But, when they were advanced as far as the iſthmus and ſaw their enemies drawn up in order to fight, they alſo formed; and in a little time they came to an action. The wing under Ariſteus, Corinthians and the very flower of their ſtrength, who engaged with him, ſoon compelled their enemies to turn their backs, and purſued execution to a great diſtance: But the reſt of the army, compoſed of Potidæans and Peloponneſians, were defeated by the Athenians and chaced to the very walls of Potidæa. Ariſteus, returning from his purſuit, perceived the rout of the reſt of the army, and knew not whither with the leaſt hazard to retreat, whether to Olynthus or Potidæa. But at laſt, he determined to embody together thoſe he had about him, and, as Potidæa lay at the ſmalleſt diſtance, to throw himſelf into it with all poſſible ſpeed. This with difficulty he effected, by plunging into the water near the abutments of the pier amidſt a ſhower of miſſive weapons, with the loſs indeed of ſome of his men, but the ſafety of the larger number.

Thoſe who ſhould have come to ſuccour the Potidæans from Olynthus, which is at no greater diſtance than * ſixty ſtadia and ſituated in view, at the beginning of the battle when [8] the colours were elevated, advanced indeed a little way as deſigning to do it, and the Macedonian horſe drew up againſt them as deſigning to ſtop them. But, as the victory was quickly gained by the Athenians and the colours were dropped, they retired again within the walls, and the Macedonians marched away to the Athenians; ſo that the cavalry of

* *About ſix miles.*

8 The elevation of the colours or enſigns was the ſignal of joining battle, and they were kept up during the whole continuance of it: The depreſſion of them, was a ſignal to deſiſt, or the conſequence of a defeat. The depreſſion of the colours, in this inſtance, was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry, that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as ſacred to Minerva the tutelary Goddeſs of Athens. See *Potter's Archæologia Græca*, vol. ii. c. 9.

neither

neither ſide had any ſhare in the action. After the battle the Athenians erected a trophy, and granted a ſuſpenſion of arms to the Potidæans for fetching off their dead. There were killed of the Potidæans and allies very near three hundred, and of the Athenians one hundred and fifty with Callias their general.

The blockade of Potidæa *begun.*

The Athenians without loſs of time, throwing up a work againſt the wall which faceth the iſthmus, blockaded the place on that ſide, but the wall towards the Pallene they left as they found it. For they thought their number was by no means ſufficient to keep the guard within the iſthmus, and to paſs over to the Pallene-ſide, and block it up alſo there. They were apprehenſive, that thus divided the Potidæans and their allies might fall upon them. And the Athenians at home, hearing there was no work on the Pallene-ſide, ſend thither a thouſand and ſix hundred heavy-armed of their own people under the command of Phormis the ſon of Aſopius, who arriving upon the Pallene, and having landed his men at Aphytis, marched forwards tó Potidæa, advancing ſlowly and laying waſte the country as he moved along. And, as no body ventured out to give him oppoſition, he alſo threw up a work againſt that ſide of the wall which faceth the Pallene. By theſe methods was Potidæa cloſely blocked up on either ſide, and alſo by the ſhips which lay before it at ſea.

Perfected.

The blockade being thus perfected, Ariſteus, deſtitute of any means of ſaving the place, unleſs ſome relief ſhould arrive from Peloponneſus or ſome miracle ſhould happen, propoſed it as his advice that "all excepting five hundred men ſhould lay hold of the firſt favourable wind to quit the place, that the proviſions might for a longer time ſupport the reſt;" declaring "his own readineſs to be one of thoſe who ſtayed behind." Though he could not prevail with them, yet willing in this plunge to do what could be done, and to manage affairs abroad in the beſt manner he was able, he made his eſcape by ſea undiſcovered by the Athenian guard. Continuing now amongſt the Chalcideans, he made what military efforts he could,

could, and killed many of the inhabitants of Sermyle by an ambuſcade he formed before that city; and endeavoured to prevail with the Peloponneſians to ſend up a timely relief. Phormio, alſo, after compleating the works round Potidæa, with his ſixteen hundred men ravaged Chalcidica and Bottiæa: And ſome fortreſſes he took by ſtorm.

The hiſtory proceedeth.

THESE were the reciprocal cauſes of diſſenſion between the Athenians and Peloponneſians. The Corinthians were enraged at the blockade of Potidæa, a colony of their own, in which were ſhut up both Corinthians and other Peloponneſians. The Athenians reſented the proceedings of the Peloponneſians in ſeducing to a revolt a city in alliance with and tributary to them, and ſiding openly by a voluntary expedition with the warring rebels of Potidæa. Yet a war open and avowed had not yet broke out between them: Hoſtilities were ſuſpended for a time. Hitherto it was merely a private quarrel of the Corinthians.

A Congreſs of the league at Lacedæmon.

But, when once the blockade of Potidæa was formed, the Corinthians could hold no longer. In *it* their own people were ſhut up, and they were at the ſame time in anxiety about the place. They ſummoned their allies to repair immediately to Lacedæmon, and thither they went themſelves with loud accuſations againſt the Athenians, that "they had violated the treaty, and injured Peloponneſus." The Æginetæ indeed, from a dread of the Athenians, did not openly diſpatch their embaſſy; but underhand they had a great ſhare in fomenting the war, aſſerting that "they were reſtrained in the privilege of governing themſelves, which had been allowed them by the treaty."

The Lacedæmonians, ſummoning to appear before them not barely their allies but whoever had any manner of charge to prefer againſt the Athenians, aſſembled in grand council as uſual, and commanded them to ſpeak: Others who were preſent laid open their reſpective complaints,

complaints, but the Megaréans preferred the largeſt accuſations, in particular that "they had been prohibited the uſe of all the harbours in the Athenian dominions and the market of Athens, contrary to treaty." The Corinthians were the laſt who ſtood forth. Having firſt allowed ſufficient time to others to exaſperate the Lacedæmonians, they preferred their own charge, as followeth ——

Speech of the Corinthian *embaſſy.*

"THAT faith, ye Lacedæmonians, which ever both in public "conduct and in private life you ſo punctually obſerve, rendereth "what others, what we ourſelves may have to ſay, more difficult to "be believed. By it, you have gained indeed the reputation of pro- "bity, but contract a prejudicial ignorance in regard to remote oc- "currences. For, though we have frequently ſuggeſted to you, "what wrongs we were apprehenſive of receiving from the Athe- "nians, yet have you not deigned to make enquiry into the grounds "of thoſe ſuggeſtions, but rather have ſuſpected our ingenuity as "ſpeaking from ſelfiſh views and private reſentments. And it is not "to prevent our ſufferings, but now, when we already feel their "weight, that you convene theſe confederates together: Before "whom, we ought to be indulged in a larger ſhare of diſcourſe, as "we have by much the largeſt ſhare of complaints to utter; wronged "as we have been by the Athenians, and by you neglected.

"If indeed by treachery lurking and unobſerved they had violated "the peace of Greece, thoſe who had not diſcerned it might juſtly "have demanded explicit proofs. But now, what need can there be "of multiplying words, when ſome you already ſee enſlaved; "againſt others, and thoſe not the meaneſt of your allies, the ſame "fate intended; and the aggreſſors fully prepared to receive you, if "at length a war ſhould be declared? With other views, they had "not clandeſtinely laid hands on Corcyra and forcibly detained it "from us, nor had they dared to block up Potidæa: of which "places, this latter lieth the moſt convenient for extending our

" power in Thrace, the former could ſupply Peloponneſus with the
" greateſt navy. But to your account theſe events are to be charged,
" who after the invaſion of the Medes firſt ſuffered the ſtrength of
" Athens to be increaſed, and afterwards their *long-walls* to be
" erected. Ever ſince, you have connived at liberty overthrown,
" not only in whatever communities they have proceeded to enſlave,
" but *now* where even your own confederates are concerned. For
" not to the men who rivet on the chains of ſlavery, but to ſuch as
" though able yet neglect to prevent it, ought the ſad event with
" truth to be imputed; eſpecially, when aſſuming ſuperior virtue
" they boaſt themſelves the deliverers of Greece.

" With much ado are we now met together in council, but not
" even now upon the plain and obvious points. We ought not to
" be any longer debating *whether* we have been injured, but by what
" meaſures we ſhould avenge ourſelves. The aggreſſors, having long
" ſince planned out their proceedings, are not about to make but
" are actually making attacks upon thoſe, who are yet come to no
" reſolution. Nor are we unexperienced by what ſteps, what gra-
" dual advances, the Athenians break in upon their neighbours.
" Imagining themſelves to be ſtill undiſcovered, they ſhew them-
" ſelves the leſs audacious becauſe you are inſenſible. But when
" once they know you alarmed and on your guard, they will preſs
" more reſolutely forwards. For you, Lacedæmonians, are the only
" people of Greece, who ſit indolently at eaſe, protecting not with
" preſent but with promiſed ſuccour: You alone pull down, not the
" commencing but the redoubled ſtrength of your foes. You have
" indeed enjoyed the reputation of being ſteddy, but are indebted
" for it more to report than fact. We ourſelves know, that *the*
" *Perſian* had advanced from the ends of the earth quite into Pe-
" loponneſus, before you exerted your dignity in reſiſtance. Now
" alſo you take no notice of the Athenians, not remote as he was
" but ſeated near you; and, inſtead of invading them, chuſe rather

" to

" to lye upon your defence againſt their invaſions; and, to expoſe
" yourſelves more to the hazards of war againſt a grown augmented
" power. And all this while you know, that *the Barbarian* was
" guilty of many errors in his conduct: And the very Athenians fre-
" quently, in their conteſts with us, have been defeated more through
" their own blunders than the vigour of your reſiſtance: For their
" confidence in you hath cauſed the deſtruction of ſome, who upon
" that very confidence were taken unprepared.

" Let no one in this aſſembly imagine, that we ſpeak more from
" malice than juſt grounds of complaint. Complaint is juſt towards
" friends who have failed in their duty; accuſation is againſt enemies
" guilty of injuſtice. And ſurely, if ever any people had, we have
" good reaſon to think we have ample cauſe to throw blame upon
" our neighbours; eſpecially, when ſuch great embroilments have
" aroſe, of which you ſeem to have no manner of feeling, nor ever
" once to have reflected, in regard to the Athenians, with what ſort
" of people, how far, and how in every point unlike yourſelves,
" you muſt ſoon contend. *They* are a people fond of innovations,
" quick not only to contrive, but to put their ſchemes in effectual
" execution: *Your* method is, to preſerve what you already have, to
" know nothing further, and when in action to leave ſomething
" needful ever unfiniſhed. *They* again are daring beyond their
" ſtrength, adventurous beyond the bounds of judgment, and in ex-
" tremities full of hope: *Your* method is, in action to drop below
" your power, never reſolutely to follow the dictates of your judg-
" ment, and in the preſſure of a calamity to deſpair of a deliver-
" ance. Ever active as *they* are, *they* ſtand againſt *you* who are ha-
" bitually indolent: ever roaming abroad, againſt *you* who think it
" miſery to loſe ſight of your homes. *Their* view in ſhifting place
" is to enlarge their poſſeſſions: *You* imagine, that in foreign at-
" tempts you may loſe your preſent domeſtic enjoyments. *They*,
" when once they have gained ſuperiority over enemies, puſh for-

" ward

" ward as far as they can go; and if defeated, are diſpirited the leaſt
" of all men. More than this, *they* are as laviſh of their lives in
" the public ſervice as if thoſe lives were not their own, whilſt their
" reſolution is ever in their power, ever ready to be exerted in the
" cauſe of their country. Whenever in their ſchemes *they* meet
" with diſappointments, they reckon they have loſt a ſhare of their
" property: When thoſe ſchemes are ſucceſsful, the acquiſition
" ſeemeth ſmall in compariſon with what they have farther in deſign:
" If they are baffled in executing a project, invigorated by reviving
" hope, they catch at freſh expedients to repair the damage. *They*
" are the only people, who inſtantaneouſly project and hope and ac-
" quire; ſo expeditious are they in executing whatever they deter-
" mine. Thus, through toils and dangers they labour forwards ſo
" long as life continueth, never at leiſure to enjoy what they already
" have, through a conſtant eagerneſs to acquire more. *They* have
" no other notion of a feſtival than of a day whereon ſome needful
" point ſhould be accompliſhed; and inactive reſt is more a torment
" to them than laborious employment. In ſhort, if any one abridg-
" ing their characters ſhould ſay, *they* are formed by nature never
" to be at quiet themſelves nor to ſuffer others to be ſo, he deſcribeth
" *them* juſtly.

" When ſuch a *ſtate* hath taken the liſts of oppoſition againſt you,
" do ye dally, O Lacedæmonians? Do you imagine that thoſe people
" will not continue longeſt in the enjoyment of peace, who timely
" prepare to vindicate themſelves, and manifeſt a ſettled reſolution
" to do themſelves right whenever they are wronged? You indeed
" are ſo far obſervers of equity as never to moleſt others, and ſtand
" on your guard merely to repel damage from yourſelves; --- points,
" you would not without difficulty ſecure, though this neighbouring
" *ſtate* were governed by the ſame principles as you are: But *now*,
" as we have already ſhewn you, your cuſtoms compared with them
" are quite obſolete; whereas thoſe which progreſſively improve

" muſt,

"must, like all the works of art, be ever the beſt. Were indeed "the continuance of peace enſured, unvarying manners would cer- "tainly be preferable: But, ſuch people as are liable to frequent vi- "ciſſitudes of foreign conteſt, have need of great addreſs to vary "and refine their conduct. For this cauſe, the manners of the "Athenians, improved by a long tract of experience, are formed "in reſpect of yours upon a model entirely new. Here therefore be "the period fixed to that ſlow-moving policy you have hitherto "obſerved. Haſten to the relief of others, to that of the Potidæans, "as by contract you are bound. Invade Attica without loſs of "time, that you may not leave your friends and your relations in the "mercy of their moſt inveterate foes, and conſtrain *us* through your "ſloth to ſeek redreſs from a new alliance. Such a ſtep, if taken "by us, could neither ſcandalize the gods who take cognizance of "ſolemn oaths, nor men who own their obligation: For treaties are "not violated by thoſe who left deſtitute by ſome have recourſe to "others, but by ſuch as being ſworn to give it, withhold their aſ- "ſiſtance in the time of need. Yet, if you are willing and ready "to perform your parts, with you we firmly abide. In changing "*then* we ſhould be guilty of impiety; and we never ſhall find "others ſo nicely ſuited to the diſpoſition of our own hearts. Upon "theſe points form proper reſolutions; and exert yourſelves, that "the honour of Peloponneſus be not impaired under your gui- "dance, who have received from your anceſtors this great pre- "eminence."

To this effect the Corinthians ſpoke. And it happened, that at this very juncture an Athenian embaſſy was at Lacedæmon, negotiat- ing ſome other points; who, ſo ſoon as they were advertiſed of what had been ſaid, judged it proper to demand an audience of the Lace- dæmonians. It was not their deſign to make the leaſt reply to the accuſations preferred againſt them by the complainant-ſtates, but in general

general to convince them, that " they ought not to form any ſudden reſolutions, but to conſider matters with ſedate deliberation." They were further deſirous " to repreſent before them the extenſive power of their own *ſtate*, to excite in the minds of the elder a recollection of thoſe points they already knew, and to give the younger information in thoſe of which they were ignorant;" concluding, that " ſuch a repreſentation might turn their attention more to pacific meaſures than military operations." Addreſſing themſelves therefore to the Lacedæmonians, they expreſſed their deſire to ſpeak in the preſent aſſembly, if leave could be obtained. An order of admittance being immediately ſent them, they approached, and delivered themſelves as followeth:

Speech of the Athenian *embaſſy.*

" IT was not the deſign of this our embaſſy, to enter into diſputa-
" tions with your confederates, but to negotiate the points for which
" our *ſtate* hath employed us. Yet, having been advertiſed of the
" great outcry raiſed againſt us, hither we have repaired: not to
" throw in our plea againſt the accuſations of the complainant-ſtates:
" for *you* are not the judges before whom either *we* or *they* are
" bound to plead: but, to prevent your forming raſh and prejudicial
" reſolutions, upon concerns of high importance, through the inſti-
" gations of theſe your confederates. Our view is, farther, to con-
" vince you, notwithſtanding the long comprehenſive charge exhi-
" bited againſt us, that we poſſeſs with credit what we have hitherto
" obtained, and that the *ſtate* of Athens is deſerving of honour
" and regard.

" And what need is there here to go back to remote antiquity,
" where hearſay tradition muſt eſtabliſh thoſe facts, to which the
" eyes of the audience are utter ſtrangers? This we ſhall wave:
" and call forth firſt to your review the Perſian invaſions and thoſe
" incidents of which you are conſcious, without regarding that cha-
" grin which the remembrance of them will conſtantly excite in
" you.

" you. Our atchievements there were attended with the utmoſt
" danger: The conſequence was public benefit, of which you re-
" ceived a ſubſtantial ſhare: and though the glory of that acquiſi-
" tion may not be all our own, yet of a beneficial ſhare we ought not
" to be deprived. This ſhall boldly be averred; not with a view
" of ſoothing you but doing juſtice to ourſelves, and giving you to
" know againſt *what* a State, if your reſolutions now are not diſ-
" creetly taken, you are going to engage. For we aver, that we
" alone adventured to engage *the Barbarian* in that moſt dangerous
" field of Marathon. And when, upon the ſecond invaſion, we
" were not able to make head by land, we threw ourſelves on ſhip-
" board with all our people to fight in conjunction with you by ſea
" at Salamis; which prevented his ſailing along the coaſts of Pelo-
" ponneſus, and deſtroying one by one your cities, unable to ſuc-
" cour one another againſt that formidable fleet. The truth of this
" *the Barbarian* himſelf hath undeniably proved: For, thus defeated
" at ſea, and unable to gather together again ſo large a force, he
" haſtily retired with the greateſt part of his army. In this ſo
" wonderful an event, where beyond diſpute the preſervation of
" Greece was atchieved at ſea, the three moſt advantageous inſtru-
" ments were contributed by us —— the largeſt number of ſhip-
" ping —— a perſon of the greateſt abilities to command —— and
" the moſt intrepid courage. For of the number of ſhips amount-
" ing in all to four hundred, very near two thirds were our own.
" Themiſtocles was the commander, to whom principally it was
" owing that the battle was fought in the ſtraits, which was un-
" deniably the means of that great deliverance: And you yourſelves
" paid him [9] extraordinary honour on that very account, more than
" ever

9 Herodotus relates, that after the great victory at Salamis " the Grecians ſailed to " the Iſthmus, to beſtow the prize upon " him who had deſerved beſt of Greece by " his behaviour in the war. But upon their " arrival, when the commanders gave in " their

" ever to any ſtranger who hath appeared amongſt you. We our-
" ſelves ſhewed further, on this occaſion, the moſt daring courage;
" ſince, though none before marched up to our ſuccour, and every *ſtate*
" already enſlaved had opened the road againſt us, we bravely de-
" termined to abandon even Athens, to deſtroy our own effects, nor,
" like the generality of thoſe who were yet undemoliſhed, to de-
" ſert the common cauſe, or diſperſing ourſelves to become uſeleſs
" to our allies, but —— to embark at once, to face the urgent
" danger, without the leaſt reſentment againſt you for your preced-
" ing backwardneſs of aid. So that we aver the ſervice we then did
" you to be no leſs than what we afterwards received. For to our
" aid indeed at laſt you came, from cities yet inhabited, from cities
" you ever deſigned ſhould ſtill be inhabited, when once you were
" alarmed for your own ſafety much more than for ours. So long
" as we were ſafe, your preſence was in vain expected: But we,
" launching forth from a city no longer our own, and hazarding our
" all for a place we almoſt deſpaired of recovering, effected our own

" their billets on the altar of Neptune, in
" which they had wrote the name of him
" who had behaved beſt, and of him who
" was ſecond, each of them had given the
" preference to his own ſelf, but moſt of
" them agreed in awarding the ſecond
" place to Themiſtocles. Thus, whilſt
" each competitor was only honoured with
" his own ſingle voice for the firſt place,
" Themiſtocles was clearly adjudged to de-
" ſerve the ſecond. Envy prevented the
" Grecians from proceeding to a juſt de-
" claration, and they broke up and de-
" parted, leaving the point undecided.
" Themiſtocles however was celebrated
" and honoured as the man, who in pru-
" dence far ſurpaſſed all the Grecians then
" alive. Thus denied the honour due to
" him for having undoubtedly excelled
" them all in the affair of Salamis, he im-
" mediately repaired to Lacedæmon, deſi-
" rous to have juſtice done him there.
" The Lacedæmonians received him no-
" bly, and honoured him abundantly.
" They gave indeed to Eurybiades the
" crown of olive, as firſt in valour; but
" for wiſdom and dexterity they beſtowed
" a ſecond crown of olive on Themiſtocles.
" They preſented him further with the firſt
" chariot in Sparta. And after ſo much ap-
" plauſe, he was conducted in his return to
" the frontier of Tegea, by three hundred
" picked Spartans, who compoſed the royal
" guard. He was the only perſon ever known
" to have received ſuch a compliment from
" the Spartans." Herodotus in *Urania*.

" pre-

" preſervation, and with it in a great meaſure yours. Had we,
" overcome with fear, gone over early to *the Mede*, as others did,
" to ſave our lands; had we afterwards not dared, as men undone
" beyond recovery, to throw ourſelves on board; you never had
" been obliged to fight at ſea, as not having ſufficient ſtrength to do
" it; but the invader without a ſtruggle would have leiſurely deter-
" mined the fate of Greece.

" Do we then deſerve, Lacedæmonians, that violence of envy
" with which the Grecians behold us, for the courage we manifeſted
" then, for our judicious reſolution, and the ſuperior power we now
" enjoy? That power, ſuperior as it is, was by no means the effect
" of violent encroachments. You would not abide with us to glean
" away the relicks of the Barbarian war. To us the aſſociated *ſtates*
" were obliged to have recourſe, and intreat us to lead them to its
" completion. Thus, by the neceſſary exigence of affairs obliged
" to be in action, we have advanced our power to what it now is;
" at firſt, from a principle of *fear*; then, from the principle of *ho-*
" *nour*; and at length, from that of *intereſt*. When envied by
" many, when obliged to reduce to their obedience ſome who had
" revolted, when you no longer well-diſpoſed towards us, were ac-
" tuated by jealouſy and malice; we thought it not conſiſtent with
" our own ſecurity, to endanger our welfare by giving up our power,
" ſince every revolt from us was an acceſſion of ſtrength to you.
" No part of mankind will fix any reproach on men, who try every
" expedient to ward off extremities of danger. Nay, it is your own
" method alſo, Lacedæmonians, to manage the *ſtates* of Peloponne-
" neſus as ſuits your own intereſt beſt, and to preſcribe them law.
" And, had you abided with us, and perſevered in that invidious ſu-
" periority as we have done, we are well convinced, that you would
" ſoon have grown no leſs odious to your allies; and ſo obliged,
" either to have ruled with rigour, or to have riſked the loſs of
" your all. It followeth therefore, that we have done nothing to

" raiſe ſurprize, nothing to diſappoint the human expectation, in ac-
" cepting a ſuperiority voluntarily aſſured, in firmly maintaining it
" thus accepted, upon thoſe moſt prevailing principles of *honour*,
" and *fear*, and *intereſt*.

" The maxim, by which we have acted, was not firſt broached
" by us, ſince it hath been ever allowed, that inferiors ſhould be
" controuled by their ſuperiors. To be the latter, we thought our-
" ſelves deſerving: You thought ſo too till now, when private inter-
" eſts engaging your attention you begin to cry out for juſtice, which
" no people ever yet ſo ſtudiouſly practiſed, as, when able to carry a
" point by ſtrength, to check their inclination and let it drop.
" And worthy, farther, are they of applauſe, who, purſuing the
" dictates of human nature in gaining rule over others, obſerve juſtice
" more ſteddily than their ſcope of power requireth from them.
" And ſo far we have reaſon to conclude, that were our power
" lodged in other hands, plain evidence would ſoon decide with
" what peculiar moderation we uſe it: Though, ſo hard indeed is
" our lot, that calumny and not applauſe hath been the conſequence
" of ſuch our lenity. In ſuits of contract againſt our dependents
" we are often worſted; and, though ever ſubmitting to fair and
" impartial trials in our own courts, we are charged with litigiouſ-
" neſs. Not one of them reflecteth, that thoſe who are abſolute in
" other places, and treat not their dependents with that moderation
" which we obſerve, are for that very reaſon exempted from re-
" proach: For, where lawleſs violence is practiſed there can be no
" room for appeals to juſtice. But our dependents accuſtomed to
" conteſt with us upon equal footing, if they ſuffer never ſo little
" damage where they fancy equity to be along with them, either by
" a judicial ſentence or the deciſion of reigning power, expreſs no
" gratitude for the greater ſhare of property they yet enjoy, but reſent
" with higher chagrin the loſs of ſuch a pittance, than if at firſt
" we had ſet law aſide and ſeized their all with open violence: Even,

" in

" in this caſe, they could not preſume to deny, that inferiors ought
" to ſubmit to their ſuperiors. But mankind, it ſeemeth, reſent the
" acts of injuſtice more deeply than the acts of violence: Thoſe,
" coming from an equal, are looked upon as rapines; Theſe, com-
" ing from a ſuperior, are complied with as neceſſities. The far
" more grievous oppreſſions of *the Mede* they bore with patience,
" but our government they look upon as ſevere: It may be ſo: For
" to ſubjects the *preſent* is always grievous. If you therefore by our
" overthrow ſhould gain the aſcendent over them, you would ſoon
" perceive that good diſpoſition towards you, which a dread of us
" hath occaſioned, to be vaniſhing away; eſpecially, ſhould you
" exert your ſuperiority according to the ſpecimens you gave during
" your ſhort command againſt *the Mede*. For the inſtitutions eſta-
" bliſhed here amongſt yourſelves have no affinity with thoſe of other
" places: And more than this, not one Spartan amongſt you, when
" delegated to a foreign charge, either knoweth how to apply his
" own, or make uſe of thoſe of the reſt of Greece.

Form " From your reſolutions therefore with great deliberation, as on
" points of no ſmall importance. Hearken not ſo far to the opi-
" nions and calumnies of foreign *ſtates*, as to embroil your own do-
" meſtic tranquillity. Reflect in time on the great uncertainty of
" war, before you engage in it. Protracted into long continuance,
" it is generally uſed to end in calamities, from which we are now
" at an equal diſtance; and, to the lot of which of us they will
" fall, lieth yet to be determined by the hazardous event. Men,
" who run eagerly to arms, are firſt of all intent on doing ſome ex-
" ploits, which ought in point of time to be ſecond to ſomething
" more important; and, when ſmarting with diſtreſs, they have re-
" courſe to reaſon. But ſince *we* are by no means guilty of ſuch
" raſhneſs ourſelves, nor as yet perceive it in *you*, we exhort you,
" whilſt healing meaſures are in the election of us both, not to break
" the treaty, not to violate your oaths, but to ſubmit the points in
" conteſt.

" conteſt to fair arbitration, according to the articles ſubſiſting be-
" tween us. If not, we here invoke the Gods, who take cogni-
" zance of oaths, to bear us witneſs, that we ſhall endeavor to re-
" venge ourſelves upon the authors of a war, by whatever methods
" *yourſelves* ſhall ſet us an example."

Theſe things were ſaid by the Athenian embaſſy. And, when the Lacedæmonians had thus heard the accuſations of their allies againſt the Athenians, and what the Athenians had urged in their turn, ordering all parties to withdraw, they proceeded to ſerious conſultation amongſt themſelves. The majority agreed in the opinion, that " the Athenians were already guilty of injuſtice, and that a war ought to be immediately declared." But Archidamus their King, eſteemed a man of good underſtanding and temper, ſtanding forth expreſſed his own ſentiments, thus----

Speech of Archidamus.

" I HAVE learned myſelf by the experience of many wars, and
" I ſee many of you, ye Lacedæmonians, as great proficients in
" years as I am, that no one ſhould be fond of an enterprize becauſe
" it is new, which is a vulgar weakneſs, judging it thence both ad-
" viſeable and ſafe. The war, which is at preſent the ſubject of
" your conſultation, you will find, if examined diſcreetly, to bode
" a very long continuance. Againſt Peloponneſians, it is true, and
" borderers upon ourſelves we have ever a competent force in readi-
" neſs, and by expeditious ſteps can advance againſt any of them.
" But, againſt a people whoſe territories are far remote, who are
" farther moſt expert in naval skill, who with all the expedients of
" war are moſt excellently provided, with wealth both private and
" public, with ſhipping, with horſes, with arms, and with men,
" far beyond what any other *ſtate* in Greece can ſingly pretend to,
" who more than this have numerous dependent *ſtates* upon whom
" they levy tribute --- where is the neceſſity ſanguinely to wiſh for

" war

" war againſt ſuch a people? and, wherein is our dependence, if
" thus unprepared we ſhould declare it againſt them? Is it on our
" naval force? But in that we are inferior: And if to *this* we ſhall
" apply our care and advance ourſelves to an equality with them,
" why this will be a work of time. Or, is it on our wealth? In
" *this* we are yet much more deficient; and neither have it in any
" public fund, nor can readily raiſe it from private purſes. But, the
" confidence of *ſome* may perhaps be buoyed up with our ſuperio-
" rity in arms and numbers, ſo that we may eaſily march into
" their territory and lay it waſte: Yet, other territories and of large
" extent are ſubject to their power, and by ſea they will import all
" neceſſary ſupplies. If, further, we tempt their dependents to a re-
" volt, we ſhall want a naval ſtrength to ſupport them in it, as the
" majority of them are ſeated upon iſlands. What therefore will be
" the event of this our war? For, if we are unable either to over-
" power them at ſea, or divert thoſe revenues by which their navy
" is ſupported, we ſhall only by acting prejudice ourſelves. And in
" ſuch a ſituation, to be forced to give it up will be a blemiſh on
" our honour; eſpecially, if we ſhall be thought to have been the
" authors of the breach. For let us not be puffed up with idle
" hope, that this war muſt ſoon be over, if we can lay their terri-
" tory waſte: I have reaſon on better grounds to apprehend, that
" we ſhall leave it behind us a legacy to our children. It is by no
" means conſiſtent with the ſpirit of Athenians, either to be ſlaves
" to their ſoil, or like unpractiſed ſoldiers to ſhudder at a war. Nor
" again, on the other hand, am I ſo void of ſenſibility, as to adviſe
" you to give up your confederates to their outrage, or wilfully to
" connive at their encroachments; but only, not yet to have recourſe
" to arms, to ſend embaſſadors to prefer our complaints, without be-
" traying too great an eagerneſs for war, or any tokens of puſilla-
" nimity. By pauſing thus, we may get our own affairs in readi-
" neſs, by augmenting our ſtrength through an acceſſion of allies,

" either

" either Grecian or Barbarian, whereſoever we can procure ſupplies " of ſhips or money. And the leaſt room there cannot be for cen- " ſure, when a people in the ſtate we are at preſent, expoſed to all " the guiles of the Athenians, endeavor to ſave themſelves not " merely by Grecian but even by Barbarian aid. And at the ſame " time, let us omit no reſource within the reach of our own ability.

" If indeed, upon our ſending an embaſſy, they will hearken to " reaſon, that will be the happieſt for us all. If not; after two or " three years delay, then better provided, we may, if it be thought " expedient, take the field againſt them. But in good time perhaps, " when they ſee our preparations and the intent of them clearly ex- " plained by our own declarations, they may make each requiſite " conceſſion, before their territory is deſtroyed by ravage, and whilſt " yet they may ſave their property from utter devaſtation. Regard " their territory, I beſeech you, in no other light than as an hoſtage " for their good behaviour, and the more firmly ſuch the better " may be its culture. Of this we ought to be ſparing as long as poſ- " ſible, that we drive them not into deſperate fury, and render more " unpracticable their defeat. For if, thus unprovided as we are and " worked up to anger by the inſtigations of our confederates, we at " once begin this ravage, reflect whether we ſhall not taint its repu- " tation and the more embroil Peloponneſus: Since accuſations as " well of *ſtates* as private perſons it is poſſible to clear away: But in " a war, begun by general concurrence for the ſake of a ſingle party, " which it is impoſſible to ſee how far it will extend, we cannot at " pleaſure deſiſt, and preſerve our honour.

" Let no one think it a mark of puſillanimity, that many as we " are we do not ruſh immediately upon one ſingle *State*. That " State has as large a number of dependents who contribute to its " ſupport: And a war is not ſo much of arms as of money, by " which arms are rendered of ſervice; and the more ſo, when a " landed power is contending againſt a naval. Be it therefore our

" earlieſt

" earlieſt endeavour to provide amply for this, nor let us prema-
" turely be too much fermented by the harangues of our allies. Let
" us, to whoſe account the event, whatever it be, will be princi-
" pally charged ----- Let us, with ſedate deliberation, endeavor in
" ſome degree to forſee it; and, be not in the leaſt aſhamed of that
" ſlow and dilatory temper, for which the Corinthians ſo highly re-
" proach you. For through too great precipitancy you will come
" more ſlowly to an end, becauſe you ſet out without proper prepa-
" rations. The *ſtate* of which we are the conſtituents, hath ever
" been free and moſt celebrated by fame: And *that* reproach can at
" moſt be nothing but the inborn ſedateneſs of our minds. By this
" we are diſtinguiſhed, as the only people who never grow inſolent
" with ſucceſs, and who never are abject in adverſity. And when
" again they invite us to hazardous attempts by uttering our praiſe, the
" delight of hearing muſt not raiſe our ſpirits above our judgment.
" If any, farther, endeavor to exaſperate us by a flow of invective,
" we are not by that to be provoked the ſooner to compliance.
" From tempers thus evenly balanced it is, that we are warm in the
" field of battle, and cool in the hours of debate: The former, be-
" cauſe a ſenſe of duty hath the greateſt influence over a ſedate diſ-
" poſition, and magnanimity the keeneſt ſenſe of ſhame: And, good
" we are at debate, as our education is not polite enough to teach
" us a contempt of laws, and by its ſeverity giveth us ſo much good
" ſenſe as never to diſregard them. We are not a people ſo imper-
" tinently wiſe, as to invalidate the preparations of our enemies by
" a plauſible harangue, and then abſurdly proceed to a conteſt; but
" we reckon the thoughts of our neighbors to be of a ſimilar caſt
" with our own, and that hazardous contingencies are not to be de-
" termined by a ſpeech. We always preſume that the projects of
" our enemies are judiciouſly planned, and then ſeriouſly prepare to
" defeat them. For we ought not to found our ſucceſs upon the
" hope that they will certainly blunder in their conduct, but that

" we have omitted no proper ſtep for our own ſecurity. We ought
" not to imagine, there is ſo mighty difference between man and
" man; but, that he is the moſt accompliſhed, who hath been re-
" gularly trained through a courſe of needful induſtry and toil.
" Such is the diſcipline which our fathers have handed down to
" us; and by adhering to it, we have reaped conſiderable advantages.
" Let us not forego it now, nor in a ſmall portion of only one day
" precipitately determine a point, wherein ſo many lives, ſo vaſt an
" expence, ſo many ſtates, and ſo much honour are at ſtake. But,
" let us more leiſurely proceed, which our power will warrant us
" in doing more eaſily than others. Diſpatch embaſſadors to the
" Athenians, concerning Potidæa; diſpatch them, concerning the com-
" plaints our allies exhibit againſt them; and the ſooner, as they have
" declared a readineſs to ſubmit to fair deciſions. Againſt men, who
" offer this, we ought not to march, before they are convicted of
" injuſtice. But, during this interval, get every thing in readineſs
" for war. Your reſolutions thus will be moſt wiſely formed, and
" ſtrike into your enemies the greateſt dread."

Archidamus ſpoke thus. But Sthenelaïdas, at that time one of the *Ephori*, ſtanding forth the laſt on this occaſion, gave his opinion as followeth:

Speech of Sthenelaïdas.

" THE many words of the Athenians for my part I do not un-
" derſtand. They have been exceeding large in the praiſe of them-
" ſelves; but as to the charge againſt them, that they injure our al-
" lies and Peloponneſus, they have made no reply. If, in truth,
" they were formerly good againſt the Medes, but are now bad
" towards us, they deſerve to be doubly puniſhed; becauſe, ceaſing
" to be good, they are grown very bad. We continue the ſame
" perſons both *then* and *now*, and ſhall not, if we are wiſe, paſs
" over the injuries done to our allies, nor wait any longer to revenge
" them,

"them, ſince they are paſt waiting for their ſufferings. But ——
"other people, forſooth, have a great deal of wealth, and ſhips,
"and horſes —— We too have gallant allies, whom we ought not
"to betray to the Athenians, nor refer them to law and pleadings,
"ſince it was not by pleadings they were injured: But we ought,
"with all expedition and with all our ſtrength, to ſeek revenge.
"*How* we ought to deliberate when we have been wronged, let no
"man pretend to inform me: It would have better become *thoſe*,
"who deſigned to commit ſuch wrongs, to have deliberated a long
"time ago. Vote then the war, Lacedæmonians, with a ſpirit be-
"coming Sparta. And, neither ſuffer the Athenians to grow ſtill
"greater, nor let us betray our own confederates; but, with the
"Gods on our ſide, march out againſt theſe authors of injuſtice."

The queſtion put.

Having ſpoke thus, by virtue of his office as preſiding in the college of *Ephori* [1], he put the queſtion in the Lacedæmonian council. But, as they vote by voice and not by ballot, he ſaid "he could not "amidſt the ſhout diſtinguiſh the majority;" and, being deſirous that each of them, by plainly declaring his opinion, might ſhew they were more inclined to war, he proceeded thus —— "To whom-"ſoever of you, Lacedæmonians, the treaty appeareth broke and the "Athenians to be in the wrong, let him riſe up and go thither," pointing out to them a certain place: "But, whoever is of the con-"trary opinion, let him go yonder." They roſe up, and were divided; but a great majority was on that ſide which voted the treaty broke.

Carried.

1 The college of *Ephori* (or *inſpectors*) at Sparta conſiſted of five. They were annually elected by the people from their own body, and were deſigned to be checks upon the regal power. They never forgot the end of their inſtitution, and in fact quite lorded it over the kings. In a word, the whole adminiſtration was lodged in their hands, and the kings were never ſovereigns but in the field at the head of the troops. One of the Ephori had the honour to give its ſtile to the year, in the ſame manner as the firſt Archon did at Athens.

Upon this, calling in their confederates, they told them, "They "had come to a reſolution that the Athenians were guilty of in- "juſtice; but they were deſirous to put it again to the vote in a "general aſſembly of all their confederates, that by taking their "meaſures in concert, they might briskly ply the war, if deter- "mined by common conſent."

The Lacedæmonians *jealous of the* Athenian *power.*

Matters being brought to this point, they departed to their reſpective homes, and the Athenian embaſſadors, having ended their negotiations, ſtay'd not long behind. This decree of the Lacedæmonian council that "the treaty was broke," was paſſed in the fourteenth year of the treaty concluded for thirty years after the conqueſt of Eubœa. But the Lacedæmonians voted this treaty broke and a war neceſſary, not ſo much out of regard to the arguments urged by their allies, as from their own jealouſy of the growing power of the Athenians. They dreaded the advancement of that power, as they ſaw the greateſt part of Greece was already in ſubjection to them.

Digreſſion.

NOW the method, by which the Athenians had advanced their power to this invidious height, was This ——[2]

After that the Medes, defeated by the Grecians both at land and ſea, had evacuated Europe, and ſuch of them, as eſcaped by ſea, were utterly ruined at Mycale, Leotychides king of the Lacedæmonians who commanded the Grecians at Mycale returned home, drawing away with him all the confederates of Peloponneſus. But the Athenians, with the confederates of Ionia and Helleſpont, who were now revolted from *the King*, continuing in thoſe parts laid ſiege to Seſtus

2 The ſeries of hiſtory on which Thucydides now enters, though not ſtrictly within the compaſs of his ſubject, yet moſt needful to give it light, and to ſhew how preſent events are connected with, and how far they reſulted from preceding, is excellent in its kind. He ſtates important facts in the cleareſt moſt orderly manner, he opens before us the ſource of the Athenian power, and by a neat and conciſe enumeration of notable events, conducts it to that height, which excited the jealouſy of other ſtates, and was the true political cauſe of the ſucceeding war.

then

then held by the Medes; and, preſſing it during the winter-ſeaſon, the Barbarians at length abandoned the place. After this they ſeparated, ſailing away from the Helleſpont, every people to their own reſpective countries.

Policy of Themiſtocles.

But the Athenian community, when the Barbarians had evacuated their territory, immediately brought back again from the places of refuge their wives and children and all their remaining effects, and vigorouſly applied themſelves to rebuild the city of Athens and the walls: For but a ſmall part of theſe was left ſtanding; and their houſes, moſt of them had been demoliſhed, and but few preſerved by way of lodgings for the Perſian nobles. The Lacedæmonians, informed of their deſign, came in embaſſy to prevent it; partly, to gratify themſelves, as they would behold with pleaſure every city in Greece unwalled like Sparta; but more, to gratify their confederates, inviting them to ſuch a ſtep from a jealouſy of the naval power of the Athenians, now greater than at any time before, and of the courage they had ſo bravely exerted in the war againſt the Medes. They required them to deſiſt from building their walls, and rather to join with them in levelling every fortification whatever without Peloponneſus. Their true meaning and their inward jealouſy they endeavoured to conceal from the Athenians by the pretence, that "then *the Barbarian*, ſhould he again invade them, would find no ſtrong-hold from whence to aſſault them, as in the laſt inſtance he had done from Thebes;" alledging farther, that "Peloponneſus was a place of ſecure retreat and certain reſource for all." To theſe repreſentations of the Lacedæmonians the Athenians by the advice of Themiſtocles made this reply, that "they would ſend embaſſadors to them to debate this affair;" and ſo without farther explanation diſmiſſed them. Themiſtocles next adviſed, that "he himſelf might be diſpatched forthwith to Lacedæmon, and by no means haſtily to ſend away the others who were to be joined in the commiſſion with him, but to detain them till the walls were carried up

to

to a height neceſſary at leaſt for a defence; that the work ſhould be expedited by the joint-labour of all the inhabitants without exception, of themſelves, their wives and their children, ſparing neither public nor private edifice from whence any proper materials could be had, but demoliſhing all." Having thus adviſed them, and ſuggeſted farther what conduct he himſelf deſigned to obſerve, he ſets out for Lacedæmon. Upon his arrival there, he demanded no public audience, he protracted matters, and ſtudied evaſions. Whenever any perſon in the public adminiſtration demanded the reaſon why he aſked not an audience, his anſwer was, that "he waited for the arrival of his collegues, who were detained by urgent buſineſs, he expected they would ſpeedily be with him, and was ſurprized they are not yet come." As they had a good opinion of Themiſtocles, they eaſily acquieſced in ſuch an anſwer. But other Perſons afterwards arriving and making clear affirmation that "the wall is carrying on and already built up to a conſiderable height," they had it no longer in their power to be incredulous. Themiſtocles, knowing this, exhorts them, "not raſhly to be biaſſed by rumours, but rather to ſend away ſome truſty perſons of their own body, who from a view might report the truth." With this propoſal they comply; and Themiſtocles ſendeth ſecret inſtructions to the Athenians how to behave towards theſe delegates; —"to detain them, though with as little appearance of deſign as poſſible, and by no means to diſmiſs them before they received again their own embaſſadors:" For his collegues were by this arrived, Abronychus the ſon of Lyſicles, and Ariſtides * the ſon of Lyſimachus, who brought him an aſſurance that the wall was ſufficiently compleated. His fear was, that the Lacedæmonians, when they had diſcovered the truth, would put them under arreſt. The Athenians therefore detained the delegates according to inſtruction. And Themiſtocles, going to an audience of the Lacedæmonians, there openly declared, "that Athens was now ſo far walled, as to be ſtrong enough

* *The Juſt.*

enough for the defence of its Inhabitants: For the future, when the Lacedæmonians or confederates ſent embaſſadors thither, they muſt addreſs themſelves to them as to a people who perfectly knew their own intereſt and the intereſt of Greece; ſince, when they judged it moſt adviſeable to abandon their city and go on ſhip-board, they aſſerted their native courage without Lacedæmonian ſupport; and, in all ſubſequent meaſures taken in conjunction, had ſhewn themſelves not at all inferior in the cabinet or the field: At preſent therefore they judge it moſt expedient to have Athens defended by a wall, and thus to render it a place of greater ſecurity for their own members and for all their allies: It would not be poſſible, with ſtrength inferior to that of a rival-power, equally to preſerve and evenly to ballance the public welfare of Greece." —From hence he inferred, that "either all cities of the *ſtates* which formed the Lacedæmonian league ſhould be diſmantled, or it be allowed that the things now done at Athens were juſt and proper." The Lacedæmonians, upon hearing this, curbed indeed all appearance of reſentment againſt the Athenians:—They had not ſent their embaſſy directly to prohibit, but to adviſe them to deſiſt upon motives of general good: at that time alſo, they had a great regard for the Athenians, becauſe of the public ſpirit they had ſhewn againſt *the Mede*: ——But however, thus baffled as they were in their political views, they were inwardly provoked; and the embaſſadors on each ſide returned home without farther embroilments.

By this conduct the Athenians in a ſmall ſpace of time walled their city around: And the very face of the ſtructure ſheweth plainly to this day that it was built in haſte. The foundations are laid with ſtones of every kind, in ſome places not hewn ſo as properly to fit but piled on at random. Many pillars alſo from ſepulchral monuments and carved ſtones were blended promiſcuouſly in the work. For the circuit of it was every where enlarged beyond the compaſs of the city; and for this reaſon, collecting the materials from every place without diſtinction, they loſt no time. The-

The Piræus.

** Archon.*

Themiſtocles alſo perſuaded them to finiſh the Piræus: For it was begun before this, during that year, in which he himſelf [3] was * chief magiſtrate at Athens. He judged the place to be very commodious, as formed by nature into three harbours; and, that the Athenians, grown more than ever intent on their marine, might render it highly conducive to an enlargement of their power. For he was the firſt perſon, who durſt tell them, that they ought to graſp at the ſovereignty of the ſea; and immediately began to put the plan in execution. And by his direction it was, that they built the wall round the Piræus of that thickneſs which is viſible to this day. For two carts carrying the ſtone paſſed along it by one another: Within was neither mortar nor mud; but the entire ſtructure was one pile of large ſtones, hewn ſquare to cloſe their angles exactly, and grappled firmly together on the outſide with iron and lead; though in height it was not carried up above half ſo far as he intended. He contrived it to be, both in height and breadth, an impregnable rampart againſt hoſtile aſſaults; and he deſigned, that a few, and thoſe the leaſt able of the people, might be ſufficient to man it, whilſt the reſt ſhould be employed on board the fleet. His attention was chiefly confined to a navy; plainly, diſcerning, in my opinion, that the forces of *the King* had a much eaſier way to annoy them by ſea than by land. He thence judged the Piræus to be a place of much greater importance than the upper-city. And this piece of advice he frequently gave the Athenians, that "if ever they were preſſed hard by land, they ſhould retire down thither, and with their naval force make head againſt all opponents." In this manner the Athenians,

3 The number of the *Archons* or *Rulers* was nine. They were annually elected by lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic deſcent, irreproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly ſound in body. The firſt of the nine gave its ſtile to the year, and was therefore called *Eponymus* or the *Namer:* The ſecond was ſtiled *King:* The third *Polemarch:* The other ſix in common *Theſmothetæ.* All the civil and religious affairs of the ſtate belonged to their department.

without

without loſing time, after the retreat of the Medes fortified their city, and prepared all the neceſſary means for their own ſecurity.

Pauſanias the ſon of Cleombrotus was ſent out from Lacedæmon, as commander in chief of the Grecians, with twenty ſail of ſhips from Peloponneſus, joined by thirty Athenian and a number of other allies. They bent their courſe againſt Cyprus, and reduced moſt of the towns there. From thence they proceeded to Byzantium garriſoned by the Medes, and blockaded, and carried the place under his directions. Pauſanias.

But, being now grown quite turbulent in command, the other Grecians, eſpecially the Ionians and all who had lately recovered their liberty from the *royal* yoke, were highly chagrined. They addreſſed themſelves to the Athenians, requeſting them "from the tie of conſanguinity to undertake their protection, and not to leave them thus largely expoſed to the violence of Pauſanias." This requeſt was favourably heard by the Athenians, who expreſſed their willingneſs to put a ſtop to ſuch grievances, and to reſettle the general order, to the beſt of their power.—But during this, the Lacedæmonians recalled Pauſanias, that he might anſwer what was laid to his charge. Many of the Grecians had carried to them accuſations againſt him for an unjuſt abuſe of his power, ſince in his behaviour he reſembled more a tyrant than a general. And it ſo fell out, that he was recalled juſt at the time when the confederates, out of hatred to him, had ranged themſelves under the Athenian orders, excepting thoſe troops which were of Peloponneſus. Upon his return to Lacedæmon, he was convicted upon trial of miſdemeanors towards particulars, but of the heavieſt part of the charge he is acquitted: For the principal accuſation againſt him was an attachment to the Mediſh intereſt; and it might be judged too clear to ſtand in need of proof. Him therefore they no longer intruſt with the public command, but appoint in his ſted Dorcis with ſome collegues to command what little force of their own remained. To theſe the confederates would

no longer yield the ſupreme command; which ſo ſoon as they perceived, they returned home. And here, the Lacedæmonians deſiſted from commiſſioning any others to take upon them that poſt; fearing, leſt thoſe who ſhould be ſent might by their behaviour ſtill more prejudice the Lacedæmonian intereſt, a caſe they had reaſon to dread from the behaviour of Pauſanias. They were now grown deſirous to rid themſelves of the Mediſh war; they acknowledged the Athenians had good pretenſions to enjoy the command, and at that time were well-affected towards them.

The Athenians having in this manner obtained the ſupreme command, by the voluntary tender of the whole confederacy in conſequence of their averſion to Pauſanias; they fixed by their own authority the quotas whether of ſhips or money which each *ſtate* was to furniſh againſt *the Barbarian*. The colour pretended was, "to revenge the calamities they had hitherto ſuffered, by carrying hoſtilities into the dominions of *the King*." This gave its firſt riſe to the Athenian office of * *General* [4] *Receivers of Greece*, whoſe buſineſs it was to collect this tribute: For the contribution of this money was called by that title. The firſt tribute levied in conſequence of this amounted to † four hundred and ſixty talents. Delos was appointed to be their treaſury; and the ſittings were held in the temple there.

The Athenians *General Receivers of* Greece.

* Hellenotamiæ.

† 89125 *l. Sterling.*

How they enlarg'd their power.

Their command was thus at firſt over free and independent confederates, who ſat with them at council, and had a vote in public

4 This nice and difficult point was adjuſted by Ariſtides, to the general ſatisfaction of all the parties concerned. Greece conferred upon him this moſt important truſt, he was called to this delicate commiſſion by the united voice of his country; "Poor (ſays Plutarch) when he ſet about it, but poorer when he had finiſhed it." The Athenian ſtate was now furniſhed with a large annual fund, by which it was enabled not only to annoy the foreign enemies of Greece, but even thoſe Greeks who ſhould at any time preſume to oppoſe the meaſures of Athens. They ſoon found out that their own city was a more convenient place for keeping this treaſure than the iſle of Delos, and accordingly took care to remove it thither.

reſolu-

reſolutions. The enlargement of their authority was the reſult of wars and their own political management during the interval between the invaſion of the Medes and the preſent war, when the conteſts were either againſt *the Barbarian*, or their own allies endeavouring at a change, or thoſe of the Peloponneſians who interfered on every occaſion on purpoſe to moleſt them. Of theſe I have ſubjoined a particular detail, and have ventured a digreſſion from my ſubject, becauſe this piece of hiſtory hath been omitted by all preceding writers. They have either confined their accounts to the affairs of Greece prior in time, or to the invaſions of the Medes. Hellanicus is the only one of them, who hath touched it in his Attic hiſtory; though his memorials are ſhort, and not accurately diſtinguiſhed by proper dates. But this, at the ſame time, will moſt clearly ſhew the method, in which the Athenian empire was erected.

In the firſt place, under the command of [5] Cimon ſon of Miltiades, they laid ſiege to Eïon a town upon the Strymon poſſeſſed by the Medes, which they carried, and ſold all found within it for ſlaves.——They afterwards did the ſame by Scyros an iſland in the Ægean ſea, inhabited by the Dolopes, and placed in it a colony of their own people.——They had, farther, a war with the Caryſthians ſingly, in which the reſt of the Eubœans were unconcerned, who at length ſubmitted to them upon terms.——After this they made war upon the Naxians who had revolted, and reduced them by a ſiege. This was the firſt confederate-ſtate, which was enſlaved to Cimon.

5 Cimon was a great general, a worthy patriot, brave, open, and ingenuous, upright in his political conduct like Ariſtides, and though an able politician yet not ſo miſchievouſly refined as to diſcard honeſty and ſincerity from public meaſures. His father Miltiades, after performing moſt ſignal ſervices to his country, was heavily fined, thrown into priſon becauſe unable to pay, and there ended his days. Cimon afterwards paid the fine, is now going alſo to perform great ſervices to the ſtate, is afterwards baniſhed, but recalled, and again employed in foreign commands, dying at laſt in the ſervice of his country, highly regretted not only at Athens, but throughout Greece.

gratify their aſpiring ambition; though afterwards all the reſt, as opportunity occurred, had the ſame fate.

The occaſions of ſuch revolts were various; though the principal were deficiencies in their quotas of tribute and ſhipping, and refuſals of common ſervice. For the Athenians exerted their authority with exactneſs and rigour, and laid heavy loads upon men, who had neither been accuſtomed nor were willing to bear oppreſſion. Their method of command was ſoon perverted; they no longer cared to make it agreeable, and in general ſervice diſallowed an equality, as it was now more than ever in their power to force revolters to ſubmiſſion. But theſe points the confederates had highly facilitated by their own proceedings. For, through a reluctancy of mingling in frequent expeditions, a majority of them, to redeem their perſonal attendance, were rated at certain ſums of money, equivalent to the expence of the ſhips they ought to have furniſhed. The ſums paid on theſe occaſions to the Athenians, were employed by them to increaſe their own naval force; and the tributaries thus drained, whenever they preſumed to revolt, had parted with the needful expedients of war, and were without reſource.

Battle of Eurymedon. After theſe things it happened, that the Athenians and their confederates fought againſt the Medes both by land and ſea, at the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia. Cimon the ſon of Miltiades commanded; and the Athenians were victorious the very ſame day in both elements. They took and deſtroyed the ſhips of the Phœnicians, in the whole about two hundred.

Thaſus. Later in time than this happened a revolt of the Thaſians, ariſing from diſputes about places of trade on the oppoſite coaſts of Thrace and the mines which they poſſeſſed there. The Athenians with a ſufficient force ſailed againſt Thaſus; and, after gaining a victory by ſea, landed upon the iſland.——About the ſame time, they had ſent a colony, conſiſting of about ten thouſand of their own and confederate people, towards the Strymon, who were to ſettle in a place

Amphipolis.

called

called then the *Nine-ways*, but now Amphipolis. They became maſters of the *Nine-ways* by diſpoſſeſſing the Edonians. But advancing farther into the midland parts of Thrace, they were all cut off at Drabeſcus of Edonia by the united force of the Thracians, who were all enemies to this new ſettlement now forming at the *Nine-ways*. —— But the Thaſians, defeated in battle and beſieged, implored the ſuccour of the Lacedæmonians, and exhorted them to make a diverſion in their favour by breaking into Attica. This they promiſed unknown to the Athenians, and were intent on the the performance, but were prevented by the ſhock of an earthquake. *Earthquake at* Sparta.

The [6] Helots, farther, had ſeized this opportunity, in concert with the neighbouring Thuriatæ and Æthéans, to revolt and ſeize Ithome. *Inſurrection of the* Helots.

Moſt of the Helots were deſcendants of the ancient Meſſenians then reduced to ſlavery, and on this account all of them in general were called Meſſenians. This war againſt the revolters in Ithome gave full employ to the Lacedæmonians. And the Thaſians, after holding out three years blockade were forced to ſurrender upon terms to the Athenians: —— They were " to level their walls, to give up Thaſus.

6 Helots was the name given in general to the ſlaves of the Lacedæmonians. The firſt of the kind were the inhabitants of Helos in Meſſenia, who were conquered and enſlaved by the Lacedæmonians; and all their ſlaves in ſucceeding times had the ſame denomination. The tillage of the ground, the exerciſe of trades, all manual labour and every kind of drudgery was thrown upon them. They were always treated by their Spartan maſters with great ſeverity, and often with the utmoſt barbarity; at their caprice, or ſometimes for reaſons of ſtate, they were wantonly put to death or inhumanly butchered. There is a remarkable inſtance of the latter in the fourth book of this hiſtory. According to Plutarch it was a common ſaying in Greece, That a freeman at Sparta was the freeſt, and a ſlave the greateſt ſlave in the world. —— Thus miſerably oppreſſed, no wonder they ſeized an opportunity of revolt. The earthquake here mentioned was ſo violent, that (according to Plutarch) it demoliſhed all the houſes in Sparta, except five. The Helots roſe at once effectually to demoliſh thoſe Spartans too, who were not buried in the ruins. But Archidamus had already, by way of precaution, ſounded an alarm, and got them together in a body. The Helots thus prevented marched off, and ſeized Ithome, where they made a long and obſtinate reſiſtance.

their

their ſhipping, to pay the whole arrear of their tribute, to advance it punctually for the future, and to quit all pretenſions to the continent and the mines."

Siege of Ithome.

The Lacedæmonians, as their war againſt the rebels in Ithome ran out into a length of time, demanded the aſſiſtance of their allies, and amongſt others of the Athenians. No ſmall number of theſe were ſent to their aid, under the command of Cimon. The demand of aſſiſtance from *them* was principally owing to the reputation they then were in for their ſuperior skill in the methods of approaching and attacking walls. The long continuance of the ſiege convinced them of the neceſſity of ſuch methods, though they would fain have taken it by ſtorm. The firſt open enmity between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians broke out from this expedition. For the Lacedæmonians, when the place could not be carried by ſtorm, growing jealous of the daring and innovating temper of the Athenians, and regarding them as aliens, leſt by a longer ſtay they might be tampering with the rebels in Ithome, and ſo raiſe them freſh embaraſſments, gave a diſmiſſion to them alone of their allies. They ſtrove indeed to conceal their ſuſpicions, by alledging "they have no longer any need of their aſſiſtance." The Athenians were convinced, that their diſmiſſion was not owing to this more plauſible colour, but to ſome latent jealouſy. They reckoned themſelves aggrieved; and, thinking they had merited better uſage from the hands of the Lacedæmonians, were ſcarcely withdrawn, than in open diſregard to the league ſubſiſting between them againſt *the Mede*, they clapped up an alliance with *their* old enemies the Argives: And in the ſame oaths and ſame alliance the Theſſalians alſo were comprehended with them both.

The rebels in Ithome, in the tenth year of the ſiege, unable to hold out any longer, ſurrendered to the Lacedæmonians on the following conditions — that "a term of ſecurity be allowed them to quit Peloponneſus, into which they never ſhall return again; that, if

any

any one of them be ever found there, he ſhould be made the ſlave of whoever apprehended him." The Pythian oracle had already warned the Lacedæmonians "to let go the ſuppliants of Jupiter Ithometes." The men therefore with their wives and children went out of Ithome, and gained a reception from the Athenians, who acted now in enmity to the Lacedæmonians, and aſſigned them Naupactus for their reſidence, which they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozoli.

The Megaréans alſo deſerted the Lacedæmonian and went over to the Athénian alliance, becauſe the Corinthians had warred upon them in purſuance of a diſpute about ſettling their frontier. Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built up for the Megaréans the *long walls* that reach down from Megara to Niſæa, and took their guard upon themſelves. This was by no means the leaſt occaſion of that violent enmity now beginning to ariſe between Corinthians and Athenians. Megara.

Inarus the ſon of Pſammetichus, a Libyan, and king of the Libyans bordering upon Egypt, taking his rout from Maræa a city beyond the Pharos, had ſeduced the greateſt part of Egypt into a revolt from king Artaxerxes. He himſelf was conſtituted their leader, and he brought over the Athenians to aſſociate in the enterprize. They happened at that time to be employed in an expedition againſt Cyprus, with a fleet of two hundred ſhips of their own and their allies: But, relinquiſhing Cyprus, they went upon this new deſign. Being arrived on that coaſt and ſailed up the Nile, they were maſters of that river and two thirds of the city of Memphis, and were making their attack upon the remaining part which is called the *White-wall*. It was defended by the Perſians and Medes who had reſorted thither for refuge, and by thoſe Egyptians who had ſtood out in the general defection. ----- Egypt.

The Athenians, further, having made a deſcent at Haliæ, a battle enſued againſt the Corinthians and Epidaurians, in which the victory was

was on the Corinthian ſide.--- And afterwards, the Athenians engaged at ſea near Cecryphaléa with a fleet of Peloponneſians, and compleatly gained the victory. ---- A war alſo breaking out after this between the Æginetæ and Athenians, a great battle was fought at ſea by theſe two contending parties near Ægina. Both ſides were joined by their reſpective confederates; but the victory remained with the Athenians; who, having taken ſeventy of their ſhips, landed upon their territory, and laid ſiege to the city, under the command of Leocrates the ſon of Strœbus. The Peloponneſians, then deſirous to relieve the Æginetæ, tranſported over to Ægina three hundred heavy-armed, who before were auxiliaries to the Corinthians and Epidaurians. In the next place they ſecured the promontory of Geranéa. The Corinthians now with their allies made an incurſion into the diſtrict of Megara, judging it impoſſible for the Athenians to march to the relief of the Megaréans, as they had ſo large a force already abroad in Ægina and in Egypt; or, if they were intent on giving them relief, they muſt of neceſſity raiſe their ſiege from Ægina. The Athenians however recalled not their army from Ægina, but marched away all the old and young that were left in Athens to the aid of Megara, under the command of Myronides: And having fought a drawn battle againſt the Corinthians, both ſides retired, and both ſides looked upon themſelves as not worſted in the action. The Athenians however, upon the departure of the Corinthians, as being at leaſt ſo far victorious, erected a trophy. The Corinthians at their return heard nothing but reproaches from the ſeniors in Corinth; ſo, after beſtowing an interval of about twelve days to recruit, they came back again; and, to lay their claim alſo to the victory, ſet about erecting a trophy of oppoſition. Upon this, the Athenians ſallying with a ſhout out of Megara, put thoſe who were buſy in erecting this trophy to the ſword, and routed all who endeavoured to oppoſe them. The vanquiſhed Corinthians were forced to fly; and no ſmall part of their number, being cloſely purſued and driven from any certain

Ægina.

tain route, were chaced into the ground of a private perſon, which happened to be encompaſſed with a ditch ſo deep as to be quite impaſſable, and there was no getting out. The Athenians, perceiving this, drew up all their heavy-armed to front them, and then forming their light-armed in a circle round them, ſtoned every man of them to death. This was a calamitous event to the Corinthians: But the bulk of their force got home ſafe again from this unhappy expedition.

Long-walls at Athens.

About this time alſo the Athenians began to build the *long-walls* reaching down to the ſea, both towards the Phalerus and towards the Piræus.

Phocians *and* Dorians.

The Phocians were now embroiled with the Dorians from whom the Lacedæmonians are deſcended. Having made ſome attempts on Bœon, and Cytinium, and Erineus, and taken one of thoſe places, the Lacedæmonians marched out to ſuccour the Dorians with fifteen hundred heavy-armed of their natives and ten thouſand of their allies, commanded by Nicomedes the ſon of Cleombrotus in the right of Pleiſtionax ſon of Pauſanias their king who was yet a minor; and, having forced the Phocians to ſurrender upon terms the town they had taken, were preparing for their return. Now, in caſe they attempted it by paſſing over the ſea in the gulf of Criſſa, the Athenians having got round with a ſquadron were ready to obſtruct it. Nor, did they judge it ſafe to attempt it by way of Geranéa, as Megara and Pegæ were in the hands of the Athenians; for the paſs of Geranéa is ever difficult, and now was conſtantly guarded by the Athenians; and, ſhould they venture this route, they perceived that the Athenians were there alſo ready to intercept them. They determined at laſt to halt for a time in Bœotia, and watch for an opportunity to march away unmoleſted. Some citizens of Athens were now clandeſtinely practiſing with them, to obtain their concurrence in putting a ſtop to the *democracy* and the building of the *long-walls*. But the whole body of the Athenian people ruſhed out into the field againſt them,

with a thouſand Argives and the reſpective quotas of their allies, in the whole amounting to fourteen thouſand. They judged them quite at a loſs about the means of a retreat; and the deſign alſo to overthrow their popular government began to be ſuſpected. Some Theſſalian horſemen came alſo up to join the Athenians, in purſuance of treaty, who afterwards in the heat of action revolted to the Lacedæmonians.

Battle of Tanagra.

They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the victory reſted with the Lacedæmonians and allies; but the ſlaughter was great on both ſides. The Lacedæmonians afterwards took their route through the diſtrict of Megara; and, having cut down the woods, returned to their own home through Geranéa and the Iſthmus.

Battle of Oenophyta.

On the ſixty ſecond day after the battle of Tanagra, the Athenians had again taken the field againſt the Bœotians, under the command of [7] Myronides. They engaged them, and gained a complete victory at [8] Oenophyta; in conſequence of which, they ſeized all the territories of Bœotia and Phocis, and levelled the walls of Tanagra. They took from the Locrians of Opus one hundred of their richeſt perſons for hoſtages; and ----- had now completed their own *long-walls* at Athens.

7 Plutarch in his *Apothegms* relates, that when Myronides was putting himſelf at the head of the Athenians on this occaſion, his officers told him, "they were not all come out yet into the field," he replied briskly, "All are come out that will fight," and marched off.

8 This battle is repreſented by ſome, as more glorious to the Athenians than even thoſe of Marathon or Platæa. In the latter they fought accompanied by their allies againſt Barbarians; but here, with their own ſingle force, they defeated a far more numerous body of the choiceſt and beſt diſciplined troops in Greece. Plato hath marked it in his *Funeral Oration*, and told us thoſe who fell in this battle were the firſt who were honoured with a public interment in the Ceramicus. "Theſe brave "men, (ſays he, as tranſlated by Mr. Weſt) "having fought againſt Grecians for the "liberties of Grecians, and delivered thoſe, "whoſe cauſe they had undertaken to de"fend, were the firſt after the Perſian "war, upon whom the commonwealth "conferred the honour of being buried in "this public cœmetery."

Soon

Soon after, the Æginetæ ſurrendered to the Athenians upon terms, —— They "demoliſhed their fortifications, gave up their ſhipping, and ſubmitted to pay an annual tribute for the future." Ægina.

The Athenians, farther, in a cruize infeſted the coaſt of Peloponneſus, under the command of Tolmidas the ſon of Tolmæus. They burnt a dock of the Lacedæmonians, took Chalcis a city belonging to the Corinthians, and landing their men engaged with and defeated the Sicyonians. Chalcis.

During all this interval, the army of Athenians and allies continued in Egypt, amidſt various incidents and events of war. ----- At firſt, the Athenians had the better of it in Egypt. Upon this, * the *king* diſpatcheth to Lacedæmon Megabazus a Perſian *noble*, furniſhed with great ſums of money, in order to prevail upon the Lacedæmonians to make an incurſion into Attica, and force the Athenians to recall their troops from Egypt: When Megabazus could not prevail, and ſome money had been ſpent to no manner of purpoſe, he carried back what was yet unexpended with him into Aſia. He then ſendeth Megabazus the ſon of Zopyrus a Perſian *noble* againſt them with a numerous army, who marching by land fought with and defeated the Egyptians and their allies; then, drove the Grecians out of Memphis; and at laſt ſhut them up in the iſle of Proſopis. Here he kept them blocked up for a year and ſix months; till, having drained the channel by turning the water into a different courſe, he ſtranded all their ſhips, and rendered the iſland almoſt continent. He then marched his troops acroſs, and took the place by a land-aſſault. And thus a war, which had employed the Grecians for ſix continued years, ended in their deſtruction. Few only of the numbers ſent thither, by taking the route of Libya, got ſafe away to Cyrene; the far greater part were entirely cut off. Egypt was now again reduced to the obedience of the *king*: Amyrtéus alone held out, who reigned in the *fenny* parts. The large extent of the fens prevented his reduction; and, beſides, the Egyptians of the fens are the moſt re- Egypt.

* Artaxerxes Longimanus.

markable of all for military valour. Inarus king of the Libyans, the author of all theſe commotions in Egypt, was betrayed by treachery, and faſtned to a croſs. Beſide this, fifty triremes from Athens and the reſt of the alliance, arriving upon the coaſt of Egypt to relieve the former, were come up to Medaſium a mouth of the Nile, quite ignorant of their fate. Theſe ſome forces aſſaulted from the land, whilſt a ſquadron of Phœnicians attacked them by ſea. Many of the veſſels were by this means deſtroyed, but ſome few had the good fortune to get away. And thus the great expedition of the Athenians and allies into Egypt was brought to a concluſion.

Theſſaly. But farther, Oreſtes ſon of Echecratidas king of the Theſſalians, being driven from Theſſaly, perſuaded the Athenians to undertake his reſtoration. The Athenians, in conjunction with the Bœotians and Phocians now their allies, marched up to Pharſalus of Theſſaly. They became maſters of the adjacent country, ſo far as they could be whilſt keeping in a body; for the Theſſalian cavalry prevented any detachments. They took not that city, neither carried any one point intended by the expedition, but were obliged to withdraw and carry Oreſtes back again with them, totally unſucceſsful.

Sicyon. Not long after this, a thouſand Athenians going on board their ſhips which lay at Pegæ, for Pegæ was now in their poſſeſſion, ſteered away againſt Sicyon, under the command of [9] Pericles the ſon

[9] Here the name of Pericles firſt occurs, and a hint ſhould be given to thoſe who are not well acquainted with him to mark a perſon, that was a true patriot, a conſummate ſtateſman, a great general, and a moſt ſublime ſpeaker. He was born of one of the moſt illuſtrious families in Athens. He was educated in the beſt manner, and learned his philoſophy or the knowledge of nature from Anaxagoras, whoſe doctrines agreed ſo little with the ſuperſtitious practices and tempers of the Athenians, that the maſter and all his diſciples were charged with atheiſm, for which many of them were proſecuted, and the divine Socrates moſt injuriouſly put to death. He engaged early in public affairs, gained the aſcendant over all his competitors, became at length and continued to his death, maſter of the affections and liberties too of the Athenian people, and though maſter yet guardian and increaſer of the latter. In ſhort,

ſon of Xantippus. They made a deſcent, and in a battle defeated thoſe of the Sicyonians who endeavoured to make head againſt them. From thence, they ſtrengthened themſelves by taking in ſome Achæans; and, ſtretching acroſs the gulph, landed in a diſtrict of Acarnania, and laid ſiege to Oenias; yet, unable to carry it, they ſoon quitted, and withdrew to their own homes.

Three years after this, a peace to continue for five years was clapped up between Peloponneſians and Athenians. Upon this, the Athenians now at leiſure from any war in Greece, engaged in an expedition againſt Cyprus with a fleet of two hundred ſhips of their own and allies, commanded by Cimon. Sixty of theſe were afterwards detached to Egypt, at the requeſt of Amyrtæus king of the fenny part; but the reſt of them blocked up Citium. Yet, by the death of Cimon, and a violent famine, they were compelled to quit the blockade of Citium: And, being come up to the height of Salamis in Cyprus, they engaged at one time an united force of Phœnicians and Cyprians and Cilicians both by land and ſea. They gained the victory in both engagements; and, being rejoined by the detachment they had ſent to Egypt, returned home. Cyprus.

After this, the Lacedæmonians, engaged in that which is known by the name of the *holy* war; and, having recovered the temple at Delphi, delivered it up to the Delphians. But no ſooner were they withdrawn, than the Athenians marched out in their turn, retook it, and delivered it into the hands of the Phocians. *The holy war.*

At no great interval of time from hence, the Athenians took the field againſt the Bœotian exiles, who had ſeized Orchomenus and Chæronæa and ſome other cities of Bœotia. Their force, ſent out upon this ſervice, conſiſted of a thouſand heavy-armed of their own, Bœotia.

ſhort, according to writers of the beſt authority and the graveſt hiſtorians, he was one of the moſt able and moſt diſintereſted miniſters that Athens ever had, Athens the moſt democratical ſtate that ever exiſted, ſo fertile in every thing great and glorious, and ſo over-run at the ſame time with faction, licentiouſneſs, and wild tumultuary caprice.

with

with proportional quotas from their allies, and was commanded by Tolmidas the ſon of Tolmæus. Having taken and enſlaved Chæronæa, they placed a freſh garriſon in it, and ſo withdrew. But upon their march, they are attacked at Coronéa by a body of men, conſiſting of the Bœotian exiles ſallying out of Orchomenus joined by Locrians and the exiles from Eubœa and others of their partizans. After a battle, the victory remained with the latter, who made great ſlaughter of the Athenians, and took many priſoners. Upon this, the Athenians evacuated Bœotia, and to get the priſoners releaſed conſented to a peace. The Bœotian exiles, and all others in the ſame circumſtances, were by this re-ſettled in their old habitations, and recovered their former liberty and rights.

Battle of Coronéa.

Eubœa.

It was not a great while after theſe laſt occurrences, that Eubœa revolted from the Athenians. And Pericles was no ſooner landed upon that iſland with an Athenian army to chaſtiſe them, than news was brought him, that "Megara alſo had revolted; that the Peloponneſians were going to make an incurſion into Attica; that the Athenian garriſon had been put to the ſword by the [1] Megaréans, excepting thoſe who had thrown themſelelves into Niſæa; and, that the Megaréans had effected this revolt by a junction of Corinthians and Sicyonians and Epidaurians." Upon hearing this, Pericles re-embarked with the utmoſt expedition, and brought back his army

[1] This revolt of Megara, a little republic almoſt ſurrounded by the dominions of Athens, leagued cloſely with her and under her protection, gave riſe to that *decree* which excluded the Megaréans from the ports and markets of Athens. Others add, that they ſlew an Athenian herald, who was ſent to expoſtulate with them on this account. Could ſuch outrages be pocketed by Athenians? Could Pericles diſſuade the people of Athens from ſhewing reſentment? They decreed farther, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the *generals of the ſtate* ſhould ſwear at their election, to make an incurſion twice a year into the Megaris. We ſhall ſoon ſee that the Peloponneſians made it a pretext for the enſuing war, and that Pericles juſtified the decree, and perſuaded the Athenians to hazard a war rather than repeal it. This is the true hiſtory of the point, though comedy and raillery and libelling, ſtrangely vary the account.

from

from Eubœa. And ſoon after the Peloponneſians, marching into Attica as far as Eleuſis and Thria, laid the country waſte, under the command of [2] Pleiſtionax the ſon of Pauſanias king of Sparta: And then, without extending the ravage any farther, they withdrew to their own homes. Now again, the Athenians tranſported a military force into Eubœa, under the command of Pericles, and ſoon compleated its reduction. The tranquillity of the reſt of the iſland was re-eſtabliſhed upon certain conditions; but they wholly ejected all the inhabitants of Heſtiæa, and repeopled it with a colony of their own. — And, not long after their return from Eubœa, they concluded a peace for thirty years with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, in purſuance of which they reſtored them Niſæa and Chalcis and Pegæ and Træzene; all which places, though belonging to the Peloponneſians, were in the hands of the Athenians. *Peace of* Eubœa.

In the ſixth year of this peace, [3] a war broke out between the Samians and Mileſians about Priene. The Mileſians, having the worſt Samian *war.*

2 As Pleiſtionax on this occaſion evacuated Attica on a ſudden, he was baniſhed from Sparta, as having been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory. Diodorus Siculus relates, that he did it by the advice of Cleandridas his guardian, who attended him in the field on account of his youth; and, that Pericles afterwards paſſing his accounts at Athens, charged "ten talents properly laid out for the ſervice of the ſtate," which paſſed without farther explanation or exception.

3 Pericles here performed a great and ſignal ſervice to his country. The motives to this war are, according to our hiſtorian, ſufficiently ſtrong, upon the ſcheme now carrying on by Pericles, to extend the ſovereignty of Athens by ſea. Yet the comic poets and writers of memoirs and private hiſtory, give another account of the affair, which it is ſurprizing to find the authors of the *Univerſal Hiſtory* incline to think as well founded as what is given by Thucydides, that "Pericles engaged the republic in this war, merely to gratify the reſentment of Aſpaſia, who was a native of Miletus, againſt the Samians." As this Aſpaſia hath had all the honour of Pericles his merit imputed to herſelf, and he hath ſuffered a weight of reproach in her behalf, the reader will accept a ſhort account of this famous lady. She is allowed on all hands to have been a woman of the greateſt beauty and the firſt genius; but averred by ſome to have been a libertine, a proſtitute, a bawd, nay every thing ſcandalous and vile. Pericles was dotingly fond of her, and got divorced from a wife, whom

worſt in the diſpute, had recourſe to the Athenians, to whom they bitterly exclaimed againſt the Samians. Nay, even ſome private citizens of Samos joined with them in this outcry, whoſe ſcheme it was to work a change in the government. The Athenians therefore, putting to ſea with a fleet of forty ſail, landed upon Samos, where they ſet up a democracy; and exacted from them fifty boys and as many grown men for hoſtages, whom they depoſited at Lemnos. They had farther, at their departure, left a garriſon behind to ſecure that iſland. But a body of Samians, who would not ſubmit to the new form of government, and therefore had refuged themſelves upon the continent, having gained the correſpondence of the moſt powerful perſons abiding in Samos, and the alliance of Piſſuthnes ſon of Hyſtaſpes at that time governor at Sardis, and collected a body of ſeven hundred auxiliaries, paſſed over by night into Samos. They firſt exerted their efforts againſt the *popular* party, and got a majority of them into their power: In the next place, they conveyed away the hoſtages from Lemnos by ſtealth; they openly declared a revolt; and delivered up the Athenian garriſon with their officers whom they had ſeized to Piſſuthnes; and then, immediately prepared to renew their war againſt Miletus. The Byzantines farther joined with them in the revolt.

whom he did not love, to marry her. She taught him, it is ſaid, his refined maxims of policy, his lofty imperial eloquence; nay, even compoſed the ſpeeches, on which ſo great a ſhare of his reputation was founded. The beſt men in Athens frequented her houſe, and brought their wives to receive leſſons from her of œconomy and right deportment. Socrates himſelf was her pupil in eloquence, and gives her the honour of that *funeral oration* which he delivers in the *Menexenus* of Plato. There muſt have been ſome ground even for complimenting her in this extraordinary manner. And, after every abatement, what muſt we think of a lady, who was in ſuch high eſteem with the greateſt men that ever lived at Athens, who taught force to orators, grace to philoſophers, and conduct to miniſters of ſtate; in a word, who had Pericles for her lover, and Socrates for her encomiaſt? See Bayle's *Dictionary* under *Pericles*, and *Univerſal-Hiſtory*, vol. vi. p. 415. note.

No

No ſooner were the Athenians informed of this, than they put out againſt Samos with ſixty ſail, though ſixteen of them were detached for other ſervices. Some of the latter were ſtationed upon the coaſt of Caria to obſerve the motions of a Phœnician fleet, and the reſt were ordered to Chios and Lesbos to give there a ſummons of aid. The remaining forty four, commanded by [4] Pericles and nine colleagues, engaged near the iſle of Tragia with the Samian fleet conſiſting of ſeventy ſail, twenty of which had land-ſoldiers on board, and the whole was now on the return from Miletus; and here the Athenians gained a ſignal victory. Afterwards, forty ſail arrived from Athens to reinforce them, and twenty five from the Chians and Lesbians. With this acceſſion of force, they landed upon the iſland, overthrew the Samians in battle, inveſted their city with a triple wall, and at the ſame time blocked it up by ſea.

But Pericles, drawing off ſixty of the ſhips from this ſervice, ſteered away with all poſſible expedition towards Caunus and Caria, upon receiving advice that "a Phœnician fleet is coming up againſt them." Steſagoras alſo and others had before been ſent from Samos with five ſhips to meet that fleet. In this interval, the Samians launched out in a ſudden ſally, fell upon the [5] unfortified ſtation of the

4 The Athenians in the aſſembly of the people choſe ten *generals* every year, according to the number of their tribes. They were ſometimes, as in the preſent inſtance, all ſent out in the ſame employ. They rolled, and each in his turn was *general* of the day. Thucydides ſeldom gives more than the name of one, whom we may conclude to have been the perſon of the greateſt weight and influence amongſt them, in fact a *general in chief*. Philip of Macedon was uſed to joke upon this multiplicity of generals, "For my part (ſaid he) I have never "had the good-fortune to find more than "one general in my life; and yet the Athe-"nians find ten freſh ones every year." Not but that theſe generals were often re-elected and continued years in commiſſion. Pericles 'tis plain did ſo: and in latter times Phocion is ſaid to have been elected five and forty times. Their power was great not only in the field but at Athens. Every point that had relation to war came under their department. Pericles in a foreign employ was always firſt of the generals, and within the walls of Athens, was the firſt or rather abſolute miniſter of ſtate.

5 When the Grecians continued long on

the Athenians, ſunk the veſſels moored at a diſtance by way of guard, and engaging thoſe which put out againſt them victoriouſly executed their purpoſe, were maſters of their own ſea for fourteen days continuance, and made whatever importations or exportations they pleaſed: But, as Pericles then returned, they were again [6] blocked up by ſea. He afterwards received freſh ſupplies from Athens, forty ſhips under Thucydides and Agnon and Phormio, and twenty under Tlepolemus and Anticles, beſide thirty others from Chios and Lesbos. And, though after this the Samians ventured a ſhort engagement at ſea, yet they now found all farther reſiſtance impracticable, ſo that in the ninth month of the ſiege they ſurrendered on the following terms--- "To demoliſh their walls; to give hoſtages; to deliver up their ſhipping; and, to re-imburſe by ſtated payments the expences of the war." [7] ---- The Byzantines alſo came in, upon the engagement of being held only to ſuch obedience, as had formerly been required of them.

Not

a ſtation, or were apprehenſive of being attacked by an enemy, they fortified their naval ſtation and camp, towards the land with a ditch and rampart, and towards the ſea with a paliſade. At other times, a number of their ſhips lay out more to ſea, by way of guard or watch to the reſt, which were generally dragged aſhore, whilſt the ſoldiers lay round them in their tents. Sometimes they were only moor'd to the ſhore, or rode at anchor, that they might be ready upon an alarm. See *Potter's Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 20.

6 The manner of doing this, was "to "environ the walls and harbour with ſhips, "ranged in order from one ſide of the "ſhore to the other, and ſo cloſely joined "together by chains and bridges, on which "armed men were placed, that without "breaking their order, there could be no "paſſage from the town to the ſea." *Potter's Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 21.

7 Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herſelf, and had well nigh defeated her grand plan of being miſtreſs of the ſea, Pericles was received upon his return with all the honours a grateful people could give him, and was pitched upon to make the funeral oration for thoſe ſlain in the war. He performed his part with high applauſe. The ladies in particular were loud in their acclamations, and were eagerly employed in careſſing and crowning him with garlands. But for a ſmart piece of raillery from one of them, on this occaſion, and his ſmarter repartee, the reader may conſult the *Univerſal Hiſtory*, Vol. VI. p. 429. the note. In the

latter

Not many years intervened between this period of time and the riſe of thoſe differences above recited concerning Corcyra and Potidæa, and all occurrences whatever, on which the pretences of *this* Peloponneſian war were grounded. All theſe tranſactions in general, whether of Grecians againſt Grecians or againſt the *Barbarian*, fell out in the compaſs of fifty years, between the retreat of Xerxes and the commencement of this preſent war; during which period the Athenians had eſtabliſhed their dominion on a ſolid baſis, and had roſe to a high exaltation of power. The Lacedæmonians were ſenſible of it, yet never oppoſed them, except by ſome tranſient efforts; and, for the moſt part of the time, were quite eaſy and indifferent about it. That people had never been known in a hurry to run to arms: Their wars were indiſpenſably neceſſary; and ſometimes they were entangled in domeſtic broils. Thus they looked on with indolent unconcern till the Athenian power was manifeſtly eſtabliſhed, and encroachments were made upon their own alliance. Then indeed they determined to be no longer patient: They reſolved upon a war, in which their utmoſt force ſhould be exerted, and the Athenian power, if poſſible, demoliſhed. *Recapitulation.*

ON theſe motives was formed the public reſolution of the Lacedæmonians---- That "the treaty was violated, and the Athenians "were guilty of injuſtice." They had alſo ſent to Delphi, to enquire of the God, "Whether their war would be ſucceſsful?" He is reported to have returned this anſwer, That "if they warred with "all their might, they ſhould at laſt be triumphant, and he himſelf "would fight on their ſide, invoked and uninvoked." *Continuation of the hiſtory.*

They had now again ſummoned their confederates to attend, and deſigned to put it to a general ballot, "Whether the war ſhould be "undertaken?" The embaſſadors from the ſeveral conſtituents of *Another congreſs at* Lacedæmon,

latter part of that note, the authors ſeem willing both to deny and to allow Pericles the merit of having ſerved his country in the reduction of Samos.

their alliance arrived, and aſſembled in one general council. Others made what declarations they pleaſed, the majority inveighing againſt the Athenians and inſiſting upon war: But the Corinthians (who had beforehand requeſted every *ſtate* apart to ballot for war) alarmed for Potidæa, leſt for want of ſome ſpeedy relief it might be utterly deſtroyed, being preſent alſo at this council, ſtood forth the laſt of all, and ſpoke to this effect:

Speech of the Corinthians.

" WE can no longer, ye confederates, have any room to complain " of the Lacedæmonians, ſince their own reſolution is already en- " gaged for war, and they have ſummoned us hither to give our " concurrence. For it is the duty of a governing and leading *ſtate*, " as in private concerns they obſerve the equitable conduct, ſo ever " to keep their view intent upon the general welfare, ſuitably to that " ſuperior degree of honour and regard, which in many points they " pre-eminently receive.

" For our parts, ſo many of us as have quitted Athenian friend- " ſhip for this better aſſociation, we require no farther trials to awaken " our apprehenſions. But thoſe amongſt us, who are ſeated up in " the inland parts, at a diſtance from the coaſt, ſhould now be con- " vinced, that unleſs they combine in the defence of ſuch as are " in lower ſituations, they will ſoon be obſtructed in carrying out " the fruits of their lands, and again in fetching in thoſe neceſſary " ſupplies which the ſea beſtoweth upon an inland-country. Let " them by no means judge erroneouſly of what we urge as not in " the leaſt affecting them; but look upon it as a certainty, that if " they abandon the guard of the maritime ſituations, the danger will " ſoon advance quite up to them, and they of courſe no leſs than " we are concerned in the iſſue of our preſent determinations. For " this reaſon they ought, without the leaſt heſitation, to make the " timely exchange of peace for war.

" It

" It is indeed the duty of the prudent, ſo long as they are not in-
" jured, to be fond of peace. But it is the duty of the brave, when
" injured, to throw up peace, and to have recourſe to arms; and,
" when in theſe ſucceſsful, to lay them down again in peaceful
" compoſition; thus, never to be elevated above meaſure by mili-
" tary ſucceſs, nor delighted with the ſweets of peace to ſuffer in-
" ſults. For he who, apprehenſive of loſing this delight, ſits indo-
" lently at eaſe, will ſoon be deprived of the enjoyment of that de-
" light which intereſteth his fears; and he, whoſe paſſions are in-
" flamed by military ſucceſs, elevated too high by a treacherous con-
" fidence, hears no longer the dictates of his judgment. Many are
" the ſchemes which, though unadviſedly planned, through the
" more unreaſonable conduct of an enemy turn out ſucceſsful: But
" yet more numerous are thoſe, which, though ſeemingly founded
" on mature counſel, draw after them a diſgraceful and oppoſite
" event. This proceeds from that great inequality of ſpirit, with
" which an exploit is projected, and with which it is put into actual
" execution. For, in council we reſolve, ſurrounded with ſecurity;
" in execution we faint, through the prevalence of fear.

" We now, having been groſly injured, and in abundant inſtances
" aggrieved, are taking up arms; and, when we have avenged our-
" ſelves on the Athenians, ſhall at a proper time lay them down
" again. Succeſs, upon many conſiderations, we may promiſe our-
" ſelves: In the firſt place, as we are ſuperior in numbers and mi-
" litary skill: In the next, as we all advance with uniformity to ac-
" compliſh our deſigns. A naval force, equal to that in which
" their ſtrength conſiſts, we ſhall be enabled to equip, from com-
" petent ſtores we ſeparately poſſeſs, and the funds laid up at Delphi
" and Olympia [8]. If we take up thoſe upon intereſt for immediate

[8] In the temple of Apollo at Delphi, and that of Jupiter at Olympia. The wealth repoſited in theſe places muſt have been very large, conſidering the great veneration univerſally paid theſe Deities, and the numerous and valuable offerings ſent annually to theſe famous temples.

ſervice,

" ſervice, we are able, by enlarging their pay, to draw away all the
" foreigners who man their fleets. The Athenian power is not
" ſupported by a natural but a purchaſed ſtrength. And our own is
" leſs liable to be injured by the ſame method, as we are ſtrong in
" our perſons more than in our wealth. Should we gain the vic-
" tory but in one ſingle engagement at ſea, in all probability we
" have done their buſineſs; or, in caſe they continue the ſtruggle,
" we ſhall then have a longer ſpace to improve our naval practice:
" And when once we have gained an equality of ſkill, our natural
" courage will ſoon ſecure us the triumph. For that valiant ſpirit,
" which we enjoy by nature, it is impoſſible for them to acquire by
" rules: But that ſuperiority, with which at preſent their ſkill
" inveſts them, we may eaſily learn to overmatch by practice.

" Thoſe ſums of money, by which theſe points are chiefly to be
" compaſſed, we will reſpectively contribute. For would it not in
" reality be a grievous caſe, when their dependents are never back-
" ward to ſend in thoſe ſums which rivet ſlavery on themſelves, if
" we who want to be revenged on our foes, and at the ſame time to
" ſecure our own preſervation —— if we ſhould refuſe to ſubmit to
" expences, and ſhould ſtore up our wealth to be plundered by them,
" to purchaſe oppreſſions and miſeries for ourſelves?

" We have other expedients within our reach to ſupport this
" war, —— a revolt of their dependents; and, in conſequence of
" that, a diminution of their revenue, the eſſence of their ſtrength;
" erecting forts within their territory; and many others not yet to
" be foreſeen. For war by no means yields to the direction of a
" pre-determined plan; but of itſelf, in every preſent exigence,
" contrives and methodizeth its own courſe. In war, who moves
" along with a temper in proper command, hath got the ſureſt
" ſupport: But he, who hath loſt his temper, is for that reaſon
" more liable to miſcarry.

" Let

" Let us remember, that if any one ſingle *ſtate* amongſt us had " a conteſt with its foes about a frontier, there would be need of " perſeverance. But now, the Athenians are a match for us all " united, and quite too ſtrong for any of us ſeparately to reſiſt: So " that unleſs we ſupport one another with our collective forces, un- " leſs every nation and every ſtate unanimouſly combine to give a " check to their ambition, they will oppreſs us, apart and diſunited, " without a ſtruggle. Such a triumph, how grating ſoever the bare " mention of it may be to any of your ears, yet be it known, can " end in nothing elſe but plain and open ſlavery. To hint in mere " words ſo baſe a doubt, that ſo many *ſtates* may be enſlaved by *one*, " is diſgrace to Peloponneſus. In ſuch a plunge, we ſhould either " be thought juſtly to have deſerved it, or through cowardice to " ſuffer it, the degenerate offſpring of thoſe anceſtors who were the " deliverers of Greece. And yet, we have not ſpirit enough re- " maining to defend our own liberty. We ſuffer one ſingle *ſtate* to " erect itſelf into a tyrant, whilſt we claim the glory of pulling " down monarchs in particular ſocieties. We know not by what " methods to extricate ourſelves from theſe three, the greateſt of " calamities, from folly, or cowardice, or ſloth. For exempt from " theſe in fact you are not, by taking up the plea of *contempt* of " your enemies, for which ſuch numbers have ſuffered. The many " misfortunes ariſing from this have changed the ſenſe of the word, " and cauſed it to ſtand for arrant *folly*.

" But on the paſt what neceſſity is there to enlarge? or, to blame " any farther than may be neceſſary for the preſent? To prevent " worſe events for the future, we ought by immediate efforts, with " toil and perſeverance, to ſeek for redreſs. Through toil to acquire " virtues, is hereditary to Peloponneſians. This cuſtom is not to be " dropped, though now in wealth and power you have made ſome " petty advancements: For it never can become you to let go in " affluence what was gained in want. It becomes you rather, upon

" many

" many accounts, with manly confidence to declare for war. The " oracle of a God preſcribeth it; —— that God himſelf hath pro- " miſed his aſſiſtance; —— and the reſt of Greece is ready to join " you in the conteſt, ſome from a principle of fear, and ſome from " a principle of intereſt. Neither on *you* will the firſt breach of " the peace be charged. The God, who adviſeth war, plainly " judgeth *that* to be already broke: You will only act, to redreſs " its violation. For the breach is not to be charged on thoſe, " who arm to revenge it; but on thoſe, who were the firſt " aggreſſors.

" Since then war, conſidered in every light, appears honourable " in regard to you, ye Lacedæmonians; ſince we, with united " voices, encourage you to it, as moſt ſtrongly requiſite for our ge- " neral and ſeparate intereſts, —— defer no longer to ſuccour the Po- " tidæans, Dorians by deſcent, and beſieged by Ionians, (the reverſe " was formerly the caſe!) and to fetch again the liberty of others. " The buſineſs will admit of no longer delay, when ſome already " feel the blow; and others, if it once be known that we met here " together, and durſt not undertake our own defence, will in a very " little time be ſenſible of the ſame. Reflect within yourſelves, confe- " derates, that affairs are come to extremities, that we have ſuggeſted " the moſt adviſeable meaſures, and —— give your ballot for war. " Be not terrified at its immediate dangers; but animate yourſelves " with the hope of a long laſting peace to be procured by it. For a " peace produced by war is ever the moſt firm; but, from tranquillity " and eaſe to be averſe to war, can by no means abate or diſſipate our " danger. With this certain concluſion, that a *ſtate* in Greece is ſtarted " up into a tyrant, and aims indifferently at the liberty of us all, " her arbitrary plan being partly executed and partly in agitation — " let us ruſh againſt, and at once pull her down. Then ſhall we " paſs the remainder of our lives exempt from dangers, and ſhall " immediately recover liberty for thoſe Grecians, who are already " enſlaved."

In

A war voted.

In this manner the Corinthians ſpoke: and the Lacedæmonians, when they had heard them all deliver their ſeveral opinions, gave out the ballots to all the confederates that were preſent, in regular order, both to the greater and leſſer *ſtates*: and the greateſt part of them ballotted for war. But, though thus decreed, it was impoſſible for them, as they were quite unprepared, immediately to undertake it. It was agreed therefore, that "every *ſtate* ſhould get in readineſs "their ſeveral contingents, and no time to be loſt." However, in leſs than a year, every thing needful was amply provided; and, before its expiration, an irruption was made into Attica, and the war openly on foot. But even this interval was employed in ſending embaſſies to Athens charged with accuſations, that reaſons ſtrong as poſſible for making war might appear on their ſide, if *thoſe* ſhould meet with diſregard.

Differed.

Embaſſies.

I.

BY the firſt embaſſadors therefore whom the Lacedæmonians ſent, they required the Athenians —— "To drive away the *pollution* of "the Goddeſs." And the *pollution* was this ——

Cylon.

There was one Cylon an Athenian, who had been victor at the Olympic games, a perſon of noble deſcent, and of great conſequence in his own perſon. He married a daughter of Theagenes a Megaréan, who in thoſe days was tyrant of Megara. This Cylon, aſking advice at Delphi about a ſcheme he had projected, was directed by the God — "To ſeize the citadel of Athens upon the greateſt feſtival of Jupiter." In purſuance of this, being ſupplied with a party of men by Theagenes, and having obtained the concurrence of his own friends, upon the day of the Peloponneſian Olympics he ſeized the citadel as inſtrumental to his tyranny. He imagined *that* to be the greateſt feſtival of Jupiter, and to bear a particular relation to himſelf, who had been an Olympic victor. But whether the greateſt feſtival meant was to be held in Attica, or any other place, he had never conſidered, nor had the oracle declared. There is a feſtival of

Jove obſerved by the Athenians, which is called *the greateſt feſtival of* Jupiter *the propitious.* This is celebrated without the city, in full concourſe of the people, where many ſacrifices are offered, not of real victims, but of artificial images of creatures peculiar to the country. Concluding however, that he had the true ſenſe of the oracle, he put his enterprize in execution. The Athenians, taking the alarm, ran out of the country in one general confluence to put a ſtop to theſe attempts, and inveſting the citadel quite blocked them up. But in proceſs of time, being wearied out with the tedioufneſs of the blockade, many of them departed, leaving the care of it to the nine Archons, with a full power of "acting in whatever manner they ſhould judge moſt expedient:" For, at that time, moſt parts of the public adminiſtration were in the management of the Archons. The party with Cylon, thus cloſely inveſted, were reduced very low through ſcarcity of bread and water. Cylon therefore and his brother privately eſcape. But the reſt, reduced to extremities, and ſome of them had already periſhed by famine, ſit themſelves down as *ſuppliants* by the altar in the citadel. The Athenian guard, having ordered them to ariſe as they ſaw them juſt ready to expire in the temple, to avoid the guilt of profanation led them out and ſlew them. But ſome of the number, who had ſeated themſelves at the *venerable Goddeſſes*, at the very altars, they murdered in [9] the act of removal. And for this action, not only the perſons concerned in it but their deſcendants alſo were called *the ſacrilegious and accurſed of the Goddeſs.* The Athenians indeed baniſhed thoſe ſacrilegious perſons out of the city: Cleomenes the Lacedæmonian, drove them

9 When theſe *ſuppliants* were ordered to come out, they tied a ſtring round the altar in the citadel, and keeping hold of it were come as far as the altars of the *venerable Goddeſſes.* Juſt there the ſtring happened to break, upon which the Archons ruſhed in to ſeize them, as if Minerva had thrown them out of her protection. Some of the number ſat inſtantly down for freſh protection at the altars of the *venerable Goddeſſes*: It was an unavailing reſource, and they were immediately ſlain upon the ſpot. *Plutarch* in *Solon.*

out

out again, when he was at Athens on account of a ſedition; nay, on this occaſion they not only drove away the living, but even dug up the bones of the dead, and caſt them out: Yet, in proceſs of time, they returned again, and ſome of their poſterity are ſtill in Athens.

This was the *pollution* which the Lacedæmonians required them to drive away; with a face indeed of piety, as vindicating the honour of the Gods; but knowing at the ſame time that Pericles the ſon of Xantippus was tainted with it by the ſide of his mother; and thence concluding that, if he could be removed, the Athenians would more eaſily be brought to an accommodation with them. They could not carry their hopes ſo far as actually to effect his baniſhment, but to raiſe againſt him the public odium, as if the war was partly owing to the misfortune they ſuffered in him. For, carrying with him the greateſt ſway of any Athenian then alive, and preſiding entirely in the adminiſtration, he was moſt ſteddy in oppoſition to the Lacedæmonians, diſſuading the Athenians from any conceſſion, and exciting them to war.

The Athenians in return required the Lacedæmonians "to drive away the *pollution* contracted at Tænarus." For the Lacedæmonians ſome time ago, having cauſed their ſupplicant Helots to riſe out of Neptune's temple at Tænarus, had led them aſide, and ſlew them. And to this action they themſelves impute the great earthquake, which happened afterwards at Sparta.

They further required them "to drive away the *pollution* of the Chalciæcan Pallas," the nature of which was this:——

When Pauſanias the Lacedæmonian, upon his being firſt recalled by the Spartans from his command in Helleſpont and brought to his trial before them, was acquitted of the charge of male-adminiſtration, but was no longer intruſted with the public commiſſion; fitting out an Hermionian trireme on his own private account, he arriveth in Helleſpont, without any authority from the Lacedæmonians. He Pauſanias.

gave out, that he did it for the ſervice of the Grecian war; but his intention was, to carry on his negotiations with *the king*, which, aſpiring to the monarchy of Greece, he had begun before. He had formerly conferred an obligation upon *the king*, from which the whole of his project took its date. When, after the return from Cyprus, during his firſt appearance there, he took Byzantium which was poſſeſſed by the Medes, and in it ſome favourites and relations of *the king* were made his priſoners, he releaſeth them all, to ingratiate himſelf with *the king*, without the privity of the other confederates, giving it out in public that they had made their eſcape. He tranſacted this affair by means of Gongylus the Eretrian, to whoſe keeping he had intruſted Byzantium and the priſoners. He alſo diſpatched Gongylus to him with a letter, the contents of which, as was afterwards diſcovered, were theſe:

"PAUSANIAS, general of Sparta, deſirous to oblige you, "ſends away theſe his priſoners of war. And by it I expreſs my "inclination, if you approve, to take your daughter in marriage, "and to put Sparta and the reſt of Greece into your ſubjection. I "think I have power ſufficient to effectuate theſe points, could my "ſcheme be communicated with you. If therefore any of theſe "propoſals receive your approbation, ſend down to the coaſt ſome "truſty perſon, through whom for the future we may hold a cor-"reſpondence."

Thus much was contained in the letter; and, on the reception of it, Xerxes was delighted, and ſends away Artabazus the ſon of Pharnacus down to the coaſt, with an order to take upon him the government of Daſcylis, having firſt diſmiſſed Megabates who was the governor. To him he intruſted a letter for Pauſanias at Byzantium, with an injunction to forward it with all poſſible expedition, and to let him ſee his ſignet; and that, if Pauſanias ſhould charge

him

him with any affairs, he ſhould execute them with all poſſible diligence and fidelity. Artabazus being arrived, obeyed all the other injunctions with exactneſs, and forwarded the letter, which brought this anſwer ——

"THUS ſaith king Xerxes to Pauſanias.--- The kindneſs done "me in thoſe perſons, whom from Byzantium you delivered ſafe "on the other ſide the ſea, ſhall be placed to your account in our "family, eternally recorded: and, with the other contents of your "letter I am delighted. Let neither night nor day relax your earneſt "endeavors to effectuate thoſe points you promiſe me: Nor ſtop at "any expence of gold or ſilver or greatneſs of military force, if "ſuch aid be any where requiſite. But confer boldly with Artabazus, "a truſty perſon, whom I have ſent to you, about mine and your "own concerns, that they may be accompliſhed in the moſt honour-"able and moſt advantageous manner for us both."

Upon the receipt of this letter, Pauſanias, who before had been in high credit with the Grecians, through the luſtre of his command at Platæa, was elevated much more than ever, and could no longer adjuſt his demeanor by the modes and cuſtoms of his native country. He immediately dreſſed himſelf up in Perſian attire, and quitting Byzantium travelled through Thrace, attended with Perſian and Egyptian guards; and refined his table into Perſian elegance. His ambition he was unable any longer to conceal, but by ſhort ſketches manifeſted too ſoon, what greater ſchemes he had formed in his mind for future accompliſhment. He then ſhewed himſelf difficult of acceſs, and let his anger looſe ſo violently and ſo indiſcriminately upon all men, that no one could approach him. And this was not the leaſt motive to the confederacy for going over to the Athenians. But the Lacedæmonians, informed of this, recalled him the firſt time upon the account of ſuch behavior; and, when he was returned again in

the

the Hermionian veſſel without their permiſſion, he plainly appeared to have re-aſſumed his former practices. And when forced to remove from Byzantium by the oppoſition raiſed againſt him by the Athenians, he went not back to Sparta; but withdrawing to Colonæ of Troas, information was given that "he was negotiating with the Barbarians, and had fixed his reſidence there for very bad deſigns." Upon this they could no longer be patient, but the *Ephori* diſpatched him a herald and the *Scytale* [1], with an order ---- "Not to ſtay behind the herald; if he did, war was proclaimed againſt him by the Spartans." And he, deſirous to clear himſelf as much as poſſible from ſuſpicion, and confident that with money he could baffle any accuſation, returned the ſecond time to Sparta. The firſt treatment he met with there was, to be thrown into priſon by order of the *Ephori*: For the *Ephori* have ſo large an authority even over a *king*. But afterwards, by ſome private management, he procured his enlargement, and offers to ſubmit to a trial againſt any who were willing to accuſe him. The Spartans indeed had no poſitive evidence againſt him, not even his private enemies, nor the general community ---- none, to ſupport them in proceeding capitally againſt a perſon of the royal deſcent, and at that time inveſted with the regal

[1] The *Scytale* is a famous inſtrument peculiar to the Lacedæmonians, and uſed by them for the cloſe conveyance of orders to their miniſters abroad. *It* was a long black ſtick, and the contrivance was this--- "When the magiſtrates gave commiſſion "to any general or admiral, they took two "round pieces of wood exactly equal to "one another; one of theſe they kept, "and the other was delivered to the com-"mander; to whom when they had any "thing of moment to communicate, they "cut a long narrow ſcroll of parchment, "and rolling it about their own ſtaff, one "fold cloſe upon another, they wrote their "buſineſs upon it; then taking it off, diſ-"patched it away to the commander, who "applying it to his own ſtaff, the folds ex-"actly fell in one with another, as at the "writing; and the characters, which, be-"fore it was wrapped up, were confuſedly "disjoined and unintelligible, appeared very "plain." *Potter*'s *Archæologia*, Vol. II. c. 13.

If it be asked (ſays the Scholiaſt) how Pauſanias came to have the Scytale with him now, as he was abroad without the public commiſſion? the anſwer is, He had kept it ever ſince his former employments.

dignity:

dignity: For, being uncle to Pleiſtarchus the ſon of Leonidas, their king though yet in minority, he was regent-guardian. But, by his diſregard of the laws, and his affectation of the Barbarian manners, he afforded them ſtrong reaſons to ſuſpect, that he would never conform to the equality then in vogue. They called to remembrance thoſe other paſſages of his behavior, in which he had at any time deviated from the inſtitutions of his country; and that further upon the tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians offered as the choiceſt part of the Perſian ſpoils, he had formerly preſumed, by his own authority, to place this inſcription ——

> For Perſia's hoſts o'erthrown, and Græcia freed,
> To Phœbus THIS Pauſanias hath decreed,
> Who led the Grecians to the glorious deed.

Theſe verſes indeed the Lacedæmonians immediately defaced from the tripod, and placed in their ſted the names of the ſeveral *ſtates*, which had joined in the overthrow of the *Barbarian* and in making this oblation. This therefore was now recollected to the prejudice of Pauſanias; and, in his preſent ſituation, it was interpreted, from the circumſtances of his late behavior, as an argument that he had been equally guilty long before. They had moreover got an information, that he was tampering with the Helots, which in fact was true: For he promiſed them their liberty and the privilege of citizens of Sparta, if they would riſe at his command and co-operate with him in the whole of his project. But even this would not prevail: They diſdained to place ſo much confidence in the informations given by Helots, as to run into irregularities to puniſh him. They adhered to the cuſtom ever obſerved amongſt them, never to be haſty in forming a ſentence never to be recalled againſt a citizen of Sparta, without unqueſtionable evidence. At length, they obtained the fulleſt conviction, as it is ſaid, by means of an Argyllian, an old minion of his,

and

and the perſon moſt in his confidence, who was to convey to Artabazus the laſt letters he wrote to *the king*. This man, alarmed by the recollection that no perſon ſent on theſe errands before him had ever returned again, having already counterfeited the ſeal, to the end that if he was deceived in his ſuſpicions, or Pauſanias ſhould demand them again to make any alteration, he might avoid diſcovery, breaks open the letters. He found by them, that he was going on the errand his fears foreboded, and that his own murther was expreſly injoined. He carried upon this the packet to the *Ephori*, who were now more than ever convinced, but ſtill were deſirous to hear themſelves, from the mouth of Pauſanias, an acknowledgment of the truth. They therefore contrived, that this perſon ſhould go to ſanctuary at Tænarus as a ſuppliant, and refuge in a cell built double by a partition. In the inner part of this cell he hid ſome of the *Ephori*: And, Pauſanias coming to him and demanding the reaſon of his *ſupplication*, they heard diſtinctly all that paſſed. The man complained bitterly to him about the clauſe in the letters relating to himſelf, and expoſtulated with him about every particular — "why "he, who had been ſo truſty to him during the whole courſe of his "negotiations with *the king*, ſhould now be ſo highly honoured, as to "be murthered upon an equal rank with the meaneſt of his tools?" Pauſanias confeſſed the truth of all that he alledged; begged him, "not to be exaſperated with what at preſent appeared;" aſſured him, "he ſhould not be hurt if he would leave his ſanctuary;" and earneſtly intreated him, "with all poſſible ſpeed to go the journey, "and not to obſtruct the ſchemes that were then in agitation." The *Ephori*, having exactly heard him, withdrew: And now, beyond a ſcruple convinced, they determined to apprehend him in the city. But it is reported, that at the inſtant fixed for his arreſt, as he was walking along, and beheld the countenance of one of the *Ephori* approaching towards him, he immediately diſcovered his buſineſs; and another of them out of kindneſs intimating the matter by a nod, he

took

took to his heels, and fled away faſter than they could purſue him. The *Chalciæcan* happened to be near, and into a little houſe within the verge of that temple he betook himſelf, and ſat quietly down to avoid the inclemency of the outward air. They, who had loſt the ſtart, came too late in the purſuit. But afterwards, they ſtripped the houſe of its roof and doors; and, watching their opportunity when he was within, they encompaſſed him round about, [2] immured him within, and placing a conſtant guard around kept him beſet that he might periſh with hunger. When he was ready to expire, and they found in how bad a ſtate he lay within the houſe, they led him out of the verge yet breathing a little; and, being thus brought out, he immediately died. They next intended to caſt his body into the Cæada, where they are uſed to throw their malafactors; but afterwards changed their minds, and put him into the ground ſomewhere thereabouts. But the God at Delphi warned the Lacedæmonians afterwards by an oracle "to remove his body to the place where he "died:" --- And now it lies in the area before the temple, as the inſcription on the pillars ſheweth ---- "and, as in what they had "done they had violated the laws of ſanctuary, to reſtore two bodies "to the *Chalciæcan* for that one." To this they ſo far conformed, as to dedicate there two ſtatues of braſs, as atonements for Pauſanias.

(The Athenians, upon the principle that the God himſelf had judged this a *pollution*, required of the Lacedæmonians, by way of retaliation, to clear themſelves of it.)

The Lacedæmonians at that time ſent embaſſadors to Athens, to accuſe Themiſtocles alſo of carrying on the ſame treaſonable correſpondence with *the Mede* as Pauſanias, which they had diſcovered from the papers which had been evidence againſt Pauſanias, and demanded that "he ſhould be equally puniſhed for it." The Athe- Themiſtocles.

2 Alcithea, the mother of Pauſanias, is ſaid to have brought the firſt ſtone on this occaſion: Such was the ſpirit of the ladies at Lacedæmon.

nians complied with this demand. But, as he then happened to be under the *oſtraciſm* [3], and reſiding chiefly at Argos, though he frequently viſited other parts of Peloponneſus, they ſend a party along with the Lacedæmonians, who readily joined in his purſuit, with orders to ſeize him wherever they could find him. Themiſtocles, adviſed in time, flieth out of Peloponneſus into Corcyra, to which people he had done a ſignal kindneſs [4]. The Corcyréans expreſſing their fear of giving him refuge, leſt it might expoſe them to the reſentment both of Lacedæmonians and Athenians, he is conveyed away by them to the oppoſite continent. Now, purſued by thoſe who were appointed to do it, and who had by enquiry diſcovered his route, he is compelled by mere diſtreſs to turn in to Admetus king of the Moloſſians [5], who was by no means his friend. It happened that Admetus was not at home; and, Themiſtocles the *ſuppliant* addreſſing

3 The *Oſtraciſm* was a compliment of an extraordinary kind paid by the people of Athens to ſuperior merit. When a perſon had done them great ſervices, and they grew apprehenſive they might poſſibly ſhew him too much gratitude, to the prejudice of their own liberties, they baniſhed him for ten years. On ſome particular day, each citizen gave in the name of a perſon, wrote upon an *oſtracum* (a ſhell, or piece of tile), whom he deſired ſhould be ſent into retirement. Six thouſand of theſe votes carried the point; and he, who had thus a legal number of votes, was obliged to quit Athens within ten days. The moſt diſintereſted patriot, and moſt ſucceſsful commander received, for the moſt part, this public acknowledgment of their ſervices. At length, a ſcoundrel fellow, one Hyperbolus, was thus honourably diſtinguiſhed by the public voice. The Athenians thought afterwards they had profaned the oſtraciſm by treating him like a Themiſtocles, an Ariſtides, or a Cimon, and therefore aboliſhed this ſtrange injurious privilege, by which wanton liberty was enabled to triumph over its beſt friend public ſpirit. Other republics in Greece had ſomething of the ſame nature amongſt them. Authors vary much about the circumſtances of the *oſtraciſm*, I have mentioned thoſe points only which are univerſally agreed.

4 At the time of the Perſian invaſion, the Corcyréans had refuſed to join in the common cauſe of Greece. The Grecians therefore had afterwards a deſign to fall upon and deſtroy them. But Themiſtocles interpoſed, and ſaved them by remonſtrating, that by ſuch proceedings Greece would be plunged into greater calamities, than it would have ſuffered under the deſpotic power of Xerxes.

5 Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themiſtocles

himſelf

himſelf to the wife, is by her directed to take their child in his hand, and ſit himſelf down upon the hearth. Admetus returning ſoon after, he tells him who he was, and conjures him --- "though "he had formerly oppoſed him in a ſuit he had preferred to the "people of Athens, not to take revenge upon an exile --- To make "him ſuffer now, would be taking thoſe advantages over a man in "diſtreſs, which he ought to diſdain --- The point of honour con-"ſiſted in equals revenging themſelves upon equal terms --- He had, "it is true, ſtood in oppoſition to him, but merely in a point of in-"tereſt, and not where life was at ſtake --- But if he now gave him "up" (telling him by whom, and why he was perſecuted) "he de-"prives him of the only reſource he had left to preſerve his life." Admetus, having heard him, bids him riſe together with the child whom he held as he ſat down: For this was the moſt pathetic form of ſupplication. And when, not long after, the Lacedæmonians and Athenians arrived, and preſſed him earneſtly to do it, he refuſeth to give him up, and ſends him under a guard, as he had declared his intention to go to *the king*, to the other ſea by a journey over land, as far as Pydne, a town belonging to Alexander. He here met with a trading-veſſel bound to Ionia; and going on board, is driven by a ſtorm into the Athenian fleet, which then lay before Naxos. Alarmed at his danger, he diſcovereth himſelf to the maſter (for not one perſon on board ſuſpected who he was) and telleth him the occaſion of his flight; and, unleſs he will undertake his preſervation, threatens "to inform againſt him, as one who had been bribed to further his "eſcape; --- preſerved he ſtill might be, provided no perſon was ſuf-"fered, during the voyage, to ſtir out of the veſſel: --- If he would "comply, the favour ſhould be acknowledged with effectual grati-"tude." ----- The maſter of the veſſel promiſeth his ſervice, and keeping out at ſea a day and a night to windward of the fleet, he afterwards landeth him at Epheſus. Themiſtocles, to recompence his care, made him a handſome preſent in money (for there he re-

ceived thoſe ſums, which he had ordered ſecretly to be conveyed thither from his friends at Athens, and from Argos;) and, travelling upwards from thence, in company with a Perſian of the maritime provinces, he gets a letter to be delivered to king Artaxerxes the ſon of Xerxes, who had lately mounted the throne, the purport of which was this:——

"I THEMISTOCLES am coming to you, who of all the Gre-
" cians have done the greateſt miſchiefs to your family, ſo long as I was
" obliged by neceſſity to reſiſt the invaſion of your father. Yet the
" good ſervices I did him were much more numerous, when my own
" preſervation was ſecured, and his retreat became full of hazards.
" My former generoſity calls for a requital;" (here he inſerted the meſſage he had ſent to Xerxes about the retreat from Salamis; and, that out of regard to him, he had prevented the breaking down of the bridges, which was mere fiction;) " and now, able to perform
" great ſervices for you, I am near at hand, having been perſecuted
" by the Grecians for my friendſhip to you. I beg only a year's
" reſpite, that I may notify to you in perſon thoſe points which are
" the ſubject of my journey hither."

The king, it is ſaid, was ſurprized at the [6] ſpirit of the man, and ordered him to act as he deſired. The time of reſpite he had thus

6 The boldneſs and intrepidity of Themiſtocles hath been the ſubject of admiration, in throwing himſelf on the protection of the Perſian monarch, who had fixed a price on his head. And yet he was ſo high in his eſteem, that the night after firſt giving him audience, he cried aloud thrice in his ſleep, " I have got Themiſtocles the Athenian." He afterwards acknowledg'd himſelf two hundred talents (near 40000 *l.* Sterling) in his debt; " For ſo much I promiſed the man that brought you to me." Themiſtocles ſoon gave him a ſpecimen of his fine underſtanding. He was deſired by the king to ſpeak his mind freely in relation to the affairs of Greece: He anſwered by his interpreter, that " diſcourſe like a Perſian carpet had in it a variety of figures, which never appeared to advantage unleſs it was quite unfolded, but were not to be apprehended,

thus obtained he ſpent in making all poſſible progreſs in the Perſian language, and in learning the manners of the country. When the year was elapſed, appearing at court, he became a favourite with *the king*, a greater than any Greek had ever been before, as well on account of the former luſtre of his life, as the hope he ſuggeſted to him of enſlaving Greece; but above all, by the ſpecimens he gave of his fine underſtanding. —— For, in Themiſtocles the ſtrength of nature was moſt vigorouſly ſhewn; and by it, he was ſo highly diſtinguiſhed above the bulk of mankind, as to deſerve the greateſt admiration. By the mere force of his natural genius, without any improvement from ſtudy either in his youth or more advanced age, he could give the beſt advice upon ſudden emergencies with the leaſt heſitation, and was happy in his conjectures about the events of the future. Whatever he undertook, he was able to accompliſh; and wherein he was quite unexperienced, he had ſo prompt a diſcernment that he never was miſtaken. In a matter of ambiguity, he foreſaw with extraordinary acuteneſs the better and the worſe ſide of the queſtion. Upon the whole, by the force of natural genius, he was moſt quick at all expedients, and at the ſame time excellent, beyond competition, at declaring inſtantly the moſt adviſeable meaſures of acting upon every occurrence. —— But, being ſeized with a fit of ſickneſs, his life is at an end. Some indeed report, that he put an

hended, when wrapped up in the piece." By this ingenious plea he obtained a year's reſpite to learn the Perſian language, that he might be enabled to deliver explicitly his own ſentiments to the king in his own words and method. He became afterwards ſo great a favourite, that the moſt engaging promiſe in future times, that the Perſian monarch could make to a Greek whom he had a mind to inveigle into his ſervice, was, that "he ſhould live with him as Themiſtocles did with Artaxerxes." And yet, no attachment to his royal friend ever made him an enemy to his country; nor did his diſintereſted patriotiſm, of which never man had more, ever render him ungrateful to his benefactor. Through his bounty, he lived the remainder of his life in pomp and affluence, and was uſed to ſay humouroufly to his children, "We had been undone, my children, if we had not been undone."

end

end to his own life by taking poiſon, when he judged it impoſſible to perform what he had promiſed *the king*. His monument however is at Magneſia in Aſia, in the forum. Of this province he was governor through the bounty of *the king*, who aſſigned him Magneſia, (which yielded him * fifty talents yearly,) for his bread, Lampſacus for his wine, (which place was in the greateſt repute for wine,) and Myus for his meat. His bones are ſaid to have been conveyed home by his relations, in purſuance of his own deſire, and to have been interred in Attica without the privity of the Athenians. For it was againſt law to bury him there, as he had been out-lawed for treaſon [7].

* 9687 *l.* 10*s. Sterling.*

Such an end had the lives of Pauſanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themiſtocles the Athenian, who in their own age made the greateſt figure of any Grecians.

The Lacedæmonians, by their firſt embaſſy, had injoined, what was as amply in turn required of them, to do as hath been above
II. recited, concerning the expulſion of the *ſacrilegious*. But, coming

7 Some authors have related, that his countrymen afterwards honoured him with a cenotaph in the Piræus. Plutarch however disbelieves the fact, and thinks it merely a preſumption formed on the following verſes of Plato the comic poet.

To thee, Themiſtocles, a tomb is due,
Plac'd in the moſt conſpicuous point of view;
Merchants from every port with juſt acclaim
Should ſhout thy honour, and confeſs thy fame;
Each fleet return'd or ſetting out ſhould join
In owning all the naval glory thine;
It ſhould command, high rais'd, yon watry plain,
And point that fight which gave us all the main.

I cannot end this note about Themiſtocles, without begging the reader to accept a tranſlation of an epigram in the *Anthologia*, which appears to have been written with ſpirit worthy of this illuſtrious Athenian.

Be Greece the monument; and crown the height
With all the trophies of the naval fight.
Let Perſia's Mars and Xerxes ſwell the baſe;
Such forms alone Themiſtocles can grace.
Next, like a column of majeſtic ſize,
His acts inſcrib'd, let Salamis ariſe.
Swell every part, and give the hero room,
For nothing ſmall ſhould ſcandalize the tomb.

a ſecond time to the Athenians, they commanded them — "to quit the blockade of Potidæa;" and — "to permit Ægina to govern itſelf at its own diſcretion;" and, above all other points inſiſt upon this, declaring moſt expreſly that in *this* caſe war ſhould not be made. — "If they would revoke their decree concerning the Megaréans, in which they had been prohibited from entering any harbour whatever in the dominion of Athens, and from the Attic markets."

But the Athenians liſtened to none of theſe demands, nor would revoke the decree, but reproached the Megaréans for tilling land that was ſacred, land not mark'd out for culture, and for giving ſhelter to runaway ſlaves.

III. At laſt, the final embaſſadors arrived from Lacedæmon, namely, Ramphias and Meleſippus and Ageſander, who, waving all other points which they had formerly required, ſaid thus — "The Lace-"dæmonians are deſirous of peace, and peace there may be, if you "will permit the Grecians to govern themſelves at their own "diſcretion."

Conſultation of Athens.

The Athenians ſummoned an aſſembly, where every one was invited to deliver his opinion. They determined, after deliberate conſultation on all the points in conteſt, to return one definitive anſwer. Several others ſpoke on this occaſion, and were divided in their ſentiments; ſome inſiſting on the neceſſity of a war; others, that peace ſhould not be obſtructed by *that* decree, which ought to be repealed. At length, Pericles the ſon of Xantippus ſtanding forth, who was at that time the leading man at Athens, and a perſon of the greateſt abilities both for action and debate, adviſed them, thus: ———

Speech of Pericles.

"I FIRMLY perſevere, Athenians, in the ſame opinion that I "have ever avowed —— to make no conceſſions to the Lacedæmo-"nians — though at the ſame time ſenſible, that men never execute "a war with that warmth of ſpirit through which they are firſt im-

"pelled

" pelled to undertake it, but ſink in their ardor as difficulties
" increaſe. I perceive it, however, incumbent upon me, to perſiſt
" in the ſame unvaried uniform advice: and I require thoſe amongſt
" you who are influenced by it, as they concur in the meaſures,
" either to unite their efforts for redreſs, if any ſiniſter event ſhould
" follow; or elſe, upon a ſeries of ſucceſs, to make no parade of
" their own diſcernment. It is uſual enough for incidents unfore-
" ſeen to baffle the beſt-concerted ſchemes; ſince human intentions
" are by nature fallible. And hence it comes to paſs, that whatever
" falls out contrary to our expectations, we are accuſtomed to throw
" all the blame upon fortune.

" The treacherous deſigns of the Lacedæmonians, formerly,
" againſt us were viſible to all; nor are they, this very moment, leſs
" clear than ever. For, notwithſtanding that expreſs ſtipulation —
" That, upon controverſies between us, we ſhould reciprocally do
" and ſubmit to juſtice, each party remaining in their preſent poſ-
" ſeſſions — yet, they have never demanded juſtice, nor accept the
" offer of it from us. Their allegations againſt us they are deter-
" mined to ſupport by arms, and not by evidence: And here they
" come, no longer to remonſtrate, but actually to give us law.
" They command us — to quit the blockade of Potidæa, to permit
" Ægina to govern itſelf by its own model, and to repeal the decree
" againſt the Megaréans — — Nay, this their laſt and peremptory
" embaſſy authoritatively injoins us — to reſtore the Grecians to their
" former independence. But, let not one of you imagine that we
" excite a war for a trifling concern, if we refuſe to repeal that
" decree againſt the Megaréans, The ſtreſs they lay upon it, that,
" if it be repealed, a war ſhall not enſue, is nothing but a colour:
" Nor think there will be any ground for ſelf-accuſation, though for
" ſo trifling a concern you have recourſe to arms; ſince that con-
" cern, trifling as it is, includes within it the full proof and demon-
" ſtration of Athenian ſpirit. If, for inſtance, you condeſcend to

" this

" this demand, you will immediately be injoined ſome other conde-
" ſcenſion of greater conſequence, as if this your compliance was
" owing to the prevalence of your fear. But, if at once you ſtre-
" nouſly refuſe to hearken to them, you will convince them in a
" manner clearly to be underſtood, that they muſt treat with you
" for the future, as with men who are their equals.

" From the preſent criſis I exhort you therefore to form a reſolu-
" tion, either timely to make your ſubmiſſion before you begin to
" ſuffer; or, if we ſhall determine for war (which to me ſeemeth
" moſt expedient), without regarding the pretext of it, be it impor-
" tant or be it trifling, to refuſe every the leaſt conceſſion, nor to
" render the tenure of what we now poſſeſs precarious and uncertain.
" For not only the greateſt, but the moſt inconſiderable demand, if
" authoritatively injoined by equals upon their neighbours, before ju-
" ſtice hath decided the point, hath the very ſame tendency to make
" them ſlaves. But, from the poſture in which the affairs of both
" parties are at preſent, that we may risk a war with a proſpect of
" ſucceſs as fine and as inviting as our rivals can ----- ſuffer me di-
" ſtinctly to ſet the reaſons before you, and be convinced of their
" weight. ——

" The Peloponneſians are a people, who ſubſiſt by their bodily la-
" bour, without wealth either in the purſes of individuals, or in any
" public fund. Again, in wars of long continuance, or wars by ſea,
" they are quite unpractiſed; ſince, the hoſtilities in which they
" have been embroiled with one another have been ſhort and tran-
" ſient, in conſequence of their poverty. Such people can neither
" compleatly man out a fleet, nor frequently march land-armies
" abroad, abandoning the care of their domeſtic concerns, even
" whilſt from theſe they muſt anſwer a large expence, and more
" than this, are excluded the benefit of the ſea. Funds of money
" are a much ſurer ſupport of war, than contributions exacted by
" force. And men, who ſubſiſt by the labour of their hands, are

" more ready to advance a ſervice with their bodies than with their
" money; ſince, the former though expoſed they ſtrongly preſume
" will ſurvive the danger, but the latter they apprehend muſt be too
" ſpeedily exhauſted, eſpecially if the war run out into a greater
" length than they expect, which will probably be the caſe. In a
" ſingle battle, it is true, the Peloponneſians and their confederates
" are able to make head againſt united Greece; but they are not
" able to ſupport a war of continuance againſt an enemy in all re-
" ſpects provided better than themſelves; ſince, by one general coun-
" cil they are not guided, but execute their momentary ſchemes in
" ſudden and haſty efforts; ſince farther, having all of them an
" equality of ſuffrage, and being of different deſcents, each of them
" is intent on the advancement of a ſeparate intereſt. In ſuch cir-
" cumſtances no grand deſign can ever be accompliſhed. Some of
" them are eager to obtain a ſpeedy vengeance on a foe; others are
" chiefly intent on preſerving their ſubſtance from unneceſſary waſte.
" It is long before they can meet together to conſult; and then, with
" great precipitancy they form their public determinations, as the
" largeſt part of their time is devoted to domeſtic concerns. Each
" thinks it impoſſible, that the public welfare can be prejudiced by
" his own particular negligence, but that others are intent on watch-
" ing for himſelf to ſhare the benefit; and, whilſt this error univer-
" ſally prevaileth amongſt all the ſeveral members, the general wel-
" fare inſenſibly drops to ruin. But the greateſt obſtruction to them
" will be a ſcarcity of money, which as they can but ſlowly raiſe,
" their ſteps muſt needs be dilatory; and the urgent occaſions of war
" can never tarry.

" As for any forts they can erect within our territory, or their ap-
" plication to a navy, it is beneath us to form any apprehenſions
" from thence. To effectuate the former, would be difficult for a
" people of equal ſtrength, in a ſeaſon of tranquillity: Much more
" ſo muſt it be, upon the lands of an open enemy, and when we
" are

" are impowered to put the ſame expedients in execution againſt
" them. And, if they ſhould fix a garriſon in Attica, they might
" by excurſions or deſertions from us annoy ſome part of our ter-
" ritory; but, whatever works they can raiſe will be inſufficient to
" block us up, to prevent our deſcents upon their coaſts, and making
" reprizals upon them by our fleets, wherein we are ſuperior. For,
" we are better qualified for land-ſervice by the experience we have
" gained in that of the ſea, than they for ſervice at ſea by their ex-
" perience at land. To learn the naval ſkill they will find to be by
" no means an eaſy taſk. For even you, who have been in conſtant
" exerciſe ever ſince the Perſian invaſion, have not yet attained to a
" maſtery in the ſcience. How then ſhall men, brought up to til-
" lage and ſtrangers to the ſea, whoſe practice farther will be ever in-
" terrupted by us, through the continual annoyance which our larger
" number of ſhipping will give them, effect any point of éclat?
" Againſt ſmall ſquadrons they might indeed be ſometimes adven-
" turous, emboldening their want of ſkill by multiplying their num-
" bers: But, when awed by ſuperior force, they will of neceſſity
" deſiſt; and ſo, by practice interrupted the growth of their ſkill
" will be checked, and in conſequence of it their fears be increaſed.
" The naval, like other ſciences, is the effect of art. It cannot be
" learned by accident, nor uſefully exerciſed at ſtarts; or rather,
" there is nothing which ſo much requireth an uninterrupted
" application.

" If, farther, they ſhould ſecrete the funds laid up at Olympia
" and Delphi, and endeavour by an increaſe of pay to ſeduce from
" our ſervice the foreigners, who are on board our fleets; — in caſe
" we were not their equals in ſtrength, and they themſelves and ſuch
" foreigners could entirely apply themſelves to the work: — This
" then might be terrible indeed. But nought would it avail them
" now, whilſt — what is our peculiar advantage — we have com-
" manders Athenian-born and ſeamen to man our fleets, in larger

" number and of greater ſkill than all the reſt of Greece together.
" Beſides, in ſo dangerous a criſis, not one of theſe foreigners
" would think of bartering an exile from his own ſettlement, and
" a deſertion to that ſide where the proſpect of victory is not near
" ſo inviting, for an enlargement of his pay of few days con-
" tinuance.

" The ſtate of the Peloponneſians I judge to be ſuch, or very nearly
" ſuch as I have deſcribed it; whereas, our own is exempt from
" thoſe defects which I have pointed out in them, and enjoys other
" great advantages far beyond their competition. Grant, that they
" may invade our territories by land: We too ſhall make deſcents
" upon theirs. And —— whether is the greateſt damage, only ſome
" part of Peloponneſus, or all Attica put to fire and ſword — will
" admit of no compariſon. In the former caſe, they will have no
" other land to repair the damage, but what they muſt earn by dint
" of arms: Whilſt we have large tracts already in our power, both
" in the iſlands and on the main. —— Of vaſt conſequence indeed is
" the dominion of the ſea. But — conſider it with attention. For,
" were we ſeated upon an iſland, which of us would be ſubdued
" with greater difficulty? —— And now, you ought to think, that
" our preſent ſituation is as nearly as poſſible the ſame; and ſo, to
" evacuate your lands and houſes here, to confine your defence to
" the ſea, and to Athens itſelf; and not, exaſperated againſt the Pe-
" loponneſians for the ſake of thoſe, to hazard a battle againſt ſupe-
" rior numbers. Should we be thus victorious, we muſt fight it over
" again with another body not inferior; and ſhould we be vanquiſh-
" ed, at that inſtant we loſe all our dependents, the very eſſence
" of our ſtrength. For, the moment we ceaſe to be able to awe
" them by our forces, they will be no longer obedient to our com-
" mands. We ought not to wail and lament for the loſs of our
" houſes or our lands, but for the lives of our people: Becauſe lands
" and houſes can never acquire men, but are by men acquired.

" Durſt

" Durſt I preſume on a power to perſuade, I would exhort you,
" to march out yourſelves, with your own hands to execute the
" waſte, and let the Peloponneſians ſee that for things of ſuch va-
" lue you will never think of compliance. I have many other in-
" ducements to hope for victory, if, intending this war alone, you
" will forbear the ambition of enlarging your dominions, and not
" plunge into voluntary ſuperfluous hazards. For, in truth, I am
" more afraid of our own indiſcretions than the ſchemes of the
" enemy. But the explanation, of what at preſent I only hint at,
" ſhall be reſerved till due occaſions offer in the courſe of action.
" Let us now diſmiſs the embaſſadors with the following anſwer—

" That, we will open our market and harbours to the Megaréans,
" provided the Lacedæmonians in their prohibitions of foreigners will
" except us and our confederates: For neither was that act in us,
" nor will this in them be contrary to treaty.——

" That, we will ſuffer the *ſtates* to govern themſelves at their own
" diſcretion, if they were poſſeſſed of that right when the treaty
" was made, and ſo ſoon as ever *they* relax the neceſſity they lay
" upon the *ſtates* in their own league, of governing themſelves by
" that model, which ſuits beſt the Lacedæmonian intereſt, and allow
" them the choice of their own polity.——

" That, farther, we are willing to ſubmit to a judicial determina-
" tion, according to treaty.———

" That, a war ſhall not begin, but will retaliate upon thoſe
" that do.

" Such an anſwer is agreeable to juſtice, and becomes the dig-
" nity of the Athenian *ſtate*. But you ought to be informed, that
" a war unavoidably there will be; that, the greater alacrity we
" ſhew for it, the more ſhall we damp the ſpirits of our enemies in
" their attacks; and, that the greateſt dangers are ever the reſource
" of the greateſt honours to communities as well as individuals. It
" was thus, that our fathers withſtood the Medes, and ruſhing to

" arms

" arms with reſources far inferior to ours, nay abandoning all their " ſubſtance, by reſolution more than fortune, by courage more than " real ſtrength, beat back the *Barbarian*, and advanced this *State* to " its preſent ſummit of grandeur. From them we ought not to de- " generate, but by every effort within our ability avenge it on our " foes, and deliver it down to poſterity, unblemiſhed and un- " impaired."

Final anſwer of the Athenians.

In this manner Pericles ſpoke; and the Athenians, judging that what he adviſed was moſt for their intereſt, *decreed* in conformity to his exhortation. They returned a particular anſwer to the Lacedæmonians, according to his directions, nay in the very words of his motion; and in fine concluded — that " they would do nothing upon command, but were ready to ſubmit the points in conteſt to a judicial determination, according to treaty, upon a fair and equal footing". Upon this, the embaſſadors departed; and here all negotiations came to a concluſion.

Such were the the pretexts and diſſenſions on both ſides previous to the war, and which took their firſt riſe from the buſineſs of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Theſe however never interrupted their commercial dealings nor mutual intercourſe, which ſtill were carried on without the intervention of heralds, but not without ſuſpicions. For ſuch incidents manifeſtly tended to a rupture, and muſt infallibly end in war. [8]

8 As the Athenians were a free people, they made uſe of their liberty on all occaſions to aſperſe, calumniate, and ridicule the great men amongſt them. They were at this time exhibited on the ſtage by name; and Ariſtophanes, whoſe plays were acted during the Peloponneſian war, hath ridiculed the co-temporary ſtatefmen and commanders with the utmoſt petulancy and virulence. The Athenians afterwards thought proper to reſtrain this licentiouſneſs of their comic poets; but it may not be amiſs in the courſe of the *notes* to quote occaſionally ſome paſſages from him, to ſhew my countrymen, how much writing libels differs from writing hiſtory; and, that where liberty is abuſed, no public merit nor private worth can defend its owners from the malice of faction, or the petulance of buffoons.

Our

Our hiſtorian hath laid open the true and pretended cauſes of the Peloponneſian war. Let us now ſee, how affairs were repreſented on the ſtage of Athens. His comedy of *The Acharnians* was exhibited by Ariſtophanes at Athens in the ſixth year of this war, after the death of Pericles. The decree againſt Megara is the ground-work of it: One *Dicæopolis* of the borough of Acharnæ is the droll of the play, and amply ridicules it to a ſet of his neighbours ——

"Do not be angry, *ſays he*, if though a "beggar I preſume to talk to Athenians "about affairs of ſtate, and for once play "the tragedian. It is the province of tra- "gedy to give a juſt repreſentation of "things; and I am going to ſpeak in a "very juſt manner of very ſad things in- "deed. Cleon will not be able to catch "me this bout, for traducing my country- "men in the hearing of ſtrangers. We are "here by ourſelves, and to-day is the feſti- "val of Bacchus. The ſtrangers are not "yet come, nor the tributes, nor the con- "federates from other ſtates: We are here "ſnug by ourſelves, all of us true-blooded "Athenians. Thoſe odd creatures the ſo- "journers I look upon as the chaff of "Athens. And now to ſpeak ſincerely, I "hate the Lacedæmonians from the bot- "tom of my ſoul; and I heartily wiſh that "Neptune, the God adored at Tænarus, "would give them an earthquake, and "tumble down all their houſes upon their "heads. They have made ſad work with "me, all my vineyards are quite deſtroyed "by the rogues. But, my dear friends and "countrymen here preſent, why do we "blame the Lacedæmonians for this? And "mind, Sirs, I caſt no aſperſions upon our "own *ſtate*; I aim at no body employed "in the affairs of the adminiſtration, but "at a parcel of ſad raſcals, ſcurvy, low, "infamous ſcoundrels, who are eternally "bringing informations againſt a Mega- "rean pair of paniers. If they once ſet "eye but on a cucumber, a leveret, a ſuck- "ing-pig, a ſprig of parſley, or a grain of "ſalt, they ſwear at once they belonged to "Megarèans, and were ſold that very day. "Theſe things however, though the ge- "neral practice, are of ſmall ſignification. "A parcel of jolly fellows, deep in their "cups, ſtole away from Megara that jade "Simætha. The Megarèans, exaſperated "at the loſs of their wench, made repri- "zals by carrying off a brace of ſtrum- "pets, that belonged to Aſpaſia. And thus "this curſed war, which plagues all Greece, "took its riſe from three ſtrumpets. Ay, "on account of three whores Olym- "pian Pericles began to ſtorm, he light- "en'd, thunder'd, rous'd all Greece to "arms; he made new laws as faſt as ſo "many ballads, that the poor dogs of Me- "gara muſt be found neither in the fields, "nor the markets, nor by ſea, nor by "land. Upon this, being juſt ready to "ſtarve, away they go to Lacedæmon, to "get the decree reverſed which had been "made on account of three whores. It "would not do, embaſſy after embaſſy had "no avail, and then immediately roſe all "this clattering of ſhields."

Calumny hath a dart always left in her quiver, and in another comedy of Ariſtophenes we find *another* let fly at Pericles. This was, his being an accomplice with Phidias in ſecreting ſome of the gold iſſued from the public treaſury for the ſtatue of Minerva in the citadel, the workmanſhip of that celebrated artiſt. In his comedy called *The Peace*, Mercury ſays —— "Ye "wiſe husbandmen attend to my words, "if

" if you have a mind to know how things
" came into this ſad confuſion. Phidias
" was the firſt cauſe of it by cheating the
" public. Then Pericles helped it for-
" wards, for fear he ſhould ſhare the fate
" of Phidias. He ſtood in awe of your
" tempers; he was afraid of falling under
" your cenſure; ſo, to prevent his own
" perſonal danger, he ſet the whole com-
" munity in a flame, by lighting up firſt
" that little ſpark of the decree againſt
" Megara. He then blew up that ſpark
" into this mighty war, the ſmoke of
" which hath fetched tears from all the
" eyes of Greece, from Grecians on both
" ſides."

Pericles had employed Phidias in adorning Athens. The fine taſte of the patron and fine execution of the artiſt have been univerſally acknowledged. An accuſation however was preferred againſt Phidias by one of his workmen, that he had ſecreted ſome gold. By the advice of Pericles he had laid it on ſo artfully, that it might be taken off without prejudicing the ſtatue. The trial accordingly was made, and the gold found to anſwer weight. It ſeems however that Phidias was baniſhed; becauſe, as the enemies of Pericles attacked him at the ſame time, for impiety in the perſons of his beloved Aſpaſia and his preceptor in philoſophy Anaxagoras, and for a cheat in that of his favourite artiſt, he had only influence enough to ſave the former, by pleading earneſtly for her and ſoftening his plea with abundant tears.

Both Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos have recorded a third ſtory of Pericles in relation to this war. It is this —— Alcibiades, then a youth, ſaw him in a very penſive and melancholy mood, and demanded the reaſon of it. Pericles told him, " great ſums of public mo-
" ney had paſſed through his hands, and he
" knew not how to make up his accounts."
" Contrive then, replied Alcibiades, to give
" no account at all." And in purſuance of this advice he is ſaid to have involved the *ſtate* in the Peloponneſian war. But is not Thucydides more to be depended upon than a whole hoſt of writers of ſcandal, memoirs, private hiſtory and ſatire? If we liſten to the latter, there never was and never will be any truth in hiſtory; there never was, nor is there this moment any true worth or merit in the world. A buffoon can degrade a hero, a ſpiteful ſatiriſt cloud every good quality in others, and the ears and hearts of men will be filled with nothing but detraction and ſlander.

THE

THE HISTORY OF The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE SECOND.

CONTENTS.

Year I. *Hoſtilities begin. The Thebans by night ſurprize Platæa, but are afterwards repulſed and ſlaughtered. The Peloponneſians invade Attica: The Athenians in their turn cruize and make deſcents on the coaſt of Peloponneſus. A public Funeral ſolemnized at Athens for thoſe who fell in the firſt campaign, and the Oration ſpoke on that occaſion by Pericles.*

Year II. *Early the next year Attica again invaded. The Plague breaks out in Athens. Its ſymptoms, progreſs, and mortality deſcribed. The Athenians being greatly dejected murmur againſt Pericles: His juſtification. The Ambraciots war againſt the Amphilochians. The ſurrender of Potidæa.*

Year III. *In the beginning of the third year the Peloponneſians appear before Platæa; a parley without effect: The ſiege is begun and carried on with great induſtry and art. The Peloponneſians beaten at ſea by Phormio in the gulf of Criſſa; and when reinforced beaten by him a ſecond time before Naupactus. A project to ſeize the Piræus quite diſconcerted. War between Thracians and Macedonians. Motions in Acarnania, with an acount of that Country.*

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK II.

HENCE inſtantly commenceth the War between the Peloponneſians and Athenians, and the Confederates on both ſides ---- during which, they had no kind of intercourſe with one another without the herald; and now, once engaged, carried it on without intermiſſion. The particular incidents of it are orderly related by the *Summer* and the *Winter*. Before Chriſt, 431. *The war beginneth.*

The Thirty-years Peace, which was made after the conqueſt of Eubœa, had now laſted fourteen: But in the fifteenth year, when Chryſis had been forty-eight years *Prieſteſs* at Argos, when Æneſias was *Ephorus* at Sparta, and Pythodorus ten months *Archon* at Athens, in the ſixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the very beginning of the ſpring ---- a body of Thebans, ſomewhat above three Platæa *ſurprized by the* Thebans.

hundred, under the command of Pythangelus the ſon of Phylidas and Diemporus the ſon of Onetoridas, two of the rulers of Bœotia, about the firſt ſleep got into [1] Platæa of Bœotia with their arms, which place was then in alliance with the Athenians. They were induced to this attempt, and had the gates opened to them by Nauclides and aſſociates, citizens of Platæa, who had formed a deſign, for the ſake of aggrandizing themſelves, to deſtroy all their fellow-citizens, averſe to their ſchemes, and to gain the city for the Thebans. But the affair was managed by Eurymachus the ſon of Leontiades a perſon of the greateſt authority amongſt the Thebans. For the Thebans, foreſeeing a war unavoidable, had, even now while peace was actually ſubſiſting and the war not yet declared, a ſtrong deſire to get poſſeſſion of Platæa, which had been at eternal enmity with them. No regular watch was as yet kept in it, which was a means of facilitating their entrance. When they had gained admiſſion, they drew themſelves up in order of battle on the public forum, contrary to the ſcheme propoſed by the conſpirators, of marching immediately to the houſes of their enemies, and putting them to the ſword. Their own deſign was, publickly to offer ſome fair propoſals, and gain the city by an amicable compoſition. With this view, their herald proclaimed aloud, that --- "All who were willing to enter into league, according to the ancient cuſtom of all Bœotians [2], "ſhould

1 Platæa was a city and petty ſtate in Bœotia, on the confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been ſo firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, that it drew upon them the laſting rancour of the Thebans, who had joined the Perſians when they invaded Greece, and perſuaded them to burn down Platæa. The Platæans engaged with the Athenians on the ſide of Greece, in the famous battle fought within their own territory. The Athenians, to ſhew their gratitude, gave them a place in the fine battle-piece painted in the Pæcile in honour of the victory, made them all citizens of Athens, and ever after concluded their religious ſolemnities with a prayer for the proſperity of the Platæans.

2 Bœotia was one large republic formed by the union of ſeveral little *ſtates*. The ſovereignty (as Thucydides informs us, book the *fifth*) was lodged in four *councils*, compoſed of deputies ſent from every city in the

" ſhould come and join their arms with them." By this method, they thought the city would eaſily be brought to an accommodation.

The Platæans *ſubmit, but are ſoon in an inſurrection.*

The Platæans, when they found that the Thebans were already got in and had ſurprized the town, being in great conſternation, and thinking the enemy more numerous than they really were, for the night prevented a view of them, came ſoon to a compoſition; and accepting what terms they offered, made no reſiſtance; eſpecially, as they found that violence was offered to no man. Yet, by means of the parley, they had diſcovered that the Thebans were few in number; and judged, ſhould they venture an attack, they might eaſily overpower them: --- for the bulk of the Platæans had not the leaſt inclination to revolt from the Athenians. It was at length concluded, that this point ſhould be attempted, after having conferred together, by digging thro' the partition-walls of one another's houſes, to avoid the ſuſpicion which going through the ſtreets might have occaſioned. Then along the ſtreets they ranged carriages without the oxen, to ſerve them inſtead of a rampart, and made a proper diſpoſition of every thing neceſſary for immediate execution. When they had got every thing ready in the beſt manner they were able, watching till night began to vaniſh and the firſt dawn appear, they marched from their houſes towards the Thebans, that they might fall upon them before the full light ſhould embolden their reſiſtance, and give them equal advantages in the fight, and that they might be more intimidated by being charged in the dark, and ſenſible of diſadvantage from their ignorance of the city. The attack was immediately begun, and both ſides ſoon came to action. The Thebans,

the union. Theſe were the *ſtates-general*, and ſat at Thebes, the principal city of Bœotia. The executive and military powers were lodged in eleven perſons, choſen annually, and ſtiled *Rulers* of Bœotia, in whoſe election each city had a ſhare. They rolled, and at the battle of Delium Pagondas was in the chief command, in right of Thebes. Platæa had no ſhare in this union, but was cloſely allied with and under the protection of Athens.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

when

when they found themſelves thus circumvented, threw themſelves into an oval, and wherever aſſaulted, prevented impreſſion. Twice or thrice they beat them back with ſucceſs; but, when the aſſaults were again with a loud noiſe repeated, when the very women and menial ſervants were ſhouting and ſcreaming from the houſes all around, and throwing ſtones and tiles amongſt them, incommoded further by the rain which had fallen plentifully that night, they were ſeized with fear, and abandoning their defence fled in confuſion about the city. The greateſt part of them running in the dark and the dirt, knew not any of the paſſages by which they could get out (for this affair happened upon the change of the moon) and were purſued by men who knowing them all prevented their eſcape, ſo that many of them periſhed. The gates by which they entered, and which only had been opened, one of the Platæans had barr'd faſt by thruſting the point of a ſpear into the ſtaple inſtead of a bolt, ſo that they could not poſſibly get out there. Thus purſued about the city, ſome of them got upon the walls, and threw themſelves over, but moſt of theſe were killed by the fall: Some of them found a gate unguarded, and a woman ſupplying them with a hatchet, they cut the bolt in pieces unperceived, tho' few only eſcaped by this means, for they were ſoon diſcovered. Others were ſeparately ſlain in the different quarters of the city. But the greateſt part, and chiefly thoſe who had kept in a body, threw themſelves into a great houſe contiguous to the walls, the doors of which happened to be open, imagining the doors of this houſe to be the city-gates and a certain paſſage to a place of ſafety. When the Platæans ſaw them thus ſhut up, they conſulted together, whether they ſhould fire the houſe and burn them all in their incloſure, or reſerve them for ſome other puniſhment. But at laſt, theſe and all the other Thebans yet ſurviving, who were ſcattered about the city, agreed to give up their arms, and ſurrender themſelves to the Platæans priſoners at diſcretion. Such was the iſſue of this attempt on Platæa.

The

The other Thebans, who ought during night to have come up with all their ſtrength to reinforce the firſt body, in caſe they miſcarried, and were ſtill upon the march, when the news of this defeat met them, advanced with all poſſible expedition. Platæa is diſtant from Thebes about * ſeventy ſtadia, and the rain which fell that night had retarded their march; for the river Aſopus was ſo much ſwelled by it that it was not eaſily fordable. It was owing to the march in ſuch a heavy rain and the difficulty of paſſing this river, that they came not up till their men were either ſlain or made priſoners. When the Thebans were convinced of that event, they caſt their attention towards the Platæans, who were ſtill *without*: For the people of Platæa were ſcattered about the adjacent country with their implements of huſbandry, becauſe annoyance in time of peace was quite unexpected. They were deſirous to catch ſome of theſe as exchange for their own people within the city, if any were yet living and priſoners there. On this they were fully bent; but, in the midſt of their project, the Platæans, who ſuſpected the probability of ſome ſuch deſign, and were anxious for their people yet *without*, diſpatched a herald to the Thebans, repreſenting to them — "the injuſtice of the attempt already made; ſince, treaties ſubſiſting, they had endeavoured to ſurprize the city;" and then warned them, "to deſiſt from any violence to thoſe *without*. If not, they poſitively declared, they would put all the priſoners yet alive to the ſword; whereas, in caſe they retired peaceably out of their territory, they would deliver them up unhurt." This account the Thebans give, and ſay farther, it was ſworn to. The Platæans diſown the promiſe of an immediate diſcharge of the priſoners, which was reſerved for terms to be agreed upon in a ſubſequent treaty, and flatly deny that they ſwore. The Thebans however retired out of their territory, without committing any violence. But the Platæans, when they had with expedition fetched into the city all their effects of value that were out in the fields, immediately put all their priſoners to the ſword.

Platæa *recovered and ſecured.*

* *About* 7 Engliſh *miles.*

ſword. The number of thoſe that were taken was one hundred and eighty. Eurymachus was amongſt them, with whom the traitors had concerted the ſurprize. And this done, they diſpatched a meſſenger to Athens; and reſtored to the Thebans their dead under truce. And then, they regulated the affairs of the city in the manner moſt ſuitable to their preſent ſituation.

The news of the ſurprizal of Platæa had ſoon reached the Athenians, who immediately apprehended all the Bœotians then in Attica, and diſpatched a herald to Platæa with orders, — "to proceed no farther againſt the Theban priſoners, till they ſhould ſend their determination about them;" —— for they were not yet informed of their having been actually put to death. The firſt meſſenger had been ſent away, immediately upon the irruption of the Thebans — the ſecond, ſo ſoon as they were defeated and made priſoners — as to what happened afterwards, they were utterly in the dark. Thus ignorant of what had ſince been done, the Athenians diſpatched away their herald, who upon his arrival found them all deſtroyed. Yet, after this the Athenians, marching a body of troops to Platæa, carried thither all neceſſary proviſions, left a garriſon in the place, and brought away all the hands that would be uſeleſs in a ſiege, with the women and children.

Meaſures on both ſides for war.

After this buſineſs of Platæa, and ſo manifeſt a breach of peace, the Athenians made all neceſſary preparations for immediate war. The Lacedæmonians alſo and their confederates took the ſame meaſures. Nay, both ſides were intent on diſpatching [3] embaſſies to * *the king*,

* Artaxerxes Longimanus.

3 By this means the inteſtine quarrels of Greece were going to throw a power into the hands of the Perſian monarch, which he could not obtain by force. Each party could cringe to the common enemy, in order to obtain ſubſidies from him to enable them to diſtreſs each other. And thus the balance of power reſted at laſt in his hands, and he became for a time ſupreme arbiter of Greece. Ariſtophanes, in his comedy of *The Acarnians*, hath deſcribed theſe embaſſies and the Perſian monarch too with exceſſive buffoonry, but quite too low and ridiculous to quote. He bears hard upon the

king, and to ſeveral other Barbarian *powers*, wherever they had hope of forming ſome effectual intereſt for themſelves, and ſpared no pains to win thoſe *ſtates* over to their alliance, which had hitherto been independent. In the Lacedæmonian league, beſides the ſhips already furniſhed out for them in Italy and Sicily, the confederates there were ordered to prepare a new quota, proportioned to the abilities of the ſeveral *ſtates*, that the whole number of their ſhipping might be mounted to five hundred.—They were farther to get a certain ſum of money in readineſs; but in other reſpects to remain quiet; and till their preparations could be compleated, never to admit more than one Athenian veſſel at a time within their ports.—The Athenians made a careful ſurvey of the ſtrength of their own alliance, and ſent preſſing embaſſies to the places round about Peloponneſus, to Corcyra, to Cephallene, to the Acarnanians, and to Zacynthus; plainly ſeeing, that if theſe were in their intereſt, they might ſecurely attack Peloponneſus on all ſides.—The minds of both parties were not a little elated, but were eager after and big with war. For it is natural to man, in the commencement of every important enterprize, to be more than uſually alert. The young men, who were at this time numerous in Peloponneſus, numerous alſo at Athens, were for want of experience quite fond of the rupture. And all the reſt of Greece ſtood attentively at gaze on this contention between the two principal *ſtates*. Many oracles were toſſed about, the ſoothſayers ſung abundance of predictions, amongſt thoſe who were upon the point to break, and even in the cities that were yet neutral. Nay, Delos had been lately ſhook with an earthquake, which it had never been be-

the Athenian embaſſadors for lengthening out the time of their employ as much as poſſible for the lucre of the ſalary paid them by the ſtate, which is there mentioned at two drachmas a day. Was it either avarice, or public rapine —— this exorbitant ſalary of 15 *d.* $\frac{1}{3}$ a day to an embaſſador from the republic of Athens to the great king of Perſia?

fore in the memory of the Greeks. It was ſaid and indeed believed, that this was a prognoſtic of ſomething extraordinary to happen; and all other accidents of an uncommon nature whatever were ſure to be wreſted to the ſame meaning.

Greece *in general beſt affected to the* Lacedæmonians.

The generality of Greece was indeed at this time much the beſt affected to the Lacedæmonians, who gave out the ſpecious pretence, that "they were going to recover the liberty of Greece." Every one made it both his private paſſion and his public care, to give them all poſſible ſuccour both in word and act; and every one thought, that the buſineſs certainly flagged in thoſe places where he himſelf was not preſent to invigorate proceedings. So general an averſion was there at this time formed againſt the Athenians, when ſome were paſſionately deſirous to throw off their yoke, and others apprehenſive of falling under their ſubjection. —— With ſuch preparations and ſuch diſpoſitions did they run into the war.

League of Sparta.

The *ſtates* in league with either party, upon the breaking out of the war, were theſe. —— In confederacy with the Lacedæmonians, were all Peloponneſians within the Iſthmus, except the Argives and Achæans, for theſe had treaties ſubſiſting with both parties. But of the Achæans, the Pellenians ſingly were the firſt who went over, tho' they were afterwards joined by all the reſt. Without Peloponneſus, were the Megaréans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians. Of theſe they were ſupplied with ſhipping by the Corinthians, Megaréans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eléans, Ambraciots, Leucadians; with horſe by the Bœotians, Phocians, Locrians: and the other *ſtates* furniſhed them with foot. This was the confederacy of the Lacedæmonians. —With the Athenians, were the Chians, Leſbians, Platæans, the Meſſenians of Naupactus, moſt of the Acarnanians, the Corcyreans, Zacynthians, and other ſtates tributary to them in ſo many nations: Namely, the

Of Athens.

maritime

maritime people of Caria, the [4] Dorians that border upon the Carians, Ionia, Helleſpont, the cities on the coaſt of Thrace, all the iſlands ſituated to the eaſt between Peloponneſus and Crete, and all the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of theſe, they were ſupplied with ſhipping by the Chians, Leſbians, Corcyréans; the reſt ſupplied them with foot and with money. This was the alliance on both ſides, and the ability for the war.

The former take the field.

The Lacedæmonians, immediately after the attempt on Platæa, ſent circular orders to the *ſtates* both within and without Peloponneſus, to draw their quotas of aid together, and get every thing in readineſs for a foreign expedition, as intending to invade Attica. When all was ready, they aſſembled on the day appointed, with two thirds of the force of every *ſtate*, at the Iſthmus. When the whole army was thus [5] drawn together, Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, who commanded in the expedition, convened the commanders from all the auxiliary *ſtates*, with all thoſe that were in authority, and moſt fitting to be preſent, and addreſſed them, as follows ——

Speech of Archidamus.

"PELOPONNESIANS and allies, many are the expedi-
" tions in which our fathers have been engaged both within and
" without Peloponneſus. Even ſome of us, who are more advanced
" in years, are by no means unexperienced in the buſineſs of war.
" Yet, never before did we take the field with a force ſo great as
" the preſent. But, numerous and formidable in arms as we may
" now appear, we are however marching againſt a moſt powerful
" *ſtate*. Thus is it incumbent upon us, to ſhew ourſelves not inferior
" in valour to our fathers, nor to ſink below the expectations of the

4 Theſe were the Dorians, who were ſeated in the iſlands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus, according to the *Scholiaſt*.

5 Plutarch informs us, that the number amounted to ſixty thouſand men.

" world. The eyes of all Greece are fixed attentively on our mo-
" tions. —— Their good-will to us, their hatred of the Athenians,
" make them wiſh for our ſucceſs in all our undertakings. It is
" therefore our buſineſs, without placing too great a confidence in
" ſuperior numbers, or truſting to the preſumption that our enemies
" dare not come out to fight us — for no reaſons like theſe, to relax
" our diſcipline, or break the regularity of our march — but, the
" commander of every confederate body and every private ſoldier
" ought to keep within himſelf the conſtant expectation, of being
" engaged in action. Uncertain are the turns of war; great events
" ſtart up from a ſmall beginning, and aſſaults are given from indig-
" nation. Nay, frequently an inferior number engaging with cau-
" tion hath proved too hard for a more numerous body, whom
" contempt of their enemy expoſeth to attacks for which they are
" not prepared. Upon hoſtile ground, it is always the duty of ſol-
" diers to be reſolutely bold, and to keep ready for action with pro-
" per circumſpection. Thus, will they be always ready to attack
" with ſpirit, and be moſt firmly ſecured againſt a ſurprize.

" We are not marching againſt a people, who are unable to de-
" fend themſelves, but excellently well qualified for it in every
" reſpect; ſo that we may certainly depend upon their advancing
" againſt us to give us battle; — not yet perhaps in motion, ſo long
" as no enemy appears; but moſt aſſuredly ſo, when once they ſee
" us in their territory, waſting and deſtroying their ſubſtance. All
" men muſt kindle into wrath, when uncommon injuries are unex-
" pectedly done them, when manifeſt outrage glares before them.
" Reflection then may indeed have loſt its power, but reſentment
" moſt ſtrongly impels them to reſiſtance. Something like
" this may more reaſonably be looked for from Athenians, than
" from other people. They eſteem themſelves worthy to command
" others, and their ſpirit is more turned to make than to ſuffer depre-
" dations. Againſt ſo formidable a people are we now to march;

and

" and by the event, whatever it be, ſhall we acquire the greateſt " glory or diſgrace, for our anceſtors and ourſelves. — Let it therefore " be the buſineſs of every man to follow his commander, obſervant " in every point of diſcipline and the rules of war, and obeying with " expedition the orders you receive. The fineſt ſpectacle and the " ſtrongeſt defence is the uniform obſervation of diſcipline by a nu- " merous army."

A fruitleſs meſſage to Athens.

When Archidamus had finiſhed his oration and diſmiſſed the aſſembly, the firſt thing he did was ſending to Athens Meleſippus a Spartan the ſon of Diacritus, to try, whether the Athenians were grown any thing more pliant, ſince they found an army upon the march againſt them. But they would not allow him to come into the city, nor grant him a public audience. For the advice of Pericles had before this gained the general aſſent, that " no herald or embaſſy ſhould be received from the Lacedæmonians, ſo long as they were in the field againſt them." They ſend him back therefore unheard, and ordered him " to quit their territories that very day; that further, the Lacedæmonians ſhould retire within their own frontier; and then, if they had any thing to tranſact with them, ſhould ſend their embaſſadors for the purpoſe." They even commiſſion ſome perſons to guard Meleſippus back, that he might have no conference with any perſon whatever. When he was brought to the borders and received his diſmiſſion, he parted from them with theſe words —— " This day is the beginning of great " woes to the Grecians." Upon his return to the camp, Archidamus was convinced that the Athenians were inflexible as ever, ſo that he immediately diſlodged and advanced with his army into their territories. —— The Bœotians ſent their quota of foot and their horſe to join the Peloponneſians in this expedition, but with the reſt of their forces they marched towards Platæa, and laid the country waſte.

Whilſt

The behaviour of Pericles, *and advice.*

Whilſt the Peloponneſians were yet aſſembling at the Iſthmus, or yet on the march, before they had entered Attica, Pericles the ſon of Xantippus, who with nine others had been appointed to command the Athenian forces, when he ſaw an irruption from the Peloponneſians unavoidable, had conceived a ſuſpicion that Archidamus, whom the hoſpitable [6] intercourſe had made his friend, from a principle of good-nature willing to oblige him, would leave his lands untouched, or, might be ordered to do ſo by the policy of the Lacedæmonians, as they had already demanded an *excommunication* on his account; by which means he muſt certainly incur the public jealouſy. He declared therefore to the Athenians, in a general aſſembly of the people --- That, " tho' Archidamus was his friend, he ſhould not be " ſo to the prejudice of the *ſtate*; and that, if the enemy ſpared his " lands and houſes in the general ravage, he made a free donation of " them to the public; ſo that for any accident of that nature he " ought not to fall under their cenſure." He then exhorted all who were preſent, as he had done before ---- " to prepare vigorouſly for " war, and to withdraw all their effects from out of the country, --- " by no means to march out againſt the enemy, but keep within the " walls and mind only the defence of the city; ----- to fit out their " navy, in which their ſtrength principally conſiſted, and keep a " tight rein over all their dependants. By the large tributes levied

6 The tie of *hoſpitality* was ſacred and inviolable amongſt the Ancients. It was a neceſſary exertion of humanity at firſt from the want of inns and lodging-houſes, and was frequently improved into friendſhip and endearment. This between Pericles and Archidamus was merely of a private nature, between the royal family of Sparta, and a principal one in the republic of Athens. The family of Alcibiades was the public hoſt of the Spartan ſtate, and entertained their embaſſadors and public miniſters. The ſtate of Athens had likewiſe in all places a public hoſt who lodged their miniſters. Yet amongſt private perſons it was a frank diſintereſted tie; when once they had eat ſalt together, or ſat at the ſame table, they regarded themſelves as under mutual obligations, which ſmall points ought not to aboliſh. They who ſwerved from this laudable cuſtom through caprice or ingratitude were looked upon as infamous execrable perſons.

" upon

" upon thoſe, *he ſaid*, their power was chiefly to be ſupported, ſince " ſucceſs in war was a conſtant reſult from prudent meaſures and " plentiful ſupplies. --- [7] He exhorted them by no means to let their " ſpirits droop, ſince beſides their certain revenue, ſix hundred talents " were annually paid them by their tributary ſtates, and they had ſtill in " the citadel ſix thouſand talents of ſilver coined." Their primary fund was nine thouſand ſeven hundred talents out of which had been taken what defrayed the expence of refitting the gates of the citadel, of other public works, and the exigencies of Potidæa.-- "That, beſides this, they " had gold and ſilver uncoined both in public and private repoſitories, " many valuable vaſes deſtined for religious uſes and their public ſo- " lemnities, and the Perſian ſpoils, the whole value of which would " not amount to leſs than five hundred talents."--He mentioned further, " the great wealth that was ſtored up in other temples, which they " had a right to uſe; and if this right ſhould be denied them, they " might have recourſe to the golden ornaments of the *Goddeſs* her- " ſelf." He declared, " that her image had about it to the weight " of forty talents of gold without alloy, all which might be taken off " from the ſtatue. --- That, for the preſervation of their country, it " might lawfully be employed;" but added, " that it ought after- " wards to be amply replaced." In this manner did he render them confident that their funds of money would ſuffice. ---- He told them further, that " they had thirteen thouſand men that wore heavy ar- " mour, excluſive of thoſe that were in garriſons, and the ſixteen " thouſand on the guard of the city,"--for ſo large a number, draughted from the youngeſt and oldeſt citizens and ſojourners, who wore the

7 The account here given ſheweth Athens at this time to have been a very opulent *ſtate*. Reduced to Engliſh money it ſtands thus. ----- The tribute paid them annually amounted to 116250 *l.* ſterling. The fund yet remaining in the citadel was 1,162500 *l.* ſterling. They had expended lately on their public works 3700 talents which is equal to 716875 *l.* ſterling. The weight of the gold on the ſtatue of Minerva was 40 talents, which, computing the talent only at 65 *l.* Troy, to avoid fractions, and the gold at 4 *l.* ſterling an ounce, amounts in value to 124800 *l.* ſterling.

heavy

heavy armour, was employed in this ſervice upon the firſt invaſion of their enemies. For the length of the Phalerian-wall to the place where it joined the circle of the city was * thirty five ſtadia, and that part of the circular-wall which was guarded was † forty three in length; but that which lay between the long-wall and the Phalerian had no guard. The long-walls continued down to the Piræus are * forty ſtadia, but the outermoſt of them only was guarded. The whole compaſs of the Piræus, including Munichia, is † ſixty ſtadia, but then only one half of this had a guard. [8] ---- He then aſſured them, that "they had, including the archers that were mounted, twelve hundred horſemen, ſixteen hundred archers, and three hundred triremes fit for ſea." ---- So great in general, and no leſs in any one article, were the military proviſions of the Athenians, when the Peloponneſians had formed the deſign of invading them, and both ſides began the war. ---- Theſe, and ſuch like arguments, was Pericles continually employing, to convince them that they were well able to carry on a ſucceſsful war.

* *About* 3½ Engliſh *miles.*

† *Above* 4 *miles.*

* *About* 4 Engliſh *miles.*

† *About* 6 Engliſh *miles.*

Regarded by the Athenians.

The Athenians heard him with attention, and followed his advice. They withdrew from the country their children, their wives, all the furniture of their houſes there, pulling down with their own hands the timber of which they were built. Their flocks and their labouring cattle they ſent over into Eubœa and the adjacent iſlands. But this removal was a very grievous buſineſs to them, ſince it had been the ancient cuſtom of many of the Athenians to reſide at large in the country.

This method of living had been more habitual to the Athenians, than to any other Greeks, from their firſt commencement as a people. From the time of Cecrops and their firſt ſeries of Kings down to Theſeus, Attica had been inhabited in ſeveral diſtinct towns, each of

8 The whole compaſs of the walls of Athens was 178 ſtadia, or above 22 Attic miles. But, according to Dr. Arbuthnot, the Attic mile conſiſted of but 805 paces, whereas the Engliſh is 1056. Hence, the compaſs of Athens appears to have been about 17 Engliſh miles.

which

which had its own *Archons* [9] and its own *Prytanéum*; and, unleſs in times of danger, had ſeldom recourſe to the regal authority, ſince juſtice was adminiſtred in every ſeparate *borough*, and each had a council of its own. Sometimes they even warred againſt one another; for inſtance, the Eleuſinians, when they ſided with Eumolpus againſt Erectheus. But when the regal power devolved upon Theſeus, a man of an extenſive underſtanding, and who knew how to govern, in ſeveral reſpects he improved the whole territory; and beſides, diſſolving all the councils and magiſtracies of the petty boroughs [1], he removed them to the *metropolis*, as it is at preſent, and conſtituting one grand Senate and Prytanéum, made *it* the point of union in which all concentred. Their private properties he left to them entire, but made them reſt contented with Athens alone for their city; which, when all its ſubjects were now jointly contributing to its ſupport, was quickly enlarged, and delivered ſo by Theſeus to the ſucceeding Kings. In memory of this, from the days of Theſeus quite down to the preſent time, the Athenians have held an anniverſary ſolemnity to the *Goddeſs*, which they call the *Synæcia* or *Cohabitation*. Before this, that which is now *the Citadel*, and that part which lies on the ſouth-ſide of the citadel, was all the city. The temples built either within the citadel or without ſufficiently ſhew it. For in the ſouth-part of the city, particularly, ſtand the Temples of the Olympian Jove, of the Pythian Apollo, of Terra, and of Bacchus in Limnæ, in honour of whom the old Bacchanalian-feaſts are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Antheſterion [2]: which

9 That is --- Magiſtrates of its own, and a common-hall, in which thoſe Magiſtrates performed the duties of their office in adminiſtring juſtice, and offering ſacrifices, and where they had their diet at the public expence.

1 The number of the *boroughs* in Attica was one hundred ſeventy four.

2 The Engliſh reader may perhaps call this a hard word, but I hope will not be frightned. The names of other Attic months will occur in the ſequel, which I ſhall leave as I find them, becauſe no exact correſpondence hath been found out between the Attic months which were lunar and thoſe now in uſe. Monſieur *Tourreil*,

which cuſtom is ſtill retained to this day by the Ionians of Attic deſcent. All the other ancient temples are ſeated in the ſame quarter. Near it alſo is the fountain, now called the *Enneakrounos* or *Nine-pipe*, from the manner in which it was embelliſhed by the * Tyrants; but formerly, when all the ſprings were open, called *Callirrhoë*; and which, as near at hand, they preferred on the moſt ſolemn occaſions. And that ancient cuſtom is to this day preſerved, by making uſe of the ſame water in connubial and many other religious rites. And further, it is owing to ſuch their ancient reſidence in the citadel, that it is *eminently* called by the Athenians to this very day, *The City*.

* *The* Piſiſtratidæ.

In the manner above-mentioned, were the Athenians for a long

the celebrated French tranſlator of Demoſthenes, hath made it a very ſerious point. "I have long doubted (ſays he) "whether in my tranſlation I ſhould give "the months their old Greek names, or "ſuch as they have in our language. The "reaſon that made me balance is the im-"poſſibility of computing the months ſo "that they ſhall anſwer exactly to our "French.—— My firſt determination was "to date in our own manner; I choſe to "be leſs exact, rather than frighten the "greateſt part of my readers by words to "which they are not accuſtomed. For "what French ears would not be appalled "at the words, *Thargelion*, *Boedromion*, "*Elaphebolion*," &c? He then gives reaſons for retaining the Greek ones, and adds, "I declare then once for all, that I "am far from pedantically affecting the "terms of an old calendar conceived in a "language barbarous to numbers of people, "who, ſhocked at the ſound, would perhaps impute to me a taſte, which thank "God I have not. I proteſt that to my "ear, no leſs than to theirs, the French "name of the word would be more pleaſing and would ſound better. But neither "falſe delicacy, nor vicious complaiſance "hath been able to prevail with me to expoſe myſelf to reproaches, for knowingly "leading others into miſtake, and uſing "words appropriated to Roman and ſolar "months, which have no correſpondence "with the lunar and Attic." He ſays a deal on the ſubject ſo little affecting his countrymen, that ſince his death they have again thrown all the greek terms into the margin, and placed in the text the incongruous modern ones for the ſake of familiar ſounds. If the Engliſh reader be as delicate he may read *April* or *May* at his option. The ableſt chronologers are unable to exchange them into currency with any tolerable exactneſs. A great deal of learning might be alſo diſplayed about the days of the month and the Grecian method of counting them: But, as it is exceeding eaſy to tranſlate theſe right, learning may be excuſed in a point where no light is wanting.

T ſeries

ſeries of time ſcattered about the country, in towns and communities at their own diſcretion. And, as not only the more ancient, but even the latter Athenians quite down to the preſent war, had ſtill retained the cuſtom of dwelling about the country with their families, the general removals into the city, after they were formed into one body, were attended with no ſmall embaraſſment; and particularly *now*, when they had been refitting their houſes, and reſettling themſelves after the Perſian invaſion. It gave them a very ſenſible grief and concern to think, that they muſt forſake their habitations and temples, which, from long antiquity, it had been their forefathers and their own religious care to frequent; that they muſt quite alter their ſcene of life, and each abandon as it were his native home. When they were come into the city, ſome few had houſes ready for their reception, or ſheltered themſelves with their friends and relations. The greater part were forced to ſettle in the leſs frequented quarters of the city, in all the buildings ſacred to the Gods and Heroes, except thoſe in the citadel, the Eleuſinian, and any other from whence they were excluded by religious awe. There was indeed a ſpot of ground below the citadel, called the *Pelaſgic*, which to turn into a dwelling-place, had not only been thought profaneneſs, but was expreſly forbid by the cloſe of a line in a Pythian oracle, which ſaid,

—— "Beſt is Pelaſgic empty."

Yet this ſudden urgent neceſſity conſtrained them to convert it to ſuch an uſe. To *me*, I own, that oracle ſeems to have carried a different meaning from what they gave it. For the calamities of Athens did not flow from the profane habitation of this place, but from the war which laid them under a neceſſity of employing it in ſuch a manner. The oracle makes no mention of the war, but only hints that its being ſome time inhabited would be attended with public

misfortune. Many of them, further, were forced to lodge themſelves within the turrets of the walls, or wherever they could find a vacant corner. The city was not able to receive ſo large a conflux of people. But afterwards, the *Long-walls*, and a great part of the Piræus, were portioned out to them for little dwellings. At the ſame time they were buſied in the military preparations, gathering together the confederate-forces, and fitting out a fleet of one hundred ſhips to infeſt Peloponneſus. In affairs of ſuch great importance were the Athenians engaged.

Slow advance of the enemy into Attica.

The Peloponneſian army, advancing forwards, came up firſt to Oënoe, through which they deſigned to break into Attica. Encamping before it, they made ready their engines and all other neceſſaries for battering the walls. For Oënoe, being a frontier-town between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about, ſince the Athenians were uſed, upon the breaking out of war, to throw a garriſon into it. The enemy made great preparations for aſſaulting it, and by this and other means ſpent no little time before it.

Archidamus *cenſured.*

This delay was the occaſion of drawing very heavy cenſures on Archidamus. He had before this been thought too dilatory in gathering together the confederate-army, and too much attached to the Athenians, becauſe he never declared warmly for the war. But after the army was drawn together, his long ſtay at the Iſthmus, and the ſlow marches he had made from thence, expoſed him to calumny, which was ſtill heightened by the length of the ſiege of Oënoe: For, in this interval of delay, the Athenians had without moleſtation withdrawn all their effects from the country, tho' it was the general opinion, that, had the Peloponneſians advanced with expedition, they might undoubtedly have ſeized them, were it not for theſe dilatory proceedings of Archidamus. Under ſuch a weight of reſentment did Archidamus ſtill lie with his army before Oënoe. His remiſſneſs was ſaid to be owing to his preſumption, that the Athenians, if their territory was ſpared, would make ſome conceſſions,

ſions, and that they dreaded nothing more than to ſee it deſtroyed. But after their aſſault on Oënoe, and the ſucceſſive miſcarriage of all the methods employed to take it, the Athenians ſtill reſolutely refraining from the leaſt ſhew of ſubmiſſion, they broke up the ſiege and marched into Attica, in the height of ſummer, when the harveſt was ripe, about eighty days after the Thebans had miſcarried in the ſurprize of Platæa. They were ſtill commanded by Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp began their devaſtations. They firſt of all ravaged Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia. Near Rheiti they encountered, and put to flight a party of Athenian horſe. Then they advanced further into the country through Cecropia, leaving mount Ægaleon on their right, till they came to Acharnæ, the greateſt of all thoſe which are called *The Boroughs* of Athens. They ſat down before it, and having fortified their camp, continued a long time there, laying all the adjacent country waſte.

The deſign of Archidamus in ſtopping thus before Acharnæ, keeping there his army ready for battle, and not marching down this firſt campaign into the plains, is ſaid to be this. —— He preſumed that the Athenians who flouriſhed at that time in a numerous youth, and who never before had been ſo well prepared for war, would probably march out againſt him, and would not ſit quiet, whilſt their lands were ravaged before their eyes. But when he had advanced to Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia without any reſiſtance, he had a mind to try whether laying ſiege to Acharnæ would provoke them to come out. This place ſeemed further to him a convenient ſpot for a long encampment. Beſides, he could not perſuade himſelf, that the Acharnians, ſo conſiderable a body amongſt the citizens of Athens (for three thouſand of them now wore the heavy armour) could ſee with patience their own properties ruined by hoſtile devaſtation, without inciting all their fellow-citizens to ruſh out to battle. And if the Athenians would not come out againſt

them

them this campaign, he might another campaign with greater ſecurity extend his devaſtation even to the very walls of Athens. He thought it not likely that the Acharnians, when all their lands had been ruined in this manner, would chearfully run into hazards to prevent the loſſes of others, and that hence [3] much diſſenſion might be kindled up amongſt them. Of theſe imaginary ſchemes was Archidamus full, whilſt he lay before Acharnæ.

The Athenians *loſe their temper.*

The Athenians, ſo long as the enemy remained about Eleuſis and the plain of Thriaſia, conceived ſome hopes that they would advance no farther. They put one another in mind, that Pleiſtoanax ſon of Pauſanias king of the Lacedæmonians, when fourteen years before this war he invaded Attica with an army of Peloponneſians, came only as far as to Eleuſis and Thrias, and then retreated without penetrating any farther — that, upon this account he had been baniſhed Sparta, becauſe it looked as if he had been bribed to ſuch an unſeaſonable retreat. But when they ſaw the enemy advanced to Achar-

[3] Ariſtophanes wrote his comedy of *The Acharnians* upon this plan, and abundantly ridiculed the public conduct as injurious to the citizens of Athens. Though it was not brought upon the ſtage till the ſixth year of the war, it amply ſhews us, how the Acharnians reſented their being thus expoſed to the ravage of the enemy; and how the wits, that lived upon the public paſſions, helped ſtill more to exaſperate them, and miſ-repreſented the meaſures of the ableſt politicians, and who perfectly well underſtood and aimed at the general welfare of the whole community, as weak, corrupt, and miſchievous. No care to redreſs, and no commiſeration for the Acharnians, as *Dicæopolis* hints, who was one of that *borough* — "And what? it "will be ſaid, Can this poſſibly be help-"ed? Be helped, do you ſay? why not? "Tell me, if you can. Suppoſe only, "that a Lacedæmonian had ſtood acroſs "in his ſkiff to Seriphus, and after kil-"ling a favourite lap-dog got off again "ſafe: — Would ye now in this caſe "ſit ſtill? Quite the contrary. You "would immediately be putting out to ſea "with three hundred ſail of ſhips; Athens "would roar with the tumult of ſoldiers; "the captains of veſſels would be ſhout-"ing, pay delivering, and our gold flying "about. What a buſtle would there be in "the long *portico!* what diſtributing of "proviſions, ſkins, thongs, caſks full of "olives, onions in nets, *&c. &c. &c.* "all the decks would be crowded with "ſeamen. What a daſhing of oars, muſic "ſounding, boatſwains bawling; nothing "but hurry and confuſion! Such, I am "well aſſured, would then be the caſe."

næ,

ner, which was diſtant but * ſixty ſtadia from Athens, they thought their incurſions were no longer to be endured. It appeared, as it reaſonably might, a heavy grievance, to have all their lands thus ravaged within their ſight; —— a ſcene like this the younger ſort never had beheld, nor the elder but once — in the Perſian war. The bulk of the people but eſpecially the younger part were for ſallying out and fighting, and not to ſtand tamely looking upon the inſult. Numbers of them aſſembled together in a tumultuous manner, which was the riſe of great confuſion, ſome loudly demanding to march out againſt the enemy, and others reſtraining them from it. The ſoothſayers gave out all manner of predictions, which every hearer interpreted by the key of his own paſſions. The Acharnians, regarding themſelves as no contemptible part of the Athenian body, becauſe their lands had been waſted, in a moſt earneſt manner inſiſted upon a ſally. The whole city was in a ferment, and all their reſentments centred on Pericles. They quite forgot the prudent conduct he had formerly planned out for them — They reproached him as a general that durſt not head them againſt their enemies, and regarded him as author of all the miſeries which the city endured.

* *About* 6 Engliſh *miles.*

Inveigh againſt Pericles.

Pericles, ſeeing their minds thus chagrined by the preſent ſtate of their affairs, and in conſequence of this intent upon unadviſeable meaſures, but aſſured within himſelf of the prudence of his own conduct in thus reſtraining them from action, called no general aſſembly of the people, nor held any public conſultation, leſt paſſion which was more alive than judgment ſhould throw them into indiſcretions. He kept ſtrict guard in the city, and endeavoured as much as poſſible to preſerve the public quiet. Yet he was always ſending out ſmall parties of horſe, to prevent any damage that might be done near the city, by adventurous ſtragglers from the army. By this means, there happened once at Phrygii a ſkirmiſh between one troop of the Athenian horſe accompanied by ſome Theſſalians, and the horſemen of Bœotia, in which the Athenians and Theſſalians maintained

His conduct on this occaſion.

tained their ground, till ſome heavy-armed foot reinforced the Bœotian horſe. Then they were forced to turn about, and ſome few both Theſſalians and Athenians were ſlain. However they fetched off their bodies the ſame day without the enemy's leave, and the next day the Peloponneſians erected a trophy.—The aid ſent now by the Theſſalians was in conſequence of an ancient alliance between them and the Athenians. Theſe auxiliaries conſiſted of Lariſſéans, Pharſalians, Paraſians, Cranonians, Peiraſians, Gyrtonians, Pheræans. Thoſe from Lariſſa were commanded by Polymedes and Ariſtonous, each heading thoſe of his own faction; thoſe from Pharſalus by Menon; and thoſe from the reſt of the cities had their reſpective commanders.

The Peloponneſians, when the Athenians made no ſhew of coming out againſt them, broke up from Acharnæ, and laid waſte ſome other of the Athenian *boroughs*, which lay between the mountains Parnethus and Briliſſus.

During the time of theſe incurſions, the Athenians ſent out the hundred ſhips they had already equipped, and which had on board a thouſand heavy-armed ſoldiers and four hundred archers, to infeſt the coaſt of Peloponneſus. The commanders in the expedition were Carcinus ſon of Xenotimus, Proteas ſon of Epicles, and Socrates ſon of Antigenes. Under their orders, the fleet ſo furniſhed out weighed anchor and ſailed away.

The enemy evacuates Attica.

The Peloponneſians, continuing in Attica till proviſions began to fail them, retired not by the ſame route they came in, but marched away through Bœotia. And paſſing by Oropus, they waſted the tract of ground called Piraïce, which was occupied by the Oropians, who were ſubject to Athens. On their return into Peloponneſus, the army was diſperſed into their ſeveral cities.

Meaſures taken at Athens.

After their departure, the Athenians ſettled the proper ſtations for their guards both by land and ſea, in the ſame diſpoſition as they were to continue to the end of the war. They alſo made a decree,

decree, that " a thouſand talents ſhould be taken from the fund of treaſure in the citadel and laid up by itſelf; that this ſum ſhould not be touched, but the expence of the war be defrayed from the remainder — and, that if any one moved or voted for converting this money to any other uſe, than the neceſſary defence of the city, in caſe the enemy attacked it by ſea, he ſhould ſuffer the penalty of death." Beſide this, they ſelected conſtantly every year an hundred of their beſt triremes, with the due number of able commanders. Theſe alſo they made it capital to uſe upon any other occaſion, than that *extremity* for which the reſerve of money was deſtined.

The Athenians *act offenſively at ſea.*

The Athenians on board the fleet of one hundred ſail on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, being joined by the Corcyréans in fifty ſhips and by ſome other of their confederates in thoſe parts, hovered for a time and infeſted the coaſt, and at length made a deſcent and aſſaulted Methone a town of Laconia, whoſe walls were but weak and poorly manned. It happened that [4] Braſidas the ſon of Tellis a Spartan had then the command of a garriſon ſomewhere near Methone. He was ſenſible of the danger it was in, and ſet forwards with one hundred heavy-armed to its relief. The Athenian army was then ſcattered about the country, and their attention directed only to the walls; by which means, making a quick march through the midſt of their quarters, he threw himſelf into Methone, and with the loſs of but a few who were intercepted in the paſſage,

[4] Here the name of *Braſidas* firſt occurs, and I muſt beg the reader to note him, as one who is to make no ordinary figure in the ſequel. Trained up through the regular and ſevere diſcipline of Sparta, he was brave, vigilant, and active. He was ſecond to none of his countrymen, in thoſe good qualities which did honour to the Spartans; and was free from all the blemiſhes, which their peculiarity of education was apt to throw upon them, ſuch as haughtineſs of carriage, ferocity of temper, and an arrogance which ſtudied no deference or condeſcenſion to others. He ſerves his country much by his valour and military conduct, and more by his gentle, humane, and engaging behaviour. In a word, the diſtinguiſhing excellencies both of the Spartan and Athenian characters ſeem to have been united in this *Braſidas*.

effectually ſecured the town. For this bold exploit, he was the firſt man of all who ſignalized themſelves in this war, that received the public commendation at Sparta. Upon this the Athenians re-embarked and ſailed away, and coming up to Pheia, a town of Elis, they ravaged the country for two days together. A body of picked men of the lower Elis, with ſome other Eléans, that were got together from the adjacent country, endeavour'd to ſtop their devaſtations, but coming to a ſkirmiſh were defeated by them. But a ſtorm ariſing, and their ſhips being expoſed to danger on the open coaſt, they went immediately on board, and ſailing round the cape of Icthys, got into the harbour of Pheia. The Meſſenians in the mean time, and ſome others who had not been able to gain their ſhips, had marched overland and got poſſeſſion of the place. Soon after the ſhips, being now come about, ſtood into the harbour, took them on board, and quitting the place put out again to ſea. By this time a great army of Eléans was drawn together to ſuccour it, but the Athenians were ſailed away to other parts of the coaſt, where they carried on their depredations.

About the ſame time, the Athenians had ſent a fleet of thirty ſail to infeſt the coaſt about Locris, and at the ſame time to guard Eubœa. This fleet was commanded by Cleopompus the ſon of Clinias, who making ſeveral deſcents, plundered many maritime places, and took Thronium. He carried from thence ſome hoſtages, and at Alope defeated a body of Locrians, who were marching to its relief.

Clear Ægina. The ſame ſummer, the Athenians tranſported from Ægina all the inhabitants, not only the men but the children and the women, reproaching them as the principal authors of the preſent war. And judging they might ſecurely keep poſſeſſion of Ægina, which lay ſo near to Peloponneſus, if they peopled it with a colony of their own —with this view, not long after, they fixed ſome of their own people in poſſeſſion of it. The Lacedæmonians received the Æginetæ on their expulſion,

expulſion, and aſſigned them Thyræa for their place of reſidence, and the country about it for their ſubſiſtence, not only on account of their own enmity to the Athenians, but the particular obligations they lay under to the Æginetæ, for the ſuccour they had given them in the time of the earthquake and the inſurrection of the Helots. The diſtrict of Thyræa lies between Argia and Laconia, declining quite down to the ſea. Here ſome of them fixed their reſidence, but the reſt were diſperſed into other parts of Greece.

Eclipſe of the ſun.

The ſame ſummer, on the firſt day of the lunar month, at which time alone it can poſſibly fall out, there was an eclipſe of the ſun in the afternoon. The ſun looked for a time like the creſcent of the moon, and ſome ſtars appeared, but the full orb ſhone out afterwards in all its luſtre.

Sitalces.

The ſame ſummer alſo, the Athenians, who had hitherto regarded as their enemy Nymphodorus the ſon of Pythes of Abdera, whoſe ſiſter was married to Sitalces, and who had a great influence over him, made him their *public* friend and invited him to Athens. They hoped by this to gain over Sitalces the ſon of Teres king of Thrace to their alliance. This Teres, father of Sitalces, was the firſt who made the kingdom of Odryſa the largeſt in all Thrace: For the greater part of the Thracians are free and governed by their own laws. But this Teres was not in the leaſt related to Tereus, who married from Athens Procne the daughter of Pandion, nor did they both belong to the ſame part of Thrace. Tereus lived in Daulia a city of that province, which is now called Phocis, and which in his time was inhabited by Thracians. Here it was that the women executed the tragical buſineſs of Itys; and many poets who make mention of the nightingale, do it by the name of the *Daulian* bird. And it is more probable that Pandion matched his daughter to a perſon at this leſſer diſtance from him, from the view of mutual advantage, than to one ſeated at Odryſæ, which is many days journey further off. But Teres, whoſe name is not the ſame with Tereus, was the firſt king of

Odryſæ, and compaſſed the regal power by violence. This man's ſon Sitalces the Athenians admitted into their alliance, hoping he might gain over to their ſide the cities of Thrace and Perdiccas. Nymphodorus arriving at Athens finiſhed the alliance with Sitalces, and made *his* ſon Sadoeus an Athenian. He alſo undertook to bring the war now in Thrace to an end, and to perſuade Sitalces to ſend to the Athenians a body of Thracian horſemen and targeteers. He alſo reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians by procuring for him the reſtitution of Therme: Immediately after which, Perdiccas joined the Athenians and Phormio in the expedition againſt the Chalcidéans. Thus was Sitalces the ſon of Teres a Thracian king, and [5] Perdiccas the ſon of Alexander a Macedonian king, brought into the Athenian league.

The Athenians in the fleet of one hundred ſail, ſtill continuing their cruize on the coaſt of Peloponneſus, took Solium a fort belonging to the Corinthians, and delivered the place with the diſtrict of land belonging to it to the Palirenſians, excluſively of other Acarnanians. They took alſo by ſtorm Aſtacus of which Evarchus was tyrant, whom they forced to fly away, and added the town to their own aſſociation. Sailing from hence to the iſland Cephallene, they reduced it without a battle. Cephallene lies towards Acarnania and Leucas, and hath four cities; the Pallenſians, Cranians, Samæans, Pronæans. Not long after this the fleet ſailed back to Athens.

The Athenians *invade* Megara.

In the autumn of this ſummer, the Athenians with all their forces, citizens and ſojourners, made an incurſion into the territories of

5 Macedonia at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, and both king and people were regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive pedigree, in order to aſſiſt at the Olympic games. And Perdiccas now himſelf, whoſe ſucceſſor Alexander the Great, not many years after, was leader of Greece and conquetor of Aſia, was at this time ballancing between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, important to either merely as a neighbour to their colonies in Thrace. The Greek generals will be ſometimes ſeen in this hiſtory to uſe the monarch of Macedonia very cavalierly.

Megara,

Megara, under the command of Pericles the ſon of Xantippus. —— Thoſe alſo, who had been cruizing about Peloponneſus in the fleet of one hundred ſail (for they were now at Ægina) finding upon their return that all their fellow-citizens were marched in the general expedition againſt Megara, followed them with the fleet, and came up to them. By this means, the army of the Athenians became the largeſt they had ever at any time got together, the city being now in its moſt flouriſhing ſtate, and as yet uninfected with the plague: For there were of Athenian citizens only no leſs than ten thouſand heavy-armed, excluſive of the three thouſand who were now at Potidæa: The ſojourners of Athens who marched out along with them, were not fewer than three thouſand heavy-armed: They had beſides a very large number of light-armed ſoldiers. They laid waſte the greateſt part of the country, and then returned to Athens. Every ſucceeding year of the war, the Athenians conſtantly repeated theſe incurſions into the territory of Megara, ſometimes with their cavalry, and ſometimes with all their united force, till at laſt they made themſelves maſters of Niſæa.

Take poſſeſſion of Atalante.

In the cloſe alſo of the Summer, Atalante, an iſland lying near the Locrians of Opus, 'till now uninhabited, was fortified and garriſoned by the Athenians, to prevent the pirates of Opus and other parts of Locris, from annoying Eubœa. —— Theſe were the tranſactions of the Summer, after the departure of the Peloponneſians out of Attica.

An expedition of the Corinthians.

The Winter following, Evarchus the Acarnanian, who had a great deſire to recover Aſtacus, prevailed with the Corinthians to carry him thither, with a fleet of forty ſhips, and a force of fifteen hundred heavy-armed, and endeavor to re-eſtabliſh him. He himſelf alſo hired ſome auxiliaries for the ſame purpoſe. This armament was commanded by Euphamidas ſon of Ariſtonymus, Timoxenus ſon of Timocrates, and Eumachus ſon of Chryſis; who ſailing thither executed their buſineſs. They had a mind to endeavor the reduction of

ſome

ſome others of the maritime towns of Acarnania, but miſcarrying in every attempt they made, they returned home. But in their paſſage touching at Cephallene, and debarking upon the lands of the Cranians, they were treacherouſly inveigled into a conference, where the Cranians falling ſuddenly upon them, kill ſome of their men. It was not without difficulty, that they drew the others ſafely off, and gained their own ports.

The public Funeral.

But the ſame Winter, the Athenians, in conformity to the eſtabliſhed cuſtom of their country, ſolemnized a public funeral for thoſe who had been firſt killed in this war, in the manner as follows ——

The bones of the ſlain are brought to a tabernacle erected for the purpoſe three days before, and all are at liberty to deck out the remains of their friends at their own diſcretion. But when the grand proceſſion is made, the cypreſs-coffins are drawn on carriages, one for every tribe, in each of which are ſeparately contained the bones of all who belonged to that tribe. One ſumptuous bier is carried along empty for thoſe that are loſt, whoſe bodies could not be found amongſt the ſlain. All who are willing, both citizens and ſtrangers, attend the ſolemnity; and the women who were related to the deceaſed, ſtand near the ſepulchre groaning and lamenting. They depoſit the remains in the public ſepulchre, which ſtands in the fineſt ſuburb of the city; —— for it hath been the conſtant cuſtom *here* to bury all who fell in war, except thoſe at Marathon, whoſe extraordinary valour they judged proper to honour with a ſepulchre on the field of battle. As ſoon as they are interred, ſome one ſelected for the office by the public voice, and ever a perſon in great eſteem for his underſtanding, and of high dignity amongſt them, pronounces over them the decent panegyric ---- and this done, they depart. Through all the war, as the occaſions recurred, this method was conſtantly obſerved. But over theſe, the firſt victims of it, Pericles ſon of Xantippus was appointed to ſpeak. So, when the proper time was come, walking from the ſepulchre, and mounting a lofty pulpit erected

erected for the purpoſe, from whence he might be heard more diſtinctly by the company, he thus began ——

Oration by Pericles.

" MANY of thoſe, who have ſpoken before me on theſe occa-
" ſions, have commended the author of that law which we are now
" obeying, for having inſtituted an oration to the honour of thoſe
" who ſacrifice their lives in fighting for their country. For my part,
" I think it ſufficient, for men who have approved their virtue in
" action, by action to be honoured for it --- by ſuch as you ſee the
" public gratitude now performing about this funeral; and ---- that
" the virtues of many ought not to be endangered by the manage-
" ment of any one perſon, when their credit muſt precarioufly de-
" pend on his oration, which may be good and may be bad. Diffi-
" cult indeed it is, judicioufly to handle a ſubject, where even pro-
" bable truth will hardly gain aſſent. The hearer, enlightned by a
" long acquaintance, and warm in his affection, may quickly pro-
" nounce every thing unfavourably expreſſed, in reſpect to what he
" wiſhes and what he knows, --- whilſt the ſtranger pronounceth all
" exaggerated, through envy of thoſe deeds, which he is conſcious
" are above his own atchievement. For the praiſes beſtowed on
" others are then only to be endured, when men imagine they can
" do thoſe feats they hear to have been done: They envy what they
" cannot equal, and immediately pronounce it falſe. Yet, as this
" ſolemnity hath received its ſanction from the authority of our an-
" ceſtors, it is my duty alſo to obey the law, and to endeavor to
" procure, ſo far as I am able, the good-will and approbation of all
" my audience.

" I ſhall therefore begin firſt with our forefathers, ſince both juſtice
" and decency require we ſhould on this occaſion beſtow on them
" an honourable remembrance. In this our country they kept them-
" ſelves always firmly ſettled, and through their valour handed it
" down free to every ſince ſucceeding generation. Worthy indeed

" of

" of praiſe are they, and yet more worthy are our immediate fa-
" thers; ſince enlarging their own inheritance into the extenſive *em-*
" *pire* which we now poſſeſs, they bequeathed *that* their work of
" toil to us, their ſons. Yet even theſe ſucceſſes, we ourſelves here
" preſent, we who are yet in the ſtrength and vigor of our days have
" nobly improved, and have made ſuch proviſions for this our
" Athens, that now it is all-ſufficient in itſelf to anſwer every exi-
" gence of war and of peace. I mean not here to recite thoſe mar-
" tial exploits by which theſe ends were accompliſhed, or the reſo-
" lute defences we ourſelves and our fathers have made againſt the
" formidable invaſions of Barbarians and Greeks --- your own know-
" ledge of theſe will excuſe the long detail. But ----- by what me-
" thods we have roſe to this height of glory and power; by what
" polity and by what conduct we are thus aggrandized, I ſhall firſt
" endeavor to ſhew; and then proceed to the praiſe of the deceaſed.
" Theſe, in my opinion, can be no impertinent topics on this occa-
" ſion; the diſcuſſion of them muſt be beneficial to this numerous
" company of Athenians and of ſtrangers.

" We are happy in a form of government which cannot envy the
" laws of our neighbors; --- for it hath ſerved as a model to others,
" but is original at Athens. And this our form, as committed not
" to the *few*, but to the whole body of the people, is called a *de-*
" *mocracy*. How different ſoever in a private capacity, we all enjoy
" the ſame general equality our laws are fitted to preſerve; and ſu-
" perior honours, juſt as we excel. The public adminiſtration is
" not confined to a particular family, but is attainable only by merit.
" Poverty is not an hindrance, ſince whoever is able to ſerve his
" country, meets with no obſtacle to preferment from his firſt ob-
" ſcurity. The offices of the *ſtate* we go through without obſtruc-
" tions from one another; and live together in the mutual endear-
" ments of private life without ſuſpicions; not angry with a neighbor
" for following the bent of his own humour; nor putting on that

" countenance

" countenance of diſcontent, which pains tho' it cannot puniſh ----- " ſo that in private life we converſe together without diffidence or " damage, whilſt we dare not on any account offend againſt the " Public through the reverence we bear to the magiſtrates and the " laws, chiefly to thoſe *enacted* for redreſs of the injured, and to " thoſe *unwritten*, a breach of which is allowed diſgrace. Our " laws have further provided for the mind moſt frequent intermiſ- " ſions of care by the appointment of public recreations and ſacri- " fices [6] throughout the year, elegantly performed with a peculiar " pomp, the daily delight of which is a charm that puts melancholy " to flight. The grandeur of this our Athens cauſeth the produce of " the whole earth to be imported here, by which we reap a familiar " enjoyment, not more of the delicacies of our own growth, than of " thoſe of other nations.

" In the affairs of war we excel thoſe of our enemies, who ad- " here to methods oppoſite to our own. For we lay open Athens " to general reſort, nor ever drive any ſtranger from us whom either " improvement or curioſity hath brought amongſt us, leſt any enemy " ſhould hurt us by ſeeing what is never concealed. We place not " ſo great a confidence in the preparatives and artifices of war, as in " the native warmth of our ſouls impelling us to action. In point " of education, the youth of ſome people are inured by a courſe of " laborious exerciſe, to ſupport toil and hardſhip like men; but we, " notwithſtanding our eaſy and elegant way of life, face all the dan- " gers of war as intrepidly as they. This may be proved by facts, " ſince the Lacedæmonians never invade our territories, barely with " their own, but with the united ſtrength of all their confederates. " But, when we invade the dominions of our neighbours, for the " moſt part we conquer without difficulty in an enemy's country

6 Beſide the vaſt number of feſtivals, which were celebrated at Athens with pompous proceſſions, coſtly ſacrifices, and ſometimes public games, the *preſidents* in courſe offered up ſacrifices every morning conſtantly for the public welfare.

" thoſe who fight in defence of their own habitations. The ſtrength
" of our whole force no enemy yet hath ever experienced, becauſe
" it is divided by our naval expeditions, or engaged in the different
" quarters of our ſervice by land. But if any where they engage
" and defeat a ſmall party of our forces, they boaſtingly give it out
" a total defeat; and if they are beat, they were certainly over-
" powered by our united ſtrength. What tho' from a ſtate of in-
" activity rather than laborious exerciſe, or with a natural rather
" than an acquired valour, we learn to encounter danger?--this good
" at leaſt we receive from it, that we never droop under the appre-
" henſion of poſſible misfortunes, and when we hazard the danger,
" are found no leſs courageous than thoſe who are continually inured
" to it. In theſe reſpects our whole community deſerves juſtly to be
" admired, and in many we have yet to mention.

" In our manner of living we ſhew an elegance tempered with
" frugality, and we cultivate philoſophy without enervating the
" mind. We diſplay our wealth in the ſeaſon of beneficence, and
" not in the vanity of diſcourſe. A confeſſion of poverty is diſ-
" grace to no man; no effort to avoid it is diſgrace indeed. There
" is viſibly in the ſame perſons an attention to their own private
" concerns and thoſe of the public; and in others engaged in the la-
" bours of life, there is a competent skill in the affairs of govern-
" ment. For we are the only people who think him that does not
" meddle in ſtate-affairs —— not indolent, but good for nothing.
" And yet, we paſs the ſoundeſt judgments, and are quick at catch-
" ing the right apprehenſions of things, not thinking that words are
" prejudicial to actions, but rather the not being duly prepared by
" previous debate, before we are obliged to proceed to execution.
" Herein conſiſts our diſtinguiſhing excellence, that in the hour of
" action we ſhew the greateſt courage, and yet debate beforehand the
" expediency of our meaſures. The courage of others is the reſult
" of ignorance; deliberation makes them cowards. And thoſe un-

" doubtedly

" doubtedly muſt be owned to have the greateſt ſouls, who, moſt
" acutely ſenſible of the miſeries of war and the ſweets of peace,
" are not hence in the leaſt deterred from facing danger.

" In acts of beneficence, further, we differ from the many. We
" preſerve friends, not by receiving but by conferring obligations.
" For he, who does a kindneſs, hath the advantage over him, who
" by the law of gratitude becomes a debtor to his benefactor. The
" perſon obliged is compelled to act the more inſipid part, conſcious
" that a return of kindneſs is merely a payment and not an obliga-
" tion. And we alone are ſplendidly beneficent to others, not ſo
" much from intereſted motives, as for the credit of pure liberality.
" I ſhall ſum up what yet remains, by only adding —— that our
" Athens in general is the ſchool of Greece; and, that every ſingle
" Athenian amongſt us, is excellently formed by his perſonal qua-
" lifications, for all the various ſcenes of active life, acting with a
" moſt graceful demeanor, and a moſt ready habit of diſpatch.

" That I have not on this occaſion made uſe of a pomp of words,
" but the truth of facts, that height to which by ſuch a conduct
" this *State* hath roſe, is an undeniable proof. For we are now the
" only people of the world who are found by experience to be
" greater than in report ---- the only people who, repelling the at-
" tacks of an invading enemy, exempts their defeat from the bluſh
" of indignation, and to their tributaries yields no diſcontent, as if
" ſubject to men unworthy to command. That we deſerve our
" power, we need no evidence to manifeſt. We have great and
" ſignal proofs of this, which intitle us to the admiration of the pre-
" ſent and of future ages. We want no Homer to be the herald of
" our praiſe; no poet to deck off a hiſtory with the charms of
" verſe, where the opinion of exploits muſt ſuffer by a ſtrict rela-
" tion. Every ſea hath been opened by our fleets, and every land been
" penetrated by our armies, which have every where left behind them
" eternal monuments of our enmity and our friendſhip.

" In the juſt defence of ſuch a *State*, theſe victims of their own " valour, ſcorning the ruin threatned to it, have valiantly fought and " bravely died. And every one of thoſe who ſurvive is ready, I am " perſuaded, to ſacrifice life in ſuch a cauſe. And for this reaſon have " I enlarged ſo much on national points, to give the cleareſt proof " that in the preſent war we have more at ſtake than men whoſe " public advantages are not ſo valuable, and to illuſtrate by actual " evidence, how great a commendation is due to them who are now " my ſubject, and the greateſt part of which they have already re- " ceived. For the encomiums with which I have celebrated the " *State*, have been earned for it by the bravery of *theſe*, and of men " like *theſe*. And ſuch compliments might be thought too high and " exaggerated, if paſſed on any Grecians, but them alone. The fa- " tal period, to which theſe gallant ſouls are now reduced, is the " ſureſt evidence of their merit — an evidence begun in their lives " and compleated in their deaths. For it is a debt of juſtice to pay " ſuperior honours to men, who have devoted their lives in fighting " for their countrey, tho' inferior to others in every virtue but that of " valour. Their laſt ſervice effaceth all former demerits, — it ex- " tends to the public; their private demeanors reached only to a " few. Yet, not one of theſe was at all induced to ſhrink from " danger through fondneſs of thoſe delights which the peaceful aflu- " ent life beſtows, — not one was the leſs laviſh of his life, through " that flattering hope attendant upon want, that poverty at length " might be exchanged for affluence. One paſſion there was in their " minds much ſtronger than theſe, —— the deſire of vengeance on " their enemies. Regarding this, as the moſt honourable prize of " dangers, they boldly ruſhed towards the mark, to glut revenge, " and then to ſatisfy thoſe ſecondary paſſions. The uncertain event " they had already ſecured in hope; what their eyes ſhewed plainly " muſt be done they truſted their own valour to accompliſh, " thinking it more glorious to defend themſelves and die in the at-

tempt,

" tempt, than to yield and live. From the reproach of cowardice
" indeed they fled, but preſented their bodies to the ſhock of battle;
" when, inſenſible of fear, but triumphing in hope, in the doubt-
" ful charge they inſtantly dropt — and thus diſcharged the duty
" which brave men owe to their country.

" As for you, who now ſurvive them — it is your buſineſs to pray
" for a better fate — but, to think it your duty alſo to preſerve the
" ſame ſpirit and warmth of courage againſt your enemies; not judg-
" ing of the expediency of this from a mere harangue — where any
" man indulging a flow of words may tell you, what you your-
" ſelves know as well as he, how many advantages there are in fight-
" ing valiantly againſt your enemies — but rather, making the daily-
" increaſing grandeur of this community the object of your thoughts
" and growing quite enamoured of it. And, when it really appears
" great to your apprehenſions, think again, that this grandeur was
" acquired by brave and valiant men; by men who knew their duty,
" and in the moments of action were ſenſible of ſhame; who,
" whenever their attempts were unſucceſsful, thought it diſhonour
" their country ſhould ſtand in need of any thing their valour
" could do for it, and ſo made it the moſt glorious *preſent*. Beſtow-
" ing thus their lives on the public, they have every one received a
" praiſe that will never decay, a ſepulchre that will always be moſt
" illuſtrious — not that in which their bones lie mouldering, but
" that in which their fame is preſerved, to be on every occaſion,
" when honour is the employ of either word or act, eternally re-
" membered. This whole earth is the ſepulchre of illuſtrious men;
" nor is it the inſcription on the columns in their native ſoil alone
" that ſhews their merit, but the memorial of them, better than all
" inſcriptions, in every foreign nation, repoſited more durably in
" univerſal remembrance, than on their own tomb. From this very
" moment, emulating theſe noble patterns, placing your happineſs
" in liberty, and liberty in valour, be prepared to encounter all the

" dangers

" dangers of war. For, to be laviſh of life is not ſo noble in thoſe
" whom misfortunes have reduced to miſery and deſpair, as in men
" who hazard the loſs of a comfortable ſubſiſtence, and the enjoy-
" ment of all the bleſſings this world affords, by an unſucceſsful en-
" terprize. Adverſity after a ſeries of eaſe and affluence ſinks
" deeper into the heart of a man of ſpirit, than the ſtroke of death
" inſenſibly received in the vigor of life and public hope.

" For this reaſon, the *parents* of thoſe who are now gone, whoever
" of them may be attending here, I do not bewail, —— I ſhall ra-
" ther comfort. It is well known to what unhappy accidents they
" were liable from the moment of their birth; and, that happineſs
" belongs to men who have reached the moſt glorious period of life,
" as theſe now have who are to you the ſource of ſorrow, — theſe,
" whoſe life hath received its ample meaſure, happy in its conti-
" nuance, and equally happy in its concluſion. I know it in truth
" a difficult taſk, to fix comfort in thoſe breaſts, which will have
" frequent remembrances in ſeeing the happineſs of others, of what
" they once themſelves enjoyed. And ſorrow flows not from the ab-
" ſence of thoſe good things we have never yet experienced, but
" from the loſs of thoſe to which we have been accuſtomed. They
" who are not yet by age exempted from iſſue, ſhould be comforted
" in the hope of having more. The children yet to be born will be
" a private benefit to ſome, in cauſing them to forget ſuch as no
" longer are, and will be a double benefit to their country, in pre-
" venting its deſolation, and providing for its ſecurity. For thoſe
" perſons cannot in common juſtice be regarded as members of equal
" value to the public, who have no children to expoſe to danger for
" its ſafety. —— But you, whoſe age is already far advanced, com-
" pute the greater ſhare of happineſs your longer time hath afforded
" for ſo much gain, perſuaded in yourſelves, the remainder will be
" but ſhort, and enlighten that ſpace by the glory gained by *theſe*.
" It is greatneſs of ſoul alone that never grows old; nor is it wealth

" that

" that delights in the latter ſtage of life, as ſome give out, ſo much " as honour. ——

" To you, the *ſons* and *brothers* of the deceaſed, whatever num- " ber of you are here, a field of hardy contention is opened. For " him, who no longer is, every one is ready to commend, ſo that to " whatever height you puſh your deſerts, you will ſcarce ever be " thought to equal, but to be ſomewhat inferior to theſe. Envy " will exert itſelf againſt a competitor, whilſt life remains; but " when death ſtops the competition, affection will applaud without " reſtraint.

" If after this it be expected from me to ſay any thing to *you*, who " are now reduced to a ſtate of widowhood about female vir- " tue, I ſhall expreſs it all in one ſhort admonition; —— It is your " greateſt glory not to be deficient in the virtue peculiar to your ſex, " and to give the men as little handle as poſſible to talk of your be- " haviour, whether *well* or *ill*.

" I have now diſcharged the province allotted me by the laws, " and ſaid what I thought moſt pertinent to this aſſembly. Our " departed friends have by facts been already honoured. Their " children from this day till they arrive at manhood ſhall be " educated at [7] the public expence of the *State*, which hath appointed " ſo beneficial a meed for theſe and all future relicts of the public " conteſts. For wherever the greateſt rewards are propoſed for " virtue, there the beſt of patriots are ever to be found. —— " Now, let every one reſpectively indulge the decent grief for his " departed friends, and then retire."

Such was the manner of the public funeral ſolemnized this winter, and with the end of which, the firſt year of this war was alſo ended.

7 The law was, that they ſhould be inſtructed at the public expence, and when come to age preſented with a compleat ſuit of armour, and honoured with the firſt ſeats in all public places.

YEAR

YEAR II.

Before Chriſt 430.

Attica *again invaded.*

IN the very beginning of ſummer, the Peloponneſians and allies with two thirds of their forces, made an incurſion as before into Attica, under the command of Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having formed their camp, ravaged the country.——

The plague of Athens.

They had not been many days in Attica before a [8] ſickneſs began firſt to appear amongſt the Athenians, ſuch as was reported to have raged

[8] The hiſtorian in the *funeral-oration* hath given us a very exalted idea of the Athenian *ſtate*, and the diſtinguiſhing excellencies of that humane and polite people. The *plague*, which now broke out, enables him to contraſte his pieces, and give his hiſtory a moſt agreeable variety. It is now going to be exceeding ſolemn, ſerious, and pathetic. It is as an *hiſtorian* and not as a *phyſician* that he gives us the relation of it: A relation, which in general hath been eſteemed an elaborate and compleat performance. He profeſſeth to give an accurate detail of it. The accuracy hath generally been allowed, but it hath been blamed as too minute. Lucretius however hath transferred all the circumſtances mentioned by Thucydides into his own poem, l. 6. enlarging ſtill more minutely upon them; and yet, this is the greateſt ornament, and certainly the leaſt exceptionable part, of his poem. Lucretius, an excellent poet, affected to write with the preciſion of a philoſopher; and Thucydides, the hiſtorian, always compoſed with the ſpirit of a poet. Hippocrates hath left ſome *caſes* of the plague, which he hath recited as a phyſician; but not one of them is dated at Athens. Thucydides hath mentioned nothing of his practiſing there, much leſs of his practiſing with ſucceſs. He ſays on the contrary that "all human art was totally unavailing;" and his follower Lucretius, that "Muſſabat tacito medicina timore." The letters of Hippocrates, which mention this affair are certainly ſpurious: The facts they would eſtabliſh are without any grounds, as Le Clerc hath proved to conviction in his *Hiſtoire de la medecine*, l. 3. They make the plague to have broke out firſt in Europe, and to have ſpread from thence into the dominions of the king of Perſia. This is quite contrary to the account of Thucydides, and to the experience of every age. All plagues and infectious diſtempers have had their riſe in Africa. Need I ſay more than that Dr. Mead hath proved it? But whether his account of this plague at Athens be duly ſuccinct, not too minute, ſerious, affecting; and, whether Thucydides hath well managed the opportunity it gave him to moralize

raged before this in other parts, as about Lemnos and other places. Yet a plague ſo great as this, and ſo dreadful a mortality, in human memory could not be parallel'd. The phyſicians at firſt could adminiſter no relief, through utter ignorance; nay, they died the faſteſt, the cloſer their attendance on the ſick, and all human art was totally unavailing. Whatever ſupplications were offered in the temples, whatever recourſe to oracles and religious rites, all were inſignificant; at laſt, expedients of this nature they totally relinquiſhed, overpowered by calamity. It broke out firſt, as it is ſaid, in that part of Æthiopia which borders upon Egypt; it afterwards ſpread into Egypt and Lybia, and into great part of *the king*'s dominions, and from thence it on a ſudden fell on the city of the Athenians. The contagion ſhewed itſelf firſt in the Piræus, which occaſioned a report that the Peloponneſians had cauſed poiſon to be thrown into the wells, for as yet there were no fountains there. After this it ſpread into the upper city, and then the mortality very much increaſed. Let every one, phyſician or not, freely declare his own ſentiments about it; let him aſſign any credible account of its riſe, or the cauſes ſtrong enough in his opinion to introduce ſo terrible a ſcene —— I ſhall only relate what it actually was; and, as from an information in all its *ſymptoms*, none may be quite at a loſs about it, if ever it ſhould happen again, I ſhall give an exact detail of them; having been ſick of it myſelf, and ſeen many others afflicted with it.

This very year, as is univerſally allowed, had been more than any other remarkably free from common diſorders; or, whatever diſeaſes had already ſeized the body, they ended at length in this. But thoſe, who enjoy'd the moſt perfect health, were ſuddenly, without any apparent cauſe, ſeiz'd at firſt with head-achs extremely violent, with inflammations and fiery redneſs in the eyes. Within — the throat

moralize like a man of virtue and good-ſenſe, every reader muſt judge, as every reader will judge for himſelf. The *tranſlator* hath chiefly endeavoured to preſerve that ſolemn air, which [illegible] ought the prime diſtinction of the original.

and tongue began inſtantly to be red as blood; the breath was drawn with difficulty and had a noiſome ſmell. The ſymptoms that ſucceeded theſe were ſneezing and hoarſeneſs; and not long after, the malady deſcended to the breaſt, with a violent cough: But when once ſettled in the ſtomach, it excited vomitings, in which was thrown up all that matter phyſicians call *diſcharges of bile*, attended with exceſſive torture. A great part of the infected were ſubject to ſuch violent hiccups without any diſcharge, as brought upon them a ſtrong convulſion, to ſome but of a ſhort, to others of a very long continuance. The body, to the outward touch was neither exceeding hot, nor of a pallid hue, but reddiſh, livid, marked all over with little puſtules and ſores. Yet inwardly it was ſcorched with ſuch exceſſive heat, that it could not bear the lighteſt covering or the fineſt linen upon it, but muſt be left quite naked. They longed for nothing ſo much as to be plunging into cold water; and many of thoſe who were not properly attended, threw themſelves into wells, hurried by a thirſt not to be extinguiſhed; and whether they drank much or little, their torment ſtill continued the ſame. The reſtleſsneſs of their bodies and an utter inability of compoſing themſelves by ſleep never abated for a moment. And the body, ſo long as the diſtemper continued in its height, had no viſible waſte, but withſtood its rage to a miracle, ſo that moſt of them periſhed within nine or ſeven days, by the heat that ſcorched their vitals, tho' their ſtrength was not exhauſted; or, if they continued longer, the diſtemper fell into the belly, cauſing violent ulcerations in the bowels, accompanied with an inceſſant flux, by which many, reduced to an exceſſive weakneſs, were carried off. For the malady beginning in the head, and ſettling firſt there, ſunk afterwards gradually down the whole body. And whoever got ſafe through all its moſt dangerous ſtages, yet the extremities of their bodies ſtill retained the marks of its violence. For it ſhot down into their privy-members, into their fingers and toes, by loſing which they eſcaped

with

with life. Some there were, who loſt their eyes; and ſome, who being quite recovered, had at once totally loſt all memory, and quite forgot, not only their moſt intimate friends, but even their own ſelves. For as this diſtemper was in general virulent beyond expreſſion, and its every part more grievous than yet had fallen to the lot of human nature, ſo, in one particular inſtance, it appeared to be none of the natural infirmities of man, ſince the birds and beaſts that prey on human fleſh, either never approached the dead bodies, of which many lay about uninterred; or certainly periſhed, if they ever taſted. [9] One proof of this is the total diſappearance then of ſuch birds, for not one was to be ſeen, either in any other place, or about any one of the carcaſes. But the dogs, becauſe of their conſtant familiarity with man, afforded a more notorious proof of this event.

The nature of this peſtilential diſorder was in general --- for I have purpoſely omitted its many varied appearances, or the circumſtances particular to ſome of the infected in contradiſtinction to others---ſuch as hath been deſcribed. None of the common maladies incident to

9 This paſſage is tranſlated cloſe to the letter of the original. It was intended by the Author to ſhew the exceſſive malignancy of the plague, as the very fleſh of the dead bodies was ſo fatally peſtilential to carnivorous animal; — "Either, they never taſted; or, if they taſted, died." One proof of this is preſumptive, ariſing from the diſappearance of all birds of prey. The ſecond was certain, and an object of ſenſible obſervation. Every body could ſee that dogs, thoſe familiar animals who live with and accompany men abroad, either never taſted; or, if hunger at any time forced them to it, they certainly loſt their lives. Lucretius literally tranſlates the *circumſtance* itſelf, but hath enlarged in the *proofs*, and intimates that the diſtemper raged amongſt thoſe animals, even without eating the fleſh of the dead, and was general to every living ſpecies.

Multaque humi cùm inhumata jacerent corpora ſupra
Corporibus, tamen alituum genus atque ferarum
Aut procul abſiliebat, ut acrem exiret odorem:
Aut, ubi guſtârat, languebat morte propinquâ.
Nec tamen omnino temere illis ſolibus ulla
Comparebat avis, nec noctibu' ſæcla ferarum
Exibant ſylvis: languebant pleraque morbo,
Et moriebantur: cum primis fida canum vis
Strata viis animam ponebat in omnibus ægram;
Extorquebat enim vitam vis morbida membris.

human nature prevailed at that time; or, whatever diſorder any where appeared, it ended in this. Some died, merely for want of care; and ſome, with all the care that could poſſibly be taken; nor was any one medicine diſcovered, from whence could be promiſed any certain relief, ſince that which gave eaſe to one, was prejudicial to another. Whatever difference there was in bodies, in point of ſtrength or in point of weakneſs, it availed nothing; all were equally ſwept away before it, in ſpite of regular diet and ſtudied preſcriptions. Yet the moſt affecting circumſtances of this calamity were --- that dejection of mind, which conſtantly attended the firſt attack; for the mind ſinking at once into deſpair, they the ſooner gave themſelves up without a ſtruggle ---- and, that mutual tenderneſs in taking care of one another, which communicated the infection, and made them drop like ſheep [1]. This latter caſe cauſed the mortality to be ſo great. For if fear withheld them from going near one another, they died for want of help, ſo that many houſes became quite deſolate for want of needful attendance: And, if they ventured, they were *gone*. This was moſt frequently the caſe of the kind and compaſſionate. Such perſons were aſhamed, out of a ſelfiſh concern for themſelves, entirely to abandon their friends, when their menial ſervants, no longer able to endure the groans and lamentations of the dying, had been compelled to fly from ſuch a weight of calamity. But thoſe eſpecially, who had ſafely gone through it, took pity on the dying and the ſick, becauſe they knew by experience what it really was, and were now ſecure in themſelves; for it never ſeized any one a ſecond

1 This paſſage is thus tranſlated upon the authority of Dr. Mead, in his treatiſe on *the Plague*, which convinced me, that the comma ſhould be omitted in the original after ἑτέρῳ, and διεφθείρετο be governed of ἀπό. Lucretius hath given it a different turn, as if the reſemblance to ſheep was not in their dying faſt, but to the forlorn and ſolitary manner in which thoſe creatures die; and he hath put before it what follows a little after in Thucydides.

Nam quicunque ſuos fugitabant viſere ad ægros,
Vitaï nimiùm cupidi, mortiſque timentes,
Pœnibat paulò pòſt turpi morte malâque
Deſertos, opis expertes, incuria mactans,
Lanigeras tanquam pecudes, et bucera ſæcla.

time

time ſo as to be mortal. Such were looked upon as quite happy by others, and were themſelves at firſt overjoyed in their late eſcape, and the groundleſs hope that hereafter no diſtemper would prove fatal to them. Beſide this reigning calamity, the general removal from the country into the city, was a heavy grievance, more particularly to thoſe who had been neceſſitated to come thither. For as they had no houſes, but dwelled all the ſummer-ſeaſon in booths, where there was ſcarce room to breathe, the peſtilence deſtroyed with the utmoſt diſorder, ſo that they lay together in heaps, the dying upon the dead, and the dead upon the dying. Some were tumbling one over another in the public ſtreets, or lay expiring round about every fountain, whither they had crept to aſſuage their immoderate thirſt. The temples, in which they had erected tents for their reception, were full of the bodies of thoſe who had expired there. For in a calamity ſo outrageouſly violent and univerſal deſpair, things ſacred and holy had quite loſt their diſtinction. Nay, all regulations obſerved before in matters of ſepulture were quite confounded, ſince every one buried wherever he could find a place. Some, whoſe ſepulchres were already filled by the numbers which had periſhed in their own families, were ſhamefully compelled to ſeize thoſe of others. They ſurprized on a ſudden the piles which others had built for their own friends, and burned their dead upon them; and ſome, whilſt one body was burning on a pile, toſſed another body they had dragged thither upon it, and went their way.

Thus did the peſtilence give their firſt riſe to thoſe iniquitous acts which prevailed more and more in Athens. For every one was now more eaſily induced openly to do what for decency they did only covertly before. They ſaw the ſtrange mutability of outward condition, the rich untimely cut off, and their wealth pouring ſuddenly on the indigent and neceſſitous; ſo that they thought it prudent to catch hold of ſpeedy enjoyments and quick guſts of pleaſure; perſuaded, that their bodies and their wealth might be their own merely

for

for the day. Not any one continued reſolute enough to form any honeſt or generous deſign, when ſo uncertain whether he ſhould live to effect it. Whatever he knew could improve the pleaſure or ſatisfaction of the preſent moment, *that* he determined to be honour and intereſt. Reverence of the Gods or the laws of ſociety laid no reſtraints upon them; either judging that piety and impiety were things quite indifferent, ſince they ſaw that all men periſhed alike; or throwing away every apprehenſion of being called to account for their enormities, ſince juſtice might be prevented by death; or rather, as the heavieſt of judgments to which man could be doomed, was already hanging over their heads, ſnatching this interval of life for pleaſure, before it fell.

With ſuch a weight of calamity were the Athenians at this time on all ſides oppreſſed. Their city was one ſcene of death, and the adjacent country of ruin and devaſtation. In this their affliction they called to mind, as was likely they ſhould, the following *prediction*, which perſons of the greateſt age informed them had been formerly made,

Two heavy judgments will at once befall,
A Doric war *without*, a plague *within* your wall.

There had indeed been a diſpute before, whether their anceſtors in this prediction read λοίμῳ a *plague*, or λιμῷ a *famine*. Yet in their preſent circumſtances all with probability agreed that λοιμῷ, a *plague*, was the right: For they adapted the interpretation to what they now ſuffered. ---- But in my ſentiments, ſhould they ever again be engaged in a Doric war, and a famine happen at the ſame time, they will have recourſe with equal probability to the other interpretation. It was further remembred by thoſe who knew of the oracle given to the Lacedæmonians, that when they inquired of the *God*, "whether they ſhould engage in this war," his anſwer was, that ---- "if

"if they carried it on with all their ſtrength, they ſhould be victo-
"rious, and he himſelf would fight on their ſide;" --- and therefore they concluded, that what now befel was the completion of the oracle. ----- The peſtilence broke out immediately upon the irruption of the Peloponneſians, and never extended itſelf to Peloponneſus, a circumſtance which ought to be related. It raged the moſt and for the longeſt time in Athens, but afterwards ſpread into the other towns, eſpecially the moſt populous. --- And this is an exact account of the plague.

Peloponneſians *ſtill in* Attica.

The Peloponneſians, after they had ravaged the inland-parts, extended their devaſtations to thoſe which are called, *The Coaſt*, as far as mount Laurium [2], where the Athenians had ſilver-mines. And here, they firſt ravaged the part which looks towards Peloponneſus, and afterwards that which lies towards Eubœa and Andros. But Pericles, who was then in the command, perſiſted in the ſame opinion as before in the former incurſion, that "the Athenians ought not to "march out againſt them." Yet, whilſt the enemy was up in the country, before they had advanced as far as the coaſt, he had equip'd a fleet of an hundred ſhips to invade Peloponneſus; and, when every thing was ready, he put to ſea [3]. On board theſe ſhips he had embarked

2 The ſilver-mines at Laurium originally belonged to private perſons, but were united to the public domaine by Themiſtocles. A great number of ſlaves were employed in working them, and the produce paid amply for all the labour beſtowed upon them. Whether the *ſtate* was much enriched by them is a queſtion; the undertakers and proprietors of the ſlaves who wrought them drew great wealth from them, as we are told by Xenophon in his treatiſe of *revenue*.

3 Plutarch relates, in the *life* of Pericles, that on this occaſion, when all was ready, "when the forces were ſhipped, and Pericles himſelf was juſt got on board his trireme, the ſun was eclipſed. It ſoon grew ſo dark, that all men were aſtoniſhed at ſo dreadful a prodigy. Pericles, ſeeing his own pilot quite terrified and confounded, threw a cloke over his face, and wrapping him up in it, asked, Whether he ſaw any thing dreadful, or any thing that portended danger? The pilot anſwering in the negative, What difference then (he went on) between this affair and that, unleſs that what hath darkned the ſun is bigger than a cloke?" Pericles had eaſily learned of his preceptor Anaxagoras

barked four thouſand heavy-armed Athenians; and in veſſels for tranſporting horſe, now firſt fitted up for this ſervice out of old ſhips, three hundred horſemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined in the expedition with fifty ſail. At the very time this fleet went to ſea from Athens, they left the Peloponneſians on the *coaſt* of Attica. When they were arrived before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponneſus, they ravaged great part of the country about it, and making an aſſault on the city itſelf, had ſome hopes of taking it, but did not ſucceed. Leaving Epidaurus, they ravaged the country about Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione; all theſe places are ſituated on the ſea-coaſt of Peloponneſus. But ſailing from hence, they came before Praſiæ, a fort of Laconia ſituated upon the ſea, around which they laid the country waſte; and having taken the fort by aſſault, demoliſhed it. After theſe performances they returned home, and found the Peloponneſians no longer in Attica, but retired within their own dominions.

The whole ſpace of time that the Peloponneſians were upon the lands of the Athenians, and the Athenians employed in their ſea-expedition, the plague was making havoc both in the troops of the Athenians, and within the city. This occaſioned a report, that the Peloponneſians, for fear of the infection, as having been informed by deſerters that it raged in the city, and been witneſſes themſelves of their frequent interments, retired out of their territory with ſome precipitation. Yet they perſever'd in this incurſion longer than they had ever done before, and had made the whole country one continued devaſtation; for the time of their continuance in Attica was about forty days.

Acts of the Athenians.

The ſame ſummer, Ægon the ſon of Nicias, and Cleopompus the ſon of Clinius, joined in the command with Pericles, ſetting them-

Anaxagoras how to account for eclipſes. But whether Plutarch hath placed this incident in right time, is a queſtion: For Thucydides, who is exact in theſe things, mentions no eclipſe of the ſun this ſummer,

ſelves

ſelves at the head of the force which he had employed before, carried them without loſs of time againſt the Chalcidéans of Thrace. But when they were come up to Potidæa, which was ſtill beſieged, they play'd their engines of battery againſt, and left no method unattempted to take it. But the ſucceſs in this attempt did not anſwer expectation, nor indeed was the event in any reſpect the leaſt proportioned to their great preparations: For the plague followed them even hither, and making grievous havoc among the Athenians, deſtroyed the army; ſo that even thoſe ſoldiers who had been there before, and had from the beginning of the ſiege been in perfect health, caught the infection from the troops brought thither by Agnon.—— Phormio, and the body of ſixteen hundred men under his command, had before this quitted Chalcidica, ſo that Agnon ſailed back with the ſhips to Athens, of his four thouſand men the plague having ſwept away one thouſand and fifty in about forty days: But the ſoldiers who were there before, were left to carry on the ſiege of Potidæa.

Sad ſtate of the Athenians.

After the ſecond incurſion of the Peloponneſians, the Athenians, whoſe lands were now a ſecond time laid waſte, who felt the double affliction of peſtilence and war, had entirely changed their ſentiments of things. The blame was univerſally thrown on Pericles, as if at his inſtigation they had engaged in this war, and by him had been plunged in all theſe calamities. They deſired with impatience to make up the breach with the Lacedæmonians; but, tho' they diſpatched an embaſſy for this purpoſe, no terms could be agreed on. Thus grievouſly diſtreſſed, and no method of reſource occurring to their minds, their reſentments fell ſtill heavier on Pericles. He, ſeeing them quite diſpirited with their preſent misfortunes, and intent on ſuch projects as he had reaſon to expect they would, called a general aſſembly of the people, which by ſtill continuing in the command of the army he was authorized to do. He had a mind to encourage them, to ſooth the hot reſentments fermenting in their breaſts,

and bring them into a more calm and confident temper. He presented himself before them, and spoke as follows ——

Speech of Pericles.

" I FULLY expected, I freely own it, to become the object of " your resentments. I am not ignorant of the causes of it; and for " this purpose have convened *this* assembly, to expostulate with, " nay even to reprimand you, if without any reason you make me " the mark of your displeasure, or cowardly sink under the weight " of your misfortunes: For it is my firm opinion, that by the full " health and vigor of a *state* the happiness of its constituents is bet- " ter secured, than when each separate member is thriving whilst " the public welfare totters. Be the situation of any private person " prosperous and fine as his heart can wish --- if his country be ruin- " ed, he himself must necessarily be involved in that ruin. But he " that is unfortunate in a flourishing community, may soon catch " hold of expedients of redress. When therefore your country is " able to support the misfortunes of its every member, and yet each " of those members must needs be inveloped in the ruin of his " country, why will you not join and unite your efforts to prevent " that ruin ---- and not (as you are now going to do, because con- " founded with your domestic misfortunes) basely desert the public " safety, and cast the most unjust of censures upon me who ad- " vised this war, upon your own selves also who approved this ad- " vice? What --- I am the man that must singly stand the storm " of your anger! ----- I am indeed the man, who I am confident is " not inferior to any one amongst you in knowing what ought to " be known, and in speaking what ought to be spoke, who sincerely " loves his country, and is superior to all the sordid views of in- " terest. For he, who thinks aright, and yet cannot communicate " his own thoughts, is just as insignificant as if he could not think " at all. He that enjoys both these faculties in perfection, and yet

" is

" is an enemy to his country, will in like manner never ſay any
" thing for his country's good: Or, tho' he love his country, and
" be not proof againſt corruption, he may proſtitute every thing to
" his own avarice. If therefore you judged my qualifications in all
" theſe reſpects to be in ſome moderate degree ſuperior to thoſe of
" other men, and were thus drawn into a war by my advice, there
" can certainly be no reaſon why I ſhould be accuſed of having done
" you wrong. Thoſe indeed, who are already in the faſt poſſeſſion
" of all the ends attainable by war, muſt make a fooliſh choice if
" they run to arms: But, if once under a neceſſity, either through
" tame ſubmiſſion to be inſlaved by a neighbour-power, or by a brave
" reſiſtance to get the maſtery over them ---- he who flies danger in
" ſuch a caſe, is much more worthy of reproach than he who meets
" it with bold defiance.

" I indeed am the man I was, and of the mind I was. It is
" you, whoſe reſolutions have wavered; --- you, who whilſt unhurt
" through my perſuaſion reſolved on war, and repent ſo ſoon as you
" feel its ſtrokes --- who meaſure the ſoundneſs of my advice by the
" weakneſs of your own judgments, and therefore condemn it, be-
" cauſe the preſent diſaſters have ſo entirely engaged the whole of
" your attention, that you have none left to perceive the high im-
" portance of it to the Public. Cruel indeed is that reverſe of for-
" tune which hath ſo ſuddenly afflicted you, dejecting your minds
" and diſpiriting your former reſolutions! Accidents ſudden and un-
" foreſeen, and ſo oppoſite to that event you might reaſonably have
" expected, inſlave the mind; --- which hath been your caſe in all
" the late contingencies, and more particularly ſo in this grievous pe-
" ſtilence. Yet men, who are the conſtituents of ſuch a mighty
" *State*, and whoſe manners have been by education formed for its
" ſupport, ought never to want that inward fortitude which can ſtem
" the greateſt of afflictions, nor by ſelf-deſertion utterly to efface
" their native dignity. The world will always have equal reaſon

" to condemn the perſon, who ſinks from a height of glory by his
" own puſillanimity, and to hate the perſon who impudently pre-
" tends to what he never can deſerve. It muſt be therefore your
" duty to ſuppreſs this too keen a ſenſibility of your own private
" loſſes, and with united fortitude to act in the defence of the public
" ſafety. Let us therefore bravely undergo the toils of this war;
" and, if the toil increaſeth, let our reſolution increaſe with it. And
" let theſe, added to all thoſe other proofs of my integrity I have
" exhibited on other occaſions, ſuffice to convince you, that your
" preſent cenſures and ſuſpicions of me are raſh and groundleſs.

" I ſhall now lay before you a *point*, which, ſo far as I can judge,
" you have as yet never properly conſidered, nor have I in any for-
" mer diſcourſe inſiſted upon —— " the means within your reach of
" riſing to ſupreme dominion." Nor ſhould I meddle even now with
" [4] a point, pompous beyond poetic viſions, did I not ſee you beyond
" meaſure fearful and dejected. You think you are only maſters of
" your own dependents; but I loudly aver, that you are greater
" maſters now both at land and ſea, thoſe neceſſary ſpheres for car-
" rying on the ſervices of life, than any other power; and may be
" greater yet, if ſo inclined. There is not now a king, there is not
" any nation in the univerſal world, able to withſtand that navy,
" which even at this juncture you can lanch out to ſea. Why is not

4 Pericles here is about to convince the Athenians, that they may riſe to ſupreme dominion in conſequence of their naval ſuperiority. It was his ambition to execute the grand extenſive plan which was formed originally by Themiſtocles. And the words, in which he introduceth this topic, are ſo full of energy, that they bear hard upon a tranſlator. He calls it a *point* —— Κομψοτέραν ἔχουσι τὴν προσ-ποίησιν. My firſt attempts at them were very faint and imperfect. I was ſoon convinced of it by the greateſt *Genius* of the age, who did me the honour to read over this ſpeech in manuſcript, and who, as he thinks and ſpeaks like Pericles, could not endure that any of his words ſhould be depreciated. I hope now I have expreſſed all the ideas which the orginal words include. Mr. *Hobbes* hath entirely dropped them in his tranſlation.

this

" this extenſive power regarded in ballancing the loſs of your houſes " and lands, thoſe intolerable damages which you think you have " ſuffered? — It is not ſo reaſonable, to grieve and deſpond under " ſuch petty loſſes, as to deſpiſe them from the thought, that they " are merely the trappings and embelliſhments of wealth; to fix the " firm remembrance within us, that liberty, in defence of which we " are ready to hazard our all, will eaſily give us thoſe trifles again; " and, that by tamely ſubmitting to our enemies, the poſſeſſion of " all we have will be taken from us. We ought not in either of " theſe reſpects to degenerate from our fathers. By toil and toil alone " they gained theſe valuable acquiſitions, defended themſelves in " the poſſeſſion, and bequeathed the precious inheritance to us. " And to loſe the advantages we have poſſeſſed, will be much more " diſgraceful than to have miſcarried in their purſuit. But we ought " to encounter our enemies, not with valour only but with confi- " dence of ſucceſs. Valour ſtarts up even in a coward, if he once " prevails through lucky ignorance; but *ſuch* a confidence muſt be " in every mind, which is ſeriouſly convinced of its own ſuperiority, " as is now our caſe. Nay even when the match is equal, the " certainty of what muſt be done ariſing from an inward bravery, " adds the greater ſecurity to courage. Confidence then is not built " on hope which acts only in uncertainty, but on the ſedate deter- " mination of what it is able to perform, an aſſurance of which is " more guarded againſt diſappointments.

" It is further your duty to ſupport the public *character*, (as in it " to a man you pride yourſelves,) with which its extenſive rule in- " veſts our community, and either not to fly from toils, or never to " aim at glory. Think not you have only one point at ſtake, the " alternative of ſlavery inſtead of freedom; but think alſo of the " utter loſs of ſovereignty, and the danger of vengeance for all the " offences you have given in the practice of it. To reſign it is not " in your power, —— and of this let *him* be aſſured, who refines

" through

" through fear and hopes to earn indemnity by exerting it no longer.
" In your hands it hath run out into a kind of tyranny. To take
" it up ſeems indeed unjuſt, but to lay it down is exceeding danger-
" ous. And if ſuch daſtardly ſouls could perſuade others, they
" would ſoon bring this *ſtate* to utter ruin, or indeed any other
" where they were members and enjoy'd the chief adminiſtration of
" affairs. For the undiſturbed and quiet life will be of ſhort conti-
" nuance without the interpoſition of a vigilant activity. Slavery is
" never to be endured by a *ſtate* that once hath governed —— ſuch
" a ſituation can be tolerable only to *that* which hath ever been
" dependent.

" Suffer not yourſelves therefore to be ſeduced by men of ſuch
" mean and groveling tempers, nor level your reſentments at me —
" ſince tho' I adviſed the war, it was not begun without your appro-
" bation — if the enemy hath invaded you in ſuch a manner as you
" could not but expect from your own reſolutions never to be de-
" pendent. What tho' beyond our apprehenſions we have ſuffered
" the ſad viſitation of peſtilence? —— Such misfortunes no human
" foreſight will be able to prevent —— tho' I know, that even *this*
" hath in ſome meaſure ſerved to ſharpen your averſion to me. But
" if this be juſt, I claim as my lawful right, the glory of all thoſe
" happy contingencies, which may ever befal you beyond your ex-
" pectation. The evils inflicted by heaven muſt be born with patient
" reſignation; and the evils by enemies with manly fortitude. Such
" rational behaviour hath hitherto been habitual in Athens; let it
" not now be reverſed by you; —— by you, who know to what a
" pitch of excellence this *State* hath roſe in the eſteem of the world,
" by not yielding to adverſity; but, by braving all the horrors of war
" and pouring forth its blood in the glorious cauſe, hath reached the
" higheſt ſummit of power, and ever ſince retained it. The memory
" of this, time itſelf will never be able to efface, even tho' we may
" ſuffer it to droop and periſh in our hands —— as what is human

" muſt

" muſt decline —— Our memory I ſay, who, tho' Grecians our-
" ſelves, gave laws to all other Grecians, ſtood the ſhock of moſt
" formidable wars, reſiſted them all when combined againſt us, con-
" quered them all when ſeparately engaged, and maintained our-
" ſelves in poſſeſſion of the moſt flouriſhing and moſt powerful *State*
" in the world. *Theſe* things let the indolent and ſluggiſh ſoul con-
" demn, but *theſe* let the active and induſtrious ſtrive to emulate, for
" *theſe* they who cannot attain will envy.

" To be cenſured and maligned for a time, hath been the fate of
" all thoſe, whoſe merit hath raiſed them above the common le-
" vel; — but wiſe and judicious is the man, who enjoying the ſupe-
" riority, deſpiſeth the envy. An averſion ſo conceived will never
" laſt. His merit ſoon breaks forth in all its ſplendor, and his glory
" is afterwards handed down to poſterity never to be forgot. You,
" who have ſo clear a proſpect before you, both of what will be
" ſome time glorious and of what at preſent is not diſgraceful, re-
" collect your own worth and ſecure both. Sink not ſo low as to
" petition terms from the Lacedæmonians; nor let them imagine,
" that you feel the weight of your preſent misfortunes. The man,
" whoſe reſolution never ſinks before it, but ſtrives by a brave oppo-
" ſition, to repel calamity, *ſuch* — whether in a public or private
" capacity — muſt be acknowledged to be the worthieſt man."

Pericles a good and able miniſter.

By arguments like theſe did Pericles endeavour to mollify the reſentments of the Athenians againſt himſelf, and to divert their minds from their public calamities. In regard to the public, they ſeemed to be ſatisfied with all that he had urged; they deſiſted from ſoliciting an accommodation with the Lacedæmmonians; and were more hearty than ever for continuing the war. Yet, in their own private concerns, they were grievouſly dejected under their preſent misfortunes. The poor citizens, who had but little, could not bear with patience the loſs of that little. The rich and the great regretted the

loſs

loſs of their eſtates, with their country-ſeats and ſplendid furniture; — but worſt of all, that inſtead of peace they had the ſad alternative of war. However neither poor nor rich abated their diſpleaſure to Pericles, till they had laid upon him a pecuniary fine.[5] And yet, no long time after — ſo unſteddy are the humours of the people — they elected him *general* again, and intruſted him with the adminiſtration of affairs. The keen ſenſe they had at firſt of their own private loſſes ſoon grew blunt and unaffecting, and they could not but allow him the moſt capable perſon to provide for all the urgent neceſſities of the public. For the ſupreme authority he enjoyed in times of peace he had exerciſed with great moderation; he was vigilant and active for the good of the community, which never made ſo great a figure as under his adminiſtration; and after war broke out it is plain he beſt knew the reach of its ability to carry it on. He lived two years and ſix months from its commencement: and after his[6] death, his judicious foreſight in regard to this war was more

5 Plutarch (in the *life* of Pericles) ſays authors are not agreed about the quantity of the fine at this time laid upon Pericles. Some lower it to fifteen talents, others mount it up to fifty. The demagogue, who incited the people to fine him, is alſo ſaid by ſome to have been *Cleon*, with whoſe genius and character the reader will ſoon become acquainted.

6 As the Hiſtorian is here going to take his leave of Pericles, he adjoins a true repreſentation of his patriot ſpirit, his great abilities, his judicious foreſight, and ſucceſsful adminiſtration. And here, the reader may be informed of ſome points, which Thucydides either thought needleſs when he wrote, or foreign to his ſubject. — Pericles had two ſons by his former wife. The eldeſt of them proved a great vexation to his father, who was unable to ſupport him in his expenſive way of living. Pericles had no large eſtate, and he was not richer for fingering the public money. He laid it all out in adorning his Athens, and was rewarded for it by giving ſo many magnificent and laſting proofs of his fine taſte in painting, ſculpture, and building. For the city of Rome received not ſo much decoration from her foundation till the time of the Cæſars, as Athens did from Pericles alone. Yet œconomy was his paſſion at home, as that of his ſon Xantippus was luxury. This ſon however was taken off by the plague, as was afterwards a ſiſter of Pericles, moſt of his intimates and relations, and his other ſon Paralus. This laſt was the heavieſt blow; he felt it deeply: And all

more and more acknowledged. For he had aſſured them they could not fail of ſucceſs, provided they would not meddle by land, but apply themſelves ſolely to their navy, without being ſolicitous to enlarge their territories in this war, or expoſing Athens itſelf to danger. But they had recourſe to ſchemes quite oppoſite to theſe, nay even to ſome that had no connexion at all with this war, wherein private ambition or private intereſt puſhed them to ſuch management as was highly prejudicial to themſelves and their allies. Whenever theſe politic ſchemes ſucceeded, private perſons carried off all the honour and advantage; — whenever they miſcarried, the hardſhips of the war fell more ſeverely on the *State*. The reaſon was this —— Pericles, a man of acknowledged worth and ability, and whoſe integrity was undoubtedly proof againſt corruption, kept the

all Athens did all that lay in their power to comfort him, ſince, contrary to a law of Pericles' own making, they enrolled his ſon Pericles, whom he had by Aſpaſia, an Athenian of the full blood. At length, he was ſeized himſelf by the plague; and, after languiſhing a long time, in a manner different to moſt others, died of it. In his laſt moments, he ſhewed to a friend who was viſiting him a charm which the women had hung about his neck, as if he was ſick indeed, when he could ſubmit to ſuch foolery. When ſeveral of them were ſitting round his bed, and, thinking he did not hear them, were enumerating the great exploits of his life, the ſhining incidents of his adminiſtration, his victories, and the nine trophies he had erected, he interrupted them with theſe words, "I wonder you "lay ſtreſs upon ſuch actions, in which "fortune claims a ſhare along with me, "and which many others have performed "as well as myſelf, and yet paſs over the "higheſt glory and moſt valuable part of "my character, that no citizen of Athens "ever put on mourning through me." The wonderful man, though engaged for forty years in buſineſs, and conſtantly attacked by every furious, ſeditious and turbulent Athenian, had never amidſt all his power given way to the ſpirit of revenge. For this, as Plutarch finely obſerves, he in ſome meaſure deſerved the lofty title of *Olympian*, too arrogant in any other light for man to wear; ſince gentleneſs of manners and the habits of mercy and forgiveneſs raiſe men to the neareſt reſemblance of the Gods. Plutarch adds, that the Athenians never regretted any man ſo much, and with ſo much reaſon. —— If the reader be willing to hear any more of Aſpaſia, the ſame writer tells us, that after the death of Pericles, ſhe married one Lyſicles, a low and obſcure man and a dealer in cattle, whom however ſhe improved into an Athenian of the firſt claſs.

people in order by a gentle management, and was not ſo much directed by them as their principal director. He had not worked himſelf into power by indirect methods, and therefore was not obliged to ſooth and honour their caprices, but could contradict and diſregard their anger with peculiar dignity. Whenever he ſaw them bent on projects injurious or unreaſonable, he terrified them ſo by the force of his eloquence, that he made them tremble and deſiſt; and when they were diſquieted by groundleſs apprehenſions, he animated them afreſh into brave reſolution. The *State* under him, tho' ſtiled a democracy, was in fact a monarchy. His ſucceſſors more on a level with one another, and yet every one affecting to be chief, were forced to cajole the people, and ſo to neglect the concerns of the public. This was the ſource of many grievous errors, as muſt unavoidably be the caſe in a great community and poſſeſſed of large dominion — but in particular of the expedition to Sicily; the ill-conduct of which did not appear ſo flagrantly in relation to thoſe againſt whom it was undertaken, as to the authors and movers of it, who knew not how to make the proper proviſion for thoſe who were employed in it. For engaged in their own private conteſts for power with the people, they had not ſufficient attention to the army abroad, and at home were embroiled in mutual altercations. Yet, notwithſtanding the miſcarriage in Sicily in which they loſt their army with the greater part of their fleet, and the ſedition which inſtantly broke out in Athens, they bravely reſiſted for three years together, not only their firſt enemies in the war, but the Sicilians alſo in conjunction with them, the greater part of their dependents revolted from them, and at length Cyrus *the king*'s ſon, who favouring the Peloponneſians ſupplied them with money for the ſervice of their fleet; — nor would at laſt be conquered, till by their own inteſtine feuds they were utterly diſabled from reſiſting longer. So much better than any other perſon was Pericles acquainted with their ſtrength, when he marked out ſuch a conduct to them as would infallibly have enabled the

Athenian

Athenian *State* to have continued the war longer than the Peloponeſians could poſſibly have done.

Proceedings of the Lacedæmonians.

The Lacedæmonians in junction with their allies, the ſame ſummer fitted out a fleet of one hundred ſhips againſt the iſland Zacynthus which lies over-againſt Elis. They are a colony of the Achæans of Peloponneſus, and were then in league with the Athenians. On board this fleet were a thouſand heavy-armed Lacedæmonians; and Cnemus the Spartan commanded in the expedition. Making a deſcent upon the iſland they ravaged great part of the country, — but finding the entire reduction of it impracticable, they re-embarked and returned home.

Their embaſſadors to the king.

In the cloſe of the ſame ſummer, Ariſteus the Corinthian, Aneriſtus, Nicolaus, Protodemus and Timagoras of Tegea, embaſſadors from the Lacedæmonians, and Polis the Argive without any public character, travelling into Aſia, to engage the Perſian king to ſupply them with men and money for carrying on the war, on their journey ſtop firſt in Thrace and addreſs themſelves to Sitalces the ſon of Teres. They had a mind to try if they could prevail upon him to quit the Athenian alliance, to march to the relief of Potidæa now beſieged by the Athenians, to deſiſt for the future from giving the latter any aſſiſtance, and to obtain from him a ſafe conduct through his territory for the continuance of their journey beyond the Helleſpont to Pharnaces ſon of Pharnabazus, who would afterwards conduct them in ſafety to the royal court. Learchus the ſon of Callimachus, and Ameiniades the ſon of Philemon, happening at that time to be with Sitalces, on an embaſſy from Athens, perſuade Sadocus the ſon of Sitalces, who had been made a citizen of Athens, to ſeize and deliver them up to them, that they might not go forwards to the *king*, to the prejudice of that community of which he was a member. He hearkening to their advice arreſts them juſt as they were going on ſhip-board to croſs the Helleſpont, after they had travelled through Thrace to the ſpot marked for their embarkation. He executed this

by means of ſome truſty perſons diſpatched purpoſely after them along with Learchus and Ameiniades, and expreſly ordered to deliver them up to the latter: They, ſo ſoon as they had got them in their power, carried them to Athens. Upon their arrival there, the Athenians ſtanding in great fear of Ariſteus, leſt upon eſcape he might do them further miſchief, ſince before this he had been the author of all the projects to their prejudice both at Potidæa and in Thrace, put them to death on the very day of their arrival, unjudged and ſuing in vain to be heard, and caſt them into pits. This cruel uſage of them they juſtified from the example of the Lacedæmonians, who had in the ſame manner put to death and caſt into pits the Athenian merchants and thoſe of their allies, whom they had ſeized in the trading-veſſels upon the coaſts of Peloponneſus. For, in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians had put to death as enemies, all thoſe whom they could take at ſea — not thoſe only who belonged to the *States* in alliance with the Athenians, but even ſuch as were of the yet neutral communities.

Ambraciots *war upon the* Amphilochians.

About the ſame time in the end of ſummer, the Ambraciots in conjunction with many of the Barbarians, whom they had excited to take up arms, invaded Argos of Amphilochia, and made excurſions over all its dependent territory. Their enmity againſt the Argives took its original from hence. —— This Argos was firſt built, and this province of Amphilochia firſt planted by Amphilochus the ſon of Amphiaraus immediately after the Trojan war, who on his return home, being diſſatisfied with the ſtate of affairs in that other Argos, founded this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and gave it the ſame name with the place of his nativity. It ſoon became the largeſt city of Amphilochia, and the inhabitants were moſt powerful of any thereabouts. Yet many generations after, being ſunk by misfortunes, they prevailed upon the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia to unite with them. This community of reſidence brought them to their preſent uſe of one common language, the Greek: But the reſt of the

Amphilochians

Amphilochians are ſtill Barbarians. Yet in proceſs of time, the Ambraciots drive the Argives from amongſt them, and keep poſſeſſion of the city for themſelves. Upon this event, the Amphilochians threw themſelves under the protection of the Acarnanians, and both together implored the ſuccour of the Athenians, who ſent thirty ſhips to their aſſiſtance under the command of Phormio. Upon Phormio's arrival, they take Argos by ſtorm, made all the Ambraciots ſlaves, and then both the Amphilochians and Acarnanians ſettle themſelves together in the city. To theſe incidents was firſt owing the league offenſive and defenſive between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The chief cauſe of the inveteracy, which the Ambraciots bore to the Argives, was their having made them in this manner ſlaves; and which afterwards impelled them, in the confuſion of this war, to form this invaſion with the junction of the Chaonians and ſome other neighbouring Barbarians. Advancing up to Argos, they were entire maſters of the whole territory, but in vain endeavoured to take the town by aſſault; upon which they again returned home and diſperſed to their reſpective nations. — Such were the tranſactions of the ſummer.

On the firſt approach of winter, the Athenians ſent out twenty ſhips to cruize on the coaſts of Peloponneſus, under the command of Phormio; who, fixing his ſtation before Naupactus, kept ſo ſtrict a guard, that nothing durſt paſs in or out from Corinth and the gulf of Criſſa. — Six other ſhips they ſend to Caria and Lycia, under the command of Meleſander, to levy contributions there, and to ſtop the excurſions of the Peloponneſian privateers, harbouring in thoſe parts, from moleſting the courſe of their trading veſſels from Phaſelis, Phœnicia, and the adjacent continent. Meleſander, with the Athenian and confederate force he had on board his ſhips, landed in Lycia, and was defeated in the firſt battle, in which he loſt part of his army and his own life.

Phormio.

Meleſander.

The

Surrender of Potidæa.

The ſame winter, the Potidæans, as they were no longer able to hold out the ſiege; and as beſides, the irruptions of the Peloponneſians into Attica, had not induced the Athenians to raiſe it; their proviſions being quite ſpent; and amongſt other calamities to which their extremities had reduced them, having been forced to feed upon one another; they held a parley about their ſurrender with the Athenian officers, who [7] commanded in the ſiege, Xenophon the ſon of Euripides, Heſtiodorus the ſon of Ariſtoclides, and Phanomachus the ſon of Callimachus. They, ſenſible of the hardſhips their troops ſuffered by long lying abroad in the winter-ſeaſon, and that the carrying on of the ſiege had already coſt Athens * two thouſand talents, granted them a compoſition. The terms agreed on were theſe —— "That, they ſhould quit the place with their wives, their children, "and auxiliaries, every man with one ſuit of clothing, but the "women with two; and with a certain ſum of money to defray the "expence of their departure." —— By virtue of this compoſition, they went away to Chalcis, where every one ſhifted for himſelf. But the Athenians called their *generals* to account for their conduct,

* 387500 *l. Sterling.*

7 In this ſiege of Potidæa, two perſons ſerved amongſt the heavy-armed as private ſoldiers, one of whom was the glory of human nature; and the other the glory and bane of his country: I mean, the divine Socrates, and at this time young Alcibiades. Plutarch (in the *life* of Alcibiades) ſays, they lay in the ſame tent and fought always ſide by ſide. Once, in a ſharp skirmiſh, both of them diſtinguiſhed themſelves above all their fellow-ſoldiers. Alcibiades at length was wounded and dropped; Socrates ſtood over and defended him, and ſaved both him and his arms from the enemy. Socrates therefore had the juſteſt right to the public reward, as the perſon who had behaved beſt in this action. But when the *generals*, on account of Alcibiades his quality, ſhewed a great deſire to confer honour upon him, Socrates, willing alſo to increaſe his ardor for gallant actions, turned witneſs in his favour, and procured him the wreath and the public preſent of a compleat ſuit of armour. Socrates coveted no recompence for brave exploits but the conſciouſneſs of having performed them, and young Alcibiades was to be nurſed up to virtue. He was capable of every degree either of virtue or vice: And Socrates always endeavoured to encourage him in the former, and give his eager and enterprizing ſoul the juſt direction.

becauſe

becauſe they had ſigned this compoſition without their privity, (for they thought it in their power to have made them ſurrender at diſcretion,) and afterwards ſent to Potidæa ſome of their people whom they ſettled in a colony there. —— Theſe things were done this winter, and ſo ended the ſecond year of this war, the hiſtory of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

YEAR III.

Before Chriſt 429.

EARLY the next ſummer, the Peloponneſians and their allies, omitting the incurſion as before into Attica, marched their forces againſt Platæa. Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians commanded, who having encamped his army, was preparing to ravage the adjacent country. He was interrupted by an embaſſy from the Platæans, who addreſſed themſelves to him in the following manner. ——— *Siege of* Platæa.

" The war, O Archidamus and Lacedæmonians, you are now le- " vying on Platæa, is a flagrant breach of common juſtice, a ble- " miſh on your honour and that of your fathers. Pauſanias the " Lacedæmonian ſon of Cleombrotus, when — aided by thoſe Greci- " ans, who chearfully expoſed themſelves with him to the dangers of " that battle which was fought on our land —— he had delivered " Greece from Perſian ſlavery, at a public ſacrifice to Jupiter *the* " *deliverer* ſolemnized by him on that occaſion in the public forum " of Platæa, called all the confederates together, and there confer'd " theſe privileges on the Platæans —— " That they ſhould have free " poſſeſſion of the city and territory belonging to it, to be governed " at their own diſcretion; — that no one ſhould ever unjuſtly make " war upon them, or endeavour to inſlave them; and in caſe of ſuch " attempts, all the confederates then preſent ſhould avenge it to the " utmoſt Platæans *addreſs* Archidamus.

" utmoſt of their power." —— Such grateful returns did your fa-
" thers make us in recompence of our valour, and the zeal we ex-
" erted in the common dangers. Yet their generoſity you are now
" reverſing — you, with the Thebans our inveterate foes, are come
" hither to inſlave us. But by the Gods who were then witneſſes to
" the oath they ſwore, by all the tutelary Deities both of your own
" and of our community, we adjure you to do no damage to Platæan
" ground nor to violate your oaths, but to retire and leave us in that
" ſtate of independence, which Pauſanias juſtly eſtabliſhed for us."—
To theſe words of the Platæans Archidamus made this reply—

His anſwer. " What you have urged, ye men of Platæa, is juſt and reaſon-
" able, if it be found agreeable to your actions. Let the declarations
" of Pauſanias be obſerved; be free and independent yourſelves,
" and at the ſame time vindicate their own freedom to others, to
" thoſe who, after participation of the ſame common dangers, made
" that oath in your favour, and yet are now inſlaved by the Atheni-
" ans. To reſcue them and others from that ſlavery have our pre-
" parations been made, this war hath been undertook. You who
" know what liberty is, and are ſuch advocates for it, do you abide
" firmly by your oaths; at leaſt, as we heretofore adviſed you, keep
" at quiet, enjoying only what is properly your own; ſide with
" neither party; receive both in the way of friendſhip, in the way
" of enmity, neither. —— To a conduct like this we never ſhall
" object."

Reply of the Platæans. When the Platæan embaſſadors had heard this reply of Archida-
mus, they returned into the *city*, and communicating what had
paſſed to the body of the citizens, they carried back in anſwer to
him —— " That they could not poſſibly comply with his propoſals,
" without the conſent of the Athenians, becauſe their wives and
" children were in their power ---- that they were apprehenſive a
" compliance

" compliance might endanger their whole community, ſince in ſuch " a caſe, either the Athenians might not confirm the neutrality, or " the Thebans who were comprehended in the ſame neutral oath to " the two principal powers, might again attempt to ſeize their city." — Archidamus to remove their apprehenſions ſpoke as follows —— " Deliver up your city and your houſes to us Lacedæmonians; let us " know the bounds of your territory and the exact number of your " trees, and make as true a calculation as you poſſibly can of all " that belongs to you. Depart yourſelves, and reſide wherever you " pleaſe ſo long as the war continues; at the end of it we will reſtore " every thing again. In the mean time, we will make the beſt uſe " of every thing intruſted to us, and pay you an annual equivalent " for your ſubſiſtence." Upon hearing this, they again returned into the city, and the whole body of the people aſſiſting at a general conſultation, they returned for anſwer — " That they deſired only " to communicate the propoſals to the Athenians, and then with " their approbation would accept them. In the mean time they " begged a ſuſpenſion of arms, and to have their lands ſpared from " depredation." He granted them a truce for the time requiſite to receive an anſwer, and forbore ravaging the country.

The embaſſadors of Platæa, having been at Athens and conſulted with the Athenians, return again with this anſwer to their city. —— " The Athenians ſay, that in no preceding time, ever ſince we en- " tered into confederacy with them, did they ever ſuffer us in any " reſpect to be injured; that neither will they neglect us now, but " ſend us a powerful aid. And you they ſolemnly adjure by the " oaths which your fathers have ſworn, to admit no change or in- " novation in the league ſubſiſting between you and them." — When the embaſſadors had thus delivered the anſwer of the Athenians, after ſome conſultation the Platæans reſolved, " never to deſert them, to bear " any devaſtation of their lands, nay if ſuch muſt be the caſe, to " behold it with patience, and to ſuffer any extremities, to which

" their enemies might reduce them; —— that, further, no perſon " ſhould ſtir out of the city, but an anſwer be given from the " walls, — " That it was impoſſible for them to accept the terms " propoſed by the Lacedæmonians."

This was no ſooner heard than Archidamus the king made this ſolemn appeal to all their tutelary Heroes and Gods. —— " Ye Gods " and Heroes, *ſaid he*, who protect this region of Platæa, bear wit- " neſs to us, that it was not till after a violation of oaths already " ſworn, that we have marched into this country, where our fathers " through the bleſſings you ſent down upon their prayers overcame " the Medes, and which you then made that fortunate field whereon " the arms of Greece were crowned with victory — and that what- " ever we ſhall here undertake, our every ſtep ſhall be agreeable to " juſtice. We have offered many honourable conditions to them, " which are all rejected. Grant therefore our ſupplications, that the " firſt tranſgreſſors of juſtice may receive their puniſhment, and " that thoſe who fight with equity, may obtain revenge." After this ſolemn addreſs to the Gods, he rouſed up his army into action.

Conduct of the ſiege.

He firſt of all formed an incloſure round about them with the trees they had fell'd, ſo that no one could get out of the city. In the next place, they raiſed a mount of earth before the place, hoping that it could not long hold out a ſiege againſt the efforts of ſo large an army. Having felled a quantity of timber on mount Cithæron, with it they framed the mount on either ſide, that thus caſed it might perform the ſervice of a wall, and that the earth might be kept from mouldering away too faſt. Upon it they heaped a quantity of matter, both ſtones and earth, and whatever elſe would cement together and increaſe the bulk. This work employed them for ſeventy days and nights without intermiſſion, all being alternately employed in it, ſo that one part of the army was carrying it on, whilſt the other took the neceſſary refreſhments of food and ſleep.

Thoſe

Thoſe Lacedæmonians who had the command over the hired troops of the other *States*, had the care of the work, and obliged them all to aſſiſt in carrying it on. The Platæans, ſeeing this mount raiſed to a great height, built a counterwork of wood, cloſe to that part of the city-wall againſt which this mount of earth was thrown up, and ſtrengthened the inſide of it with bricks, which they got for this uſe by pulling down the adjacent houſes. The wooden caſe was deſigned to keep it firm together, and prevent the whole pile from being weakned by its height. They farther covered it over with ſheep-ſkins and hides of beaſts, to defend the workmen from miſſive weapons, and to preſerve the wood from being fired by the enemy. This work *within* was raiſed to a great height, and the mount was raiſed with equal expedition *without*. Upon this, the Platæans had recourſe to another device. They broke a hole through the wall, cloſe to which the mount was raiſed, and drew the earth away from under it into the city. But this being diſcovered by the Peloponneſians, they threw into the hole hurdles made of reeds and ſtuffed with clay, which being of a firm conſiſtence could not be dug away like earth. By this they were excluded, and ſo deſiſted for a while from their former practice. Yet digging a ſubterraneous paſſage from out of the city, which they ſo luckily continued that it undermined the mount, they again withdrew the earth from under it. This practice long eſcaped the diſcovery of the beſiegers, who ſtill heaping on matter, yet the work grew rather leſs, as the earth was drawn away from the bottom, and that above fell in to fill up the void. However ſtill apprehenſive, that as they were few in number, they ſhould not be able long to hold out againſt ſo numerous beſiegers, they had recourſe to another project. They deſiſted from carrying on the great pile which was to counterwork the mount, and beginning at each end of it where the wall was low, they run another wall in the form of a creſcent along the inſide of a city, that if the great wall ſhould be taken this might afterwards hold out, might

lay the enemy under a neceſſity of throwing up a freſh mount againſt it, and that thus the further they advanced the difficulties of the ſiege might be doubled, and be carried on with increaſe of danger.

When their mount was compleated, the Peloponneſians play'd away their battering-engines againſt the wall; and one of them they worked ſo dextrouſly from the mount againſt the great pile within, that they ſhook it very much, and threw the Platæans into conſternation. Others they applied in different parts againſt the wall, the force of which was broke by the Platæans, who threw ropes around them; they alſo tied large beams together, with long chains of iron at both ends of the beams, by which they hung downwards from two other tranſverſe beams inclined and extended beyond the wall; ---theſe they drew along obliquely, and againſt whatever part they ſaw the engine of battery to be aimed, they let go the beams with a full ſwing of the chains, and ſo drop'd them down directly upon it, which by the weight of the ſtroke broke off the beak of the battering machine. Upon this the Peloponneſians, finding all their engines uſeleſs, and their mount effectually counterworked by the fortification within, concluded it a buſineſs of no little hazard to take the place amidſt ſo many obſtacles, and prepared to draw a circumvallation about it.

But firſt they were willing to try whether it were not poſſible to ſet the town on fire, and burn it down, as it was not large, by help of a brisk gale of wind; for they caſt their thoughts towards every expedient of taking it without a large expence and a tedious blockade. Procuring for this purpoſe a quantity of faggots, they toſſed them from their own mount into the void ſpace between the wall and the inner fortification. As many hands were employed in this buſineſs, they had ſoon filled it up, and then proceeded to toſs more of them into the other parts of the city lying beyond, as far as they could by the advantage which the eminence gave them. Upon theſe they threw fiery balls made of ſulphur and pitch, which caught the faggots,

and

and ſoon kindled ſuch a flame as before this time no one had ever ſeen kindled by the art of man. It hath indeed ſometimes happened, that wood growing upon mountains hath been ſo heated by the attrition of the winds, that without any other cauſe it hath broke out into fire and flame. But this was exceeding fierce; and the Platæans, who had baffled all other efforts, were very narrowly delivered from periſhing by its fury: For it cleared the city to a great diſtance round about, ſo that no Platæan durſt approach it: And if the wind had happened to have blown along with it, as the enemy hoped, they muſt all unavoidably have periſhed. It is now reported, that a heavy rain falling on a ſudden, attended with claps of thunder, extinguiſhed the flames, and put an end to this imminent danger.

The Peloponneſians, upon the failure of this project, marched away part of their army; but, continuing the remainder there, raiſed a wall of circumvallation quite round the city, the troops of every confederate *ſtate* executing a determinate part of the work. Both inſide and outſide of this wall was a ditch, and by firſt digging theſe they had got materials for brick. This work being compleated about the riſing of Arcturus *, they left ſome of their own men to guard half of the wall, the other half being left to the care of the Bœotians; then marched away with the main-army, and diſmiſſed the auxiliary forces to their reſpective cities. —— The Platæans had already ſent away to Athens their wives, their children, their old people, and all the uſeleſs crowd of inhabitants. There were left only in the town during this ſiege four hundred Platæans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women to prepare their food. This was the whole number of them when the ſiege was firſt formed; nor was there any other perſon within the wall, either ſlave or free. --- And in this manner was the city of Platæa beſieged in form.

* *Beginning of* September.

The ſame ſummer, and about the time that the army appeared before Platæa, the Athenians, with a body of their own people, conſiſting of two thouſand heavy-armed, and two hundred horſe-men, Thrace.

men, invaded the Chalcideans of Thrace and the Bottiæans. The corn was in the ear, when this army was led againſt them under the command of Xenophon the ſon of Euripides and two collegues. Coming up to Spartolus, a town in Bottiæa, they deſtroyed the corn, and hoped to get poſſeſſion of the place by the management of a faction they had within. But a contrary party, having ſent in good time to Olynthus, had procured from thence an aid of heavy-armed and other force for their protection. Theſe even made a ſally out of Spartolus, and forced the Athenians to a battle under the walls of the town. The heavy-armed Chalcideans, with ſome of their auxiliaries, are defeated by the Athenians, and retire into Spartolus. The horſe and light-armed Chalcideans get the better of the horſe and light-armed Athenians; but they had with them a ſmall number of targeteers from the province called Crufis. On the firſt joining of battle other targeteers came to their aſſiſtance from Olynthus. The light-armed of Spartolus ſeeing this reinforcement juſt come up, and reflecting that they had received no loſs before, with reanimated courage again charge the Athenians, in conjunction with the Chalcidean horſe, and the freſh reinforcement. The Athenians retire to the two companies which they had left to guard the baggage. Here they drew up again, and whenever they thought proper to charge, the enemy fell back; when they retreated from the charge, the enemy preſſed upon and infeſted them with miſſive weapons. The Chalcidean horſe rode up where they thought they could break them, and falling in without fear of a repulſe, put the Athenians to flight, and purſued them to a great diſtance. The Athenians fly for refuge to Potidæa; and afterwards, obtaining a truce to fetch off their dead, return with their ſhattered army to Athens. In this action they loſt four hundred and thirty men, and all their commanders. The Chalcideans and Bottiæans erected a trophy, and having taken proper care of their dead, ſeparated to their own cities.

Not

Not long after this, in the ſame ſummer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, who aimed at the total reduction of Acarnania, and to compaſs a general defection there from the Athenians, prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to ſupply them with ſhipping from their confederate-cities, and to ſend a thouſand heavy-armed into Acarnania. They told them, that -- "if they would join them with a land and a "naval force at the ſame time, it would be impoſſible for the Acar- "nanians to ſuccour one another by ſea; that hence they might eaſily "get all Acarnania into their power, from whence they might be- "come maſters of Zacynthus and Cephallene, and a ſtop would then "be made to the Athenian cruizes on the coaſts of Peloponneſus; "nay, that there was even a hope of reducing Naupactus." -- This ſcheme was pleaſing to the Lacedæmonians, who ordered Cnemus (yet their admiral) to ſail thither with a few ſhips, having on board the heavy-armed; and circulated orders to their confederates to fit out their ſhips, and repair with all expedition to Leucas. The Corinthians were thoſe who ſhewed moſt zeal for the Ambraciots, a colony of their own; and the ſhipping of Corinth, Sicyon, and the adjacent places, was prepared with all poſſible expedition; but that of Leucas, Anactorium, and Ambracia was already at Leucas, and waiting for the reſt. Cnemus and the thouſand heavy-armed performed their voyage undiſcovered by Phormio, who commanded the Athenian fleet of twenty ſail, ſtationed round Naupactus, and immediately landed his men for the deſtined ſervice. Beſides the thouſand Peloponneſians he brought with him, he was now joined by the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, of the Grecians; —— of the Barbarians, by a thouſand Chaonians not ſubject to a regal government, but commanded by Photius and Nicanor, men of thoſe families which had a right to command by annual election. With the Chaonians came the Theſprotians, who alſo had no king. Sabylinthus, guardian of their king Tharyps, yet a minor, led the Meloſſians and Antitanians. The Paravæans were headed by their own king Orœdus, Ambraciots.

Ordœus, who had alſo the command of a thouſand Oreſtians, ſubjects of Antiochus, which ſerved with his troops by the permiſſion of Antiochus. Perdiccas ſent alſo a thouſand Macedonians, of which the Athenians were ignorant, but theſe were not yet come up.

With theſe forces Cnemus began his march, without waiting the arrival of the ſhips from Corinth, and paſſing through Argia they deſtroyed Limnæa, a village unfortified. They march next for Stratus, the capital city of Acarnania, judging that if they firſt took *this*, all other places would readily ſubmit. The Acarnanians, finding a large army broke in amongſt them by land, and more enemies coming to attack them by ſea, gave up all view of ſuccouring one another, and ſtood ſeparately on their own defence. They ſent information to Phormio, and requeſted him to come up to their relief. He ſent them word, "he could not poſſibly leave Naupactus without a "guard, when a fleet was ready to ſail from Corinth." The Peloponneſians and their allies, dividing themſelves into three bodies, advanced towards the city of the Stratians, with a deſign to appear before it, and if it did not ſurrender at once, to ſtorm it without loſs of time. The Chaonians and the reſt of the Barbarians marched in the middle; to the right were the Leucadians, Anactorians, and their auxiliaries; to the left Cnemus with his Peloponneſians, and the Ambraciots; each body at ſo great a diſtance from the reſt, that ſometimes they were out of one another's ſight. The Grecians, in their march, kept firm within ranks, and guarded all their motions, till they came up to the ſpot fit for their incampment. But the Chaonians, confident of their own bravery, and valuing themſelves as the moſt martial people in that part of the world, could not bear the delay of incamping, but with the reſt of the Barbarians ruſhing eagerly forwards, thought to take the town at a ſhout, and carry all the honour. The Stratians finding them thus advanced, thought, that could they maſter *them* thus detached, the Grecians would become more averſe to attack them. With this view, they place ambuſcades

in

in the approaches of the city; and when the enemy was near, ruſh up at once from the places of ambuſh, and out of the city, charging them on all ſides. The Chaonians are thrown into conſternation, and many of them are ſlain. The reſt of the Barbarians, when they ſaw them give way, durſt not keep their ground, but fled immediately. Neither of the Grecian bodies knew any thing of this engagement, ſo haſtily had thoſe advanced, and were ſuppoſed to have done it only to encamp with greater expedition. But when the Barbarians came running back to them in diſorderly rout, they received them into ſhelter, and all cloſing firm together ſtood quiet the reſt of the day. The Stratians durſt not directly aſſault them, becauſe the other Acarnanians were not yet come up to their aſſiſtance, but were continually ſlinging at them from a diſtance, thus haraſſing them abundantly, but unable, without better weapons, to make them diſlodge: The Acarnanians only could have attacked them with effectual vigour.

By the favour of a dark night, Cnemus withdrew his army by a quick march to the river Anapus, which is eighty ſtadia * diſtant from Stratus. The next day he obtains a truce to fetch off the dead. And the Oeniadæ coming up in a friendly manner to his relief, he went to take refuge amongſt them, before the Acarnanians could draw their ſuccours together, and from thence the forces which compoſed his army marched to their own homes. But the Stratians erected a trophy on account of their victory over the Barbarians.

* *About eight miles.*

Battle at ſea off Naupactus

The fleet of Corinth and the other confederate ſtates, that was to ſail from the gulf of Criſſa, to attend the orders of Cnemus, and prevent the Acarnanians on the coaſt from ſuccouring thoſe within the land, never arrives: For about the time of the action at Stratus, they had been compelled to fight the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſhips, ſtationed at Naupactus under the command of Phormio. Phormio had watched their coming out of the gulf, intending to attack ſo ſoon as ever they got out to ſea. The Corinthians and their allies ſailed

out indeed, yet not ſo well prepared to fight by ſea, as to forward the land-expedition on Acarnania. They never imagined that the Athenians with their twenty ſhips durſt preſume to attack them who had forty ſeven. Yet when they ſaw them ſteering the ſame courſe on the oppoſite ſhore, they kept firſt along their own coaſt, and afterwards from Patræ of Achaia ſtretched over to the oppoſite ſide in order to make for Acarnania. But now again they deſcried them ſtanding directly againſt them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and found they had obſerved their anchoring the night before. Thus are they compelled to come to an engagement in the midſt of the open ſea [8]. The ſhips of every *ſtate* were under the command of thoſe who had been appointed by their principals: Over the Corinthians were Machon, Iſocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponneſians drew up their ſhips in form of a circle, as large as they poſſibly could, without leaving open a paſſage for the ſhips of the enemy. The heads of the ſhips ſtood to ſea, the ſterns were turned inwards. Within were ranged the ſmall veſſels that attended the fleet, and five ſhips that were prime ſailors, which were to ſtart out at narrow paſſages, wherever the enemy ſhould begin the attack. The Athenians drawing up their ſhips in a line, and ſailing quite round them, bruſhed along by them in their paſſage, and making ſucceſſive feints of engaging, forced them to draw into a ſmaller compaſs. Phormio had beforehand given ſtrict orders not to engage

8 Phormio was watching to catch them in the open ſea, ἐν τῇ εὐρυχωρίᾳ, as Thucydides words it above. They were now out of the gulf, ſtretching acroſs the ſea, in the midſt of which Phormio came up to them, and engaged, κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμὸν. The ſea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Criſſa, is indeed a narrow ſea, or πόρθμος, but then it was open ſea in regard to the gulf within the capes, and gave Phormio all the advantages which more expert ſeamen knew how to uſe. As the Peloponneſian fleet ſtood out from Patræ in Achaia, and the Athenian from Chalcis in Ætolia, the ſituation of thoſe two places eaſily guides to the place of the engagement. Phormio got a deal of honour by this action, which Plutarch, in his piece about *the glory of the Athenians*, reckons up amongſt the moſt remarkable exploits related by our Hiſtorian.

without

without the ſignal: For he hoped the enemy could not long preſerve that order of battle like a land-army, but that the ſhips muſt fall foul upon one another, and the ſmall veſſels within give them no little embarraſſment; that further, the wind would blow out of the gulf, as was uſual every morning; in expectation of which he continued to ſail round about them, and then they could not poſſibly keep firm in their ſtations for any time. He thought farther, that the time of engagement was intirely in his own power, as his ſhips were beſt ſailors, and that it was moſt adviſeable to begin at ſuch a juncture. As ſoon as that wind began to riſe, and the greater ſhips, now contracted into a narrow circle, were diſordered both by the wind and the ſmaller veſſels within, one falling foul upon another, the poles applied to puſh them off again; amidſt the noiſe cauſed by this confuſion, calling out to *take care*, and curſing one another, they could no longer hear the orders of their commanders or their maſters; and the ſea beginning to run ſo high as to render uſeleſs the oars of unexperienced mariners, as they were, they left the unmanageable ſhips to the pilots art. Exactly at this juncture Phormio gives the ſignal. The Athenians engage, and at the firſt ſhock ſink one of the admiral-ſhips, and ſeveral more afterwards in the different parts of the engagement. They purſued their ſucceſs with ſo much fury, that amidſt the general diſorder not one durſt think of reſiſting, but all, with the greateſt precipitation, fled towards Patræ and Dyme of Achaia. The Athenians purſuing, and taking twelve of their ſhips, and having ſlaughtered moſt of the crews, draw off to Molychrium; and having erected a trophy on the promontory, and conſecrated a ſhip to Neptune, returned to their ſtation at Naupactus.

The Peloponneſians, without loſs of time, crept along the coaſt with the remnant of their fleet ſaved at Patræ and Dyme, to Cyllene a dock belonging to the Eleans; whither, after the battle of Stratus, arrive alſo from Leucas, Cnemus and the ſhips of that ſtation,

which ought to have been joined by theſe other. The Lacedæmonians ſend thither Timocrates, Braſidas and Lycophron to aſſiſt Cnemus in his naval conduct, ordering him to get ready for a more ſucceſsful engagement, and not to leave the dominion of the ſea to ſuch a ſmall number of ſhips. For their late defeat appeared to them quite unaccountable, eſpecially as this was the firſt trial they had of an engagement at ſea; nor could they think it ſo much owing to their want of skill in naval affairs, as to a want of courage, never balancing the long experience of the Athenians with their own ſhort application to theſe matters. Theſe perſons therefore they ſent away in anger, who, coming to Cnemus, iſſued their circular orders to the *ſtates* for new quota's of ſhipping, and refitted what was already there for another engagement. Phormio alſo ſends meſſengers to Athens with an account of theſe preparations, and to report the victory they had already gained; requeſting a further reinforcement of as many ſhips as they could expeditiouſly diſpatch, ſince he was in daily expectation of another fight.

Twenty ſhips were the number they agree to ſend him, but they ordered him who was to carry them to touch by the way at Crete. For Nicias a Cretan of Gortys, a public friend of the Athenians, had perſuaded them to appear before Cydonia, aſſuring them that this place, which had been an enemy to them, ſhould ſoon be their own. This he inſinuated merely to gratify the Polychnitæ, who bordered upon the Cydonians. The commander therefore with theſe ſhips went to Crete, and joining the Polychnitæ, ravaged the territory of the Cydonians; by which, together with adverſe winds and weather unfit for ſea, no little time was unſeaſonably waſted away.

Preparations for a ſecond engagement.

The Peloponneſians at Cyllene, during the time that the Athenians lay weather-bound in Crete, having got every thing in readineſs for another engagement, ſailed along the coaſt to Panormus of Achaia, where the land-forces of the Peloponneſians were come to forward their attempts. Phormio likewiſe, with the twenty ſhips which had

fought

fought the former battle, ſailed up to cape Molychrium, and lay at anchor juſt without it. This cape belonged to the Athenian alliance, but [9] the other cape over-againſt it belonged to the Peloponneſians. The arm of ſea which divides them is about * ſeven ſtadia over; and this is the mouth of the gulf of Criſſa. The Peloponneſians with a fleet of ſeventy-ſeven ſhips rode alſo at anchor under the cape of Achaia, which is not far diſtant from Panormus, where their land-forces lay. When they had here a ſight of the Athenians, both parties lay for ſix or ſeven days over-againſt each other, intent on the needful preparations for engaging. The ſcheme on each ſide was this: —— The Peloponneſians, ſtruck with their former defeat, would not ſail from without the capes into the open ſea: —— The Athenians would not enter into the ſtraits, judging it would be an advantage to the enemy to fight in a narrow compaſs. At length Cnemus, Braſidas, and the other Peloponneſian commanders, deſirous to come ſoon to an engagement, before the Athenian ſquadron ſhould receive a reinforcement, called firſt their ſoldiers together, and ſeeing ſome of them not yet recovered from the terror occaſioned by the former defeat and by no means eager to fight again, endeavour'd to animate and rouſe up their courage by the following harangue ——

* *About three quarters of a mile.*

Speech of the Peloponneſian *commanders.*

" IF the former engagement, ye men of Peloponneſus, affects any " of you with ſad apprehenſions about the event of another, know " that it by no means affords you any reaſonable ground for ſuch de- " ſponding thoughts. That was owing, as you well know, to a de- " ficiency in all needful preparations; for you were not then fitted " out for ſervice of ſea, but for the ſervice of land. We then were " diſtreſſed in ſeveral reſpects by the adverſe turns of fortune; and " in ſome, we who fought for the firſt time at ſea run into errors

9 The cape on the Peloponneſian ſide was the oppoſite cape Antirrhium, or Molychrium.

called Rhium, or the Rhium of Achaia;

" through

" through want of ſkill. It thus happened that we were defeated,
" but not through any cowardice of our own. There can be no
" reaſon for men, who were not conquered by ſuperior courage,
" but who can explicitly account for the means of their defeat, to
" let their ſpirits be ſunk by a calamity merely accidental; but they
" ought to reflect, that though fortune may diſconcert the human
" enterprizes, yet that men can never be deſerted by their own va-
" lour; and where true valour is, they ought not to catch a plea
" from want of experience to palliate what ſigns of cowardice they
" betray. Inferior ſkill in you is by no means a balance for your ſu-
" perior valour. The expertneſs of your enemies which you ſo much
" dread, if it be accompanied with valour, will indeed direct them
" in a performance of their duty, amidſt all the hazards of war;
" but if it wants true valour, thoſe hazards will be too hard for all
" human art. For fear baniſheth the remembrance of what ought
" to be done; and art without ſtrength is quite unavailing. Place
" therefore your own ſuperior valour in the balance againſt their ſu-
" perior ſkill; and remove the apprehenſions flowing from your de-
" feat by the recollection that you were not prepared to fight. You
" have now the advantage of a larger number of ſhips, and an op-
" portunity of fighting on your own coaſts, in ſight of a land-army
" of your own. Victory is generally obtained by thoſe, who are
" moſt in number and beſt provided. So that, upon cloſe exami-
" nation, no reaſon appears why we ſhould dread the event. Our
" former miſcarriages make not againſt us; nay, the paſt commiſ-
" ſion of them will inſtruct us now. Let every maſter therefore
" and every mariner act his part with manly reſolution; let each take
" care to perform his duty, nor quit the poſt to which he is appoint-
" ed. We ſhall take care to order the engagement, in no worſe a
" manner than our predeceſſors have done; and ſhall leave no man
" any reaſon to excuſe his cowardice. Yet — if any one will be a
" coward, he ſhall certainly receive the puniſhment he deſerves;

" but

"but the valiant ſhall be honoured with rewards proportioned to "their merit."

In ſuch terms did their commanders animate the Peloponneſians. But Phormio, — who began to apprehend a depreſſion of ſpirits in his own men, ſince he plainly ſaw that by keeping their ſhips cloſe together they were afraid of the numerous ſhips of the enemy — had a mind by calling them together, to reinſpire them with courage, and give them an exhortation ſuitable to their preſent condition. He had hitherto in all his diſcourſes inſiſted, and induced them to give him credit, that — "no number of ſhips could be got together large enough to make head againſt them." And his ſeamen had long ſince been elated with this preſumption, that "as they were Athenians, they ought not to avoid any fleet of the Peloponneſians, however numerous." But, when he ſaw them intimidated by the formidable object before their eyes, he thought it high time to endeavour to revive their ſinking courage. The Athenians being gathered round him, he harangued them thus ——

Speech of Phormio.

"I HAVE obſerved, my fellow-ſoldiers, that the number of "your enemies hath ſtruck you with fear. — I have therefore called "you together, as I cannot bear to ſee you terrified with what is by "no means dreadful. Theſe enemies of yours, whom you have "already conquered, who in no wiſe think themſelves a match for "you, have got together a great number of ſhips and a ſuperior "force. In the next place they come confidently to attack you "with the vain preſumption, that valour is only peculiar to themſelves. Their confidence is occaſioned by their ſkill in the ſervice "of the land. Their frequent ſucceſſes there induce them to ſuppoſe that they muſt alſo for certainty be victorious at ſea. If they "have any reaſon to preſume ſo far upon their excellence at land, "you have more to form preſumptions in your own favour, ſince in "natural

" natural courage they are not in the leaſt ſuperior to us, and if larger
" degrees of ſkill give either ſide an advantage, we have hence an
" argument to be more confident of ſucceſs. The Lacedæmonians,
" now at the head of their league, merely to preſerve their own
" reputation, have dragged numbers hither to fight againſt their will;
" otherwiſe, they durſt never have attempted to engage us a ſe-
" cond time, after receiving ſo ſignal a defeat. Frighten not your-
" ſelves with extravagant ſuſpicions of their courage —— but rather
" ſtrike a panic into them; a panic, for which they have more am-
" ple reaſon, as you have already gained a victory over them, and as
" they are certain you would not give them another opportunity to
" fight, unleſs you had ſome grand deſign to execute. An enemy,
" that like them exceeds in number, in action depends more on their
" ſtrength than on their conduct. They who are far inferior in
" ſtrength of numbers, and dare, tho' uncompelled, to fight, muſt do
" it through the prevalence of ſome extenſive views. This they can-
" not but know, and hence dread more this our diminutive than they
" would an equal force. Large armies defeated, through defect of ſkill
" or ſometimes through defect of courage, by an inferior force, are
" caſes that have often happened. Yet neither of theſe defects can
" be imputed to us. For my own part, I ſhall not willingly hazard
" the event within the gulf, nor will I ſail into it. For I am not
" ignorant that want of ſea-room is very improper for a few ſhips
" that ſail beſt and are beſt managed, againſt a number which thoſe
" on board them know not how to govern. In ſuch a ſituation, no
" one can pour down to an attack in the proper manner for want of
" having a clear view of the enemy; nor, if he is forced to ſheer
" off, can he do it with ſafety. There is no room to break through,
" or to tack at pleaſure, which is the buſineſs of ſhips that are better
" ſailors; but the fight muſt of neceſſity be the ſame with a battle
" at land, and in this caſe the greater number of ſhips muſt have
" the advantage. I ſhall take the greateſt care I am able to pre-

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" vent theſe inconveniences. And you I expect to ſtand regularly " to your poſts on board every ſhip. Receive your orders with ala- " crity, eſpecially as we lie ſo near our enemy; and above all things " when we come to action, obſerve the rules of diſcipline without " hurry and noiſe: For theſe are matters of great importance in " every ſcene of war, and of not the leaſt in a naval engagement; — " and charge your enemies with a ſpirit worthy of your former at- " chievements. Great indeed are the points you are now to decide, " the hopes of the Peloponneſians of making a figure at ſea are now " either to be totally demoliſhed, or the power of the ſea muſt be- " come precarious to the Athenians, even near their own homes. " Once more I call to your remembrance, that great part of theſe " enemies you have already conquered — and the courage of ene- " mies once conquered is ſeldom equal to what it was, when un- " conſcious of defeat."

Second engagement at ſea.

In this manner Phormio encouraged his men. — But the Peloponneſians, when they found that the Athenians would not ſail into the gulf and ſtraits, had a mind to compel them to it againſt their inclinations. At break of day they began to move, their ſhips being ranged in lines conſiſting of four, and ſtood along their own coaſts within the gulf, the right wing leading the courſe in the ſame order, as they had lain at anchor. In this wing they had ranged twenty of their beſt ſailors, with a view that if Phormio ſhould imagine they had a deſign upon Naupactus, and he himſelf ſhould haſten to its ſuccour, the Athenians might not be able to outſail them and eſcape their outermoſt ſquadron which compoſed the right wing, but be ſurrounded on all ſides. He, juſt as they expected, being alarmed for that place, which he knew was defenceleſs, no ſooner ſaw them under ſail, than againſt his will and in no little hurry he got on board, and ſailed along his own coaſt — the land-forces of the Meſſenians marching along the adjacent ſhore to be ready with their aſſiſtance.

The Peloponneſians ſeeing them move along in a line ſhip after ſhip, and that they were now within the gulf and near the ſhore, which was what they chiefly wanted, — on a ſignal given at once altered their courſe, pouring down directly upon the Athenians, all as faſt as their ſhips could advance, in full expectation of intercepting the whole fleet. Eleven of the Athenian ſhips, which were a-head of the reſt, being too quick for the wing of the Peloponneſians and their ſhifting of their courſe towards the open ſea, ran ſafely off. [1] Yet intercepting all the reſt, they run them aground and ſo diſabled them. The Athenians on board, who could not eſcape by ſwimming, were ſlaughtered to a man: Some of theſe empty ſhips they got off again and carried away in tow; and one they had already took with the whole crew on board. The Meſſenians got down to the ſuccour of ſome of them. They waded with their arms through the water, and climbing on board and fighting from the decks ſaved ſome which were already in tow. — In this manner did the Peloponneſians defeat and deſtroy the Athenian ſhips.

Their twenty ſhips which were of the right wing, gave chace to the eleven Athenian, which on the ſhifting of the courſe, had ran off amain. But all theſe, excepting one ſhip, out-ſailed them and got ſafe into Naupactus. Having gained their harbour, they tacked about under the temple of Apollo and ſtood ready to defend themſelves, in caſe the enemy ſhould make an attempt upon them

1 The Latin tranſlators, whoſe chief aim is a grammatical conſtruction, have made a ſlip here in point of chorography; they ſay, "*Subterfugerunt* or *fugerunt in apertum mare.*" But it is ſurprizing that Mr. *Hobbes* ſhould be guilty of ſo much inadvertence, as to make eleven Athenian ſhips "get out into open ſea." The Peloponneſians made their tack *towards* the open ſea, on purpoſe to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, which gave opportunity to the foremoſt ſhips in the Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naupactus, for the ſake of ſecuring which they had thought themſelves obliged, though contrary to their judgment and inclination, to come within the capes. Had they run out to ſea, they never could have reached Naupactus, but would have run directly from it.

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ſo near the ſhore. Soon after, they appeared, ſailing along and ſinging their pæan, as having gained a victory. One ſhip belonging to Leucas was ſhot far a-head of the reſt giving chace to that only ſhip of the Athenians which was left behind. It happened that a trading-veſſel was then lying out at anchor before the harbour. The Athenian ſhip came up firſt with this veſſel, and fetching a compaſs round her, runs directly againſt the Leucadian that was chacing, and inſtantly ſinks her. By this accident, ſo ſudden and unexpected, the Peloponneſians are thrown into conſternation; and having beſides followed the chace without any regular order, as ſecure of victory, ſome of the ſhips now dropping their oars, ſtopp'd further motion. This was an unlucky expedient when ſo near the enemy; but their deſign was to wait for the greater number of ſhips that were yet behind. Some of them, being ignorant of the coaſt, ran upon the ſhelves and were ſtranded. When the Athenians ſaw them ſuffer theſe diſtreſſes, their courage began to revive. Shouting out aloud with one voice, they encouraged one another to attack. The miſcarriages of which they were this moment ſenſible, and their irrecoverable diſorder, prevented the others from making any long reſiſtance. And they ſoon were forced to run back again towards the ſtation of Panormus, from whence they came. The Athenians chacing them thither, took the ſix ſhips that were moſt behind, and recovered their own, which were in the enemy's hands by having been run aſhore, and afterwards brought off in tow. Some men beſides they killed, and made ſome priſoners.

On board the Leucadian, which was ſunk near the trading-veſſel, was Timocrates the Lacedæmonian, who, when the ſhip received the ſtroke that ſunk her, immediately ſlew himſelf [2], and floated afterwards

2 We have here a notable proof of the peculiar ſpirit and genius of the *Spartans*. They regarded the land as their own element, in which they were ſuperior to the reſt of the world. And yet now they were convinced, that without practice at ſea, they ſhould never be able to pull down the power of Athens. Their firſt attempts are aukward

terwards into the harbour of Naupactus. The Athenians, returning thither again, erected a trophy near the place from whence they had purſued this victory. They took up their dead, and the ſhattered pieces of their ſhips, whatever they found on their own coaſts, and by a truce gave permiſſion to the Peloponneſians to fetch off theirs.

The Peloponneſians alſo erected a trophy, in token of a victory gained by forcing aſhore and damaging ſome of the enemy's ſhips. The ſhip they took they conſecrated on the Rhium of Achaia, near their trophy. Yet, after this, being in ſome dread of the reinforcement expected from Athens, all of them, except the Leucadians, ſailed away by favour of the night into the gulf of Criſſa and Corinth. The Athenians, in the twenty ſhips from Crete, that ought to have been up with Phormio before the engagement, not long after the above retreat of the other ſhips, arrived at Naupactus. And here this ſummer ended.

Attempt to ſurprize the Piræus.

Before the ſeparation of the fleet that withdrew into Corinth and the gulf of Criſſa, Cnemus, Braſidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponneſians, by the advice of the Megaréans, formed a deſign, in the beginning of this winter, to make an attempt upon the Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. It was not guarded or ſecured in the uſual manner; nor was this judged requiſite, as the naval power of Athens was become ſo extenſive. Their project was, that every mariner carrying with him an oar, a cuſhion, and a leathern-thong, ſhould march over-land from Corinth, to the ſea on which Athens is ſituated, and that making the beſt of their way to Megara, and drawing out the forty ſhips that lay there in the Niſæan dock, they ſhould immediately ſtand into the Piræus. For there was not

aukward and unſucceſsful. The art ſhewn by the Athenians in tacking round, darting out again, and ſinking a ſhip at one ſtroke, put them all to a ſtand; and, it ſeems, made ſo ſudden and ſtrong an impreſſion on Timocrates, whoſe paſſion it was to die fighting, and with wounds all *before*, that he could not endure the thought of periſhing in a whole skin, and therefore ſnatched the moment, and killed himſelf for fear he ſhould be drowned.

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ſo much as one ſhip appointed to its guard; nor was there the leaſt ſuſpicion at Athens that the enemy would attempt in this manner to ſurpriſe them: For, openly, and in a regular train, they durſt not attempt it; nor could a project which required deliberate procedure have eſcaped diſcovery. But no ſooner had they reſolved upon, than they ſet out to execute the preſent ſcheme. Arriving in the night, they drew the ſhips out of the Niſæan dock; but inſtead of making directly for the Piræus, as they at firſt intended, diſmayed with the danger of the attempt, and, as it is ſaid, forced by a contrary wind to ſteer another courſe, they went over to that promontory * of Salamis which faceth Megara. Upon this promontory was a fort, and three ſhips were ſtationed below to prevent all importation and exportation at Megara. This fort they aſſaulted, and carried the three ſhips, tho' empty, away with them. Other parts of Salamis they plundered, as the inhabitants never dreamed of this invaſion.

* Budorus.

The lights [3], that ſignify the approach of enemies, were however held up and waved towards Athens, which cauſed as great a conſternation there, as was known during all the ſeries of the war. Thoſe in the city imagined the enemy to be already within the Piræus. Thoſe in the Piræus concluded the city of the Salaminians to be taken, and that the enemy was only not within their port, which indeed they might eaſily have been, had they not been hindered by their own fears and a contrary wind. At break of day, the Athenians ran down in general concourſe to the Piræus. They got their ſhips afloat, and leaping on board with the utmoſt expedition and uncommon tumult, ſailed away for Salamis, but left what land-forces they had to guard the Piræus. When the Peloponneſians had notice

3 Theſe (according to the *Scholiaſt*) were lighted torches, which perſons on the walls reared aloft in air, to notify to neighbouring and confederate places, that they diſcerned the approach of enemies, in order to put them on their guard. The ſame thing was alſo done at the approach of friends, to notify that ſuccour was at hand. In the latter caſe, they held the lights ſteady and unmoved; in the former, they waved them to and fro, as an indication of fear.

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of the approach of this ſuccour, having now over-run great part of Salamis, and got many priſoners, and a large booty, beſide the three ſhips ſtationed at Budorus, they made the beſt of their way back to Niſæa. They were afraid of truſting too much to their ſhips, which having been long laid up were become leaky. After thus getting back to Megara, they returned again over-land to Corinth. The Athenians, finding they were gone from Salamis, ſailed home again. But ever after this they guarded the Piræus in a ſtricter manner, barring up the mouth of the haven, and omitting no method of ſecuring it effectually for the future.

Sitalces *with a vaſt army invades* Macedonia.

About the ſame time, in the beginning of this winter, Sitalces the Odryſian, ſon of Teres, a Thracian king, marched an army againſt Perdiccas, the ſon of Alexander, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcideans bordering on Thrace, to inforce the execution of two engagements, one made to and the other by himſelf. For Perdiccas, who had entered into ſome engagement to him, for reconciling him to the Athenians when he was formerly preſſed hard with war, and for not reſtoring his brother Philip, then at enmity with him, to his throne, had not yet performed that engagement. And he himſelf was under an engagement to the Athenians, ſince the late alliance offenſive and defenſive made between them, that he would finiſh the war for them againſt the Chalcideans of Thrace. On both theſe accounts, he undertook the preſent expedition, carrying along with him Amyntas the ſon of Philip, to reſtore to him the kingdom of Macedonia, with the Athenian ambaſſadors commiſſioned to attend him on this occaſion, and Agnon an Athenian general: Though the Athenians had obliged themſelves by treaty to accompany the expedition with a fleet by ſea, and a numerous land-army.

Beginning the march himſelf from Odryſæ, he ſummons to attend him firſt all his Thracian ſubjects that live within the mountains Hæmus and Rhodope, quite down to the Helleſpont and Euxine ſea; next, the Getæ beyond mount Hæmus, and as many other nations

tions as lay between the river Iſter and along quite down to the Euxine. The Getæ, and the nations ſo ſituated, border upon the Scythians, wearing the ſame habiliments of war, and all like them drawing the bow on horſeback. He procured alſo to join him many of the free Thracians that live upon the mountains, and make uſe of ſcimetars, who are diſtinguiſhed by the name of Dians, and dwell moſt of them about Rhodope. Some of theſe he took into pay, but ſome of them voluntarily attended. He had levies alſo from amongſt the Agrianians, Leæans, and the other nations of Pæonia ſubject to himſelf. Theſe were the furtheſt people in his dominions, reaching up to the Graæans and Leæans of Pæonia and the river Strymon, which driving its ſource from mount Scomius waters the Graæans and Leæans, and is the boundary of his empire from thoſe Pæonians who ſtill are free. Towards the Triballians, who are alſo a free people, the boundary is formed by the Trerians and Tilatæans. Theſe live to the north of mount Scomius, and reach weſterly as far as the river Oſcius, which riſeth out of the ſame mountain with the Neſtus and the Heber, a great but barren mountain adjoining to the Rhodope.

The kingdom of Odryſæ is of this large extent along the coaſt, reaching from the city of Abdera to the mouth of the river Iſter in the Euxine ſea. The ſhorteſt cut round its coaſt requireth four days and as many nights for a trading-veſſel of the round-built, ſailing directly before the wind. A good walker will alſo be eleven days in going the neareſt way by land from Abdera to the Iſter. So large was its extent along the coaſt. But towards the continent, to go along it from Byzantium to the Leæans and the Strymon, for ſo far does it run upwards from the ſea, would coſt an expeditious walker thirteen days continued journey. The yearly tribute exacted from this tract of Barbaric land, and his cities in Greece, by Seuthes, who ſucceeding Sitalces in theſe dominions very much improved the revenue, amounted to four hundred talents of ſilver *, tho' it might be

* 78940 l. *ſterling.*

be paid either in ſilver or gold. The preſents conſtantly made to him either of gold or ſilver were not leſs in value, beſides gifts of veſtments both figured and plain, and all kinds of furniture, which were not only made to him, but to all his officers and the noble Odryſians. The cuſtom obſerved by them and general to all the Thracians, "of "receiving rather than beſtowing," was contrary to that which prevails in the Perſian court, where it was a greater ſhame to be asked and to deny, than to ask and be denied. Yet, as their power was great, this practice continued long in vogue amongſt them; for nothing could be obtained by him who brought no preſent: And this afforded a large increaſe of power to his kingdom. It had the greateſt revenue, and was in other reſpects the moſt flouriſhing of all the kingdoms in Europe between the gulf of Ionia and the Euxine ſea. But in military ſtrength and numerous armies, it was the ſecond, tho' at a great diſtance from the Scythians. For there is no one nation in Europe, nor even in Aſia, that in theſe points can in any degree be a match for them; or when ſtanding ſingly, nation againſt nation, is able to make head againſt the Scythians, united and in good harmony with one another. Yet, at the ſame time, in every point of conduct, and management of all the neceſſary affairs of life, they fall vaſtly ſhort of other people.

Sitalces therefore, who was king of ſo large a country, got his army together; and, when every thing was ready, marched againſt Macedonia. He firſt of all paſſed thro' his own dominions; then over Cercine a deſert mountain, the boundary between the Sintians and Pæonians. He went over it by a paſſage he had, by cutting down the wood, made formerly himſelf, in an expedition againſt the Pæonians. In their march from Odryſæ over this mountain, they left the Pæonians on their right, but on their left the Sintians, and Mædians. On their deſcent from it, they arrived at Doberus a city of Pæonia. He loſt none of his army in the march, but by ſickneſs; notwithſtanding which it was very much increaſed: For many of

of the free Thracians came daily in without invitation, and followed for the ſake of plunder; ſo that the whole number is ſaid at laſt to have amounted to a hundred and fifty thouſand. Of theſe, the greater part were foot, but about a third of them were horſe. The greateſt ſhare of the horſe was provided by the Odryſians, and next to them by the Getæ. Of the foot, the free Thracians that came from about mount Rhodope, and uſed ſcimitars, were the moſt valiant: All the reſt that followed were a mixt crowd, formidable only in their number. All theſe therefore were got together at Doberus, and preparing to break in to the lower Macedonia, ſubject to Perdiccas, under the ridge of the mountains. For in the general name of Macedonians are compriſed the Lynceſtians and Helimiotians and other nations lying upwards, allied to and dependent upon the reſt, yet governed as diſtinct kingdoms. The dominion over the maritime Macedonia was firſt obtained by Alexander, father of Perdiccas, and his anceſtors the Temenidæ, who derived their original from Argos. Theſe, by a ſucceſsful war, had driven the Pierians out of Pieria, who afterwards fixed their reſidence at Phagres under mount Pangæus, on the other ſide the Strymon, and at other places; for which reaſon, the tract of ground lying under Pangæus towards the ſea is ſtill called the gulf of Pieria. From the region called Bottia they alſo expelled the Bottiæans, who now live upon the confines of the Chalcideans. And further, they ſeized in Pæonia, near the river Axius, a narrow tract of land running along from the mountains down to Pella and the ſea; and got poſſeſſion of that which is called Mygdonia lying between the Axius and the Strymon, by driving away the Edonians. They expelled the Eordians out of what is now called Eordia (of whom the greateſt part were deſtroyed, but a ſmall number dwell now about Phyſca); and out of Almopia, the Almopians. Theſe Macedonians alſo conquered other nations, of which they are ſtill in poſſeſſion, as Anthemus, Greſtonia and Biſaltia, and a large part of the territories belonging to the other Macedonians. But this whole tract of country

hath the general name of Macedonia, and Perdiccas, ſon of Alexander, reigned over them when Sitalces formed this invaſion.

The Macedonians, unable to make head againſt the numerous army by which they were invaded, retired within the walled and fortified places of the country, which at this time were not many. But Archelaus, ſon of Perdiccas, ſucceeding his father in the kingdom, built thoſe fortreſſes which are now there, opened the roads, and made many other regulations both in the military way about horſes and arms, and in other public matters, more than all the eight preceding kings put together. The Thracian army from Doberus broke firſt into that part of the country, which was formerly in the poſſeſſion of Philip. They took Eidomene by ſtorm; and got Gortynia, Atalante, and ſome other places by compoſition, which were readily brought to capitulate, out of their regard for Amyntas, whoſe ſon Philip now appeared amongſt them. They alſo laid ſiege to Europus, but were not able to reduce it. They afterwards advanced into the other Macedonia, lying to the left of Pella and Cyrrhus. Within theſe, they did not advance into Bottiæa and Pieria; but ravaged Mygdonia, Greſtonia, and Anthemus. The Macedonians never once thought of being able to make head againſt them with their foot; but, ſending for horſe from their allies in the upper Macedonia, wherever by the advantage of ground a few could encounter with many, they made frequent attacks upon the Thracian army. They made ſo ſtrong an impreſſion, that nothing could reſiſt ſuch excellent horſemen and ſo completely armed. For this reaſon, the enemy incloſed them about with their numerous forces, and thus made it exceeding hazardous for them to fight againſt ſuch manifold odds of numbers; ſo that at laſt they were forced to give over theſe ſkirmiſhes, judging it imprudent to run any hazards againſt ſo large an inequality of ſtrength.

Sitalces, at a parley held with Perdiccas, imparted to him the motives of the war. And, as the Athenians were not yet come up with their fleet, becauſe diffident of his punctuality to the engagement be-

tween

tween them, and had only ſent him preſents and embaſſadors, he detached part of his army againſt the Chalcideans and Bottiæans; where, by driving them into their fortreſſes, he ravaged the country. During his ſtay in theſe parts, the ſouthern Theſſalians, Magnetians, and other people ſubject to the Theſſalians, and the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, grew apprehenſive that his army might be turned againſt them, and prepared for their defence. Under the ſame apprehenſions were the northern Thracians beyond the Strymon that inhabit the plains, the Panæans, the Odomantians, the Droans, and the Derſæans, who are all of them free and independent. He farther gave occaſion for a rumour that ſpread amongſt the Grecians, enemies to Athens, that this army, brought into Greece by virtue of an alliance with them, would invade them all in their turns. Yet, without advancing any further, he was at one and the ſame time continuing his ravage upon Chalcidica, and Bottiæa, and Macedonia. But unable to execute any of thoſe points for which he formed this invaſion, when his army began to want proviſions, and to ſuffer by the rigor of the winter's cold, he is perſuaded by Seuthes the ſon of Sparadoxus, and his own couſin-german, who had a greater influence over him than any other perſon, to march back again with the utmoſt expedition. This Seuthes had been ſecretly gained by Perdiccas, who promiſed to give him his ſiſter, and a large dower with her. Thus perſuaded, after a ſtay upon the whole of but thirty days, and eight of theſe in Chalcidica, he retired precipitately into his own dominions. Perdiccas, according to promiſe, ſoon after gives his ſiſter Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes. And to this end came this grand expedition of Sitalces [4].

The

4 Sitalces, and his ſon Sadocus, who, as Thucydides relates above, was made a citizen of Athens, have not eſcaped the buffoonery of Ariſtophanes in his comedy of *The Acharnians*. Act I. Sc. 4. "*Crier*. Embaſſador to Sitalces, come into court. "*Embaſſ*. Here. *Dicæopolis*. Oh! here's "another knave ſummoned to make his "appearance. *Embaſſ*. We ſhould not "have ſtay'd ſo long in Thrace ——

Phormio.

The ſame winter, the Athenians at Naupactus, after the ſeparation of the Peloponneſian fleet, coaſting from thence under the command of Phormio, appeared before Aſtacus. Making there a deſcent, they pierced into the midland parts of Acarnania with four hundred heavy-armed Athenians from on board the fleet, and four hundred Meſſenians; and expelled from Stratus, Coronta, and other places the diſaffected part of the inhabitants; and having re-eſtabliſhed at Coronta Cynes the ſon of Theolytus, embarked again on board their ſhips. They judged it not adviſeable, in the winter-ſeaſon, to undertake any thing againſt the Oeniadæ, the only people of Acarnania who had perſiſted in continual hoſtilities againſt them. For the river Achelous, that takes its riſe from mount Pindus, and runs through Dolopia, the provinces of the Agræans and the Amphilochians, and all the plain of Acarnania, paſſing above by the city of Stratus, and diſcharging itſelf into the ſea near the Oeniadæ, renders all the adjacent country one continued moraſs, and by a ſtagnation of water makes it impracticable for an army in the winter-ſeaſon. Moſt of the iſles of the Echinades lie over-againſt the Oeniadæ, not greatly diſtant from the mouth of the Achelous; inſomuch that the river, being great, cauſeth a continual afflux of ſand, and by it ſome of theſe iſlands are already joined to the main-land; and it is expected that all the reſt in a ſhort time will be ſo too: For the current is large and rapid, and brings down with it great quantities of ſand. The iſles ſtand thick; and ſtopping, bind faſt together from farther diſſipation, the ſands

" *Dicæopolis.* I believe you, unleſs you had " been well paid for it. *Embaſſ.* Had not " a great ſnow fallen and covered all the " country, and all the rivers at the ſame " time been froze over. When Theognis " was contending here for glory, we were " drinking all the time with Sitalces. He " is an honeſt heart, and loves Athenians " dearly. In good truth, he is dotingly " fond of you all: He is for ever writing " upon the walls, *O rare Athenians!* And " his ſon, whom we made an Athenian, " longs mightily for ſome of your dainty " ſauſages, and hath preſſed his father to " ſuccour his dear countrymen. He, at a " ſolemn ſacrifice, ſwore he would; and " hath got ſuch a numerous army at his " heels, that the Athenians cry out —— " What a vaſt ſwarm of gnats is coming " along here!"

brought

brought down by the current. They lie not in a line, but in an alternate ſituation one from another, preventing the ſtrait courſe of the waters forwards into the ſea. They are further uncultivated, and of no large extent. The tradition is —— that Apollo, by an oracle, made a grant of this land to Alcmæon the ſon of Amphiaraus, when a vagabond, after the murder of his mother, telling him, "that he "never ſhould be freed from the terrors that haunted him, till he "found a place for his reſidence, which at the time he ſlew his mo-"ther had never been ſeen by the ſun, and then was not land;" becauſe every other part of the earth was polluted by the parricide. After great perplexities, he at length, as it is ſaid, diſcovered theſe riſing heaps of ſand at the mouth of the Achelous, and thought enough caſt up to ſuffice for his ſupport, after the long courſe of wandering about to which he had been neceſſitated ever ſince he murdered his mother. Fixing therefore his reſidence in the parts about the Oeniadæ, he grew powerful, and left to the whole country the name of Acarnania from his ſon Acarnas. This account of Alcmæon we have given exactly as we have received it from tradition.

The Athenians and Phormio weighing from Acarnania, and touching again at Naupactus, very early in the ſpring returned to Athens. Thither they brought all the freemen whom they had made priſoners in the late naval engagements (theſe were afterwards exchanged man for man), and the ſhips taken from the enemy.

And thus the winter ended, and with it the third year of the war, the hiſtory of which hath been compiled by Thucydides.

THE

THE HISTORY OF The PELOPONNESIAN WAR

By THUCYDIDES.

BOOK THE THIRD.

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THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

BOOK III.

YEAR IV.

IN the ſucceeding ſummer, the Peloponneſians and allies, when the corn was full-grown, made incurſion into Attica under the command of Archidamus ſon of Zeuxidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, and having fixed their camp ravaged the country. The Athenian cavalry at all convenient places ſkirmiſhed with them as uſual, and checked the greater number of the light-armed from advancing before the heavy-armed, and infeſting the parts adjacent to the city. Having continued here 'till proviſions began to fail, they retired, and were diſbanded to their reſpective cities. *Before* Chriſt 428. Attica *again invaded.*

Upon this irruption of the Peloponneſians, Leſbos immediately revolted from the Athenians, excepting Methymné. They were well *Revolt of* Leſbos.

inclined to ſuch a ſtep before the war broke out, but were diſcountenanced by the Lacedæmonians, and now were neceſſitated to make their revolt ſooner than they intended. They would have been glad to have deferred it, till they had compleated the works they were about for ſecuring their harbour, perfecting their walls and the ſhips then upon the ſtocks — till they had received what they wanted from Pontus, both archers and corn, and whatever they had already ſent for thither.

The reaſon was — the people of Tenedos then at enmity with them, thoſe of Methymné, and even ſome perſons of Mitylene underhand, who in a civil broil had received the hoſpitable protection at Athens, had ſent the Athenians advice — "That they are compelling all Leſbos to go into Mitylene, and are getting every thing "in readineſs for a revolt by the aid of the Lacedæmonians and "their kindred Bœotians; and if timely prevention be not given, "Leſbos will be loſt."

The Athenians, at preſent miſerably diſtreſſed by the plague and a war now grown very briſk and vigorous, knew that the acceſſion of Leſbos to their enemies, poſſeſſed as it was of a naval force and freſh in ſtrength, muſt be a terrible blow, and would not liſten at firſt to the accuſations ſent, chiefly from the earneſtneſs of their own wiſhes, that they might be groundleſs. But when they had in vain diſpatched an embaſſy to the Mitylenéans to put a ſtop to the forced reſort of the Leſbians thither and their other preparations, their fears were increaſed, and they became intent on ſome expedient of timely prevention — and order thither on a ſudden forty ſail that lay ready fitted out for a cruize on Peloponneſus. Cleïppides ſon of Deinias, with two collegues, had the command of this fleet. Information had been given them, that the feſtival of Apollo Maloeis was ſoon to be celebrated without the city, at which ſolemnity the whole people of Mitylene are obliged to aſſiſt. — It was therefore hoped, that they might ſurprize them on this occaſion, and by one ſudden aſſault

compleat

compleat the work. Should it ſo fall out, it would be a happy turn;—But, if this miſcarried, they were to order the Mitylenéans to deliver up their ſhipping and demoliſh their works, and in caſe they refuſed, to make inſtant war.

With theſe inſtructions the fleet went to ſea. And the Athenians ſeized ten triremes belonging to the Mitylenéans, which happened at that time to be lying in their port as an auxiliary quota in purſuance of treaty, and caſt into priſon all the crews. But a certain perſon paſſing over from Athens to Eubœa, and haſtening by land to Geræſtus, finds a veſſel there ready to put off, on board of which he gets a quick paſſage to Mitylene, and on the third day after his ſetting out from Athens, gives notice to the Mitylenéans that ſuch a fleet was coming to ſurprize them. Upon this, they adjourned their feſtival, and patching up their half-finiſhed walls and harbours as well as they could, ſtood ready on their guard. Not long after the Athenian fleet arrived, and finding the alarm had been given, the commanders notified to them the injunctions they brought; with which as the Mitylenéans refuſed to comply, they ranged themſelves for action.

The Athenian *fleet before* Mitylene.

The Mitylenéans, unprepared as they were and thus ſuddenly neceſſitated to make ſome reſiſtance, advanced on board their ſhips a little beyond the mouth of their harbour, as willing to engage. But being forced to retreat upon the approach of the Athenian fleet, they begged a parley with the commanders, from a view, if it were poſſible upon eaſy conditions, to rid themſelves of that fleet for the preſent. And the Athenian commanders readily accorded, from the apprehenſion, they had not ſufficient ſtrength to ſupport the war againſt all Leſbos.

Hoſtilities having thus ceaſed for a time, the Mitylenéans diſpatched their agents to Athens, and amongſt the number one of thoſe perſons who had ſent intelligence of their motions, but had now repented of the ſtep—to procure if poſſible the recalment of

the fleet, by aſſurances, that they were not bent on any innovations. But in the mean time, undiſcovered by the Athenian fleet, which lay at anchor in the road of Malea, to the north of the city, they ſend away a trireme to carry an embaſſy to Lacedæmon; for they had no room to believe they ſhould ſucceed in their negotiation at Athens. This embaſſy, after a laborious and dangerous voyage arriving at Lacedæmon, began to ſolicit a ſpeedy ſuccour. —— And when their agents returned from Athens, totally unſucceſsful, the Mitylenéans and all the reſt of Leſbos, excepting Methymne, prepare for war. This laſt place ſent in aid to the Athenians, as did alſo the Imbrians and Lemnians, and ſome few other of their allies.

The Mitylenéans once indeed made a general ſally with all their people againſt the ſtation of the Athenians. Hereupon a battle enſued, after which the Mitylenéans, tho' by no means worſted, yet durſt not continue all night in the field, but diffident of their own ſtrength retreated behind their walls. After this they kept themſelves quiet, unwilling to run any more hazards, till they had got ſome additional ſtrength from Peloponneſus, and were in other reſpects better provided. By this time Meleas a Lacedæmonian and Hermæondas a Theban are arrived among them, who had been diſpatched on ſome buſineſs before the revolt, and unable to compaſs their return before the Athenian fleet came up, had now in a trireme got in undiſcovered ſince the battle. It was the advice of theſe to diſpatch another trireme and embaſſy in company with *them*, which is accordingly done. But the Athenians, as the Mitylenéans remained in ſo quiet a poſture, became more full of ſpirits than before, and ſent ſummons of aid to their confederates, who came in with more than ordinary alacrity, as they ſaw ſuch an appearance of weakneſs on the ſide of the Leſbians. Having now formed a ſtation on the ſouth-ſide of the city, they fortified by a wall two camps, which inveſted the place on both ſides, whilſt their ſhipping was ſo ſtationed as to ſhut

up

up both the harbours. By this means the communication by ſea was quite cut off from the Mitylenéans. Of the land indeed the Mitylenéans and other Leſbians, who had now flocked to their aid, were for the moſt part maſters. The quantity which the Athenians had occupied by their camps was but inconſiderable, as the ſtation of their ſhipping and their market was held chiefly at Malea: And in this poſture ſtood the war againſt Mitylene. ——

Athenians cruize on the coaſt of Peloponneſus.

About the ſame time this ſummer, the Athenians ſend out thirty ſail of ſhips againſt Peloponneſus, under the command of Aſopius the ſon of Phormio, in purſuance of ſome ſolicitations they had received from the Acarnanians to ſend them either a ſon or ſome relation of Phormio to command in thoſe parts. Theſe ſhips ſailing along the coaſts of Laconia ravaged all the maritime places. After this, Aſopius ſends back the greateſt part of his ſhips to Athens, but with a reſerve of twelve proceeds himſelf to Naupactus. And raiſing afterwards the whole force of the Acarnanians, he leads them againſt the Oeniadæ. With his ſhips he ſailed up the Achelous, and the army marching by land laid the country waſte. But when this was found ineffectual, he diſmiſſeth the land-force, and ſtretching over *himſelf* to Leucas, and having made a deſcent upon Nericum, was intercepted in his retreat — by thoſe of the adjacent country, who ran together for mutual aid, ſupported by a ſmall party that lay there for guards, — with the loſs of his own life and a part of his army. After this, the Athenians ſtayed only to take up their dead by favour of a truce obtained from the Leucadians, and then ſteered homewards.

Mitylenéan embaſſadors repair to Olympia.

The embaſſadors of Mitylene, who were ſent in the firſt ſhip, having been ordered by the Lacedæmonians to repair to Olympia, that their applications might be addreſſed, and reſolutions formed about them, in the grand reſort of their whole alliance, arrive at that place. It was that Olympiad, in which Dorieus the Rhodian was

*Olympiad 88. was a * ſecond time victor. So, when the ſolemnity was ended, and an [1] audience was granted them, they ſpoke as follows ——

Their ſpeech. "YE men of Lacedæmon and you their Confederates, we are "ſenſible of that method of procedure, which hath hitherto pre- "vailed amongſt the Grecians — Revolters whilſt a war is on foot, "and deſerters from a former alliance, they readily receive, and ſo "long as their own intereſt is furthered by it, abundantly careſs "them: Yet, judging them traitors to their former friends, they re- "gard them as perſons who ought not to be truſted. To judge in "this manner is certainly right and proper, where thoſe who revolt "and thoſe from whom they break aſunder happen to be equal to "one another in turn of principle, in benevolent affection, and well "matched together in expedients of redreſs and military ſtrength, "and no juſt reaſon of revolt ſubſiſts. —— But the caſe is quite dif- "ferent between us and the Athenians. And we ought not to be

[1] In this manner for private ends, and through party-feuds, was a moſt noble and ſacred inſtitution abuſed. All Grecians in general paid their attendance at the Olympic Games; and were obliged by all the ties of honour and religion to ſuſpend their animoſities and quarrels, and meet together as countrymen and brethren with frank and open ingenuity. And yet, in the preſent inſtance, they are going to contrive the means of annoying one another, ſo ſoon as that ſolemnity is over, which was calculated to teach them union and concord and a ſteddy attachment to the intereſts of Greece their common mother. The policy however of the preſent proceeding is remarkable. The Athenians who aſſiſted at the games could ſuſpect nothing from the preſence of the Mitylenæans, who were equally bound in duty to attend. The Lacedæmonians and allies had thus an opportunity of aſſembling together to receive complaints, and to encourage revolts from Athens, without danger of ſuſpicions or a detection of their counſels, till they were ripe for execution. "The Lacedæmonians, (it is a remark "which will afterwards occur in this hiſ- "tory,) amongſt one another and in pay- "ing all due regard to the laws of their "country, gave ample proofs of honour "and virtue. But in regard to the reſt of "mankind, they reputed as honourable "the things which pleaſed them, and as "juſt the things which promoted their "intereſt."

"treated

" treated with cenſure and reproach, from the appearance of having
" deſerted them in extremities, after having been honourably re-
" garded by them in the ſeaſon of tranquillity. This our conduct to
" juſtify and approve, eſpecially as we come to requeſt your alliance,
" our words ſhall firſt be employed, as we know that friendſhip can
" be of no long continuance in private life, nor public aſſociations
" have any ſtability, unleſs both ſides engage with an opinion of re-
" ciprocal good-faith, and are uniform in principle and manners.
" For out of diſſonancy of temper, diverſities of conduct continually
" reſult.

" An alliance, it is true, was formerly made between us and the
" Athenians, when you withdrew yourſelves from the Median war,
" and they ſtayed behind you, to compleat what was yet to be
" done. We grant it — we made an alliance with the Athenians —
" not to inſlave the reſt of Greece to Athenians, but to deliver
" Greece from the Barbarian yoke. And whilſt they led us on in
" juſt equality, ſo long with alacrity we followed their guidance.
" But when once we perceived that they relaxed in their zeal againſt
" the *Mede*, and were grown earneſt in rivetting ſlavery upon al-
" lies, we then began to be alarmed. It was impoſſible, where ſo
" many parties were to be conſulted, to unite together in one body
" of defence, and thus all the allies fell into ſlavery, except our-
" ſelves and the Chians. We indeed, left in the enjoyment of our
" own laws and of nominal freedom, continued ſtill to follow them
" to war: But, from the ſpecimens we had hitherto ſeen of their be-
" haviour, could no longer regard theſe Athenians as truſty and
" faithful leaders. For it was not in the leaſt probable, that after
" inſlaving thoſe who were comprehended in the ſame treaty with
" ourſelves, they would refrain from treating ſuch as yet were free
" in the ſame tyrannic manner, whenever opportunity ſerved. Had
" we all indeed been left in the free exerciſe of our own laws, we
" ſhould then have had the ſtrongeſt proof that the Athenians acted

" upon

" upon honeſt uninnovating principles. But now, when they have
" laid their yoke upon the greater number, tho' they ſtill continue
" to treat us as their equals, yet undoubtedly it highly grates them;
" and they cannot long endure, when ſuch numbers couch beneath
" their power, that our *State* alone ſhould ſtand up and claim equa-
" lity. No; it cannot be! For the more their power hath ſwelled
" in bulk and ſtrength, by ſo much are we become more deſolate.
" The only ſecure pledge of a laſting alliance is that mutual awe,
" which keeps the contracting parties in proper balance. For then,
" if any be diſpoſed to make incroachments, he finds he cannot act
" upon advantage, and is effectually deterred. Our preſervation hi-
" therto hath not been owing to their honeſty but their cunning.
" Their ſcheme hath been gradually to advance their empire by all
" the ſpecious colourings of juſtice, by the road of policy rather than
" of ſtrength. And thus, we have been reſerved to juſtify their
" violence, and to be quoted as a proof, that unleſs thoſe whom they
" have inſlaved had deſerved their fate, a *State* upon an equal footing
" with themſelves would never have marched in conjunction with
" them to execute their vengeance. By the ſame ſtrain of policy,
" their firſt ſtep was to lead out thoſe that were ſtrongeſt againſt the
" weaker parties, deſigning to finiſh with them, when left deſtitute
" of any outward reſource, by the prior reduction of the reſt.
" Whereas, if they had begun with us, the confederate body re-
" maining yet poſſeſſed of its ſtrength and able to make a ſtand,
" their inſlaving project could not have equally ſucceeded. They
" were beſides under ſome apprehenſion of our naval force, leſt
" uniting with yours or any other *State*, ſuch an acceſſion might have
" endangered the whole of their plan. Some reſpite alſo was
" gained, from the reſpect we have ever ſhewn to their whole com-
" munity and to the ſeries of magiſtrates who have preſided
" amongſt them. We knew however that we could not long
" hold out, had not this war come timely to our relief. We

" ſaw

" ſaw our own fate in the examples which had been made
" of others.

" What friendſhip therefore, what aſſurance of liberty could ſub-
" ſiſt, when receiving each other with the open countenance, ſuſpi-
" cion lay lurking within? — when, in war apprehenſive of our
" power to us they paid their court; and we, from the ſame prin-
" ciple, paid our court to them in the ſeaſon of tranquillity? The
" bond of union, which mutual good-will cements in others, was
" in us kept faſt by fear. For through the prevalence of fear and
" not of friendſhip, we have thus long perſiſted in alliance. And
" whichever ſide ſecurity had firſt emboldened, that ſide would firſt
" have began incroachments upon the other. Whoever therefore
" chargeth us with injuſtice for revolting, whilſt they were only me-
" ditating our ruin and before we actually felt the miſeries deſigned
" us: — that perſon chargeth us without a reaſon. For had our ſi-
" tuation been ſuch, that we could have formed equal ſchemes to
" their prejudice and diſconcerted all their projects, what neceſſity
" did we lie under to reſign our equality and receive their law?
" But, as the power of attempting was ever within their reach, we
" ought certainly to lay hold of every proper expedient to ward off
" the blow.

" Such are the reaſons, ye men of Lacedæmon and you their
" confederates, ſuch the grievances which induced our revolt; ——
" reaſons ſo clear, that all who hear them muſt juſtify our con-
" duct — grievances ſo heavy, that it was time to be alarmed, and
" to look for ſome expedient of ſafety. We long ſince ſhewed our
" inclination to find this expedient, when during the *peace*, we
" ſent to you to negotiate a revolt, but by you rejected were ob-
" ſtructed in our ſcheme. And now, no ſooner did the Bœotians
" invite, than we without a pauſe obeyed the call. Now we have
" determined to make a double revolt — one from the Grecians, no
" longer in concert with the Athenians to force the load of oppreſ-

" ſion upon them, but with you to vindicate their freedom —— " another from the Athenians, that we may not in the train of af- " fairs be undone by them, but timely vindicate our own ſafety.

" Our revolt, we grant it, hath been too precipitate and unpre- " pared. — But this lays the ſtronger obligation upon you to admit " us to alliance, with the utmoſt expedition to ſend us ſuccours, " that you may ſhew your readineſs to redreſs the oppreſſed, and at " the ſame inſtant annoy your foes. Such a juncture for this was " never known before. What with the plague and the exorbitant " expence of the war, the Athenians are quite exhauſted. Their " fleet is divided, ſome to cruize upon your coaſt, others to make " head againſt us. It is not probable, they can have now the com- " petent reſerve of ſhipping, ſhould you invade them a ſecond time " this ſummer both by land and ſea; ſo that, either they muſt be " unable thus divided to make head againſt you, if you ſingly " attack them; or, the union of us both they will not be able " to face.

" Let no one amongſt you imagine, that this will be endangering " your own domeſtic welfare for the ſake of foreigners with whom " you have no connexion. For tho' Leſbos lies apparently at a great " diſtance from you, yet the conveniencies of it will lie near at hand " for your ſervice. For the war will not be made in Attica, as ſuch " an one ſuppoſeth, but in thoſe parts whence Attica deriveth its " ſupport. Their revenue ariſeth from the tribute paid by their " dependents. And that revenue will be increaſed, if they can " compaſs the reduction of us. For then not a ſoul will dare to re- " volt, and their own will be enlarged by the addition of our " ſtrength, and more grievous burdens will be laid upon us, as being " the laſt who have put on their yoke. On the other hand, if with " proper alacrity you undertake our ſupport, you will gain over a " *State* poſſeſſed of a conſiderable navy, that acquiſition you ſo " greatly want; and you will more eaſily be enabled to demoliſh

" the

"the Athenians, by withdrawing their dependents from them: "For then, every one of that number will with aſſurance and con- "fidence revolt — and you yourſelves be cleared of the bad impu- "tation you at preſent lie under, of rejecting thoſe who fly to you "for protection. If added to this, you manifeſt your views to re- "eſtabliſh the general freedom, you will ſo conſiderably ſtrengthen "the ſinews of war, that all reſiſtance will be unavailing.

"Reverencing therefore as you ought, theſe hopes which Greece "hath conceived of you; — Reverencing further Olympian Jove, in "whoſe temple we now ſtand, like ſupplicants diſtreſſed and ſuing for "redreſs —— Grant to the Mitylenéans the honour of your alliance, "and undertake their protection. Reject not the intreaties of men, "who have now indeed their lives and properties expoſed to dangers "merely their own, but whoſe deliverance from their preſent plunge "will reflect ſecurity and advantage upon all; and who, if you now "continue to be deaf to their intreaties, muſt drop into ſuch a ruin, "as will at length involve you all. At this criſis ſhew yourſelves to "be the men, which the voice of Greece united in your praiſe and "our dreadful ſituation require you to be."

They are admitted into the Peloponneſian *league.*

In this manner the Mitylenéans urged their plea; and the Lacedæmonians and confederates, having liſtned with attention, and owned themſelves convinced, admitted the Leſbians into their alliance, and decreed an incurſion into Attica. To put this in execution, orders were iſſued to the confederates then preſent, expeditiouſly to march with two thirds of their forces to the Iſthmus. The Lacedæmonians themſelves arrived there firſt, and got machines ready at the Iſthmus to convey their ſhips over-land from Corinth to the ſea of Athens, that they might invade them at the ſame time both by land and ſea. *They* indeed were eager and intent on the enterprize: But the other confederates were very ſlow in aſſembling together, as they were buſy in getting in their harveſt, and began to be ſadly tired of the war.

The Athenians *make a ſhew of their ſtrength.*

When the Athenians found that ſuch preparations were made againſt them, as an avowed inſult on their imagined weakneſs, they had a mind to convince their foes that ſuch imaginations were erroneous, and that they were well able, without countermanding their fleet from before Leſbos, to make head againſt any force that could come from Peloponneſus. Accordingly, they manned out an hundred ſhips, obliging all as well ſojourners as citizens (thoſe excepted of the firſt and ſecond claſs [2]) to go on board. Shewing themſelves firſt before the Iſthmus, in great parade they diſplayed their force,

2 The original is, "except thoſe who were worth five hundred *medimns*, and the *Horſemen* or *Knights*." The Athenians were ranged into claſſes by Solon. Plutarch hath deſcribed the manner in *the life of Solon*, as thus tranſlated in Potter's *Antiquities of* Greece, v. i. p. 14.

"Solon finding the people variouſly affected, ſome inclined to a monarchy, others to an oligarchy, others to a democracy, the rich men powerful and haughty, the poor men groaning under the burden of their oppreſſion, endeavoured as far as was poſſible to compoſe all their differences, to eaſe their grievances, and give all reaſonable perſons ſatisfaction. In the proſecution of this deſign he divided the Athenians into four ranks, according to every man's eſtate; thoſe, who were worth five hundred *medimns* of liquid and dry commodities, he placed in the firſt rank, calling them *Pentaceſiomedimni*. The next were the Horſemen, or *Ippeis*, being ſuch as were of ability to furniſh out a horſe, or were worth three hundred *medimns*. The third claſs conſiſted of thoſe that had two hundred *medimns*, who were called *Zeugitæ*. In the laſt he placed all the reſt, calling them *Thetes*, and allowed them not to be capable of bearing any office in the government, only gave them a liberty to give their votes in all public aſſemblies; which, tho' at the firſt it appeared inconſiderable, was afterwards found to be a very important privilege; for it being permitted every man, after the determination of the magiſtrates to make an appeal to the people aſſembled in convocation, hereby it came to paſs, that cauſes of the greateſt weight and moment were brought before them. And thus he continued the power and magiſtracy in the hands of the rich men, and yet neither expoſed the inferior people to their cruelty and oppreſſion, nor wholly deprived them of having a ſhare in the government. And of this equality he himſelf makes mention in this manner:

What power was fit I did on all beſtow,
Nor rais'd the poor too high, nor preſs'd too low;
The rich that rul'd and every office bore,
Confin'd by laws they could not preſs the poor:
Both parties I ſecur'd from lawleſs might,
So none prevail'd upon another's right.

Mr. CREECH.

and

and then made deſcents at pleaſure all along the coaſt. The Lacedæmonians ſeeing them thus ſtrong beyond what they had imagined, concluded, that the Leſbians had purpoſely amuſed them with fictions; and being perplexed how to act, as their confederates were not yet come up to join them, and as information was brought them, that the firſt Athenian ſquadron conſiſting of thirty ſail was laying waſte the territory round about their city, they retired to their own homes.

Afterwards they ſet about the equipment of a fleet to be ſent to Leſbos; and ordered the confederate-cities to ſend in their contingents, the whole amounting to forty ſail; and further appointed Alcidas to be admiral in chief, who was ready to put himſelf at the head of the expedition. The Athenians departed off the coaſt with their hundred ſail, when they ſaw their enemies had retreated.

During the time this fleet was out at ſea, tho' the Athenians at the commencement of the war had as large if not a larger number of ſhips, yet they never had their whole navy ſo compleatly fitted out for ſervice and with ſo much pomp as now. One hundred of their ſhips were ſtationed for guards round Attica and Eubœa and Salamis; and another hundred were coaſting all along Peloponneſus, beſide thoſe that were at Potidæa, and in other parts,—— inſomuch that the whole number employed this ſummer amounted to two hundred and fifty ſail. The expence of this, with that of Potidæa, quite exhauſted their treaſure. For the pay of the heavy-armed who were ſtationed at Potidæa, was two drachmas a day, each of them receiving a * drachma for himſelf and another for his ſervant. The number of the firſt body ſent thither was three thouſand, and not fewer than thoſe were employed during the whole ſiege; — but the ſixteen hundred who came with Phormio were ordered away before its concluſion. The whole fleet alſo had the ſame pay. In this manner was their public treaſure now for the firſt time exhauſted — and ſuch a navy, the largeſt they ever had, compleatly manned.

* 7 d. $\frac{1}{4}$.

The

Proceedings in Leſbos.

The Mitylenéans, during the time the Lacedæmonians lay at the Iſthmus, with a body of their own and auxiliaries marched by land againſt Methymne, expecting to have it betrayed to them. Having aſſaulted the place and being diſappointed in their expectations, they marched back by way of Antiſſa and Pyra and Ereſſus. In each of theſe places they halted for a while, to ſettle affairs in as firm order as poſſible, and to ſtrengthen their walls, and then without loſs of time returned to Mitylene.

Upon their departure, the Methymnéans marched out againſt Antiſſa. The Antiſſéans with a party of auxiliaries ſallying out to meet them, gave them a terrible blow, ſo that many of them were left dead upon the ſpot, and thoſe who eſcaped made the beſt of their way back.

The Athenians *ſend a reinforcement under* Paches.

The Athenians — adviſed of theſe incidents, and that further the Mitylenéans were quite maſters of the country, and that their own ſoldiers were not numerous enough to bridle their excurſions — about the beginning of autumn, ſend a reinforcement of a thouſand heavy-armed of their own people commanded by Paches the ſon of Epicurus. Theſe, having rowed themſelves the tranſports which brought them, arrive; and build a ſingle wall in circle quite round Mitylene, and on the proper ſpots of ground ſtrengthned it by erecting forts. Thus was Mitylene ſtrongly beſieged on all ſides, both by ſea and land —— And by this time it began to be winter.

Blockade of Mitylene.

A tax at Athens.

But the Athenians, wanting money to carry on the ſiege, determined now to tax themſelves, and by their firſt [3] contribution raiſed

3 It was a voluntary contribution: The original *term* implieth it. The manner was no doubt the ſame as was obſerved in ſucceeding times, when the neceſſities of the *ſtate* called for an extraordinary ſupply. On ſuch occaſions, the *preſidents* of the *aſſembly* laid before the Athenians the preſent want of money, and exhorted them with chearfulneſs and generoſity to contribute towards the national ſupport. Such as were willing roſe up in turn, ſaying, "I contribute ſo much," and naming the ſum. Such as, tho' rich, were niggardly and ſtrangers to all public ſpirit, ſat ſilent on theſe occaſions, or as faſt as they could ſtole out of the aſſembly.

raiſed * two hundred talents for the preſent ſervice; and at the ſame time diſpatched twelve ſhips under the command of Lyſicles and four collegues to levy money abroad. He, intent on raiſing contributions, made a viſit for this purpoſe to ſeveral places; and, having landed at Myus in Caria, intending to pierce through the plain of Mæander as far as the hill of Sandius, he was attacked on his route by the Carians and Anæitans, where himſelf and a great part of his army periſhed. * 38750*l.*

Platæa. *The plan of an eſcape.*

This winter, the Platæans — for they were ſtill blocked up by the Peloponneſians and Bœotians — finding themſelves much diſtreſſed by the failure of their proviſions, giving up all hope of ſuccour from the Athenians, and quite deſtitute of all other means of preſervation, formed a project now in concert with thoſe Athenians who were ſhut up with them in the blockade, "firſt of all to march out of the town in company, and to compaſs their eſcape, if poſſible, over the works of the enemy." The authors of this project were Theænetus the ſon of Timides a ſoothſayer, and Eumolpidas the ſon of Daimachus, who was one of their commanders. But afterwards, half of the number, affrighted by the greatneſs of the danger, refuſed to have a ſhare in the attempt. Yet the remainder, to the number of about two hundred and twenty, reſolutely adhered to attempt an eſcape, in the following manner ——

They made ladders equal in height to the enemy's wall. The meaſure of this they learned from the rows of brick, where the ſide of the wall facing them was not covered over with plaiſter. Several perſons were appointed to count the rows at the ſame time; ſome of them might probably be wrong, but the greater part would agree in the juſt computation; eſpecially, as they counted them ſeveral times over, and were beſides at no great diſtance, ſince the part marked out for the deſign was plainly within their view. In this method, having gueſſed the meaſure of a brick from its thickneſs, they found out what muſt be the total height for the ladders.

The

The work of the Peloponneſians was of the following ſtructure.—It was compoſed of two circular walls; one, towards Platæa; and the other, outward, to prevent any attack from Athens. Theſe walls were at the diſtance of ſixteen feet one from the other; and this intermediate ſpace of ſixteen feet was built into diſtinct lodgments for the guards. Theſe however, ſtanding thick together, gave to the whole work the appearance of one thick intire wall, with battlements on both ſides. At every ten battlements were lofty turrets of the ſame breadth with the whole work, reaching from the face of the inward wall to that of the outward; ſo that there was no paſſage by the ſides of a turret, but the communication lay open through the middle of them all. By night, when the weather was rainy, they quitted the battlements, and ſheltering themſelves in the turrets, as near at hand and covered over-head, there they continued their watch. Such was the form of the work, by which the Platæans were incloſed on every ſide.

Put in execution.

The enterprizing body, when every thing was ready, laying hold of the opportunity of a night tempeſtuous with wind and rain, and further at a dark moon, marched out of the place. The perſons, who had been authors of the project, were now the conductors. And firſt, they paſſed the ditch which ſurrounded the town; then they approached quite up to the wall of the enemy, undiſcovered by the guards. The darkneſs of the night prevented their being ſeen, and the noiſe they made in approaching was quite drowned in the loudneſs of the ſtorm. They advanced alſo at a great diſtance from one another, to prevent any diſcovery from the mutual claſhing of their arms. They were further armed in the moſt compact manner, and wore a covering only on the left foot, for the ſake of treading firmly in the mud. At one of the intermediate ſpaces between the turrets they got under the battlements, knowing they were not manned. The bearers of the ladders went firſt and applied them to the wall. Then twelve light-armed with only

only a dagger and a breaſt-plate ſcaled, led by Ammeas the ſon of Chorœbus, who was the firſt that mounted. His followers, in two parties of ſix each, mounted next on each ſide of the turrets. Then other light-armed with javelins ſucceeded them. Behind came others holding the bucklers of thoſe above them, thus to facilitate their aſcent, and to be ready to deliver them into their hands, ſhould they be obliged to charge. When the greater part of the number was mounted, the watchmen within the turrets perceived it. For one of the Platæans, in faſtening his hold, had thrown down a tile from off the battlements, which made a noiſe in the fall; and immediately was ſhouted an alarm. The whole camp came running towards the wall, yet unable to diſcover the reaſon of this alarm, ſo dark was the night, and violent the ſtorm. At this criſis the Platæans, who were left behind in the city, ſallied forth and aſſaulted the work of the Peloponneſians, in the part oppoſite to that where their friends were attempting to paſs, from them to divert as much as poſſible the attention of the enemy. Great was the confuſion of the enemy yet abiding in their poſts, for not one durſt leave his ſtation to run to the place of alarm, but all were greatly perplexed to gueſs at its meaning. At laſt the body of three hundred, appointed for a reſerve of ſuccour upon any emergency, marched without the work to the place of alarm. Now the lighted torches, denoting enemies, were held up towards Thebes. On the other ſide, the Platæans in the city held up at the ſame time from the wall many of theſe torches already prepared for this very purpoſe, that the ſignals given of the approach of foes might be miſtaken by their enemies the Thebans, who judging the affair to be quite otherwiſe than it really was, might refrain from ſending any ſuccour, till their friends who had ſallied might have effectuated their eſcape, and gained a place of ſecurity.

In the mean time, thoſe of the Platæans, who having mounted firſt, and by killing the guards had got poſſeſſion of the turrets on

either hand, poſted themſelves there to ſecure the paſſage, and to prevent any manner of obſtruction from thence. Applying further their ladder to theſe turrets from the top of the wall, and cauſing many of their number to mount, thoſe now upon the turrets kept off the enemies, running to obſtruct them both above and below, by diſcharging their darts; whilſt the majority, rearing many ladders at the ſame time, and throwing down the battlements, got clean over at the intermediate ſpace between the turrets. Every one, in the order he got over to the outward ſide, drew up upon the inner brink of the ditch, and from thence, with their darts and javelins, kept off thoſe who were flocking towards the work to hinder their paſſage. When all the reſt were landed upon the outſide of the work, thoſe upon the turrets coming down laſt of all, and with difficulty, got alſo to the ditch. By this time the reſerve of three hundred was come up to oppoſe them, by the light of torches. The Platæans by this means, being in the dark, had a clear view of them, and, from their ſtand upon the brink of the ditch, aimed a ſhower of darts and javelins at thoſe parts of their bodies which had no armour. The Platæans were all obſcured, as the glimmering of lights made them leſs eaſy to be diſtinguiſhed; ſo that the laſt of their body got over the ditch, tho' not without great difficulty and toil. For the water in it was froze, not into ice hard enough to bear, but into a watery congelation, the effect not of the northern but eaſtern blaſts. The wind blowing hard, had cauſed ſo much ſnow to fall that night, that the water was ſwelled to a height not to be forded without ſome difficulty. However, the violence of the ſtorm was the greateſt furtherance of their eſcape.

Succeſsful. The paſs over the ditch being thus completed, the Platæans went forwards in a body, and took the road to Thebes, leaving on their right the temple of Juno built by Andocrates. They judged it would never be ſuppoſed, that they had taken a route which led directly towards their enemies: And they ſaw at the ſame time the Peloponneſians

sians purſuing with torches along the road to Athens, by Cythæron and * the *Heads of the Oak*. For † ſix or ſeven ſtadia they continued their route towards Thebes, but then turning ſhort, they took the road to the mountains by Erythræ and Hyſiæ; and having gained the mountains, two hundred and twelve of the number completed their eſcape to Athens. Some of them indeed turned back into the city, without once attempting to get over; and one archer was taken priſoner at the outward ditch.

* Dryoſcephalæ.
† *Above half a mile.*

The Peloponneſians deſiſted from the fruitleſs purſuit, and returned to their poſts. But the Platæans within the city, ignorant of the real event, and giving ear to the aſſurances of thoſe who turned back, that "they are all to a man cut off," diſpatch a herald as ſoon as it was day to demand a truce for fetching off the dead; but learning hence the true ſtate of the affair, they remained well-ſatisfied. And in this manner theſe men of Platæa, by thus forcing a paſſage, wrought their own preſervation.

About the end of this winter, Salæthus the Lacedæmonian was diſpatched in a trireme from Lacedæmon to Mitylene; who being landed at Pyrrha, went from thence by land, and having paſſed the Athenian circumvallation by favour of a breach made in it by a torrent of water, gets undiſcovered into Mitylene. His commiſſion was, to tell the governors of the place, that "at the ſame time an incur-"ſion will be made into Attica, and a fleet of forty ſail be ſent "to their relief, according to promiſe; that he himſelf was diſ-"patched beforehand, to aſſure them of theſe, and to take all pro-"per care of other points." Upon this the Mitylenæans reſumed their ſpirits, and grew more averſe to any compoſition with the Athenians. Salæthus.

The winter was now paſt, and in this manner ended the fourth year of the war, of which Thucydides hath compiled the hiſtory.

YEAR V.

Before Chriſt 427.

Alcidas *goes to the relief of* Mitylene.

Attica *invaded.*

IN the beginning of the enſuing ſummer — after that the Peloponneſians had diſpatched Alcidas, admiral appointed, and the forty-two ſhips under his command to the relief of Mitylene, with the moſt preſſing orders — they and their confederates invaded Attica. Their deſign was, by this diverſion to give the Athenians ſo much employ on all ſides, that they might be unable to give any obſtruction to their ſquadron bound for Mitylene. This preſent invaſion was led by Cleomenes, who was his father's brother, in the right of Pauſanias ſon of Pleiſtionax the king, but yet in his minority. They now utterly deſtroyed thoſe parts of Attica that had been ravaged already. Whatever again began to flouriſh, and whatever had been ſpared in former incurſions now fell before their fury. And this incurſion, next to the ſecond, was the ſharpeſt they ever made upon the Athenians. For, having continued their ſtay ſo long, as to give time to their ſquadron to arrive at Leſbos, and ſend them news of their ſucceſs, they had leiſure to extend their devaſtations over almoſt all the country. But when all their expectations ended in diſappointment, and forage began to fail, they withdrew, and were diſbanded to their reſpective cities.

The Mitylenéans *mutiny and ſurrender.*

In the mean time the Mitylenéans, when they ſaw nothing of the ſquadron from Peloponneſus (which was loitering in the courſe) and their proviſions began to fail, are neceſſitated to capitulate with the Athenians, upon this occaſion — Salæthus, who had alſo himſelf given up all hopes of relief, cauſeth the *populace*, who before were light-armed, to put on heavy-armour, with a deſign to make a ſally on the Athenians. But they, ſo ſoon as they had received their armour, would no longer obey their governors, but aſſembling together in bodies, ordered thoſe in authority either publicly to produce what proviſions they had and divide equally among them, or otherwiſe they would imme-

immediately make their own terms with the Athenians, and give up the city. Thoſe in command being ſenſible that they had not force ſufficient to hinder this, and that their own danger would be extreme, ſhould they by ſtanding out be excluded the capitulation, join with them in procuring the following terms from Paches and the Athenians —

" That it ſhould be ſubmitted to the people of Athens to deter-
" mine as they pleaſe in relation to the Mitylenéans.

" That the Mitylenéans ſhould immediately receive their army into
" the city—and diſpatch an embaſſy to Athens to know their pleaſure.

" That ſufficient reſpite ſhould be indulged for this, during which
" Paches ſhould put no one Mitylenéan in chains, ſhould make none
" a ſlave, ſhould put none to death."

Theſe were the terms of the ſurrender. — But thoſe of the Mitylenéans, who had been moſt active in all the negotiations with the Lacedæmonians, were thrown into the utmoſt conſternation, and being quite in deſpair when the army took poſſeſſion of the place, ſeat themſelves down at the altars for refuge. Paches, having ordered them to ariſe, with a promiſe of protecting them from inſults, ſends them over to Tenedos, till he could know the pleaſure of the Athenians. Having further detached ſome triremes to Antiſſa, he took it in, and made all other diſpoſitions he judged expedient in regard to his army.

Alcidas arrives too late.

The Peloponneſians on board the ſquadron of forty ſhips, who ought to have made the utmoſt expedition, but inſtead of that had loitered upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus, and made the reſt of the voyage in a leiſurely manner, had proceeded ſo far as Delos, before their motions were known at Athens. Being advanced from Delos to Icarus and Myconus, they receive the firſt intelligence that Mitylene was taken. But being deſirous of certain information, they ſailed forwards to Embatus of Erythræa. Mitylene had been taken about ſeven days before they came up to Embatus. Here aſſured of the

the truth, they conſulted what was now to be done; and Teutiaplus, an Eléan, gave his opinion thus——

Advice of Teutiaplus.

"TO you, O Alcidas and as many other Peloponneſians as are "joined with me in the preſent command, I freely declare it to be "my own opinion, that we ſhould ſail to Mitylene, as we are, be- "fore the enemy is apprized of our arrival. It is probable, as they "are ſo lately poſſeſſed of the city, we ſhall find it very remiſly "and imperfectly guarded: and towards the ſea intirely neglected, "as on that ſide they cannot in the leaſt expect the approach of an "enemy, and our ſtrength in that element is ſuperior. It is proba- "ble alſo that their land-force is diſperſed, in that negligent manner "which victory indulgeth, into the ſcattered houſes of refreſhment. "If therefore we can come upon them by ſurprize and by night, I "hope by the aſſiſtance of our friends within, if really within we "have a friend remaining, to give a new turn to our affairs. Let us "not be ſtaggered at the danger of the attempt, but remember, that "all the turns of war are owing to ſome ſuch reverſe as this: "which, that commander who is moſt on his guard againſt, and who "can diſcern and ſeize ſuch critical moments for aſſaulting his ene- "mies, muſt be moſt frequently ſucceſsful."

Of the Ionian *exiles.*

He gave his opinion thus, but it had no effect upon Alcidas. Some other perſons, exiles from Ionia, and ſome Leſbians who were alſo on board, adviſed him further—"That ſince he ſeemed to "be diſcouraged by the apparent danger of that attempt, he ſhould "ſeize ſome city in Ionia, or Cyme in Ætolia: that, by favour of "ſuch a hold for war, they might bring about the revolt of Ionia: "That in ſuch a ſtep ſucceſs might juſtly be hoped, as his preſence "would be highly acceptable there: That, if they could cut off the "very great revenue which accrued thence to the Athenians, the loſs, "added to the expence of endeavouring a recovery, muſt drain their "treaſure.—

" treaſure. — That they further thought they could prevail on Piſ-
" ſuthnes, to join with them in the war."

Determination of Alcidas.

But Alcidas would not liſten to theſe propoſals, and got a majority to ſupport his own opinion — " That, ſince it was too late to ſuc-
" cour Mitylene, they ſhould without loſs of time return to Pelo-
" ponneſus." Weighing therefore from Embatus, he put again to ſea; and touching at Myoneſus of the Teians, he there butchered in cold blood a number of priſoners, whom he had taken in the voyage. Putting afterwards into Epheſus, he was attended there by an embaſſy from the Samians of Anæa repreſenting to him — " That it
" was no honourable method of vindicating the liberty of Greece,
" to butcher men who had not ſo much as lift up the hand againſt
" him, who were not enemies in heart, but of mere neceſſity de-
" pendent on the Athenians: — that, unleſs he chang'd his conduct,
" he would bring over but few of his enemies into friendſhip, but
" turn a far greater number of friends into enemies." —— He was wrought upon by this remonſtrance, and ſet all the Chians and others, whom he had yet reſerved, at liberty. For thoſe, who had at any time deſcried this ſquadron, had never thought of flying, but boldly approached it as certainly Athenian. They really had no ground to imagine, that whilſt the Athenians were maſters of the ſea, a Peloponneſian fleet ſhould dare to put over to Ionia.

He quits the coaſt of Ionia.

From Epheſus, Alcidas made the beſt of his way, or rather fled outright; for he had been diſcovered by the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*, whilſt he lay at anchor near Claros. Theſe veſſels happened at that time to be on a courſe from Athens. He was now apprehenſive of a chace, and ſo ſtretched out to ſea; determining, if poſſible, not to make any land again till he had reached Peloponneſus. Notice of him came firſt to Paches and the Athenians from Erythræa; it was then repeated from all parts. For as the country of Ionia is quite unfortified, the ſight of the Peloponneſians on that coaſt, had ſtruck a panic;

a panic; leſt, tho' their intention was not to continue there, they ſhould at once aſſault and deſtroy their cities. The *Salaminian* [4] alſo and *Paralus*, after they had deſcried him at Claros, came voluntarily to notify the tidings. Paches ſet upon the chace with warmth, and purſued it as far as the iſle of Latmos. But there giving up all hope of reaching him, he turned back again for his poſt; and ſince he had not been able to come up with them by ſea, thought a great point was carried, in not finding them refuged in any harbour, where they muſt have been under a neceſſity to fortify their ſtation, and oblige him to a regular procedure and attack.

Purſued by Paches.

In ſailing back he touched at Notium of the Colophonians, in which at this time the Colophonians reſided, the upper city having been taken by Itamenes and the Barbarians, who had broke in by favour of an inteſtine ſedition. It was taken about the time, that the Peloponneſians made their ſecond incurſion into Attica. But in Notium a ſecond ſedition broke out, between thoſe who reſorted thither for refuge and the old inhabitants. The latter having obtained an aid of Arcadians and Barbarians from Piſſuthnes kept within a part ſeparated by a traverſe wall, and the management of affairs was in the hands of ſome Colophonians of the upper city, who were in the Mediſh intereſt, and had been received amongſt them as an aid. But the former, who had reſorted hither for refuge, and were a body of exiles, apply to Paches for protection. He invited Hippias, the commander of the Arcadians within the tranſverſe wall, to come out to a conference, aſſuring him, "if they came to no agreement, he "would replace him within both ſafe and ſound." Upon this Hippias

4 Theſe two veſſels ſeem to have been the packets or yachts of the *State* of Athens. Their force was ſmall in compariſon of the ſhips of war, as they were chiefly deſigned for nimbleneſs and expedition. They carried embaſſadors to and fro, went on all public errands whether of a civil or religious nature, and tranſported magiſtrates and generals to and from their poſts. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who beſides receiving more pay, eſteemed it alſo a greater honour to ſerve on board theſe veſſels, which were ſacred.

came

came out: And Paches immediately put him under an arreſt, but laid no bonds upon him. This done, he on a ſudden aſſaults the wall; by favour of the ſurprize carries it; and puts all the Arcadians and Barbarians within to the ſword. After this, he replaceth Hippias within, in the ſame ſtate he had promiſed; but when he had him there, immediately apprehends him again and ſhoots him to death with arrows. Notium he delivers into the hands of the Colophonians, excluding thoſe only who were in the intereſt of the Mede. In proceſs of time, the Athenians having ſent leaders thither on purpoſe, and declared Notium an Athenian colony, ſettled in it the Colophonians that were any where to be found, under the accuſtomed regulations.

Paches *ſends his priſoners to* Athens.

Paches, being returned to Mitylene, compleated the reduction of Pyrra and Ereſſus; and having apprehended Salæthus the Lacedæmonian, who had been concealed in the city, ſends him to Athens along with thoſe citizens of Mitylene from Tenedos, whom he had kept in ſafe cuſtody there, and all others who appeared to have been concerned in the revolt. As an eſcort to theſe he ſends away alſo the greater part of his army. With the remainder he himſelf ſtayed behind to regulate the affairs of Mitylene and the reſt of Leſbos, to the beſt of his diſcretion.

The bloody decree againſt Mitylene.

When the authors of the revolt and Salæthus were arrived at Athens, the Athenians inſtantly put Salæthus to death. He made them many fruitleſs propoſals to ſave his life; and amongſt the reſt, that the ſiege of Platæa ſhould be raiſed, which was ſtill beſieged by the Peloponneſians. They next entered into conſultation, what ſhould be done with the revolters; and in the warmth of anger decreed — "That not only thoſe who were now at Athens ſhould "be put to death, but the ſame ſentence ſhould extend to all the "men of Mitylene who were adult; and the women and children "be ſold for ſlaves." They were exaſperated againſt them not only becauſe they had revolted, but becauſe they had done it without the

provocation which others had received in the rigour of their government. The Peloponneſian fleet added the greater impetuoſity to this their reſentment, as they had dared to venture ſo far as Ionia in aid of the Rebels. For it plainly appeared to them, that the revolt had not been made without much previous deliberation. — In ſhort, they diſpatch a trireme to notify their decree to Paches, with orders to ſee it put in immediate execution upon the Mitylenéans.

Reſumed. The day following, repentance on a ſudden touched their hearts, moved by the reflexion, that they had paſſed a ſavage and monſtrous decree in dooming a whole city to that deſtruction, which was due only to the authors of the guilt. This was no ſooner perceived by the Mitylenéan ambaſſadors then reſiding at Athens, and ſuch of the Athenians, as inclining to mercy had a mind to ſave them, than they addreſſed themſelves to the magiſtrates, begging the decree might be again debated. Their requeſt was more eaſily granted, as the magiſtrates had diſcovered that the bulk of the city were deſirous to have a ſecond opportunity of declaring their ſentiments. An aſſembly of the people is again convened, and various opinions were offered by different perſons, till Cleon the ſon of Cleanetus, who in the former aſſembly had propoſed and carried the murdering ſentence, who in all other reſpects was the moſt violent of all the citizens, and at this time had by far the greateſt influence over the people, ſtood forth again and ſpoke as follows ——

Speech of Cleon. "UPON many other occaſions my own experience hath con-
" vinced me, that a democracy is incapable of ruling over others;
" but I ſee it with the higheſt certainty now in this your preſent re-
" pentance concerning the Mitylenéans. In ſecurity ſo void of ter-
" ror, in ſafety ſo exempt from treachery, you paſs your days within
" the walls of Athens, that you are grown quite ſafe and ſecure
" about your dependents. Whenever, ſoothed by their ſpecious in-
" treaties, you betray your judgment or relent in pity, not a ſoul
" amongſt

" amongſt you reflects that you are acting the daſtardly part, not in " truth to confer obligations upon thoſe dependents, but to endanger " your own welfare and ſafety. It is then quite remote from your " thoughts, that your rule over them is in fact a tyranny, that " they are ever intent on projects to ſhake off your yoke —— *that* " yoke, to which they ever reluctantly ſubmitted. It is not for- " giveneſs on your part, after injuries received, that can keep them " faſt in their obedience, ſince this muſt be ever the conſequence " of your own ſuperior power and not of gratitude in them.

" Above all, I dread that extremity of danger to which we are " expoſed, if not one of your decrees muſt ever be carried into act, " and we remain for ever ignorant —— that the community which " uniformly abides by a worſe ſet of laws, hath the advantage over " another, which is finely modelled in every reſpect, except in " practice; — that, modeſt ignorance is a much ſurer ſupport than " genius which ſcorns to be controled; — and that, the duller part " of mankind in general adminiſter public affairs much better " than your men of vivacity and wit. The laſt aſſume a pride in " appearing wiſer than the laws; in every debate about the public " good they aim merely at victory, as if there were no other points " ſufficiently important, wherein to diſplay their ſuperior talents — " and by this their conduct they generally ſubvert the public welfare: " The former, who are diffident of their own abilities, who regard " themſelves as leſs wiſe than the laws of their country —— tho' " unable to detect the ſpecious orator, yet being better judges of " equity than champions in debate, for the moſt part inforce the " rational conduct. This beyond denial is our duty at preſent; " we ſhould ſcorn competitions in eloquence and wit, nor wilfully " and contrary to our own opinion miſlead the judgment of this full " aſſembly.

" For my part, I perſiſt in my former declarations, and I am ſur- " prized at the men who propoſed to have the affair of Mitylene

" again debated, who endeavour to protract the execution of juſtice,
" in the intereſt of the guilty more than of the injured. For by this
" means the ſufferer proceeds to take vengeance on the criminal with
" the edge of his reſentment blunted; when revenge, the oppoſite
" of wrong, the more nearly it treads upon the heels of injury, ge-
" nerally inflicts the moſt condign puniſhment. But I am more ſur-
" priſed at him, whoever he be, that ſhall dare to contradict, and
" pretend to demonſtrate that the injuries done by the Mitylenéans
" are really for our ſervice, and that our calamities are hardſhips on
" our dependents. He certainly muſt either preſume upon his own
" eloquence, if he contends to prove that what was plainly decreed
" was never decreed; or, inſtigated by lucre will endeavour to ſeduce
" you by the elaborate and plauſible artifice of words. In ſuch con-
" tentions, the *State* indeed awards the victory to whom ſhe pleaſeth,
" but ſhe ſuſtains all the damage herſelf. You are anſwerable for
" this, Athenians!--- You! who fondly dote on theſe wordy com-
" petitions: You! who are accuſtomed to be ſpectators of ſpeeches
" and hearers of actions. You meaſure the poſſibility of future ef-
" fects by the preſent eloquence of your orators; you judge of ac-
" tions already paſt, not by the certain conviction of your own eyes,
" but the fallible ſuggeſtions of your ears, when ſoothed by the in-
" veigling inſinuating flow of words. You are the beſt in the world
" to be deceived by novelty of wit, and to refuſe to follow the dic-
" tates of the approved judicious ſpeaker, ---- ſlaves as you are to
" whatever trifles happen always to be in vogue, and looking down
" with contempt on tried and experienced methods. The moſt ear-
" neſt wiſh that the heart of any of your body ever conceived is, to
" become a ſpeaker; if that be unattainable, you range yourſelves in
" oppoſition againſt all who are ſo, for fear you ſhould ſeem in judg-
" ment their inferiors. When any thing is acutely uttered, you are
" ready even to go before it with applauſe, and intimate your own
" pre-conception of the point, at the ſame time dull at diſcerning

" whither

" whither it will tend. Your whole paſſion, in a word, is for things
" that are not in reality and common life; but of what paſſeth di-
" rectly before your eyes you have no proper perception. And
" frankly, you are quite infatuated by the luſt of hearing, and re-
" ſemble more the idle ſpectators of contending ſophiſts, than men
" who meet to deliberate upon public affairs. From ſuch vain
" amuſements endeavouring to divert you, I boldly affirm, that
" no one city in the world hath injured you ſo much as Mitylene.

" Thoſe, who unable to ſupport the rigor of your government,
" or who compelled to do it by hoſtile force, have revolted from
" you, I readily abſolve. But for a people who inhabit an iſland, a
" fortified iſland; who had no reaſon to dread the violence of our
" enemies, except by ſea; who even at ſea, by the ſtrength of their
" own ſhipping, were able to guard themſelves againſt all attacks,
" who enjoyed their own model of government, and were ever
" treated by us with the higheſt honour and regard ----- for ſuch a
" people to revolt in this manner, is never to be forgiven. Is not
" their whole procedure one ſeries of treachery? Have they not ra-
" ther made war upon than revolted againſt us? For revolt can
" only be aſcribed to thoſe who have ſuffered violence and outrage.
" Have they not further ſought out our implacable foes, and begged
" to participate with them in our deſtruction? This certainly is a
" much greater aggravation of guilt, than if merely on their own do-
" meſtic ſtrength they had rebelled againſt us. They would not be
" deterred by the calamities of their neighbours, who have fre-
" quently before this revolted, and been puniſhed for it by a total re-
" duction; nor would they ſo far acquieſce in preſent felicity, as not
" to hazard the dangerous reverſe of miſery. Audacious in regard
" to the future, preſumptuous above their ſtrength but below their
" intention, they made war their choice, and in preferring violence
" to the juſt obſervance of duty have placed their glory. For, tho'

" uninjured

" uninjured and unprovoked, the firſt moment they ſaw a probability
" of prevailing, they ſeized it and rebelled.

" It is the uſual effect of proſperity, eſpecially when felt on a ſud-
" den, and beyond their hope, to puff up a people into inſolence of
" manners. The ſucceſſes of mankind, when attained by the ra-
" tional courſe, are generally of much longer continuance than when
" they anticipate purſuit. And in a word, men are much more ex-
" pert at repelling adverſity than preſerving proſperity. By this ought
" we long ago to have adjuſted our conduct towards the Mitylenéans,
" never diſtinguiſhing them above others with peculiar regard; and
" then, they never would have been that inſolent people we have
" found them now. For ſo remarkably perverſe is the temper of
" man, as ever to contemn whoever courts him, and admire whoever
" will not bend before him.

" Let condign puniſhment therefore be awarded to their demerits.
" Let not the guilt be avenged upon the heads of the *few*, and the
" bulk of offenders eſcape unpuniſhed. The whole *people* to a man
" have rebelled againſt us, when it was in their power to have been
" ſheltered here, and now again to be reinſtated in their former
" ſeats. But, they judged the danger would be leſſened by the
" general concurrence with the *few*, and ſo all revolted in concert.

" Extend further your regards to the whole body of your depen-
" dents; for if you inflict the ſame puniſhments on thoſe who re-
" volt by compulſion of enemies, and who revolt on pure deliberate
" malice, which of them, do you think, will not ſeize the leaſt
" pretext to throw off your yoke; when, if he ſucceeds, his liberty
" is recovered, and, tho' he fails, the hurt is ſo eaſy to be cured?
" Beſides this, our lives and fortunes will be endangered upon every
" ſingle attempt which ſhall be made. Suppoſe we ſucceed, we only
" recover an exhauſted ruinated city, but ſhall for the future be de-
" prived of the revenue ariſing from it, the eſſence of our ſtrength:

" But,

" But, if we cannot prevail, we ſhall enlarge the number of enemies
" we already have: And at a time when we ought to be employed
" in reſiſting our preſent adverſaries, we ſhall be intangled in wars
" againſt our own dependents. We ought not therefore to encou-
" rage the hope, whether raiſed by the force of intreaty, or pur-
" chaſed by the force of corruption, that their errors are but the er-
" rors of men, and ſhall therefore be forgiven. The damage they
" have done was not involuntary, but they have been deliberate de-
" termined villains: Forgiveneſs is only for thoſe who erred not by
" deſign.

" Moved by the ardency and zeal of my former plea, you made
" the decree; and now I earneſtly conjure you, not to repent of your
" own determinations, not to plunge yourſelves in inextricable diffi-
" culties, through pity, through delight of hearing, and ſoft for-
" bearance, the three moſt prejudicial obſtacles of power. It is juſt
" to ſhew pity to thoſe who are its proper objects, and not to men
" who would never have felt compaſſion for us, nor to foes who of
" neceſſity muſt be implacable. The orators, thoſe delights of your
" ears, will have room in debates of leſſer moment to catch at your
" applauſe, but ſhould be ſilenced here, where they only can give
" the public a ſhort-liv'd pleaſure, whilſt they embroil it with per-
" plexities not eaſy to be ſurmounted, and themſelves alone in requi-
" tal of ſpeaking well will be well rewarded for it. Forbearance,
" further, may be ſhewn to thoſe who are willing to be, and will for
" the future prove themſelves our friends; but not to ſuch invete-
" rate ſouls as theſe, who, if ſuffered to live, will live only to wreak
" their malice againſt you.

" I ſhall wave enlargements, and give you only one ſhort aſſu-
" rance, that if you hearken to my admonitions, you will at the
" ſame time do juſtice to the Mitylenéans and ſervice to yourſelves;
" but, if you reſolve in any other manner, you will receive no
" thanks from them, and will eſtabliſh the cleareſt evidence for your

" own

" own condemnation. For, if theſe men had reaſon to revolt, it
" follows that you have tyrannically ruled them. Grant the injuſtice
" of ſuch a rule, but yet that you have preſumed to be guilty of it;
" —— why then, upon the mere motive of intereſt, you ought now
" to chaſtiſe them beyond what is right, or immediately to forego
" your power, and dropping yourſelves down into impotent ſecurity,
" to ſet about the practice of humanity and virtue. But, adieu to
" this vain expedient! and at once reſolve to make them feel that
" weight of miſery they deſigned for us. Convince them that thoſe
" who have eſcaped it, can feel as ſtrong reſentments as thoſe who
" projected the fatal blow. Determine now, by recollecting with
" yourſelves what kind of uſage you would have received from
" them, had *they* ſucceeded in their plots, *they!* the uninjured, un-
" provoked aggreſſors. It is an allowed truth, that men, who
" without the leaſt provocation have recourſe to acts of malice, will
" be ſated with nothing leſs than complete deſtruction, as they muſt
" ever be terrified at the ſight of a ſurviving foe. For he who ſuf-
" fers from a quarter whence he never deſerved it, will not ſo ea-
" ſily lay down his reſentments, as when mutual enmity hath kindled
" the contention. Be not therefore traitors to your own ſelves. Fi-
" gure to yourſelves, as ſtrongly as you can, the miſeries they de-
" ſigned you; remember how you wiſhed for nothing in this world
" ſo much as to have them in your power, and now retaliate upon
" them. Relent not at the ſcene of horror imagination may preſent
" to your fancy, but fix your remembrance faſt on that weight of
" miſery, which was juſt now ſuſpended over your own heads.
" Puniſh theſe wretches according to their deſerts; make them a
" notable example to the reſt of your dependents, that death muſt
" be the portion of whoever dares revolt. For when once they
" are certain of this, your arms will no more be recalled from your
" foreign enemies, to be employed in the chaſtiſement of your own
" dependents."

In

In this manner Cleon [5] ſupported the decree, and when he had concluded, Diodotus the ſon of Eucrates, who in the former aſſembly had moſt ſtrenuouſly oppoſed the bloody ſentence againſt the Mitylenéans, ſtood forth, and thus replied.

Speech of Diodotus.

" I NEITHER blame thoſe who propoſed the reſumption of " the decree againſt Mitylene, nor do I praiſe the men who inveigh " againſt repeated conſultations on points of the greateſt importance. " But I lay it down for certain, that there are no two greater im- " pediments of ſound mature counſel than precipitation and anger; " of which, the one is cloſely connected with madneſs, the other " with raw inexperience and ſhort limitary judgment.

" It may indeed be warmly aſſerted, that words are not the pro- " per guides to actions. But the author of ſuch an aſſertion is either

5 From the ſhort ſketch of Cleon's character given before by Thucydides, and the ſpeech he hath now made, it is likely he can be no favourite with the reader. Cicero hath ſtiled him, " a turbulent but elo- " quent Athenian." By means of his eloquence, and an impudence that never could be daſhed, he was now a prime favourite with the people, but the ſcorn and terror of all good men at Athens. He had ever been a ſnarler at Pericles, but ſo long as he lived could obtain no ſhare in the public adminiſtration. He had now got the aſcendant by cajoling the people, and by his loud and daily invectives againſt their miniſters and commanders. He will make a very ſplendid and very deſpicable figure in the ſequel. Ariſtophanes, who had a particular grudge againſt him, hath exhibited him in the moſt diſtaſteful light. His comedy of the *Horſemen* or *Knights* is intirely employed to ſhew him off. He calls him throughout the *Paphlagonian*, to brand his low and brutal diſpoſition, who " quitting his ori- " ginal trade of ſelling leather, vile leather, " ſince people rather ſwam than walked in " the ſhoes made of it, was now become " the leading politician, the ſcourge and " peſt of the republic." The *chorus* of the play ſalutes him with the moſt villainous titles. And an oracle is cooked up, which propheſieth that they ſhall never get rid of Cleon, till he is overpower'd by a greater ſcoundrel than himſelf. A dealer in black-puddings is at laſt procured to be his competitor. The conteſt is carried on with all the ribaldry and ſcurrility that unbridled wit could forge for ſuch characters, and Cleon is at length defeated. This is the event upon the ſtage, but was by no means ſo in the *State* of Athens. The wit of Ariſtophanes ſeldom hurt knaves and ſcoundrels; it wounded and was miſchievous only to the ableſt miniſters and the warmeſt patriots.

" wanting in diſcernment, or confines it only to his own ſelfiſh views.
" He is wanting in diſcernment, if he imagines there is any other
" poſſible method of putting light into things that are future or un-
" ſeen; or confines it only to himſelf, if willing to recommend a
" ſcandalous meaſure, and conſcious he hath not eloquence enough
" to ſupport it openly, he lancheth out into plauſible calumnies, to
" intimidate his opponents as well as his audience.

" But odious beyond all ſupport is their procedure, who prema-
" turely condemn the advice of others as purchaſed and corrupt. For
" would they only acquieſce in the charge of ignorance, the defeated
" opponent goes off with the bare character of a man leſs inlightned
" indeed, but quite as honeſt. If he be charged with corruption,
" his point he may carry, but his honeſty will ever be ſuſpected;
" and if his point be loſt, he muſt paſs for knave and blockhead
" both. Such methods can never be conducive to the public good.
" The men, beſt able to adviſe, are by this means intimidated:
" Though the public welfare would then be beſt ſecured, if every
" perſon of ſo diſingenuous a temper was not able to open his mouth;
" for then, by his ſeducements, the public could never be miſled.
" But it is the duty of every true patriot to deſpiſe the ſlanders of
" opponents, and on fair and impartial views to get his own advice
" accepted. It is the duty of every well-regulated public, not in-
" deed to load a man with honours for having given the beſt advice,
" but, never to abridge him of his preſent portion; and, if he can-
" not prevail, by no means to diſgrace, much leſs to puniſh him:
" For then, neither would the ſucceſsful debater, from a view of in-
" hancing his own perſonal honours, ever ſpeak againſt conſcience,
" or aim merely at applauſe; nor would he, who hath been unſuc-
" ceſsful in his motions, be greedy of propoſing whatever may ca-
" jole, and ſo earn popularity for himſelf. But the method in vogue
" with us is the reverſe of this; and what is worſe, if a perſon be
" ſuſpected of corruption, tho' he adviſe the moſt prudent expedients,

" yet

" yet the odium raiſed againſt him upon the weak ſuggeſtion of " lucre, quite weighs him down, and we are deprived of the mani- " feſt ſervice he could do the *State*. Nay, ſuch is our method, that " even the beſt advice, if readily offered, can eſcape ſuſpicion no " more than the worſt. And hence, it is neceſſarily incumbent, as " well upon him who would perſuade the public into the moſt pre- " judicial meaſures, to ſeduce the people with art; as upon him who " would adviſe the beſt, to diſguiſe the truth in order to prevail. " Amidſt theſe jugglings, the public alone is debarred the ſervice of " its moſt able counſellors, ſince in a plain and open method they " cannot poſſibly act, and artifice muſt clear the way before them. " For the man who openly beſtows any benefit upon it, is conſtantly " ſuſpected of doing underhand a greater to himſelf.

" When affairs therefore of ſo high concern are before you, when " the general temper is ſo over-run with jealouſy, we, who preſume " to adviſe, muſt enlarge our proſpect farther than you, who only " aſſiſt at a tranſient conſultation; becauſe we are accountable for " what we propoſe, and you are not accountable for the prejudices " with which you hear. For if not only he who propoſed, but he " who complied, were equally anſwerable for events, your determi- " nations would be better framed than they are at preſent. But now, " hurried along as you are by your haſty reſentments on any ſiniſter " event, you wreak your fury only upon the ſingle opinion of the " perſon who adviſed, and not upon your own joint opinions, by con- " currence of which the miſcarriage was incurred.

" For my part, I neither ſtand up to deny certain facts in favour " of the Mitylenéans, nor to waſte the time in fruitleſs accuſations. " We are not debating now what wrongs they have done us, " ſince that would be a reproach to ſenſe; but what determination " about them is beſt. For, tho' I can prove, beyond a ſcruple, that " they have injured us in the moſt outrageous manner, yet I ſhall " not for that reaſon adviſe you to butcher them, unleſs it be expe-

" dient; nor, were they objects of forgiveneſs, ſhould I adviſe for-
" giveneſs, unleſs I judged it for the intereſt of the public. I ap-
" prehend, that our conſultations turn more upon a future than a
" preſent view. And Cleon here moſt confidently aſſerts, that the
" ſureſt expedient of your future welfare is, to prevent all other re-
" volts by inflicting death in doom of this; but, equally confident
" of the juſt expedient of future ſecurity, I declare quite on the
" other ſide. And I intreat you, by no means to reject the real ad-
" vantage of mine for the ſpecious colourings of his advice. Strict
" juſtice, I grant, may be with him; and, enraged as you are
" againſt the Mitylenéans, may have a ſudden influence upon you.
" But we meet not here in judgment upon them, and juſtly to decide
" is not now our employment; we are only to conſult how to diſpoſe
" of them beſt for our own advantage.

" In the public communities of men, death is the penalty award-
" ed to ſeveral crimes, to ſuch as are not enormous like this, but of
" a leſs guilty nature. Yet puffed up with hope, men run all ha-
" zards, and no one ever yet hath boldly incurred the danger, if
" ſelf-convinced beforehand, that he could not ſurvive the attempt.
" Where was the city ſo bent on revolt, that when its own domeſtic
" ſtrength, or the aid of others, were judged unequal to the work,
" durſt ever attempt it? The whole of mankind, whether indivi-
" duals or communities, are by nature liable to ſin: and a law of in-
" fallible prevention will never be enacted. Men by repeated trials
" have inforced all kinds of puniſhment, attentive, if poſſible, to re-
" ſtrain the outrages of the wicked. And in the early age it is pro-
" bable, that milder penalties were aſſigned for the moſt enormous
" wrongs; but, being found by experience ineffectual, they were af-
" terwards extended generally to loſs of life: This however is not yet
" effective. Some terror therefore muſt be invented, even more
" alarming than this, or this will never ſufficiently reſtrain. But then,
" there is a poverty which renders neceſſity daring; there is a power

" which

" which renders pride and inſolence rapacious. There are other con-
" tingencies, which, in the fervour of paſſions, as every human
" mind is poſſeſſed by ſome too ſtubborn to admit a cure, drive
" them on boldly to confront extremities. But the greateſt in-
" centives of all are hope and love: This points out a path, and
" that moves along according to direction: This thoughtleſly pro-
" poſeth the ſcheme, and that immediately ſuggeſteth a certainty of
" ſucceſs. Theſe are the ſources of all our evils; and theſe inviſible
" principles within us are too ſtrong for all the terrors that are ſeen
" without. To theſe add fortune, who contributes her ample ſhare
" to diveſt the mind of its balance. She ſhews herſelf by unexpected
" ſtarts, and encourageth even the incompetent to venture dangers,
" and hath a greater influence over communities, as the ends pro-
" poſed by them are of the greateſt concern, ſuch as liberty or do-
" minion, where every individual, amidſt the univerſal ardor, un-
" accountably plumes himſelf up, and acts with a ſpirit above him-
" ſelf. But in truth, it is quite impoſſible; it is a proof of egregious
" folly to imagine, when human nature is impelled by its own impe-
" tuous paſſions towards ſuch objects, that the force of laws or any
" intervening terror is ſtrong enough to divert them from the mark.
" Hence therefore ariſeth the ſtrongeſt diſſuaſive to us from confiding
" in the penalty of death as the only pledge of our future ſafety;
" which muſt betray us into weak prejudicial meaſures, which muſt
" drive all revolters into utter deſpair, by ſhewing them plainly,
" that we ſhall never accept repentance, ſhall not give them one
" moment's indulgence to palliate their offences.

" Conſider with yourſelves, in the merciful light, that a revolted
" city, when for certainty aſſured that it cannot hold out, may ſub-
" mit upon our own conditions, whilſt yet in a capacity to reimburſe
" our expences, and to advance the future tribute. But in the op-
" poſite caſe, can you imagine there is any city, which will not bet-
" ter prepare itſelf for revolt than Mitylene hath done, and hold out

" a ſiege

" a ſiege to the laſt extremity? Is there no difference between a
" quick and a ſlow ſubmiſſion? Shall not we be hurt, if forced
" through their deſpair, to continue a tedious and expenſive ſiege?
" and, when the place is taken, to be maſters only of one heap of
" deſolation, unable for the future to ſqueeze the leaſt pittance of
" revenue from it? It is revenue alone, which renders us a terror
" to our foes. We ought not therefore with the rigor of judges to
" inflict the exacteſt puniſhments upon theſe offenders. We ought
" rather to provide for futurity, and by moderate correction ſtill to
" preſerve thoſe cities in a full capacity of paying us the needful tri-
" bute. To keep men firm in their duty, we ſhould ſcorn the ex-
" pedient of ſevere and ſanguinary laws, ſince mild diſcretionary
" caution would better anſwer the purpoſe. This prudent conduct
" we are now reverſing, if, when re-poſſeſſed of a city ſtripped of
" its former liberty and ruled with violence, ſufficient motives of
" revolt, that it may again become independent; if now we judge,
" that this ought to be avenged with a weight of ſeverity. Men who
" have known what liberty is, ought not to be too ſeverely chaſtiſed,
" if they have dared to revolt; but, we ought to obſerve them with
" timely vigilance before they revolt, to prevent their taking the leaſt
" ſtep towards it, or even once entertaining a thought about it; at
" leaſt, when we have quelled the inſurrection, the guilt ſhould be
" faſtened upon as few as poſſible.

" Conſider, I beſeech you, with yourſelves, how greatly you will
" err in this, and in another reſpect, if Cleon's advice be approved.
" For now, the *populace* of all the cities are generally well-affected
" towards us. They either refuſe to concur with the *few* in their
" revolts; or, if their concurrence be forced, they inſtantly turn
" enemies to thoſe who forced them; — and you proceed to deter-
" mine the conteſt, aſſured that the *populace* of the adverſe city will
" be active in your favour. But if you doom to general exciſion the
" *people* of Mitylene, thoſe who had no ſhare in the revolt, who,

" when

" when once they had got arms into their hands, ſpontaneouſly de-
" livered up the place, —— you will be guilty, firſt of baſe ingrati-
" tude, for murdering your own benefactors, — and you will, next,
" eſtabliſh ſuch a precedent, as the factions *great* above all things
" wiſh to ſee. For then, whenever the latter effect the revolt of
" cities, they will inſtantly have the *people* attached to their party;
" ſince, you yourſelves have inforced the precedent, that puniſhment
" muſt fall upon the heads, not only of the guilty, but even of the
" innocent. Whereas indeed, tho' they had been guilty, we ought
" to have diſſembled our knowledge of it, that we might not
" force the only party which ever takes our ſide, into utter enmity
" and averſion. And I eſteem it much more conducive to the firm
" ſupport of empire, rather to connive at the wrongs we may have
" felt, than in all the ſeverity of juſtice to deſtroy thoſe perſons
" whom in intereſt we ought to ſpare. And thus, that union of
" juſtice to others and duty to yourſelves in this inſtance of puniſh-
" ing the Mitylenéans, as alledged by Cleon, is plainly found to be
" groſly inconſiſtent, to be utterly impoſſible.

" Own yourſelves therefore convinced, that the greateſt advantages
" will reſult from the conduct which I have recommended; and,
" without giving too wide a ſcope to mercy or forbearance, by which
" I could never ſuffer you to be ſeduced, follow my advice and in
" purſuance of it reſolve —— " To judge and condemn, at your
" own diſcretion, thoſe guilty Mitylenéans whom Paches hath ſent
" hither to attend your deciſions, and to let the others continue as
" they are." Theſe are expedients of your future welfare and of
" immediate terror to your foes. For they who can form the
" ſoundeſt deliberations, ſtand ſtronger up againſt hoſtile oppoſition,
" than the men who ruſh to action with indiſcreet unpremeditating
" ſtrength."

Diodotus

The decree repealed.

Diodotus ended here. And when theſe two opinions, diametrically oppoſite to one another, had been thus delivered, the Athenians had a ſtiff conteſt in ſupport of each, and upon holding up of hands there ſeemed near an equality; but the majority proved at laſt to be along with Diodotus.

Notified but juſt in time.

Upon this they immediately ſent away another trireme, injoining all poſſible diſpatch, leſt this ſecond, not coming in time, might find the city already deſtroyed, as the other had got the ſtart of a day and a night. The Mitylenéan embaſſadors amply furniſhed them with wine and barley-cakes, and promiſed them great rewards, if they arrived in time. By this means they were ſo eager to accelerate the paſſage, that even whilſt plying the oar they eat their cakes dipped in wine and oil; and whilſt one half of the number refreſhed themſelves with ſleep, the other kept rowing amain. So fortunate were they that not one adverſe blaſt retarded their courſe. The former veſſel, as ſent on a monſtrous errand, had not haſtened its paſſage in the leaſt; and the latter was moſt intently bent on expedition. *That* indeed got before to Mitylene, but only long enough for Paches to read over the decree, and give orders for its immediate execution. At that criſis, the latter arriveth, and prevented the maſſacre. To ſuch an extremity of danger was Mitylene reduced.

The other Mitylenéans, whom Paches [6] had ſent to Athens as deepeſt concerned in the revolt, were there put to death, according to the advice of Cleon. And the number of theſe amounted to ſomewhat above a thouſand.

6 We hear no more in this hiſtory of Paches, who certainly in the reduction of Lesbos had done a great ſervice to his country, and had behaved through the whole affair with great diſcretion and humanity. And yet Plutarch tells us in two paſſages (in the *lives* of Ariſtides and Nicias) that at his return to Athens he was called to account for his conduct during this command, and finding he was going to be condemned, his reſentment and indignation roſe ſo high, that he inſtantly ſlew himſelf in court.

The Athenians, further, demoliſhed the walls of Mitylene and took away their ſhipping. They did not for the future enjoin an annual tribute upon the Leſbians, but dividing the whole iſland into ſhares (except what belonged to Methymne) three thouſand in the whole, they ſet apart three hundred of theſe as ſacred to the Gods, and ſent ſome of their own people who were appointed by lot, to take poſſeſſion of the reſt, as full proprietors. The Leſbians, as tenants of theſe, were obliged to pay them two * *Minæ* yearly for every ſhare, in conſideration of which they had ſtill the uſe of the ſoil. — The Athenians alſo took from them ſeveral towns upon the continent which had belonged to the Mitylenéans, and which continued afterwards in ſubjection to the Athenians. Thus ended the commotions of Leſbos.

* 6 *l.* 9 *s.* 2 *d.* *Sterling.*

The ſame ſummer, after the reduction of Leſbos — the Athenians, commanded by Nicias [7] the ſon of Niceratus, executed a deſign upon Minoa,

Conqueſt of Minoa *by* Nicias.

7 Nicias is now for the firſt time in the chief command, who is to act parts of very great importance in the ſequel of the war. We ſhould therefore take ſome notice of him on his firſt appearance. Plutarch, who hath wrote his *life*, gives light into ſeveral circumſtances, which fall not within the cognizance of a general hiſtorian. He was born of a noble family in Athens, and was one of the moſt wealthy citizens. Beſide his eſtates, he had a large annual income from the ſilver mines at Laurium. Not that thoſe mines belonged to him, as one would infer from Plutarch; for they were the patrimony of the *State*, annexed to it by Themiſtocles for the ſupport of the navy: But, as Xenophon relates, in his treatiſe of *revenue*, Nicias had a thouſand ſlaves conſtantly employed in working theſe mines. He hired them out to Soſias the Thracian, who was undertaker of the work, on condition to receive a clear *obole* a day for every one of them; and he always kept up the number. His income from hence was therefore near 2000 *l.* Sterling a year. He acted under Pericles ſo long as he lived; and, after his death, was ſet up by the more ſober and ſenſible Athenians as a balance to Cleon, who was the idol of the people. Nicias was a true lover of his country, of unblemiſhed integrity, and very gentle and complacent in his manners. His good qualities were numerous and ſhining: His foibles were a great diffidence of himſelf, and a dread of the people, which made him court them by laying out his wealth in public games and ſhows for their entertainment. He had an inward fund of real piety; but was ſuperſtitiouſly attached to the ceremo-

Minoa, the iſland which lies before Megara. The Megaréans, having built a fort upon it, uſed it as a garriſon. But it was the ſcheme of Nicias, to fix the poſt of obſervation for the Athenians there, as being much nearer ſituated, and to remove it from Budorus and Salamis. This would prevent the ſudden courſes of the Peloponneſians, frequent from thence; would curb the piratical cruizes; and, at the ſame time, ſtop all importations into Megara. Beginning therefore with the two forts detached from Niſæa, he took them by means of the engines he played againſt them from the ſea; and having thus opened the channel between them and the iſland, he took in by a wall of fortification that part of the main-land, from whence, only by croſſing the moraſs and the help of a bridge, a ſuccour could be thrown into the iſland, which lay at a very ſmall diſtance from the continent. This work was compleated in a few days, after which Nicias, leaving behind in the iſland a ſufficient garriſon to defend the works, drew off the reſt of his army.

Surrender of Platæa.

About the ſame time this ſummer, the Platæans, whoſe proviſions were quite ſpent, and who could not poſſibly hold out any longer, were brought to a ſurrender, in the following manner —— The enemy made an aſſault upon their wall, which they had not ſufficient ſtrength to repel. The Lacedæmonian general being thus convinced of their languid condition, was determined not to take the place by ſtorm. In this, he acted purſuant to orders ſent him from Lacedæmon, with a view, that whenever a peace ſhould be concluded

nial of the religion of his country. His great wealth drew a great number of followers and paraſites about him; and his benevolent diſpoſition was always ſeeking occaſions of doing good. In ſhort, ſays Plutarch, "bad men had a ſure fund "in his puſillanimity, and good men in "his humanity." No body could either hate or fear him at Athens, and therefore his intereſt there was great. He was always cautious and always diffident, and under ſuch an awe of the people in the general aſſemblies, that they would ſhout out to him by way of encouragement, as his modeſty was amiable and engaging when oppoſed to the impudence of Cleon. —— Thus much may ſuffice at preſent, ſince his military expeditions and the whole ſeries of his political conduct will be related by Thucydides.

with

with the Lacedæmonians, one certain condition of which muſt be reciprocally to reſtore the places taken in the war, Platæa might not be included in the reſtitution, as having freely and without compulſion gone over to them. A herald is accordingly diſpatched with this demand — "Whether they are willing voluntarily to give up the "city to the Lacedæmonians, and accept them for their judges who "would puniſh only the guilty, and contrary to forms of juſtice "not even one of thoſe." — The herald made this demand aloud. And the Platæans, who were now reduced to exceſſive weakneſs, delivered up the city.

Trial of the Platæans.

The Peloponneſians ſupplied the Platæans with neceſſary ſuſtenance for the ſpace of a few days, till the five delegates arrived from Lacedæmon, to preſide at their trial. And yet, when theſe were actually come, no judicial proceſs was formed againſt them. They only called them out, and put this ſhort queſtion to them — "Whether "they had done any ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in "the preſent war?" — Their anſwer was, that they begg'd permiſſion to urge their plea at large; which being granted, they pitched upon Aſtymachus the ſon of Aſopalaus and Laco the ſon of Aeimneſtus, who had formerly enjoyed the public hoſpitality of the Lacedæmonians, to be their ſpeakers, who accordingly ſtood forth, and pleaded thus ——

Speech of the Platæans.

"PLACING in you, O Lacedæmonians, an entire confidence, "we have delivered up our city; but never imagined we ſhould "be forced to ſuch a proceſs as this, when we expected only to "be tried by juſtice and laws — when we yielded to plead, not be"fore other judges as is now our fate; but only before yourſelves. "Then indeed we thought, that juſtice might be obtained. — But "now, we have terrible grounds for apprehending, that we have "at once been doubly over-reached. Strong motives occur to alarm "our ſuſpicions, that the point moſt in view is to deprive us of our

" lives, and that you will not prove impartial judges. We cannot
" but be too certain of this, when no manner of crime is formally
" objected, againſt which we might form our defence; when
" barely at our own intreaty we are heard, and your conciſe demand
" is ſuch, that if we anſwer it with truth we condemn ourſelves; if
" with falſhood, muſt be inſtantly refuted.

" Thus on all ſides beſet with perplexities, ſomething of neceſſity
" muſt be ſaid in our own behalf; nay, where the danger is ſo ur-
" gent, the only ſmall glimpſe of ſecurity appears in hazarding a
" plea. For perſons like us diſtreſſed in ſilence to abandon their own
" defence — this may with ſad compunction torture them at laſt, as
" if their ſafety might have been earned by ſpeaking for themſelves—
" tho' never was perſuaſion ſo much to be deſpaired of as at pre-
" ſent. Were we indeed, who are the perſecuted party, entirely
" unknown to our judges, we might then alledge ſuch evidence as
" through ignorance you could not overturn, and ſo further our de-
" fence. But now we muſt ſpeak before men, who are informed of
" every point. Nor do our fears reſult from the prior knowledge
" you have had of us, as if you were now proceeding againſt us for
" having in valour been inferior to yourſelves; but, from our own
" ſad forebodings, that we are cited to a tribunal which hath already
" condemned us, to gratify others. Yet, what we can juſtly ſay for
" ourſelves in regard to all our differences with the Thebans, we ſhall
" boldly alledge; the good ſervices we have done to you and to the
" reſt of Greece we ſhall fairly recite —— and ſtrive, if poſſible,
" to perſuade.

" To your conciſe demand —— Whether we have done any good
" ſervice in this war to the Lacedæmonians and their allies? —— we
" anſwer thus: " If you interrogate us as enemies, tho' we have
" done you no good, yet we have done you no harm; if you re-
" gard us as friends, you have offended more than we, in making
" war upon us." — In regard to the *peace* and againſt the *Mede*, we

" have



" have ever honeſtly performed our duty: The *peace* was not vio-
" lated firſt by us; againſt *him*, we alone of all the Bœotians, at-
" tended you in the field to maintain the liberty of Greece. For,
" tho' an inland people, we boldly engaged in the ſea-fight at Arte-
" miſium; and in the battle, fought upon this our native ground,
" we aſſiſted you and Pauſanias; and whatever the danger to which
" Greece, in that troubleſome period of time, was expoſed, in all
" we bore a ſhare beyond our ſtrength. To you in particular, O ye
" Lacedæmonians, in that greateſt conſternation Sparta ever felt,
" when after the earthquake your rebellious Helots had ſeized upon
" Ithome, we immediately diſpatched the third part of our force for
" ſuccour. Theſe things you are bound in honour never to forget.
" For thus upon former, and thoſe moſt critical occaſions, we with
" honour ſhew'd ourſelves your friends.——But at length we became
" your enemies! —— For that blame only yourſelves: Becauſe when
" we ſtood in great want of ſupport againſt the violence and oppreſ-
" ſion of the Thebans, to you we applied, and by you were rejected.
" You commanded us then to addreſs ourſelves to Athens. Athens,
" you ſaid, was near, but Sparta lay too remote to ſerve us. Yet,
" notwithſtanding this, in the preſent war we have committed no one
" diſhonourable act in regard to you, nor ſhould ever have committed.
" You injoined us indeed to revolt from the Athenians, and we re-
" fuſed to comply; but in this we have done no injuſtice. For they
" marched chearfully to our ſuccour againſt the Thebans, when you
" ſhrunk back; and to betray them afterwards had been baſe in us; in
" us, who were highly indebted to them, who at our own requeſt were
" received into their friendſhip, and honoured by them with the free-
" dom of Athens. No, it was rather our duty boldly to advance
" wherever they pleaſed to order. And whenever either you or the
" Athenians lead out your allies into the field, not ſuch as merely fol-
" low you, are to be cenſured for any wrong you may reſpectively
" commit, but thoſe who lead them out to its commiſſion.

" Manifold

" Manifold and notorious are the inſtances in which the Thebans
" have injured us. But outrageous above all is the laſt, about which
" you need no information, ſince by it we are plunged into this depth
" of diſtreſs. A right undoubtedly we had to turn our avenging
" arms upon men, who in the midſt of peace, and what is more,
" upon the ſacred monthly ſolemnity, feloniouſly ſeized upon our
" city. We obeyed herein that great univerſal law, which juſtifieth
" ſelf-defence againſt an hoſtile invader; and therefore cannot, with
" any appearance of equity, be now doom'd to puniſhment at their
" inſtigation. For, if your own immediate intereſt, and their pre-
" ſent concurrence with you in war, is to preſcribe and regulate
" your ſentence, you will ſhew yourſelves by no means fair judges
" of equity, but partially attached to private intereſt. What? tho'
" theſe incendiaries ſeem now a people well worth your gaining?
" There was a ſeaſon, a moſt dangerous and critical ſeaſon, when
" you yourſelves, and the other Grecians, were in different ſenti-
" ments. Now indeed, incited by ambition, you aim the fatal blow
" at others; but at that ſeaſon, when the *Barbarian* ſtruck at in-
" ſlaving us all, theſe Thebans were then that *Barbarian*'s coadju-
" tors. And equitable certainly it is, that our alacrity at that ſeaſon
" ſhould be ſet in the balance againſt our preſent tranſgreſſions, if
" tranſgreſſors at preſent we have been. You then would find our
" greater merits quite outweighing our petty offences; and our me-
" rits to be dated at a time, when it was exceeding rare to ſee Gre-
" cian bravery ranged in oppoſition to the power of Xerxes; when
" praiſe was aſcribed, not to thoſe, who intent on ſelf-preſervation,
" dropped all the means of withſtanding his invaſion, but who choſe,
" thro' a ſeries of danger, courageouſly to execute the moſt glorious
" acts. Of this number are we, and as ſuch have been pre-emi-
" nently, moſt honourably diſtinguiſhed. And yet, from this ori-
" ginal we fear our ruin now may have taken its riſe, as we choſe to
" follow the Athenians from a regard to juſtice, rather than you

" from

" from the views of intereſt. But ſo long as the nature of things
" continues to be the ſame, you alſo ought to convince the world,
" that your ſentiments about them are not changed, that your prin-
" ciples ſtill ſuggeſt it to you as your greateſt intereſt, that whenever
" your gallant compatriots have laid upon you an obligation ſtrong
" enough to be eternally in force, ſomething on every preſent occur-
" rence ſhould be done for us by way of juſt acknowledgment.

" Reflect further within yourſelves, that you are now diſtinguiſhed
" by the body of Greece as examples for the upright diſintereſted
" conduct. Should you therefore determine in regard to us what in
" juſtice cannot be ſupported --- for the eyes of the world are now
" intent on your proceedings, and as judges applauded for their worth
" you ſit upon us whoſe reputation is yet unblemiſhed; take care
" that you do not incur the general abhorrence, by an indecent ſen-
" tence againſt valuable men, tho' you yourſelves are more to be va-
" lued; nor repoſit in her common temples thoſe ſpoils you have
" taken from us the benefactors of Greece. How horrible will it
" ſeem for Platæa to be deſtroyed by Lacedæmonians! that your fa-
" thers inſcribed the city upon the tripod of Delphos in juſtice to its
" merit, and that you expunged its very being from the community
" of Greece to gratify the Thebans! To ſuch exceſs of miſery have
" we been ever expoſed, that if the Medes had prevailed we muſt
" have been utterly undone; and now muſt be completely ruined by
" the Thebans, in the preſence of you who were formerly our moſt
" cordial friends! Two of the ſharpeſt, moſt painful trials we are
" to undergo, who but lately, had we not ſurrendered our city, muſt
" have gradually periſhed by famine; and now, ſtand before a tribu-
" nal to be ſentenced to death. Wretched Platæans, by all mankind
" abandoned! We, who beyond our ſtrength were once the ſupports
" of Greece, are now quite deſtitute, bereft of all redreſs! Not one
" of our old allies to appear in our behalf; and even you, O ye La-
" cedæmonians, you our only hope, as we have too much reaſon to
" apprehend, determined to give us up!

" But,

" But, by the Gods, who witneſſed once the ſocial oaths we mu-
" tually exchanged; by that virtue we exerted for the general welfare
" of Greece; by thoſe we adjure you to be moved with compaſſion,
" and to relent, if with the Thebans you are combined againſt us.
" In gratitude to us, beg the favour of *them*, that they would not
" butcher whom you ought to ſpare; demand ſuch a modeſt requital
" from them for your baſe concurrence, and intail not infamy upon
" yourſelves, to give others a cruel ſatisfaction. To take away our
" lives will be a ſhort and eaſy task; but then, to efface the infamy
" of it, will be a work of toil. You have no colour to wreak your
" vengeance upon us as enemies, who have ever wiſhed you well,
" and bore arms againſt you in mere ſelf-defence. Your deciſions
" can in no wiſe be righteous, unleſs you exempt us from the dread
" of death. Recollect in time, that you received us by free ſurren-
" der, that to you we held forth our hands; the law forbids Grecians
" to put ſuch to death; and that we have been from time immemo-
" rial benefactors to you. For caſt your eyes *there* upon the ſepul-
" chres of your fathers, who fell by the ſwords of the Medes, and
" were interred in this our earth: Theſe we have annually honoured
" with veſtments, and all ſolemn decorations at our public expence.
" Whatever hath been the produce of our ſoil, to them we have
" ever offered the firſt-fruits of the whole; as friends, out of earth
" that was dear to them; as companions, to thoſe who once fought
" together in the ſame field; and, leſt all this by a wrong determi-
" nation you inſtantly diſannul, maturely reflect. For Pauſanias in-
" terred them here, judging he had laid them in a friendly ſoil, and
" in the care of men with friendly diſpoſitions. If therefore you
" put us to death, and turn this Platæan into Theban ſoil, what is
" this but to leave your fathers and relations in a hoſtile land, and in
" the power of thoſe who murdered them, never again to receive
" the ſepulchral honours? Will you further inſlave the ſpot on
" which the Grecians earned their liberty? Will you lay deſolate the
" temples

" temples of thoſe Gods, to whom they addreſſed their vows before
" that battle againſt the Medes, and ſo were victorious? And, will
" you aboliſh the ſolemn ſacrifices, which thoſe gallant patriots have
" founded and appointed?

" It cannot, O Lacedæmonians, be conſiſtent with your glory, to
" violate the ſolemn inſtitutions of Greece, the memory of your own
" forefathers, and your duty to us your benefactors, *thus*, merely
" to gratify the malice of a hoſtile party, to put men to death who
" have never wrong'd you. No; but — to ſpare, to relent, to feel
" the juſt emotions of compaſſion, to recal the idea not only what
" miſeries we are deſigned to ſuffer, but what perſons we are for
" whom they are deſigned! and to remember the uncertain attack
" of calamity; upon whom, and how undeſervedly it may fall!
" To you, as in honour and neceſſity too obliged, we addreſs our
" intreaties; invoking aloud the Gods whom Greece at her common
" altars and with joint-devotion adores, — to accept our plea: alledg-
" ing thoſe oaths which your fathers have ſworn, — to pay them re-
" verence. We are ſuppliants now at the ſepulchres of your fathers;
" we call upon the dead repoſited there, to be ſaved from Thebans,
" that the kindeſt of friends, as we have been, may not be ſacri-
" ficed to the moſt deadly foes. Again, we recal to memory that
" day, in which having performed the moſt ſplendid atchievements
" in company with them, we are yet this day in danger of the moſt
" deplorable fate. Conclude we muſt — tho' 'tis hard for men in our
" diſtreſs to conclude; when the very moment their words are ended,
" their very lives are moſt imminently endangered: yet ſtill we inſiſt,
" that we ſurrendered not our city to the Thebans; rather than that
" we ſhould have choſe the moſt miſerable end by famine: but con-
" fiding in you, into your hands we gave it. And highly fitting
" it is, that, if we cannot prevail, you ſhould re-inſtate us in it, and
" leave us there at our own option to take our fate. But once more
" we conjure you, that we, who are citizens of Platæa, who have

" ſhewed ourſelves the moſt ſteddy patriots of Greece, and now, O " Lacedæmonians, your ſuppliants, — may not be turned over, out of " your hands, out of your protection, to the Thebans, our unre- " lenting enemies; — that you would become our ſaviours, and not " doom to utter deſtruction — the men to whom all Greece is in- " debted for her freedom."

In this manner the Platæans ſpoke; and the Thebans, fearing leſt their words might work ſo far upon the Lacedæmonians as to cauſe them to relent, ſtood forth, and declared a deſire to be alſo heard " ſince the Platæans, as they conceived, had been indulged in a much " longer diſcourſe, than was requiſite to anſwer the queſtion." Leave accordingly was given, and they proceeded thus —

Speech of the Thebans.

" WE ſhould not have requeſted your attention to any thing we " had to offer, if *theſe* Plateans had replied in brief to the queſtion, " and had not run out into ſlander and invective againſt us; — if " they had not defended themſelves in points quite foreign to the " purpoſe, and not at all charged againſt them as crimes; and " lanched forth into their own praiſe, uncenſured and unprovoked. " But now, it is incumbent upon us, in ſome points to contradict " and in ſome to refute, to prevent the bad effects which might re- " ſult, either from the criminations uttered againſt us, or the pom- " pous praiſe they have beſtowed upon themſelves; that you, under " proper information with whom the greater truth remains, may " fairly decide between us.

" Our enmity againſt them we openly avow, as it proceeded from " juſt and honourable motives; ſince to us, who were the founders " of Platæa, after we had gained poſſeſſion of Bœotia and of other " towns as well as Platæa, which, after being purged from extraneous " mixtures, remained in our juriſdiction, — theſe men diſdained to " pay ſubmiſſion, and ſcorned original and fundamental laws. They

" wilfully

" wilfully divided from the other Bœotians, tranſgreſſing the laws
" of their country; and, when likely to be forced back into their
" duty, they went over to the Athenians, and in concert with them
" accumulated wrongs upon us, which have ſince been juſtly reta-
" liated upon them.

" But, when the *Barbarian* invaded Greece, they were the only
" Bœotians, who did not join the *Mede*. —— This *they* alledge, and
" hence they arrogate applauſe to themſelves, and laviſh their ca-
" lumnies upon us. We grant indeed they did not join the *Mede*;
" and the reaſon was, becauſe the Athenians did not join him. Yet
" afterwards, when with the ſame all-graſping ambition the Athe-
" nians invaded Greece, *they* were the only Bœotians then, who
" joined thoſe *Athenians*. But conſider further the reſpective ſituati-
" ons, from which ſuch conduct enſued in both. Our city at that
" time was not adminiſtred by the *few* who preſided with an equal
" and ſteddy rule, nor directed by the general voice of the *people*.
" Its ſtate was ſuch as with laws and ſound policy is quite incom-
" patible; it bordered cloſe upon a tyranny: the incroaching ambi-
" tion of a handful of men held faſt poſſeſſion of it. Theſe with
" no other view than the ſtrong eſtabliſhment of their own private
" authority in the ſucceſs of the *Mede*, by force over-awed the peo-
" ple, and opened their gates to the invader. This was not the act
" of a whole city, of a city maſter of its own conduct; nor ought
" ſhe to be reproached for offences committed in deſpite of her
" laws. But on the other hand, when the *Mede* was once repulſed
" and the city repoſſeſſed of her ancient polity, you ought then to con-
" ſider --- freſh invaſions being formed by the Athenians, projects at-
" tempted to bring the reſt of Greece and our dominions alſo into
" their ſubjection, ſedition fomented amongſt us by favour of which
" they ſeized the greater part --- whether in the field of Coronéa we
" fought them and prevailed, recovered the liberty of Bœotia, proceed
" even now with all alacrity, to regain their liberty for others, ſup-

" plying them with horſe and all other military proviſion, far be-
" yond any other confederate. Such is the apology we make for
" all the charge againſt us in having joined the *Mede*. But,--that
" *you* have been the moſt outrageous foes to Greece, and are moſt
" deſerving of whatever puniſhment can be inflicted upon you, we
" ſhall next endeavour to demonſtrate.

" In order to procure ſome revenge on us, it is your own plea,
" you became confederates and citizens of Athens." ---- Be it ſo.
" You ought then to have marched in their company only againſt
" us; you ought not to have followed them in their expeditions
" againſt others. Had your own wills been averſe to attend them
" on theſe occaſions, it was always in your power to have had re-
" courſe to that Lacedæmonian league, in which you concurred
" againſt the *Mede*, and about which you make at preſent the greateſt
" parade. That would have been amply ſufficient to turn aſide our
" enmity from you; and, what is above all, had ſecurely enabled
" you to rectify your meaſures. But it was not againſt your will,
" neither was it upon compulſion, that you have ſolely adhered to
" the Athenians.

But, then you rejoin -- " It was baſe to betray your benefactors."--
" Yet it was much more baſeand more enormous to betray at once the
" whole body of Grecians, with whom you had ſworn a mutual de-
" fence, than the ſingle Athenians; the Athenians truly have in-
" ſlaved your country; and the others would regain its freedom. You
" have not made your benefactors the requital which gratitude
" injoined, or which is exempted from reproach. ---- " Injured and
" oppreſſed you applied, it is pretended, to them for redreſs;"----
" and then you co-operated with them in oppreſſing others. But it
" is not more diſhonourable to be wanting in any act of gratitude,
" how juſtly ſoever it may be due, than to make the return in a
" manner in itſelf unjuſt. You yourſelves by acting thus have af-
" forded undeniable proofs, that you alone did not join the *Mede*,

" from

" from a zeal for the Grecians, but merely becauſe the Athenians
" did not join him. You were deſirous to act in concert with the
" latter, but in oppoſition to the former; and now modeſtly claim
" to be recompenſed by your *country*, for all the iniquitous ſervices
" you have done to a *party*. But, juſtice will never ſuffer this. To
" Athenians you gave the preference, ſtrive therefore from them to
" obtain redreſs. Ceaſe vainly to alledge the mutual oaths you once
" exchanged, as if they obliged at preſent to preſerve you: ---- You
" renounced, you violated firſt thoſe oaths, who rather concurred to
" inſlave the Æginetæ and ſome other people of the ſame aſſociation,
" than endeavoured to prevent it; and all without compulſion; ſtill
" happy in the uninterrupted poſſeſſion of your own rights, and not
" compelled to receive law from others, as was our fate. Nay, to
" the very laſt moment, before this blockade was formed againſt you,
" when we calmly invited you to be quiet and neutral, you inſo-
" lently refuſed. Which therefore is the people, on whom all
" Greece may faſten her hatred more deſervedly than on you, who
" have made it a point to exert your bravery in ruining your coun-
" try? Thoſe former good diſpoſitions you have ſo largely boaſted,
" you have now ſhewn plainly to be repugnant to your genius.
" What your natural turn hath ever been, the event hath with truth
" aſcertained. The Athenians took the road of violence, and you at-
" tended them through all the journey. —— And thus, ample proof
" hath been exhibited by us, that againſt our wills we ſerved the Per-
" ſian, and that you with moſt chearful diſpoſition have promoted
" the Athenian tyranny.

" But in regard to your finiſhing charge againſt us as guilty of
" exceſſive outrage and injuſtice:---" that, contrary to every law, in
" the midſt of peace, on a day of ſacred ſolemnity, we ſeized upon
" your city."— This great offence, in our opinion, is leſs to be im-
" puted to us than to yourſelves. Had we marched indeed againſt
" your city in a hoſtile manner, had we ſealed your walls and put

" your

" your property to fire and ſword, the charge had then been juſt.
" But if men, of the firſt rank amongſt you both for wealth and
" birth, deſirous to put a ſtop to your foreign combinations, and re-
" cal you to the common inſtitutions of all Bœotians; if ſuch at
" their own free motion invited our preſence, wherein are we unjuſt?
" For the leaders, in all caſes, are greater tranſgreſſors than the fol-
" lowers. Tho', in the *preſent*, neither are they in our judgments,
" nor are we tranſgreſſors. ---- They were citizens as well as you;
" they had larger concerns at ſtake; and therefore opening their gate
" and receiving us within their walls as friends and not as foes, they
" intended to prevent the corrupted part of your body from growing
" worſe, and protect the worthy and good according to their merit.
" They calmly ſtudied the welfare of your minds and your bodies,
" not ſuffering your city to become an alien, but recovering it again
" to its duty and relations, exempting it from being the foe of any
" honeſt Grecian, and re-uniting it in the bonds of amity with them
" all. --- There are proofs beſides, that we did not intermeddle in a
" hoſtile manner. We did no manner of violence to any one; we
" proclaimed aloud, that " whoever was deſirous to conform to the
" primitve inſtitutions of all Bœotians, ſhould come and join us."---
" You heard our voice with pleaſure; you came in and entered into
" articles with us; you remained for a time without diſturbance;
" but at length, having diſcovered the ſmallneſs of our number,
" and then perhaps we were judged to have proceeded inhumanly
" in preſuming to enter without the conſent of your populace, you
" then returned us not ſuch treatment as you had received from us,
" you made no remonſtrances againſt innovations, nor perſuaded us
" to depart, but in open breach of articles you ruſhed upon us. We
" lament not here ſo much the death of thoſe whom you ſlew in
" this baſe attack upon us; ſome colour of law might be alledged
" for their deſtruction: but, when contrary to every law in cold
" blood you murdered men, who had ſpread their arms for mercy,

" and

" and had ſurrendered themſelves priſoners on promiſe of their
" lives,—was not that a monſtrous act? In one ſhort interval
" of time you were guilty of three outrageous enormities, an
" infraction of articles, the ſucceeding butchery of our people,
" and a breach of the ſolemn promiſe made to us, that you would not
" kill them, provided we refrained from plundering your lands. Yet
" ſtill you cry aloud, that *we* are the breakers of law; you ſtill re-
" monſtrate, that you are not debtors to juſtice. It is falſe. The
" point, we preſume, will ſoon be determined right: And for theſe,
" for all offences, you ſhall have your reward.

" We have thus diſtinctly run over this affair, for your ſakes, O
" ye Lacedæmonians, as well as for our own; that you may be con-
" vinced with how much equity you are going to condemn them,
" and that we have purſued the offenders upon yet ſtronger obliga-
" tions of juſtice. Let not the recital of their former virtues, if vir-
" tues truly they ever had, mollify your hearts. Virtue ſhould
" be pleaded by men who have ſuffered; but, on thoſe who have
" committed baſeneſs, it ſhould redouble their puniſhment, becauſe
" they ſin in foul contrariety to their former *ſelves*. Let them not
" ſave themſelves by lamentations and pathetic complaints, tho'
" they cried out ſo movingly upon the ſepulchres of your fathers,
" and their own deſtitute forlorn condition. For to ſtop their cries
" we have proved againſt them, that our youths when butchered by
" them, met with a more cruel and unjuſt fate: thoſe youths, ſome
" of whoſe fathers, reconciling Bœotia with you, died in the field
" of Coronéa; the reſt, now advanced in years, bereft of their
" children, their houſes deſolate, prefer a ſupplication far more juſt
" to you, to avenge them upon *theſe* Platæans. Thoſe are moſt de-
" ſerving of pity, who have ſuffered ſome great indignity; but when
" vengeance is duly inflicted on ſuch men as theſe Platæans, the
" world hath cauſe to triumph. Their preſent deſtitute forlorn con-
" dition is the work of themſelves. They wilfully rejected a better

" alliance;

" alliance; and, tho' uninjured, broke every law againſt us; exe-
" cutioners of hatred more than juſtice, tho' now about to ſuf-
" fer leſs than the precedent they ſet requireth. For they ſhall be
" executed by lawful ſentence; not like men who with ſtretched-
" out hands obtained fair quarter, as they deſcribe themſelves, but
" who ſurrendered on this condition — to ſubmit to juſtice.

" Avenge therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of Greece ſo
" groſly violated by them. Retaliate all the injuries we have ſuffered,
" requiting ſo that chearful friendſhip we have ever ſhewn you;
" and let not *their* flow of words overturn *our* juſt demands. Make
" now a precedent for Greece hereafter to follow. Shew them, that
" deciſions muſt be formed, not according to what men may ſay,
" but according to what they have done: If their actions have been
" right, that a ſhort ſimple narration may at any time ſuffice: But,
" if thoſe actions have been wrong, that all ſtudied ornamental pe-
" riods are intended to diſguiſe the truth. If thoſe who preſide at
" judgments, as you at preſent, would proceed in a ſummary way,
" to a general determination againſt the guilty, little room would be
" left to diſguiſe unjuſtifiable actions by plauſible ſpeeches."

The Platæans *put to death.*

In this manner the Thebans replied; and the Lacedæmonian judges agreed in the reſolution, that the queſtion — " Whether they " had received any good ſervice from them in the war? — was properly and fairly conceived. They grounded this, upon the former propoſal made them to remain neutral according to the old treaty of Pauſanias after the *Mediſh* invaſion, and upon another more lately, which they had offered before they blocked them up, to be common friends to both ſides in conformity to the ſame treaty. But after this double refuſal, looking upon themſelves as no longer bound to obſerve thoſe articles, which others had deliberately infringed to traverſe their intereſt, — they now proceed again to bring them forwards man by man, and put the queſtion ---- " Whether they had

" done

"done good ſervice to the Lacedæmonians and allies in the preſent "war?"---and upon their anſwering *No*, led them aſide and ſlew them. Not one of the number did they exempt; ſo that in this maſſacre there periſhed of Platæans not fewer than two hundred, and twenty-five Athenians who had been beſieged in their company; and all the women were ſold for ſlaves. The Thebans aſſigned the city, for the ſpace of a year, to be the reſidence of certain Megareans, who had been driven from home in the rage of a ſedition, and to thoſe ſurviving Platæans who had been friends to the Theban intereſt. But afterwards they levelled it with the earth, rooted up its whole foundation, and near to Juno's temple erected a ſpacious inn two hundred feet ſquare, partitioned within both above and below into a range of apartments. In this ſtructure they made uſe of the roofs and doors that had belonged to the Platæans; and of the other moveables found within their houſes, of the braſs and iron, they made beds which they conſecrated to Juno, in whoſe honour they alſo erected a fane of ſtone one hundred feet in diameter. The land, being confiſcated to public uſe, was farmed out for ten years, and occupied by Thebans. So much, nay ſo totally averſe to the Platæans were the Lacedæmonians become; and this, merely to gratify the Thebans, whom they regarded as well able to ſerve them in the war which was now on foot.[8] And thus was the deſtruction of

Platæa *razed by the* Thebans.

[8] Thucydides hath here been very ſparing of his cenſure. Nothing bad enough can be ſaid of the Lacedæmonian behaviour on this occaſion. To put brave men to death coolly and deliberately, who had moſt gallantly defended themſelves, and merely for their ſteddy attachment to liberty and the Athenians were hated by the Thebans, ſhews the public ſpirit of Spartans at this time to have been none at all. — The city of Platæa, thus barbarouſly demoliſhed, was rebuilt after the peace of Antalcidas, which put an end to the Peloponneſian war. But no long time after it was again demoliſhed by the Thebans, for a refuſal to join them againſt the Lacedæmonians. However, Alexander the great once more re-eſtabliſhed it, in a generous acknowledgment of the ſervices that little *State* had rendered to Greece; and the Platæans continued, even in the time of Plutarch, to celebrate the annual feſtival in honour of thoſe, who at the famous battle of Platæa had died for the liberties of Greece.

Platæa compleated in the ninety-third year of its alliance with Athens.

Alcidas returns with his fleet.

The forty ſail of Peloponneſians, which had been ſent to the relief of Leſbos, after flying through the open ſea to avoid the purſuit from Athens, were driven by a tempeſt on the coaſt of Crete; and from thence they ſeparately drop'd into Cyllene a Peloponneſian harbour, where they find thirteen triremes of Leucadians and Ambraciots, with Braſidas the ſon of Tellis ſent thither purpoſely to aſſiſt Alcidas with his counſel. It was now the project of the Lacedæmonians, ſince they had miſcarried at Leſbos, to augment their fleet, and ſail immediately for Corcyra now embroiled in ſedition, as there were no Athenians in thoſe parts, excepting only twelve ſhips which were ſtationed at Naupactus — and thus their deſign might be effectuated, before a fleet large enough to obſtruct them could be ſent from Athens. — This was their plan, and Braſidas and Alcidas prepared for its execution.

The ſedition of Corcyra.

The Corcyréans were now embroiled in a ſedition, excited by the return of the priſoners, whom the Corinthians had taken in the naval engagements of Epidamnus. They had obtained their releaſe, as was publicly given out, for the ſum of * eighty talents, for the payment of which their former friends at Corinth had joined in a ſecurity; but in fact, for a ſecret promiſe they had made the Corinthians, to put Corcyra into their hands. To fulfil their engagements, they tampered with every ſingle Corcyréan, in order to bring about a revolt from the Athenians. An Athenian and Corinthian ſhip arrived at the ſame time with embaſſadors on board. Theſe were admitted together to an audience, at which the Corcyréans decreed, "to maintain their alliance with the Athenians according to treaty, — but "to be friends to the Peloponneſians as in preceding times." Pythias, who at that time was at the head of the *people*, entertained and lodged the Athenians without the public warrant. And therefore againſt him the accomplices prefer an accuſation, as plotting how to ſubject

* 15500 *l. Sterling.*

ſubject Corcyra to Athenian ſlavery. Pythias being acquitted, in his turn exhibits a charge againſt five of the moſt conſiderable of their number, for having cut poles in the ſacred grove of Jupiter and Alcinus. The fine for every pole was by law a * *ſtater*. Being condemned to pay the whole, they fled into the temples and ſat down as ſupplicants, in hope to obtain a mitigation of their fine, which was quite exorbitant. Pythias, who was alſo ſtrong in the ſenate, gets a freſh order to have it levied in all the rigor of law. Thus debarred of any legal redreſs, and conſcious further that Pythias, ſo long as he continued in the ſenate, would prevail upon the *people* to declare thoſe their friends and thoſe their foes who were ſo to Athens, — they riſe up from ſanctuary, and ſeizing daggers ruſh ſuddenly into the ſenate-houſe, where they ſtab Pythias and others both ſenators and private perſons, to the number of ſixty. Some few indeed who were the adherents of Pythias, ſaved themſelves on board the Athenian veſſel, which yet lay in the harbour.

* 1 *l.* 0*s.* 9*d.*

After this bold aſſaſſination, they ſummoned the Corcyreans to aſſemble immediately, where they juſtified their proceedings "as moſt "highly for the public good, and the only expedient of preventing "Athenian ſlavery, — adviſing them "for the future to receive "neither of the rival-parties, unleſs they came peaceably in a ſingle "veſſel; if in more, to declare them enemies;" and in concluſion, they forced the ratification of whatever they had propoſed. They alſo inſtantly diſpatch embaſſadors to Athens, repreſenting the neceſſity they lay under to act as they had done; and to perſuade thoſe who had fled for refuge thither, not to ruſh into ſuch meaſures as might hurt the welfare of their country, from a dread of the miſeries which might thence enſue.

When theſe embaſſadors were arrived at Athens, the Athenians laid them and all their adherents under an arreſt as enemies to the *State*, and ſent them priſoners to Ægina.

In the mean time, thoſe of the Corcyreans who had thus ſeized the government, animated by the arrival of a Corinthian trireme and a Lacedæmonian embaſſy, attack the *people* and overpower them in battle. The *people*, by favour of the night which approached, fly to the citadel and more elevated parts of the city, where they drew up together and ſecured their poſts; they alſo got poſſeſſion of the Hyllaic harbour. But their opponents ſeized the forum where moſt of their own houſes were ſituated, and the harbour which points towards the forum and the continent.

The day following, they ſkirmiſhed a little with their miſſive weapons, and both parties ſent out detachments into the fields, to invite the concurrence of the ſlaves, upon a promiſe of their freedom. A majority of ſlaves came in to the aſſiſtance of the *people*, and the other party got eight hundred auxiliaries from the continent.

After one day's reſpite, they come again to blows. The *people* get the better now, by the advantage of their ſtrong poſts and their numbers. The women with notable boldneſs aſſiſted in the combat, by throwing tiles from the tops of the houſes, and ſuſtaining the tumult beyond their ſex. About the cloſe of the evening, the *few* were forced to fly, and then apprehenſive, leſt the *people* ſhould ruſh down upon and ſo at a ſhout ſeize the dock and put them to the ſword, in order to ſtop their paſſage, they ſet fire to the houſes all round the forum and to ſuch as were adjacent, ſparing neither their own nor thoſe of their enemies. The large effects of the merchants were conſumed in the flames, and the whole city was in danger of being reduced to aſhes, had a gale of wind aroſe to drive the flame that way. This put a ſtop to the conteſt and brought on a ceſſation, when both ſides applied themſelves to a ſtrict guard, for the night. The Corinthian veſſel, after this victory on the ſide of the *people*, ſtole privately away; and many of the auxiliaries, who crept off unperceived, repaſſed to the oppoſite ſhore.

The day following, Nicoſtratus the ſon of Diotrephes, who commanded the Athenian ſquadron, comes up to their aſſiſtance with his twelve ſail from Naupactus and five hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians. He forthwith negotiated an accommodation, and perſuades them to make up the affair with one another, by inſtantly condemning the ten principal authors of this ſedition (who immediately fled,) and permitting all others to continue in the city, upon articles ſigned between both parties and the Athenians--- "to have the ſame friends "and the ſame foes." Having ſo far carried his point, he was intent on immediate departure. But the managers for the *people* made him a propoſal, to leave five ſhips of his ſquadron with them, to deter the enemy from any freſh commotion, which ſhould be replaced by five of their own, which they would inſtantly man to attend him on his ſtation. With this propoſal he complied; and they named diſtinctly the mariners, who to a man were of the oppoſite party. Affrighted at this, as a pretext to convey them to Athens, they ſit down in the temple of the Dioſcuri. Nicoſtratus endeavoured to raiſe them up and to chear their deſpondency. Yet all he could ſay was unavailing; and the people run again to arms, pretending that ſuch a refuſal to put to ſea was a plain proof, that their intentions were inſincere throughout. Then they rifled their houſes of all the arms they could find; and ſome of them who fell into their hands, had immediately been butchered, if Nicoſtratus had not interpoſed.

A ſecond party, terrified at theſe proceedings, take their ſeats alſo as ſuppliants in the temple of Juno. The number of theſe was not leſs than four hundred. The *people*, grown now apprehenſive of ſome fatal turn, perſuade them to leave their ſanctuary; and having prevailed, tranſport them into that iſland which faceth the temple of Juno, whither every thing needful for their ſuſtenance was carefully ſent them.

The ſedition continuing in this poſture, about the fourth or fifth day after the tranſportation of the latter body into the iſland, the Peloponneſian.

loponnefian ſhips, which had aſſembled at Cyllene after the voyage of Ionia, appear in ſight to the number of fifty-three. Alcidas was commander in chief as before, and Braſidas attended as his counſeil. They came to anchor in the harbour of Sybota on the main; and next morning, at break of day, ſteered directly for Corcyra.

Great was the tumult now at Corcyra: They were afraid of the malecontents within, and the hoſtile fleet approaching the city. They got ſixty ſhips immediately on float, and each ſo faſt as it was manned advanced to meet the foe. The Athenians indeed propoſed, to put out firſt to ſea themſelves; and, that the Corcyréans ſhould afterwards come out and join them, when they had got all their ſhips together. But, as they advanced in a ſtraggling manner towards the enemy, two ſhips went over directly to them; and on board others the mariners were at blows with one another. In ſhort, there was no manner of order in any of their motions. The Lacedæmonians, perceiving how it was, with twenty of their ſhips drew up to engage the Corcyréans, and oppoſed the remainder to the twelve Athenian, two of which were only the *Salaminian* and the *Paralus*.

The Corcyréans, who charged in this diſorderly manner and with few ſhips in a line, were on their ſide terribly diſtreſſed; whilſt the Athenians, fearing, leſt the other, vaſtly ſuperior in number, might quite ſurround their little ſquadron, would not venture to attack them when altogether, nor to break upon the middle of the enemy's line; but, aſſaulting them towards one of the extremities, ſink one of their ſhips. Upon this, the Peloponneſians having formed a circle, the Athenians ſailed round and round, and endeavoured to break their order. Thoſe who purſued the Corcyréans perceiving this, and fearing what had happened formerly at Naupactus, ſteered away from thence to ſupport their own ſquadron. And now, with their whole embodied ſtrength, they deſigned to pour upon the Athenians. *They*, having already ſhifted the helm, fell gradually away. They were deſirous to favour the flight of the Corcyréans beyond the poſſibility

bility of a chace, and ſo they fell off entirely at their own leiſure, keeping the enemy in their front ſtill ranged in order. Such was this engagement, which at the ſetting of the ſun was quite ended.

The Corcyréans were afraid leſt the enemy in proſecution of their victory, ſhould immediately aſſault the city, or take up the perſons in the iſland, or by ſome other method attempt to diſtreſs them. For this reaſon, they removed the priſoners again from the iſland into the temple of Juno, and applied themſelves to guard the city. But the enemy, tho' victorious at ſea, durſt not think of proceeding to attack the city; but ſatisfied with taking thirteen ſhips belonging to the Corcyréans, they returned to the main, from whence they had ſallied to the engagement. The next day alſo, they refrained from making any attempt upon the city, where the diſorder and conſternation were as great as ever. Braſidas is reported urgently to have preſſed it upon Alcidas, but in the council of war was quite overruled. They landed however at cape Leucymne, and plundered the country.

The Corcyréan *people*, whoſe fears were ſtill ſuggeſting that they ſhould be attacked by the enemy's fleet, had conſer'd with the ſuppliants and others, about the only means to preſerve the city. And ſome of them they perſuaded to join in navigating their ſhips; for by ſome means or other they had again manned thirty, expecting every moment the enemy's approach. But the Peloponneſians continued the ravage of their fields only till noon, and then repaſſed to their former ſtations. Yet before the dawn of the ſucceeding day, they ſaw ſixty lights held up, to denote an equal number of Athenian ſhips advancing from Leucas. The Athenians, advertiſed of the ſedition and the courſe of the fleet under Alcidas againſt Corcyra, had ſent away this reinforcement under the command of Eurymedon the ſon of Thucles. Upon this, the Peloponneſians, whilſt yet it was night, crept homewards along the ſhore, and carrying their veſſels

over

over the iſthmus of Leucas, leſt they ſhould be diſcovered in going round it, are ſafely retreated within their own confines.

When the Corcyréans had diſcovered the approach of the Athenian reinforcement, and the departure of the enemy, they received the Meſſenians within their walls who till now had lodged without; and, having ordered the ſhips which they had mann'd to come about into the Hyllaic harbour, whilſt they were going about in purſuance of this order, they put all the adverſe faction whom they found to the ſword. Thoſe further, who had took on in the ſhips at their perſuaſion, they threw into the ſea and then retired. They afterwards went to Juno's temple, and perſuaded a party of ſuppliants there to the amount of fifty, to undergo a judicial trial, in which they were all condemned to die. The majority of ſuppliants, who refuſed to hear ſuch perſuaſion, no ſooner ſaw the fate of their brethren, than they either ſlew one another within the temple, or hung themſelves up upon the trees within its verge; each finding ſome expedient for his own diſpatch. During thoſe ſeven days that Eurymedon with his reinforcement continued at Corcyra, the people of that city extended the maſſacre to all whom they judged their enemies. The crime, on which they juſtified their proceedings, was *their* attempt to overturn the *democracy*.

Some periſhed merely through private enmity; ſome, for the ſums they had lent, by the hands of the borrowers. Every kind of death was here exhibited. Every dreadful act uſual in a ſedition, and more than uſual, was perpetrated now. For fathers ſlew their children; ſome were dragged from altars; and ſome were butchered at them. And a number of perſons immured in the temple of Bacchus were ſtarved to death. So cruel was the progreſs of this ſedition, and ſo exceſſively cruel did it appear, becauſe the firſt of ſo black a nature that ever happened. But afterwards the contagion ſpread, one may ſay, thro' the whole extent of Greece, when factions raged in every city, the *popular* demogogues contending for the Athenians,

Athenians, the aſpiring *few* for the Lacedæmonians. In peace, it is true, they were void of all pretext, of all opportunity to invite theſe rivals. But now, amidſt declared hoſtilities, and the queſt of alliance to afflict their enemies and add an increaſe of ſtrength to themſelves, opportunities were eaſily found by ſuch as were fond of innovations to introduce the ſide they favoured. The conſequence of this was ſedition in cities, with all its numerous and tragical incidents. Such were now, and ſuch things ever will be ſo long as human nature continues the ſame; but under greater or leſs aggravations and diverſified in circumſtances, according to the ſeveral viciſſitudes of conjunctures, which ſhall happen to occur. In the ſeaſons of peace and affluence, communities as well as individuals, have their tempers under better regulation, becauſe not liable to that violence which flows from neceſſity. But war, which ſnatcheth from them their daily ſubſiſtence, is the teacher of violence, and aſſimilates the paſſions of men to their preſent condition.

By theſe means were cities haraſſed with ſeditions. And thoſe, to whoſe fate the later commotions fell, through enquiry what had happened in ſuch inſtances before, grew enormouſly ambitious to ſuppreſs the machinations of others, both in policy of attempts and extravagance of revenge. Even words loſt now their former ſignificance, ſince to palliate actions they were quite diſtorted. For, truly, what before was a brutal courage, began to be eſteemed that fortitude which becomes a human and ſociable creature; prudent conſideration, to be ſpecious cowardice; modeſty, the diſguiſe of effeminacy; and being wiſe in every thing, to be good for nothing. The hot fiery temper was adjudged the exertion of true manly valour; cautious and calm deliberation, to be a plauſible pretext for intended knavery. He who boiled with indignation, was undoubtedly truſty; who preſumed to contradict, was ever ſuſpected. He who ſucceeded in a roguiſh ſcheme was wiſe; and he who ſuſpected ſuch practices in others, was ſtill a more able genius. But, was he

provident enough, ſo as never to be in need of ſuch baſe expedients; he was one that would not ſtand to his engagements and moſt ſhamefully awed by his foes. In ſhort, he who could prevent another in executing villainy, or could perſuade a well-deſigning perſon to it, was ſure to be applauded.

Men now, who were allied in blood, were leſs valued or careſſed, than ſuch as were connected by voluntary combination; ſince the latter, unſcrupulous and uninquiſitive, were more ready to embark in any ſcheme whatever. For now aſſociations were not formed for ſuch mutual advantage as is conſiſtent with, but for the execution of ſuch rapines as are contrary to human laws. In mutual truſt they perſiſted, not out of any regard to religious obligation, but from the bond of communicated guilt. To the fair and honeſt propoſals of adverſaries they hearkened indeed, when ſuch by active ſtrength could control them, but never through candid ingenuity. Revenge upon another was a more valued poſſeſſion than never to have ſuffered injury. Oaths, if ever made for preſent reconciliation, had a temporary force, ſo long as neither knew how to break them; but never, when either party had power to abet their violation. He who, at inviting opportunity, durſt firſt incur the perjury, if the adverſary was off his guard, executed his rancour with higher ſpirit, than from enmity open and avowed. Such a ſtep was thought moſt ſecure; and, becauſe he had thus ſurpaſſed in guile, it was certainly extolled as a maſter-piece of cunning. Large is the number of villains, and ſuch obtain more eaſily the reputation of dexterity than their dupes can that of goodneſs: The latter are apt to bluſh; the former moſt impudently triumph.

The ſource of all theſe evils is a thirſt of power, in conſequence either of rapacious or ambitious paſſions. The mind, when actuated by ſuch, is ever ready to engage in party-feuds. For the men of large influence in communities avowing on both ſides a ſpecious cauſe, ſome ſtanding up for the juſt equality of the *popular*, others for the fair

fair decorum of the *ariſtocratical* government, by artful ſounds embaraſſed thoſe communities for their own private lucre. Both ſides, intent on victory, carried on the contention with the keeneſt ſpirit. They moſt daringly projected, and then regularly executed the moſt dreadful machinations. Their revenge was not limited by juſtice or the public welfare; it aimed at more ample ſatisfaction. Either ſide conſtantly meaſured it by ſuch retaliation as was judged the ſweeteſt, either by a capital condemnation through an iniquitous ſentence, or by earning the victory with their own hands, in which they were always ready to glut the preſent rancour of their hearts. And hence it was, that the pious and upright conduct was on both ſides diſregarded. And, when any point of great importance was before them, to carry it by ſpecious colluſive oratory was the greateſt enhancement of their credit. Yet all this while, the moderate members of ſuch communities, either hated becauſe they would not meddle, or envied for ſuch obnoxious conduct, fell victims to both.

Seditions in this manner introduced every ſpecies of outrageous wickedneſs into the Grecian manners. Sincerity, which is moſt frequently to be found in generous tempers, was laughed out of countenance and for ever vaniſhed. It was become the univerſal practice, to keep up a conſtant enmity of intention againſt one another, and never to believe. No promiſe was ſtrong enough, no oath ſufficiently ſolemn, to baniſh ſuch mutual diffidence. Thoſe who excelled in ſhrewd conſideration, reſigned all hope of any laſting ſecurity, and ſtood ever on their guard againſt whom it was impoſſible for them to truſt. But perſons of meaner underſtandings took more effectual methods for their preſervation. Living in conſtant apprehenſions, from their own inferiority and the craft of their opponents, leſt by words they ſhould be over-reached, or that ſuch ſubtle heads might execute their treacheries upon them unawares, they boldly ſeized the preſent moment, and at once diſpatched the men they dreaded; who, preſuming too much on their own penetration, and that it was ſuper-

fluous to aim a blow at thoſe whom they could at any time ſupplant by cunning, deſpiſed them ſo far as to neglect a proper guard, and ſo contributed to their own deſtruction.

Many ſuch daring outrages were now by way of precedent committed at Corcyra; nay all whatever, that men, who are wreaking revenge upon ſuch as before were their maſters, and had exerted their ſuperiority with ſavageneſs more than humanity, can in turn retaliate upon them, were executed there.—Some joined in theſe acts of violence to procure a diſcharge from their former poverty; but the greater number, through a paſſionate deſire to ſeize the property of their neighbours. Or, tho' they were not lured by the luſt of rapine, but engaged in the conteſt upon fair and open views, yet hurried to wild extravagance through mad and undiſciplined anger, they proceeded to cruel acts, and with inexorable fury. The whole order of human life was for a ſeaſon confounded in this city. The human temper, too apt to tranſgreſs in ſpite of laws, and now having gained the aſcendant over law, ſeemed pleaſed with exhibiting this public manifeſtation, that it was too weak for anger, too ſtrong for juſtice, and an enemy to all ſuperiority. Men could not otherwiſe have awarded the preference to revenge over righteous duty, and to lucre over that habit of juſtice in which envy never yet had power to annoy them. But more than this, when the point in view is revenge upon others, men haughtily make precedents againſt themſelves, by infringing thoſe laws which are binding by the ties of nature, and from which alone any hope of ſafety can be extracted for themſelves in a plunge of miſery, precluding thus all poſſibility of redreſs, ſhould they be reduced in ſome future extremity to make the ſame appeal.

And thus the Corcyréans continued to execute the rage of ſuch cruel paſſions, upon the heads of one another, within the precincts of their own city, of which this was the firſt example in Greece, till Eurymedon with the Athenian fleet under his command put out again to ſea.

But,

But, after his departure, they who by flight had preſerved their lives, to the number of about five hundred, having ſeized their forts upon the oppoſite ſhore, got poſſeſſion of their own land, on that ſide the water. Putting out hence, they plundered the Corcyréans in the iſland, and made ſuch havoc that a violent famine enſued in the city. They further ſent a deputation to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to negotiate the means of their reſtoration. But nothing of this kind ſucceeding, they got together afterwards a body of auxiliaries and tranſports, and ſo paſſed over to the iſland of Corcyra, to the amount of ſix hundred men. Having now ſet fire to their tranſports, to preclude every other expedient but gaining firm footing where now they were, they marched up to the mountain Iſtone, and having fortified themſelves there, made cruel work with thoſe in the city, and were maſters of the country round about.

About the end of the ſame ſummer, the Athenians ſent out twenty ſail for Sicily, under the command of Laches the ſon of Melanopus and Charœadas the ſon of Euphiletus. A war was now on foot between the Syracuſans and Leontines. Confederate with the Syracuſans were, excepting Camarina, all the Doric cities, which had formerly entered into alliance with the Lacedæmonians before this war broke out, but had yet no where effectually joined them. With the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, and Camarina. Of Italy, the Locrians ſided with the Syracuſans; and the Rhegians, from the motive of conſanguinity, with the Leontines. The allies therefore of the Leontines ſent to Athens, [9] petitioning the Athenians in Sicily.

9 One of the perſons, or the chief, employed on this occaſion, is ſaid to be Gorgias of Leontium, the firſt rhetorician of that or of any age. When he had his audience from the Athenians to deliver the reaſons of his embaſſy, he made a ſpeech ſo ſmooth and flowing, ſo new in the manner of its turns, ſo pretty in the expreſſion, and ſo nicely diverſified by a change and oppoſition of figures, that he won their hearts, and ſucceeded in his negotiation. Our hiſtorian indeed who takes no notice of Gorgias, gives two political reaſons juſt after for the ready compliance of the Athenians.

in reſpect of their old alliance and their Ionic deſcent, to ſend them a ſuccour of ſhipping: For the Syracuſans had now blocked them up both by land and ſea. The Athenians immediately ſent one, giving out that they were bound in duty to take this ſtep; but their real motive was, to prevent the exportation of corn from thence to Peloponneſus, and alſo to ſound the poſſibility of bringing Sicily into their own ſubjection. Their ſquadron therefore, arriving at Rhegium on the Italian ſhore, ſupported their allies in the preſent war; and in this the ſummer ended.

The plague rageth again at Athens.

In the beginning of the winter, the plague broke out a ſecond time at Athens, not that during this whole interval of time it had wholly ceaſed, tho' its rage had very much abated. But now the mortality began again and continued not leſs than a year; but the former had raged for the ſpace of two. There was nothing which lay upon the Athenians ſo hard as this, or ſo much impaired their ſtrength. It appeared from the muſter-rolls, that there periſhed four thouſand and four hundred of thoſe citizens who wore the heavy-armour, and three hundred of the *horſemen*. The number of the lower people that died, was not to be computed.—There happened at the ſame time many earthquakes: at Athens; in Eubœa; amongſt the Bœotians, and eſpecially at the Bœotian Orchomenus.

Sicily.

The ſame winter the Athenians and Rhegians, on the coaſt of Sicily, form an expedition with thirty ſail, againſt thoſe which are called the iſles of Æolus. This was not feaſible in the ſummer-ſeaſon, for want of water. Theſe iſles are inhabited by the Liparéans, who were a colony from Cnidus. Their reſidence is chiefly in one of them called Liparé, tho' by no means large. They go from hence to the tillage of the others, Didymé and Strongylé and Hiera,

nians on this occaſion. It is a ſtep, which draws great conſequences after it. Thucydides in the ſequel will open all the plan, and give an exact detail of the operations of this new war, into which the Athenians are beginning to embark.

It

It is believed by thoſe people, that Vulcan [1] keeps his forge in Hiera, becauſe in the night it viſibly throws forth a great quantity of fire, and in the day of ſmoke. Theſe iſles are ſituated over-againſt the ſhore of the Siculi and the Meſſenians, and were allied with Syracuſe. The Athenians having plundered the ſoil, and finding the inhabitants would not come in, put back again to Rhegium. —— And here the winter ended, and the fifth year of this war, the hiſtory of which Thucydides hath compiled.

YEAR VI.

THE following ſummer, the Peloponneſians and confederates aſſembled at the Iſthmus, in order to make the uſual inroad into Attica; and Agis ſon of Archidamus king of the Lacedæmonians, was there ready for the command. But the frequent earthquakes which happened about this time, cauſed them to return back, and entirely put a ſtop to the deſigned incurſion. *Before* Chriſt 426. *Earthquakes.*

About the ſame ſpace of time, ſhocks of earthquakes were felt in Eubœa, where at Orobiæ the ſea breaking over what was then land with impetuous ſwells, laid a part of that city under water: Some of which ſtagnated there, tho' ſome waſhed its way back; however a tract now continues ſea which before was land. All thoſe, who could not reach the higher grounds in time, by running before the ſurge, were drowned. — A ſimilar inundation happened at the iſle of Atalanta, amongſt the Locrians of Opus, where it waſhed away the

1 So Virgil, l. viii. 416.

Inſula Sicanium juxta latus Æoliamque
Erigitur Liparen fumantibus ardua ſaxis:
Quam ſubter ſpecus & Cyclopum exeſa caminis
Antra Ætnæa tonant, validique incudibus ictus
Auditi referunt gemitum, ſtridunteque cavernis
Stricturæ Chalybum, & fornacibus ignis anhelat;
Vulcani domus, & Vulcania nomine tellus.

Athenian

Athenian fort, and of two veſſels that lay dry upon the beach ſtaved one to pieces. —— At Peparethus alſo the ſurge of the ſea roſe very high, but did not overflow. An earthquake however demoliſhed part of the fortification, * the town-houſe, and ſome few dwelling-houſes. —— My ſolution of ſuch effects is this: Where the ſhock of the earthquake was moſt violent, it forcibly drove away the ſea before it, which ſuddenly returning again occaſioned theſe more violent ſwells. And without an earthquake I deem all ſuch accidents impoſſible.

* Prytanéum.

Proceedings in Sicily.

The ſame ſummer, many of other nations, as they happened to be drawn into the quarrel, were engaged in the war of Sicily, as well as the Sicilians themſelves who took up arms one againſt another, and the Athenians together with their allies. Yet, the moſt memorable actions alone, either of the allies thus aided by the Athenians, or of the common enemy againſt the Athenians, ſhall I now relate. —— Charœadas the Athenian commander having loſt his life in the Syracuſan war, Laches who had now the ſole command of the fleet, in junction with the allies, appeared before Mylæ of the Meſſenians. The garriſon of Mylæ conſiſted of two companies of Meſſenians; and theſe had formed an ambuſcade to cut off the enemy when landed. But the Athenians and allies drive them from the place of ambuſh with great ſlaughter. Then they proceeded to aſſault the works, which neceſſitated the defendants to give up their citadel by capitulation, and even to attend them againſt Meſſene. But after this, the Athenians and allies were no ſooner approached, than the Meſſenians alſo compounded, giving hoſtages and all other ſecurities required for their future behaviour.

Expedition againſt Melos *by* Nicias.

The ſame ſummer, the Athenians with thirty ſail of ſhips commanded by Demoſthenes [2] the ſon of Alciſthenes and Procles the ſon of

2 This Demoſthenes will make a conſiderable figure in the courſe of this war. The moſt celebrated orator of the ſame name hath ranked him amongſt the greateſt of

of Theodorus, appeared upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus; whilſt a larger armament of ſixty, and two thouſand heavy-armed, was employed againſt Melos, under the command of Nicias ſon of Niceratus. Melos is an iſland; and as the inhabitants of it were averſe to the Athenian ſubjection, and had refuſed to accede to their alliance, they were now bent on its reduction. Having laid the iſland waſte, and the Melians ſtill refuſing to ſubmit, the Athenians put again to ſea and croſs'd over to Oropus on the oppoſite ſhore; where, arriving at night, the heavy-armed were detached to march with all expedition by land towards Tanagra of Bœotia. Notice being given of their arrival there, they were inſtantly joined by the whole force of Athens, which had marched out of the city under the orders of Hipponicus the ſon of Callias and Eurymedon the ſon of Thucles. A camp they formed; and, having for the ſpace of a day laid the territory waſte, they repoſed themſelves there the ſucceeding night. But the next morning, having gained a victory over the Tanagréans, who aided by a party of Thebans ſallied out upon them, they only ſtayed to gather up the arms and erect a trophy, and then marched away — theſe, back again to the city; and thoſe, to the fleet. Nicias upon this, putting out again with his ſixty ſail, plundered all the ſea-coaſt of Locris, and then returned into the harbour of Athens.

It was about this time that the Lacedæmonians founded the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia. Their view in doing it was this: —— Thoſe, who in general are ſtiled Melienſians, are divided into three Heraclea.

of his countrymen, with Ariſtides, Pericles and Nicias. He ſtiles him alſo an orator; and Thucydides will give us hereafter a ſpecimen of his manner of haranguing. His *name-ſake* indeed hath carried off all the glory of eloquence: But the *Demoſthenes*, who is the ſubject of this note, was an able general, very enterprizing, and very brave; always vigilant in the ſervice of his country, though more as a ſoldier than a ſtateſman; and, provided his country was ſerved, not too anxious about who carried off the honour. In ſhort, he was an open-hearted, diſintereſted, worthy Athenian.

bodies; Paralians, Hierenſians, and Trachinians. The laſt of theſe, the Trachinians, who had been terribly diſtreſſed by a war made upon them by the bordering Oetæans, had firſt of all intended to throw themſelves under the Athenian protection; but afterwards, apprehending they might not be hearty in their ſupport, they made application to Lacedæmon by Tiſamenus, the delegate appointed by them on this occaſion. The Dorians too, from whom the Lacedæmonians are deſcended, ſent their embaſſadors alſo to accompany and join with him in the negotiation, for they likewiſe were infeſted by thoſe Oetæans. The Lacedæmonians, after an audience, reſolved to ſend out this colony, as a ſure expedient not only to protect the Trachinians and Dorians from inſult, but to annoy the Athenians more ſenſibly, in the courſe of the war, from a city ſo commodiouſly ſeated. For thence they could at any time make an attack upon Eubœa, as the paſſage was but ſhort; and further, it lay moſt conveniently upon the road to Thrace. In a word, they were very eager about building this city. In the firſt place therefore, they begged the advice of the God at Delphi. His anſwer being favourable, they ſent out a colony compoſed of their own and the neighbouring people; encouraging farther all Grecian adventurers whatever to join in this ſettlement, except Ionians and Achæans, and ſome of foreign nations. Three Lacedæmonians are appointed to be the leaders of this colony; Leon, and Alcidas, and Damagon. Theſe arriving at the ſpot erect upon a new foundation and wall round the city which is now called Heraclea, diſtant about * forty ſtadia from Thermopylæ, and twenty from the ſea. They proceeded next to build the naval docks; and theſe they began at Thermopylæ cloſe under the ſtraits, ſince there they were capable of the ſtrongeſt defence.

* *About 4 miles.*

The Athenians, when they ſaw the large reſort to this colony, were at firſt under great apprehenſions. They ſuſpected it to be chiefly intended for the annoyance of Eubœa, as the paſſage from it was ſhort to Cenæum in Eubœa; tho', in the ſequel, their apprehenſions

ſions proved intirely groundleſs. Not the leaſt damage accrued to them from this colony; and the reaſon was this: The Theſſalians, who were maſters of all the country round about it, and upon whoſe very land it was built, fearing leſt this new ſettlement might prove too powerful a neighbour at laſt, gave it all poſſible annoyance, and haraſſed the new inhabitants with continual war, till from the large number they were at firſt, they mouldered into nothing. When the Lacedæmonians firſt declared the colony, the whole world was eager to get a ſettlement in a city, which they thought would want no ſupport. Not but that its ſudden decay was owing alſo in great meaſure to the Lacedæmonian leaders. From the firſt moment of their arrival they had ſpoiled every thing wherein they meddled; they reduced their numbers to a handful of men, becauſe their fears had driven away the reſt, as the government was always ſevere, and not always juſt. The neighbouring people, ſurpriſing them in ſuch a ſtate, prevailed againſt them with the utmoſt eaſe.

Expedition againſt the Ætolians by Demoſthenes.

The ſame ſummer, and even during that interval of time the Athenians were employed at Melos, the Athenians of the fleet of thirty ſail who were upon the Peloponneſian coaſt, in the firſt place, having placed an ambuſh at Ellomenus of Leucadia, intercepted and cut off a part of the garriſon. In the next place, with an augmented force they came up to Leucas, being attended now by the whole ſtrength of the Acarnanians except the Oeniadæ, by the Zacynthians and Cephallenians, and fifteen ſail of Corcyréans. The Leucadians, tho' their territory was laid waſte both without and within the Iſthmus, where the city of Leucas and the temple of Apollo are ſeated, yet durſt not venture out againſt ſuch ſuperior numbers. Upon this, the Acarnanians vehemently preſſed it upon Demoſthenes the Athenian general, to block them up by a wall of circumvallation; imagining they might eaſily reduce them, and rid themſelves of a city which had been their eternal foe. But Demoſthenes choſe rather to hearken at this time to the ſuggeſtions of the Meſſenians; "how glorious it

" would be, as he was now at the head of ſo large a force, to in-
" vade the Ætolians, who were ſuch plagues to Naupactus; and, if
" their reduction could be compleated, the reſt of that continent
" might eaſily be brought into the Athenian ſubjection. For, tho'
" the Ætolians were a great and warlike people, yet as they dwelled
" in open villages remote from one another, as light-armour only
" was in uſe amongſt them, they preſumed he might eaſily complete
" their reduction, before any ſuccour could reach them." They ad-viſed him further, " to begin with the Apodoti, to take the Ophio-
" nians next, then to proceed to the Eurytanians (which is the moſt
" numerous people of Ætolia, reported alſo to ſpeak in a moſt bar-
" barous dialect, and to feed upon raw fleſh); that, if theſe could
" be ſurpriſed, the reſt of Ætolia would ſubmit of courſe." He therefore — willing to oblige the Meſſenians, and incited above all by the thought, that without expoſing the Athenian forces, after he had done with the Ætolians, he might march with the allied ſtrength of the continent and penetrate by land as far as Bœotia, through the Locrians of Ozoli, to Cytinium in Doris, keeping Parnaſſus on his right till he got down amongſt the Phocians, who he reckoned, from their conſtant friendſhip with the Athenians, would readily join him, or however might eaſily be compelled to do it; and then, that Bœotia borders next on the Phocians:—Demoſthenes, I ſay, weighing from Leucas with his whole force, to the great regret of the Acarnanians, coaſted along to Solium. He there communicated his plan to the Acarnanians, in which they refuſed to join becauſe he had refuſed the blockade of Leucas. Demoſthenes, with his other force, the Cephallenians, and Meſſenians, and Zacynthians, and three hundred ſoldiers draughted from on board the Athenian ſhips (the fifteen Corcyréan were already departed), ſet about this expedition againſt the Ætolians. He began it from Oeneon in Locris: For the Locrians, called Ozolæ, were allies, and had notice to meet the Athenians with all their force in the midland parts. Theſe, being not only borderers,

but

but uſing alſo the ſame kind of arms with the Ætolians, were judged moſt proper to accompany the expedition, as they knew ſo well their method of battle, and their country. Having repoſed his army one night within the verge of the temple of the Nemean Jove (in which the inhabitants have a tradition that Heſiod [3] the poet expired, in purſuance of an oracle which had fixed Nemea for the place of his death), he marched again at break of day, and entered Ætolia. On the firſt day he taketh Potidania, on the ſecond Crocylium, and on the third Tichium. There he halted, and ſent away the booty to Eupolium of Locris. It was now his reſolution, after he had ſubdued the reſt, to march laſt of all againſt the Ophionians, if they did not voluntarily ſubmit beforehand, in his retreat back to Naupactus.

3 The ſtory of Heſiod's death is related by Plutarch in *The banquet of the ſeven wiſe men*. Solon interpoſing here, ſaid, "Such "things, Diocles, muſt be referred immediately to the Gods, they are above human condition. But the caſe of Heſiod "is within the lot of humanity, and concerns us all. But perhaps you know the "ſtory?" I do not, he replied. "It is "then well worth your hearing. A certain Mileſian, it ſeems, in whoſe company Heſiod was hoſpitably lodged and "entertained in Locris, had ſecretly debauched the daughter of their hoſt. "When the affair came to light, it was "ſuſpected that Heſiod had all along been "privy to the intrigue, and concealed ſuch "baſe behaviour; and, tho' he was intirely innocent, he fell a victim to haſty reſentment and foul calumniation. The "brothers of the damſel laid wait for and "ſlew him at the Nemean temple in Locris, and with him his ſervant, whoſe "name was Troilus. Their bodies being "thrown into the ſea, that of Troilus indeed, floating up into the river Daphnus, "was ſtopped at a rock quite ſurrounded "with water a ſmall diſtance from ſea. "But the moment Heſiod's body was "thrown into the ſea, a ſhoal of dolphins "caught it and carried it to Rhium and "Molycrium. The Locrians that very "day were aſſembled at Rhium for a ſolemn feſtival and ſacrifice, which they "ſtill continue to celebrate at the ſame "place. The dead body was no ſooner beheld in its approach, than full of wonder, "as was likely, they hurried down to the "beach, and, knowing it to be the body "of Heſiod, and very freſh, they poſtponed every other care to the diſcovery "of this murder, from their high regard "for Heſiod. This was ſoon done; the "aſſaſſins were found out, whom they "threw headlong into the ſea, and demoliſhed their houſes. But Heſiod was buried by them in the temple of the Nemean Jove."

This

This preparation againſt them did by no means eſcape the Ætolians. The ſcheme was no ſooner formed than they had gained intelligence of it; and by that time the army was within their borders, they were all drawn together in a numerous body for their mutual defence: Nay, even the moſt diſtant Ophionians, who are ſeated upon the Meliac bay, the Bomienſians and Callienſians, were already come up.

The Meſſenians continued to amuſe Demoſthenes with the ſame ſuggeſtions as at firſt: They ſtill inſiſted, that the conqueſt of the Ætolians would be an eaſy performance, and adviſed him to advance immediately againſt their villages, nor give them time to gather together in a body to oppoſe him, but to attack every place he came to, and take it. This advice being quite to his own taſte, and relying upon his own good-fortune, which hitherto had never been checked, without waiting for the Locrians who were very much wanted, and were to have joined him (for he ſtood moſt in need of light-armed darters), he advanced to Ægitium, and aſſaulting, takes it by ſtorm. The inhabitants made their eſcape, and poſted themſelves upon the hills which overlook the town. It was ſituated amongſt lofty eminences, and diſtant from the ſea about * eighty ſtadia.

* *About eight miles.*

Defeat of Demoſthenes.

But now the Ætolians, who were come up for the preſervation of Ægitium, running down in ſeparate bodies from different eminences, made an attack upon the Athenians and allies, and poured in their javelins amongſt them: And whenever the Athenian army approached to charge, they plied before them; when they again fell back, theſe again returned to the charge. This kind of engagement continued for a long time, a ſeries of alternate purſuits and retreats, in both which the Athenians ſuffered moſt. So long however as their archers had darts, and opportunity to uſe them, they loſt no ground; for the light-armed Ætolians fell back to avoid the darts. But when the chief of the archers dropped, his party was ſoon diſperſed, and the

the whole army began to incline. Their ſtrength was quite exhauſted by ſo many repeated charges; and now, the Ætolians preſſing hard upon them, and pouring in whole ſhowers of miſſive weapons, they turned about and fled. Now tumbling into caverns from whence they could not recover themſelves, or bewildered in places of which they had no knowledge, they were miſerably deſtroyed. For Chromon the Meſſenian, who laid out all the routes, had been killed in the battle. The Ætolians purſued with their darts, and being not only ſwift of foot, but alſo lightly-armed, eaſily overtook many of them in their flight, and did great execution. A large party, who had loſt their way, threw themſelves into a wood which was quite impaſſable. The Ætolians ſet the wood on fire, in the flames of which they were all conſumed. Every affecting ſpecies of flight and deſtruction was now the fate of the Athenian army. Thoſe who had the good-fortune to eſcape, effected it by reaching the ſea and Oeneon of Locris, from whence they firſt began the expedition.

The number of the allies who thus periſhed, was large; that of heavy-armed Athenians was about a hundred and twenty; ſo conſiderable was the loſs, and all of them in the very flower of their youth. In the whole courſe of this war, the *State* of Athens never loſt at any one time ſo many of her moſt galant citizens as now. Procles alſo, the other commander in this expedition, periſhed.

They afterwards fetched off their dead by a truce obtained from the Ætolians. This being done, they retired to Naupactus, and there ſhipped themſelves for Athens. Demoſthenes however was left behind at Naupactus, and the parts adjacent. After ſuch a miſcarriage he durſt not preſume to face the people of Athens.

About the ſame time, the Athenians on the Sicilian ſtation, having ſailed towards Locris, landed upon that coaſt. They deſtroyed a party of Locrians who endeavoured to make head againſt them; and then take Peripolium, a town ſituated on the river Halex. Sicily.

The

Naupactus. The ſame ſummer the Ætolians, who had ſome time before diſpatched an embaſſy to Corinth and Lacedæmon, compoſed of Tolophus the Ophionian, Boriades the Euryſthanian, and Tiſander the Apodotian, prevail there in their ſuit for a diverſion againſt Naupactus, becauſe the Athenians had invaded their territories. It was about autumn when the Lacedæmonians marched away three thouſand heavy-armed of their allies; of which number five hundred belonged to Heraclea, the city ſo lately founded in Trachinia. Eurylochus, a Spartan, was appointed to command in the expedition, and was accompanied by two other Spartans, Macarius and Menedæus. The army being drawn into a body at Delphi, Eurylochus diſpatched a herald to the Ozolian-Locri: His route to Naupactus lay through their territory. He was alſo deſirous to detach them from the Athenian alliance. The Amphiſſenſians were the readieſt of all the Locri to give their concurrence, as ſtanding in perpetual awe of the hatred bore them by the Phocians. Theſe therefore were the firſt who ſent in hoſtages, and who perſuaded others to follow their example, from a dread of this army which was now approaching. Accordingly, the Myonenſians, their own borderers, were the firſt who complied; for their part of Locris is moſt difficult of acceſs. Theſe were followed by the Ippenſians, and Meſſapians, and Tritæenſians, and Challæans, Tolophonians, Heſſians and Oeanthians; and all theſe gave a perſonal attendance in the expedition. The Olpéans indeed ſent in their hoſtages, but would not attend. The Hyæans refuſed their hoſtages till one of their villages called Polis was ſeized.

When all things were ready, and the hoſtages placed ſecurely at Cytinium of Doris, Eurylochus with his army taking the route of Locris, advanced againſt Naupactus. He ſeized upon Oeneon and Eupolium as he marched, for refuſing to concur. When they had entered the territory of Naupactus, and were joined by the Ætolian aid, they waſted the country to the very ſuburb, of which alſo becauſe unfortified, they took poſſeſſion. Turning thence to Molycrium,

drium, a Corinthian colony, but now ſubject to the Athenians, they reduce it.

But Demoſthenes the Athenian (for he had continued at Naupactus ever ſince the Ætolian miſcarriage) having received intelligence of this army, and dreading the loſs of this place, had addreſſed himſelf to the Acarnanians, and with ſome difficulty, owing to his departure from Leucas, perſuades them to ſend a ſuccour to Naupactus. Accordingly, they put a thouſand of their heavy-armed under his orders, whom he threw into the town by ſea, which effectually preſerved it. For the danger before was manifeſt, as the wall was very large in compaſs, and the number of defendants inconſiderable.

When Eurylochus and his council had diſcovered that ſuch a ſuccour had been received into the town, and that its reduction was now impracticable, they marched away their forces, not towards Peloponneſus, but to that Ætolia which is now called Calydon, to Pleuron, to the neighbouring towns, and to Proſchion of Ætolia. The Ambraciots had now been with and prevailed upon them, to join in ſome attempts upon Argos in Amphilochia, upon the reſt of that province, and Acarnania; aſſuring them, that could theſe be reduced, the whole continent there would inſtantly go over to the Lacedæmonian league. Eurylochus having aſſured them of his concurrence, and given the Ætolians their diſmiſſion, halted thereabouts with his army, till the Ambraciots had entered upon the expedition againſt Argos, and it was time for him to join them. And here the ſummer ended.

Sicily. The Athenians in Sicily, the beginning of the winter, putting themſelves at the head of their Grecian allies, and as many of their Sicilian as unable to ſupport the Syracuſan yoke had revolted from Syracuſe to join them, began freſh operations of war in concert, and aſſaulted Neſſa a town of Sicily, the citadel of which was in the hands of the Syracuſans. But the attempt was unſucceſsful, and they again determined to draw off. During the retreat, the Syracuſans

ſallying forth, fell upon thoſe allies of the Athenians who marched in the rear, and with ſuch force, that they put a part of the army to flight, and ſlew a conſiderable number.

After this, Laches and the Athenians, having made ſome attempts, and landed on the coaſt of Locris near the mouth of the river Caïcinus, were engaged by a party of Locrians conſiſting of about three hundred, under Proxenus the ſon of Capaton. Theſe the Athenians defeated, and having ſtripped them of their arms, went off the coaſt.

The purification of Delos. The ſame winter alſo the Athenians purified Delos, in obedience to an oracle. Piſiſtratus the tyrant had purified it formerly, not indeed the whole, but ſo much of the iſland as lies within the proſpect of the temple. The purification now was univerſal, and performed in the following manner.

They broke up all the ſepulchres of the dead without exception, and prohibited for the future any death or birth in the iſland, both which were to be confined to Rhenæa. For Rhenæa lies at ſo ſmall a diſtance from Delos, that Polycrates the tyrant of Samos, who was formerly of great power by ſea, amongſt other iſles he reduced to his dominions, took Rhenæa alſo, which he conſecrated to Delian Apollo, and faſtened it to Delos by a chain. And after this purification, the Athenians made the firſt inſtitution of the Delian games to be ſolemnized every fifth returning year. Not but that in the earlier times there was uſed to be a great conflux of Ionians and neighbouring iſlanders to Delos. They reſorted to the ſolemn feſtivals there with their wives and children, in the ſame manner as the Ionians do now to Epheſus. Games of bodily exerciſe and of muſic were actually celebrated, and cities exhibited their reſpective chorus's. For this we have the teſtimony of Homer, in the following verſes of his hymn to Apollo;

To

To thee, O Phœbus, moſt the Delian iſle
Gives cordial joy, excites the pleaſing ſmile;
When gay Ionians flock around thy fane;
Men, women, children, a reſplendent train,
Whoſe flowing garments ſweep the ſacred pile,
Whoſe grateful concourſe gladdens all the iſle,
Where champions fight, where dancers beat the ground,
Where chearful muſic echoes all around,
Thy feaſt to honour, and thy praiſe to ſound.

That there was alſo a muſical game to which artiſts reſorted to make trials of their skill, he fully ſheweth in other verſes to be found in the ſame hymn: For having ſung the Delian chorus of females, he cloſeth their praiſe with theſe lines, in which further he hath made mention of himſelf;

Hail! great Apollo, radiant god of day;
Hail! Cynthia, goddeſs of the lunar ſway;
Henceforth on me propitious ſmile! and you,
Ye blooming beauties of the iſle, adieu!
When future gueſts ſhall reach your happy ſhore,
And refug'd here from toils lament no more;
When ſocial chat the mind unbending chears,
And this demand ſhall greet your friendly ears---
" Who was the Bard, e'er landed on your coaſt,
" Who ſung the ſweeteſt, and who pleas'd you moſt?---
With voice united, all ye blooming fair,
Join in your anſwer, and for me declare;
Say --- " The blind Bard the ſweeteſt notes may boaſt,
" He lives at Chios, and he pleas'd us moſt."

Such an evidence hath Homer left us, that in early times there was a great concourſe and feſtival at Delos. But afterwards the people of the iſlands and the Athenians ſent in their parties for the chorus with victims. But the uſual games, and moſt of the ſolemn rites, had been diſuſed, through ſome ſiniſter events, till the Athenians now made a freſh inſtitution of this ſolemnity, with the addition of a chariot-race, which had not formerly been a part of it.

Invaſion of Amphilochian Argos.

The ſame winter, the Ambraciots in purſuance of their engagements with Eurylochus, who waited their motions, march away with three thouſand heavy-armed againſt the Amphilochian Argos. Accordingly breaking into Argia, they ſeize Olpæ, a ſtrong place, ſituated on an eminence on the ſea-ſide. This place had been formerly fortified by the Acarnanians, who uſed it for their public tribunal of juſtice. It is diſtant from the city of Argos, which is alſo a maritime town, about * twenty five ſtadia. The Acarnanians were now in motion, ſome running to the defence of Argos, others to encamp at the important poſt of Crenæ in Amphilochia, to obſerve the motions of the Peloponneſians commanded by Eurylochus, that they might not perfect their junction with the Ambraciots, without ſome moleſtation on their route. They alſo ſend to Demoſthenes the Athenian general in the Ætolian expedition, to come and put himſelf at their head; and to the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſail, which was then upon the coaſt of Peloponneſus, under the command of Ariſtotle ſon of Timocrates, and Hierophon ſon of Antimneſtus.

* *About two miles and half.*

The Ambraciots at Olpæ ſent alſo a meſſenger to their own city, ordering them, to a man, to come out into the field. They were afraid leſt Eurylochus might not be able to paſs the Acarnanians, and ſo they ſhould be compelled either to fight alone; or, ſhould they attempt a retreat, to find it full of danger.

But the Peloponneſians commanded by Eurylochus had no ſooner heard that the Ambraciots were at Olpæ, than diſlodging from Proſchium they marched with all expedition to their ſupport. After paſſing

fing the Achelous, they took the route of Acarnania, deſolate at preſent, as the inhabitants were fled to the defence of Argos, having on their right the city and garriſon of the Stratians, and the reſt of Acarnania on their left. When they had paſſed through the territory of the Stratians, they croſſed Phytia, and again through the extremity of Medeon, and then marched acroſs Limnæa. They now enter'd the kingdom of the Agræans, which had deſerted the Acarnanian to favour the Peloponneſian intereſt. Securing then the mountain Thyamus, a wild uncultivated ſpot, they croſſed it, and deſcended thence by night into Argia. They afterwards paſſed undiſcovered betwixt the city of the Argians, and the poſt of the Acarnanians at Crenæ, and ſo perfected their junction with the Ambraciots at Olpæ. After this junction, their numbers being large, they take poſſeſſion next morn, at break of day, of a poſt called Metropolis, and there fix their encampment.

The battle of Olpæ.

Not long after this the Athenian ſquadron of twenty ſail comes into the bay of Ambracia, to ſuccour the Argians. Demoſthenes alſo arrived, with two hundred heavy-armed Meſſenians, and ſixty Athenian archers. The ſtation of the fleet was fixed under the fort of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and ſome few of the Amphilochians, who had already gathered into a body at Argos, (for the majority of them was obſtructed by the Ambraciots,) got every thing in readineſs to engage the enemy. They elect Demoſthenes to be commander of the whole aſſociated force, with the aſſiſtance of their own generals. He cauſed them to advance near Olpæ, and there encamped them. A great hollow lay between the armies. For five days they remained in a ſtate of inaction, but on the ſixth both ſides drew up in order of battle. The Peloponneſians were more numerous, and their line of courſe was further extended. Demoſthenes therefore, that he might not be incloſed, placeth an ambuſcade of the heavy and light-armed, to the number in all of about four hundred, in a hollow way overgrown with ſhrubs and buſhes, with orders

ders that in the heat of the charge they ſhould riſe up and attack the over-extended line of the enemy in their rear. When all things were ready on both ſides, they came to blows. Demoſthenes led the right wing, compoſed of the Meſſenians and his few Athenians. The other conſiſted of the Acarnanians, drawn up in the order they happened to fall into as they came up, and the Amphilochian darters who were at hand. But the Peloponneſians and Ambraciots were drawn up promiſcuouſly, except the Mantinéans. The Mantinéans ſtood imbodied rather to the left, but not in the extremity: For Eurylochus, with a ſelect party, was poſted there over-againſt the Meſſenians and Demoſthenes.

No ſooner was the battle joined, and the Peloponneſians on that wing were moving forward their ſuperior numbers to ſurround the right of their adverſaries, than the Acarnanians ſtarting up from their ambuſcade, falling upon them in their rear, aſſault and put them to flight. They gave way before the very firſt ſhock, and ſtruck ſuch a conſternation into the bulk of the army, that they alſo began to run: For they no ſooner ſaw the party with Eurylochus, and which was the flower of their ſtrength, intirely broke, than they felt a panic for themſelves. And the Meſſenians, who fought at the ſame poſt with Demoſthenes, behaved ſo very well, that they finiſhed the rout. The Ambraciots in the mean time, and thoſe in the right, had got the better of their opponents, and were purſuing them towards Argos; for beyond a doubt they are the moſt warlike people of any in thoſe parts. But when they were returned from the purſuit, they perceived the bulk of their army was defeated; and the reſt of the Acarnanians beginning to charge them, with much difficulty they threw themſelves into Olpæ. The number of the ſlain was great, as they had made their attacks without any order, and with the utmoſt confuſion: We muſt except the Mantinéans, who kept moſt firmly together, and retreated in the beſt order of the whole enemy. The battle was ended only with the night.

The

The next morning, as Eurylochus was killed and Macarius alſo, the command devolved upon Menedæus. The defeat was irrecoverably great, and he was highly perplexed — whether he ſhould abide a ſiege, in which he muſt not only be ſhut up by land, but by the Athenian ſhips be blocked up alſo by ſea, — or, whether he ſhould endeavour to ſecure his retreat. At length — he treats with Demoſthenes and the Acarnanians for a ſuſpenſion of arms both for his own departure and the fetching off the dead. The dead they at once delivered, and ſet up a trophy themſelves, and took up their own dead to the number of about three hundred. But a truce for their departure was not openly granted to them all. Demoſthenes, in concert with the Acarnanian generals, agreed to a ſecret article with the Mantinéans and Menedæus and the other Peloponneſian officers, and as many others as were of any conſideration — that "they ſhould depart immediately." His policy was, to have the Ambraciots and the promiſcuous body of mercenaries left quite deſtitute, wiſhing above all things for ſuch a pretext to calumniate the Lacedæmonians and Peloponneſians amongſt the Grecians of thoſe parts, "as men who wilfully abandon their friends, from a mere "ſelfiſh treacherous regard to their own ſafety." Having leave therefore to fetch off their dead, they interred them all ſo well as their hurry would admit. And thoſe in the ſecret, were buſy in concerting the means of their departure.

But now intelligence is brought to Demoſthenes and the Acarnanians, that the Ambraciots of the city with their whole collected force had, in purſuance of the former ſummons, began their march for Olpæ, through Amphilochia, deſigning to join their countrymen at Olpæ, and quite ignorant of the late defeat. Upon this, he immediately detacheth a part of his army, to beſet all the paſſes, and to ſeize all the advantageous poſts upon their route, and got ready at the ſame time to march againſt them with the remainder of his force.

In

In the mean time, the Mantinéans and thoſe comprehended in the ſecret article, going out of the town upon the pretext of gathering herbs and fuel, went gradually off in ſmall parties, gathering what they pretended to come out for as they paſſed along. But when they had thus ſtraggled to a conſiderable diſtance from Olpæ, they moved away in a more nimble pace. The Ambraciots and others, who in great numbers came out in their company, when they perceived them thus ſtealing off, felt an inclination to follow, and ſo taking to their heels, ran ſpeedily after them. The Acarnanians imagined at firſt, that they were all equally endeavouring to eſcape without permiſſion, and therefore ſet out in purſuit of the Peloponneſians. Their officers endeavoured to ſtop them, crying out, that "leave "was given for their eſcape." — Upon which a ſoldier, concluding their officers had been guilty of treachery, darted his javelin amongſt them. But afterwards they connived at the eſcape of the Mantinéans and Peloponneſians, but made ſlaughter of the Ambraciots. Great indeed was the tumult, and the perplexity alſo to diſtinguiſh which was an Ambraciot, and which was a Peloponneſian; and amidſt the confuſion about two hundred were ſlain. The reſt made their eſcape into the bordering kingdom of Agræis, where Salynthius king of the Agræans, who was their friend, took them under his protection.

The Ambraciots of the city were now advanced as far as Idomené. They are two lofty eminences, which are called by this name. The higher of the two, by favour of the dark, the detachment ſent before by Demoſthenes from the camp had ſeized, without being diſcovered, and had poſted themſelves upon it. The Ambraciots had poſſeſſed themſelves already of the lower, and halted there for the night. Demoſthenes after his evening repaſt, and the remainder of the army about ſhut of evening, began to march. He himſelf took half of them to attack the enemy in front, whilſt the other was fetching a compaſs round the mountains of Amphilochia.

The next morning was no ſooner in its dawn, than he comes upon the Ambraciots yet in their beds, ſtill ignorant of all that had paſſed, and rather ſuppoſing theſe new-comers to be their friends. For Demoſthenes had politickly placed the Meſſenians in the van, and ordered them to diſcourſe as they moved along in the Doric dialect, thus to prevent any alarm from their advanced guards, who further ſo long as the dark continued could not poſſibly diſtinguiſh their faces. By this means, he no ſooner aſſaulted the camp than the rout began. Numbers of them were ſlain upon the ſpot. The remainder fled amain towards the mountains. But the paſſes were all beſet; and more than this, the Amphilochians, who were well acquainted with their own country, were purſuing in the *light* enemies who were incumbered with the *heavy* armour. Quite ignorant of the country, nor knowing whither they were flying, they ruſhed headlong into hollow ways, into all the ambuſcades laid ready by the enemy, to their own deſtruction. Yet as no poſſible method of eſcape was unattempted, ſome of them turned towards the ſea, which was not greatly diſtant. And when they beheld the Athenian ſhips moving along the ſhore, in ſo fatal a concurrence for their ruin, they plunged into the water, and ſwam up to them, chooſing rather, in the preſent conſternation, to be deſtroyed by the Athenians on board thoſe ſhips, than by Barbarians and their moſt inveterate foes, the Amphilochians. Through ſuch a ſeries of misfortunes, but few out of the numerous body of Ambraciots were ſo happy as to eſcape to their own home. The Acarnanians having ſtripped the dead, and erected the trophies, marched back to Argos.

A ſecond battle or ſlaughter at Idomene.

On the following day they were addreſſed by a herald, ſent from thoſe Ambraciots who had eſcaped from Olpe, and were now in the Agræïs. His commiſſion was to obtain the bodies of the dead who had been killed ſince the firſt engagement, as they were attempting without permiſſion to eſcape along with the Mantinéans and others who were going off by agreement. This herald, caſting his eyes upon the arms of the Ambraciots from the city, was aſtoniſhed at the number. He

The herald.

knew nothing of that freſh calamity, but concluded they all belonged to the party for whom he was now employed. Somebody asked him the reaſon of his ſurpriſe, and what he judged to be the number of the dead? Now he who asked the queſtion ſuppoſed the herald to have been ſent by thoſe of Idomene. "Not more than two hundred," ſays the herald. The demandant then replied, "It ſhould ſeem otherwiſe "by the arms, for theſe are the arms of more than a thouſand men." The herald rejoined, "Then they cannot belong to thoſe of our party." The other replied, "They muſt, if you fought yeſterday at Idomene." "We fought no where yeſterday; we ſuffered the day before in our "retreat from Olpe." "But we fought yeſterday againſt thoſe Am-"braciots, who were advancing from the city to relieve you." When the herald heard this, and found that the army of relief from the city was thus deſtroyed, he burſt into a grone; and, quite overpower'd with the weight of the preſent calamities, he went off abruptly, and without renewing his demand about the dead.

During the whole courſe of this war, no other Grecian city ſuffered ſo great a loſs in ſo ſhort a time. I have not preſumed to mention the number of the ſlain, becauſe it is ſaid to have been incredibly great, when compared with the ſize of their city. But I am well convinced, that, if in compliance with the advice of the Athenians and Demoſthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians would have proceeded to the exciſion of Ambracia, they might have done it with the bare ſhout of their voice. But they dreaded its falling into the hands of the Athenians, who might prove worſe neighbours to them than the old.

But to return. A third part of the ſpoils was beſtowed upon the Athenians, the reſt was divided amongſt the confederate-cities. Thoſe allotted the Athenians were loſt at ſea. For the three hundred ſuits of armour, which are repoſited in the temples of Athens, were ſelected for Demoſthenes, who now returned thither, and brought them with him. The dread he had been under ever ſince his miſ-

carriage

carriage in Ætolia was quite diſpelled by the good-ſervice he had now performed.

A peace between the Ambraciots *and* Amphilochians.

The Athenians, with their ſquadron of twenty ſail, were now returned to Naupactus; and, ſince the departure of the Athenians and Demoſthenes, the Acarnanians and Amphilochians had granted by treaty to thoſe Ambraciots and Peloponneſians, who had refuged with Salynthius and the Agræans, a ſafe retreat from amongſt the Oeniadæ, who had alſo gone over to Salynthius and the Agræans. And afterwards the Acarnanians and Amphilochians concluded a peace and an alliance for a hundred years with the Ambraciots, upon theſe conditions:

" That neither the Ambraciots ſhould be obliged to join the Acar-
" nanians in any attempts againſt the Peloponneſians; nor the Acar-
" nanians to act with the Ambraciots againſt the Athenians.

" That if either were attacked, the others ſhould march to their
" defence.

" That the Ambraciots ſhould reſtore all the places and frontier
" belonging to the Amphilochians, which were at preſent in their
" hands. And,

" That they ſhould in no ſhape ſupport Anactorium, which was
" then in hoſtility with the Acarnanians."

Theſe articles being mutually agreed to, the war came to a concluſion. But after this, the Corinthians ſent a party of their own people, conſiſting of three hundred heavy-armed, commanded by Xenoclides the ſon of Euthycles, for the guard of Ambracia, who arrived, after great difficulties, as they marched all the way over-land. And this is the account of tranſactions in Ambracia.

Sicily.

The Athenians in Sicily, this ſame winter, made a deſcent againſt Himeræa from their ſhips, whilſt the Sicilians, pouring down from the upper country, were ravaging its frontier. They ſteered their courſe alſo againſt the iſles of Æolus. But when they were returned to their old ſtation at Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus the ſon of Iſolochus,

lochus, who was commiſſioned to take upon him the command of the fleet, in the room of Laches. For the confederates of Sicily had ſent a deputation to Athens, to ſolicit a more ample ſuccour of ſhipping. Becauſe, as in fact, the Syracuſans were maſters of all their lands, and they were alſo awed at ſea by a few Syracuſan veſſels, they were now intent on gathering together ſuch a naval force as might ſtrike an effectual terror. The Athenians equipped out forty ſail as a reinforcement for Sicily. Their motive was, not only to bring the war in thoſe parts to a ſpeedy determination, but alſo to keep their own mariners in conſtant practice. Pythodorus, one of the admirals appointed for this ſervice, they ſent off immediately with a few ſhips: Sophocles ſon of Soſtratides, and Eurymedon ſon of Thucles, were ſoon to follow with the main body of the fleet. But Pythodorus, who had now took the command from Laches, ſteered about the cloſe of the winter, againſt that fortreſs of the Locrians which Laches had taken before. But, being defeated at his landing by the Locrians, he returned again to his ſtation.

An eruption of Ætna. About the ſpring of the year, a torrent of fire overflowed from mount Ætna, in the ſame manner as formerly, which deſtroyed part of the lands of the Catanéans, who are ſituated at the foot of that mountain, which is the largeſt in all Sicily. It is ſaid that fifty years intervened between this flow and the laſt which preceded; and that in the whole, the fire hath thus iſſued thrice ſince Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. Such were the occurrences of this winter, at the end of which, the ſixth year alſo of this war, the hiſtory of which Thucydides hath compiled, expired.

MVSEVM BRITANNICVM

The End of the Firſt Volume.